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### PART III.

### ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS.

#### *General Frontier Policy.*

Appendices  
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1. Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 1 (Secret), dated 28th January 1898.
2. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 208, dated 26th October 1899.
3. Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 3 (Political), dated 4th January 1900.

*Chitral.*

4. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 84, dated 4th May 1899.

*Khyber.*

5. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 106, dated 7th July 1898.
6. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 81, dated 4th May 1899.
7. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 141, dated 20th July 1899.

*Miranzai-Tochi-Wana.*

8. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 122 (Secret), dated 4th August 1898.
9. Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 37 (Secret), dated 25th November 1898.
10. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 82, dated 7th June 1900.

*Internal control and reorganisation of the army.*

11. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 47, dated 31st March 1904 (and enclosures).
12. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 138, dated 29th September 1904 (and enclosures).
13. Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 148, dated 18th November 1904.
14. Progress report, dated 12th October 1905, showing the deficiencies in the Indian Field army.

*Defence of India.*

15. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 58, dated 26th April 1900.
16. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 140, dated 30th July 1903.
17. Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 12, dated 4th March 1904.

*Proportion of Native to British troops.*

18. Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 6, dated 29th January 1904.
19. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 52, dated 28th April 1904.

*Recruitment of British troops.*

20. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 83, dated 13th June 1901.
21. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 130, dated 15th September 1904.

*Eurasian Regiments.*

22. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 55, dated 30th March 1899.
23. Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 6, dated 18th January 1900.

*Native army reserve.*

24. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 211, dated 5th November 1903.

*Commissions for Native gentlemen.*

25. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 103, dated 9th July 1900.

*Maritime Policy.*

26. Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 53, dated 5th May 1905.
27. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 5, dated 10th August 1905.

*Coast defences.*

28. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 218, dated 30th October 1902.

*Equipment of the Army.*

- 29. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 51 (Secret), dated 29th March 1900.
- 30. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 163, dated 10th November 1904.
- 31. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 160, dated 10th November 1904.

*Organisation.*

- 32. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 40, dated 27th February 1902 (with enclosures).
- 33. Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 27, dated 21st February 1902.
- 34. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 162, dated 28th August 1902.
- 35. Adjutant General's letter No. 2194-A., dated 7th May 1902.

*Indian Staff College.*

- 36. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 197, dated 29th October 1903.

*Decentralisation of Military business.*

- 37. Despatch No. 143 of 31st July 1902 to Secretary of State, and enclosures.
- 38. Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 172, dated 5th December 1902.

*Indian Military Administration.*

- 39. Despatch No. 153, dated 2nd December 1904, from Secretary of State.
- 40. Despatch No. 36, dated 23rd March 1905, to Secretary of State, with enclosures.
- 41. References to, and proceedings of, a Committee on Indian Army Administration, 1st May 1905.
- 42. Despatch No. 66, dated 31st May 1905, from Secretary of State.
- 43. Telegram to Secretary of State, dated 6th July 1905.
- 44. Telegram from Secretary of State, dated 14th July 1905.
- 45. Telegram to Secretary of State, dated the 20th July 1905 (containing speech by His Excellency the Viceroy to Viceregal Legislative Council).
- 46. Telegraphic correspondence between Viceroy and Secretary of State beginning with Viceroy's telegram, dated 17th July 1905, and ending with Secretary of State's telegram dated 19th August 1905.
- 47. Correspondence connected with the objections of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the summary of his proposals as stated by His Excellency the Viceroy (except extract from telegram dated 10th August 1905).

*Pay of British Soldiers.*

- 48. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 212, dated 30th October 1902.
- 49. Telegram from Secretary of State, dated 27th February 1902.
- 50. Telegram to Secretary of State, dated 8th March 1902.
- 51. Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 107, dated 1st August 1902.

*Pay of Supply and Transport Corps.*

- 52. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 169, dated 24th October 1901.

*Khyber Railway.*

- 53. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 141 (Foreign Department), dated 20th July 1899.

*Supply and Transport Organisation.*

- 54. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 134, dated 18th September 1900.

- 55. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 61, dated 26th March 1903.
- 56. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 146, dated 13th October 1904.

*Ordnance Factories.*

- 57. *Gun-Carriage Factory*.—Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 152, dated 22nd September 1898.
- 58. *Gun-Carriage Factory*.—Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 15, dated 1st February 1900.
- 59. *Cordite Factory*.—Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 21, dated 2nd February 1899.
- 60. *Rolling Mills, Ishapore*.—Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 56, dated 26th March 1903.
- 61. *Gun Factory, Cossipore*.—Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 55, dated 26th March 1903.

*Supply of Animals.*

- 62. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 210, dated 30th October 1902.

*Legislation.*

- 63. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 28, dated 7th March 1901.
- 64. Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 142, dated 27th November 1903.
- 65. Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 107, dated 10th October 1902.

*Miscellaneous.*

- 66. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 59, dated 26th April 1900.
- 67. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 163, dated 25th October 1900.





## **PART I.**

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**General review of important measures.**



## CHAPTER I.—INTRODUCTORY.

The Indian army exists for the purpose of enabling the Government of India to enforce upon its own subjects, or neighbouring communities, compliance with such standard of conduct or demands as may constitute the essential factors of any general policy which it may be desired to pursue. Political considerations, which are necessarily affected materially by the financial condition of the people, must ever predominate in the settlement of any military policy, for the ultimate authority of the civil power in all military matters can never be open to question. It is not until the general policy has been defined that the strength and character of an army can be determined. Moreover, the policy of an Empire can never be stationary or even wholly uniform in the rate of change; the demands upon the military forces must, therefore, vary from time to time. It follows that there can be no finality in the matter of military organisation; and that the success of army administration during any period must be measured by the accuracy of the adjustment of the military power to the actual political needs of the time, rather than by the degree of attainment to any ideal standard of military perfection. Further, those matters are of primary importance which effect the efficiency of an army for war.

Consideration of these principles suggests a method of classifying the various measures of reconstruction and reform. Following this system an attempt has been made, in the first part of this memorandum, to review briefly the more important projects and events which have constituted the general military policy of this country during Lord Curzon's administration. The details of the principal measures and of minor matters connected with military affairs, are examined in detail in the second part; in which will also be found a brief account of such military operations as have taken place during the last seven years. The third portion of the memorandum consists of illustrative papers, in the form of appendices, mostly despatches to and from the Government of India. For purpose of reference it is desirable to indicate here the degree of relative importance which may be assigned to recent military events, and to state briefly the matters which are included in the general review (Chapter II), and in the statement of departmental history.

The scope of military policy in India has been greatly enlarged in recent years on account of the closer proximity to our North-Western frontier which Russia has attained, and by reason of the growing power of Afghanistan. Our relations with these countries have not been uniformly satisfactory. It has been imperative, therefore, to reorganise with a view to successful opposition to external attack. Owing to the exceptional prosperity enjoyed by India during the term of Lord Curzon's Viceroyalty these measures have been undertaken without increasing the financial burden of the country. An augmentation of our military force has also become inevitable, but it has taken the form, chiefly, of an increase to the native army reserve. The efficiency and, therefore, the striking power of the native army has also been enhanced by the recruitment of more warlike races and by the transfer to local levies of the harassing duties on the North-West Frontier which were formerly carried out by regulars. The strength of the British garrison has not been materially augmented, but arrangements have been made for reinforcement, in case of need, by British troops from other portions of the Empire.

*Aims of military administration.*

*Scope and arrangement of this memorandum.*

*Chapter II. Sections (1) and (2) and Chapter IV.*

*Section (3) and Chapter V.*

*Section (4) and Chapter VI.* No vital changes have taken place in the system of marine defence, which is the complement of that on shore; on the contrary the Government of India have recently advocated a continuance of the general maritime policy, based on close co-operation with the Imperial Navy, which has hitherto proved successful in Eastern waters. The passive defence of Indian coasts has been improved by the provision of more efficient armament and personnel.

*Section (5) and Chapter VII.* The land forces, almost without exception, have been re-equipped with weapons of the most modern type. The former methods of organisation and

*Section (6) and Chapter VIII.* administration of the army have received close scrutiny, and several important changes have been made both in technical and financial matters.

*Section (7) and Chapter IX.* The rapid and effective concentration of military forces has been facilitated by the construction of strategical roads, railways and lines of telegraph; by the establishment of mobilisation camps; and by the provision of defences for the better protection of troops and their stores at the preliminary stages of a campaign. Measures have also been taken to increase the transporting capacity of railways converging on the North-West Frontier. No military force can be regarded as efficient unless it possesses, in a conspicuous degree, the quality of mobility; the Indian Army has hitherto been somewhat wanting in this respect. It has accordingly been necessary to reorganise entirely the systems of supply and transport; and also to improve the services of the Engineer, Medical, and Veterinary Departments, on which the mobility of a force and the results of a campaign so largely depend.

*Section (9) and Chapter XI.* The supply of equipment to the forces is a matter of great importance, and in the last decade great advances have been made towards the more economical provision of warlike stores by manufacture in this country. The advantages to be gained by the extension of this principle are more important politically even than financially, for India is relieved thereby from the dependence on

*Section (10) and Chapter XII.* foreign, and possibly hostile countries, from which she has until recently suffered. A similar condition of self-reliance is desirable with regard to the supply of animals for military purposes. Extensive measures have accordingly been taken to improve and extend the local breeding of horses and transport animals.

*Section (11) and Chapter XIII.* A few instances have occurred of legislation connected with military subjects. Certain events of importance which cannot conveniently be discussed in the chapters relating to the salient features of military policy have been recorded separately. The expeditions undertaken by the Government of India during the last few years have been comparatively few; but full use has been made of the Indian Army by His Majesty's Government for Imperial purposes.

*Chapter XIV.*

*Chapter XV.*

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## CHAPTER II.—GENERAL REVIEW.

## Section (1).—Military Policy.

A quarter of a century ago, the aims and objects of Indian military policy as stated by the Army Commission of 1879, were three-fold, namely, the prevention and repelling of attacks, or of threatened aggressions, from foreign enemies beyond the border; the power of immediate repression of armed disturbance or of rebellion within British India, or its feudatory States; the watch and domination over the armies of feudatory Native States. *Indian military policy*

This definition is no longer accurate. The subsequent expansion of the Indian Empire over the vast territories which stretch along its present border occasioned new demands and created a new factor in the military problem. On the other hand the military importance of Native States has steadily declined. Not only have their armies numerically decreased, but they have suffered a marked reduction in their capacity for the exercise of military force. Rebellion among the peoples directly subject to British rule is but little to be feared, unless in consequence of defeat upon the frontier. Thus while, as in 1879, Indian military policy still wears a three-fold aspect, the subject may be considered now to fall into the divisions of (1) External Defence, (2) Frontier, and (3) Internal Control.

Each of these constituents in turn has become the principal consideration of local military policy. When the Army Commission issued its report the requirements of internal control were paramount; a prolonged war with Russia was not seriously contemplated: frontier dangers might be neglected. It was not long before a change occurred. The annexation of Upper Burma; the occupation of Baluchistan, of Chitral and Gilgit; and later still, the conclusion of the Durand Agreement, by which unruly tribes were brought within the British sphere of influence—all these circumstances accentuated the relative importance of frontier military control during the last two decades of the 19th century. Although throughout this period the possibility of foreign aggression was yearly becoming more apparent, it was not until the spring of 1900, when the Empire was in straits, that the manifestations of Russian strength on the northern Afghan border became so pronounced as to relegate finally to categories of minor importance all questions relating to frontier and internal control, and to reveal the imperative need, henceforward, of contemplating a system of external military defence on such an extended scale that the unaided resources of India are unable to compare its complete fulfilment. *Recent evolution of military policy.*

The policy of the Empire will determine the measure of the assistance, which can be rendered to India in her defensive operations. Accordingly, the control of Indian military action, will in an increasing degree, devolve upon the ministers who govern the relations of the Empire with other Powers; and this country's foreign interests will be subordinated to Imperial needs. Schemes for the external defence of India, depending on the Imperial policy of the day, will, therefore, necessarily vary in their scope, and may often be indeterminate. Systems of frontier and internal control may remain effective for much longer periods, and will, as in the past, fall to local administrators to define. The present viceroyalty has witnessed the inauguration of two successful systems of this nature; the one on the initiative of the Viceroy himself; the other by the adoption of a scheme prepared under Lord Kitchener's orders.

## EXTERNAL DEFENCE.

*Sphere of Military  
influence.*

As defined in the Marine Act, Indian waters extend from the Cape of Good Hope on the west to the Straits of Magellan on the east. The military power of India pervades an area which is hardly smaller in extent; for her strength will, in the future as in the past, be made available to Great Britain for the prosecution of war in all parts of the eastern Hemisphere. India has placed at the disposal of His Majesty's Government since 1899, large contingents for the conduct of Imperial campaigns in South Africa, in China, Arabia and Somaliland. At earlier stages, forces have been provided similarly in reinforcement of the Imperial forces in Egypt, the Soudan, East Africa, and other parts of the Asian and African continents. The Indian army has become not merely an instrument for local defence, but an Imperial force which the Home Government does not hesitate to requisition for campaigns with which India has but little connection. It is inevitable that this should be the case seeing that no other organised military force of any magnitude can be detached from the garrisons of British possessions in the East.

The increasing range of our responsibilities in Asia, and the causes which have resulted in the vital change which has occurred in military policy during the last decade, cannot be more clearly expressed than in Lord Curzon's words<sup>(1)</sup>

*Recent changes in  
foreign policy.*

"I doubt if even the thoughtful public has at all realized the silent but momentous change that is going on, and that will one day have an effect upon India that is at present but dimly discerned. In the old days, and it may almost be said up to the last fifteen years, the foreign relations of India were practically confined to her dealings with Afghanistan, and to the designs or movements of the great Power beyond: and the foreign policy of India had little to do with any other foreign nation. It is true that we had territories or outposts of influence that brought us into contact with Persia and Turkey, and that we had occasional dealings with the Arabian tribes. Now all that is changed, and events are passing, which are gradually drawing this country, once so isolated and remote, into the vortex of the world's politics, and that will materially affect its future. The change has been due to two reasons. Firstly, as our own dominion has expanded, and our influence upon our frontier consolidated, we have been brought into more direct and frequent relations with the countries lying immediately beyond. For instance, the annexation of Upper Burma brought us into contact with an important corner of the Chinese Empire, and created a batch of frontier and other political problems of its own. But the second reason is much more important. Europe has woken up and is beginning to take a revived interest in Asia. Russia with her vast territories, her great ambitions, and her unarrested advance, has been the pioneer in this movement, and with her or after her have come her competitors, rivals and allies. Thus, as all these foreigners arrive upon the scene and push forward into the vacant spots, we are slowly having a European situation re-created in Asia, with the same figures upon the stage. The great European Powers are also becoming the great Asiatic Powers. Already we have Great Britain, Russia, France, Germany, and Turkey; and then, in place of all the smaller European kingdoms and principalities, we have the Empires and States of the East, Japan, China, Tibet, Siam, Afghanistan, Persia—only a few of

(1) Budget Debate of 1903.

them strong and robust, the majority containing the seeds of inevitable decay. There lie in these events and in this renewed contact or collision, as the case may be, between the east and the west, omens of the greatest significance to this country." \* \* \*

"But in Asia a great deal is still in flux and solution, and there must, and there will be, great changes. It will be well to realize what an effect these must have upon India, and how they must add to our responsibilities and cares. Our Indian dominions now directly touch those of Turkey in many parts of the Arabian peninsula, those of Russia on the Pamirs, those of China along the entire border of Turkestan and Yünnan, those of France on the Upper Mekong." \* \* \*

"In Asia we have both a sea-board and a land frontier many thousands of miles in length, and though Providence has presented us on some portion of our land frontiers with the most splendid natural defences in the world, yet the situation must become more and not less anxious as rival or hostile influences creep up to these ramparts, and as the ground outside them becomes the area of new combinations and the field of unforeseen ambitions." \* \* \*

"The geographical position of India will more and more push her into the forefront of international politics. She will more and more become the strategical frontier of the British Empire. All these are circumstances that should give us food for reflection, and that impose upon us the duty of incessant watchfulness and precaution. They require that our forces shall be in a high state of efficiency, our defences secure, and our schemes of policy carefully worked out and defined."

To fulfil Imperial demands which may involve the opposing of enemies trained and equipped in European fashion, the Indian Army must needs be efficient and strong. To enable India to furnish assistance to the Empire, her ports must be fortified and defended, since they will form the bases of such expeditionary action as her forces may be called upon to share. But those demands are of a subsidiary nature. Although new elements of risk have been introduced into the military situation by the contact of British territory with that of France and of China : although our interests may conflict with those of Persia and of Turkey on the littoral of the Persian and Arabian Gulfs, the factor which will determine the military policy of this country, must be the defence of the North-Western Frontier. If provision be made for successful opposition to an invasion of Afghanistan by Russia ; for the maintenance of our prestige and rights in Persia ; and for the simultaneous preservation of tranquillity in India and on its borders, the other factors in the military problem may be neglected so far as the total strength of military force is concerned. *Chief factor in local military policy.*

The condition of our relations with Afghanistan is a matter of primary importance. In 1880, the Amir was informed that the British Government admitted no right of interference by foreign powers with his territory. It was made clear that if any foreign power should attempt to interfere in the country, and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on his dominions, in that event the British Government would be prepared to aid him to such extent and in such manner as might appear to them necessary in repelling it, provided that the Amir followed unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to external relations. This *Relations with Afghanistan.*



assurance was repeated by Sir Mortimer Durand in 1893. It was not until three years afterwards that the Russian pressure on the Afghan frontier became more pronounced. A commencement was then made with the construction of the Merv-Kushk railway, which was completed in the latter end of 1898. By its means Russian railway communication was brought to the very boundary of Afghanistan, where its presence was regarded by the Amir to constitute so grave a menace that he consulted the Government of India as to the measures which should be taken to counteract its influence. The Amir, however, was not prepared to accept the assistance of India in the only form in which it could be offered, namely, the construction of railways and of telegraphs. His demands were for more money, more warlike materials and appliances; these the Indian Government were unwilling to grant. In consequence, no defensive action was undertaken.

In October 1901, Amir Abdur Rahman Khan died. The succession of his son Habibullah Khan was undisputed, and subsequent events have shown, that the son has elected to follow closely in his father's footsteps, not only in regard to the feeling of mistrust and hostility towards Russia, but also in respect to the aversion displayed by his father to the development of friendly relations and intercourse with the Government of India, who have been consistently excluded from a knowledge of the internal affairs of the principality. The situation has been complicated by the assertion, during the time of the Boer War, by the Russian Government of their right to send agents to Afghanistan, and to establish direct relations, professedly of a non-political character with the Afghan Government. The desire to define more closely the relations of India with the new Amir and to place matters on a more satisfactory footing, led to the despatch in the winter of 1904 of a mission to Kabul. The results of this mission were almost nugatory. The former engagements and subsidies, which have been attended by such grave draw-backs, have been again renewed. Afghanistan will, in the future as in the past, be flooded with our consent by an unlimited supply of arms and ammunition, and the Government of India remains encumbered by an indefinite responsibility for the defence of a country, which is incapable of defending itself, and will not let them take the necessary measures to do so. It follows that the military policy of India in regard to Afghanistan cannot safely be based otherwise than on the assumption that, in the event of an unsolicited advance, our forces would encounter a well-armed population, well-armed and passively if not actively hostile. It should be noted in this connection that Afghanistan can muster in all about 100,000 troops.

*Relations  
Persia.*

*with*

The maintenance of British influence and prestige in Persia is attended by great difficulty, owing to the insidious advances which have been made by Russia towards the absorption of Persian trade and the control of Persian politics. In the northern provinces her military position is commanding: with the large forces in Trans-Caucasia and Turkestan she dominates the country. Moreover, her railways touch the frontier on both sides of the Caspian, and under the guise of roads she has constructed to Teheran and Meshed railways which only lack the laying of the rails. Persian finances already in a great measure are under her control in consequence of timely loans. Her aims are clearly marked and it is not improbable that she may be within a measurable distance of carrying a portion of them into effect.

From a military point of view the most important consideration is the possibility of the construction of railways or roads towards Seistan, and the Persian Gulf. It is true that according to promises received any railway concession in the north may be balanced by a similar concession in the south, but the Russian demands might be put forward in such a shape and at such a time as might preclude strong action on the part of the British Government. The projected railway to Meshed, if prolonged, as is the intention to Seistan, and ultimately to the Gulf, will enable Russia to dispense with the necessity of crossing the Afghan frontier on the Herat side, and thereby of running the risk of war with England. From Persian territory she will menace the entire western flank of Afghanistan, she will command the Herat-Kandahar road, and will render insecure any British occupation of Kandahar. In the unsettled tracts of Baluchistan and Mekran, which we have at present only imperfectly brought under our control, there would be limitless scope for frontier disturbance and local intrigue. We should be compelled at the cost of a great expenditure of money, and of a serious addition to our responsibilities, to invest our authority over these regions with a more concrete character, and to maintain positions and garrisons to guard what would then have become a vulnerable, though it is now a negligible, section of the Indian border.

The development of such a railway project would change the whole character of the military defence of India, and could not be witnessed in silence. Nor could we tolerate an attempt, which has been contemplated by Russian strategists, to attain similar objects by the construction of a railway designed to afford direct and independent communication between the south-east districts of Persia and the Caucasus. The occupation or threatened occupation of Seistan by Russian forces must necessarily be opposed by every means at the disposal of the Empire. Indian military policy must, therefore, contemplate such action—even though it might entail the occupation of a large tract of Southern Persia, and the principal ports upon the Gulf.

Of the nature of Russian designs upon India, it is unnecessary to write in detail. The efforts which have been made to perfect communications up to the Afghan and Persian frontiers, can only have one object. For the illustration of the evolution of Indian military policy, it will suffice to show briefly how the power of Russia on the Persian and Afghan borders has developed, since the sudden attack on the Afghan troops in 1885, which led to a partial mobilisation of the Indian Army. Until that date it had been the belief of the Home Government that it would be possible for us to render insecure the Russian communications with Trans-Caspia and Turkestan by an expeditionary force landed on the shores of the Black Sea. The construction of an alternative line of communication for the Russian troops shortly afterwards put it out of our power to profit by any flanking movement, and it then became a question of the number of the forces that could be placed in direct opposition on the North-Western Frontier. In 1889, it was calculated that Russia had actually 34,000 men in Trans-Caspia and Turkestan, and could put into the field as many men as the Afghan frontier could support. This number was estimated at about 60,000 men and would have sufficed for the capture of Herat and Afghan Turkestan. It was anticipated that some months after a Russian advance that the Indian Army would have to deal with from 25,000 to 30,000 Russians with 30 guns in Turkestan and 70,000 men with 150 guns at Herat. Except for occasional intervals of inaction,

*Military power of  
Russia in relation to  
India.*

the improvement of the Russian communications has since steadily progressed. During the last ten years their labours have been unremitting. The opening of the Merv-Kushk line, which synchronised with the arrival of Lord Curzon in this country, has placed Herat at Russia's mercy. The completion of the Orenburg-Tashkent railway in 1904, rendered it possible to move large masses from her central provinces, and to mass them on the northern borders of Afghanistan without the knowledge of the Indian Government. No sooner was this work completed than a new railway was commenced from near Samarcand to a crossing of the Oxus at Patta Kesar, situated on a route towards Kabul. The line between Samarcand and Krasnovodsk on the Caspian has itself been greatly improved. The strategical results are commensurate with the magnitude of these works. According to the latest information possessed by the Military Department, Russia can now mobilise 100,000 men and 134 guns in the Turkestan military district; behind these in the Caucasus there are 327,000 men with 344 guns on a war footing from which large reinforcements can be drawn. The whole military power of Russia has now been made available as a reserve. In fact it is now believed that within two months after the commencement of hostilities, Russia could place 60,000 men on her northern line of advance, and the same number between Farah and her own frontier on the southern line. If unopposed by us, not fewer than 70,000 men would be at Kabul and 80,000 at Kandahar, within a year.

*Effect of Japanese treaty.*

An attempt has been made in the foregoing paragraphs to indicate the principal factors which must determine the local military policy of India, neglecting the effect of the recent treaty with Japan which appears to guarantee for a term of years freedom from Russian aggression on Afghanistan. The interests of Great Britain in that country have been formally recognised in the compact with our ally, and presumably any infringement would bring Japan to our assistance. It is not specifically stated that the engagement extends to Persia where Russian influence has still to be withstood; nor would it be desirable, except in the direst extremity, to bring our allies to the Indian frontier. The aim of Indian military policy must, therefore, remain unaltered. The Indian army reinforced by the strength of the Empire must be able to defeat such forces as Russia and Afghanistan combined can place and maintain upon the principal scene of action, which will necessarily be limited to Afghanistan and the South-Eastern provinces of Persia.

#### FRONTIER CONTROL.

Having reviewed the conditions of the external defence of India, it is necessary to turn to the policy which has been pursued on the North-West and the other frontiers of India. As the border-land of Afghanistan has always been and will remain the most important from a military point of view, the situation there may be first discussed.

*Control of the North-West Frontier after 1893.*

In 1893, after the conclusion of the Durand Agreement the Government of India undertook various measures with the purpose of strengthening their hold upon such outlying parts of the country as had been definitely recognised to fall within their sphere of influence. The Kurram valley had previously been garrisoned by regular troops, in consequence of requests of the local inhabitants for protection. A military force had occupied the Samana range since the close of the operations in 1891. Moved partly by the strategical considerations

relating to a possible advance into Afghanistan, and with a view also to the more effective protection of trade routes, the Government of India sanctioned the military occupation of Wana and the Tochi valleys, following the operations of the Waziristan Field Force of 1894. The Chitral expedition of the succeeding year resulted in the retention in that area of a small force of regular troops; while to secure the safety of communications with this advanced garrison, still stronger detachments were located at the Malakand and at the crossing of the River Swat.

Owing to the unsettled state of the country the situation of these advanced posts was still hazardous when in the summer of 1897, nineteen months before the arrival of Lord Curzon, there occurred the first of those fanatical outbursts against the British rule, which in succession spread along the North-West Frontier. Peace had been restored by the following spring after a series of short campaigns against the recalcitrant tribes; and with a few exceptions our forces had then been demobilised; but the results of the conflict were still apparent in the dislocation of the military organisation which was occasioned by the presence, in advanced positions, of large detached bodies of regular troops, maintained at considerable expense on a war footing, and under field service conditions. Politically, matters were still unsettled, for new agreements had not yet been entered into with the tribes.

*Outbreak of 1897  
and its results.*

The unsatisfactory nature of the situation was thus apparent, for large numbers of the most efficient troops of the Indian Army were locked up in trans-frontier stations performing duties which would ordinarily have been entrusted to the police. For their support additional forces were cantoned at intervals along the frontier. In the event of operations on a large scale, on or beyond the border, both the advanced troops and their supports must, wholly or in part, have been lost to the effective strength of the Empire. To withdraw them without relief would have been dangerous, if not impossible. Conditions are conceivable under which their replacement by troops from the more distant Indian stations might have been fraught with equal peril.

It was at this stage, in January 1898,<sup>(1)</sup> that the Government of India was invited by the Secretary of State to review the whole question of policy on this section of the Indian frontier. Certain principles were stated for their guidance in framing proposals for future action. Instructions were given that no new responsibility should be undertaken on the frontier which was not rendered obligatory by actual strategical requirements; that unnecessary interference with the tribes should be avoided; and that concentration of the troops should be effected.

*Scheme of Lord  
Elgin's Government  
for the military con-  
trol of the frontier.*

The scheme propounded by Lord Elgin's Council<sup>(2)</sup> provided for the location of stationary garrisons of regular troops in strong works at the most important places in advance of our administrative frontier; for the occupation of minor posts, and those on the lines of communications by levies or irregular troops organised as militia; for the organisation of moveable columns of sufficient strength at stations within our border for the support of the advanced posts, and for the suppression of any tribal outbreak. It was contemplated that in the event of serious attack the garrisons of the weaker posts should be withdrawn or reinforced, according to a pre-arranged plan. The construction of light railways on the frontier formed an integral part of this scheme.

(1) Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 1, dated 28th January 1898 (Appendix No. 1).

(2) Military Despatch (Secret) No. 122, dated 14th August 1898 (Appendix No. 8).

Had these recommendations been accepted the Government of India would have been committed to a policy involving the construction of fortifications and the retention of a regular garrison in Chitral; the establishment of a new and costly post at Landi Kotal, and the provision of other fortified works in the Khyber; the construction of a road bed for a light railway from Jamrud to Landi Kotal; the maintenance of a military garrison on the Samana range and in the Kurram Valley; and the construction of many forts and posts in these two places, besides the building of additional lines in Kohat. It was contemplated that a considerable, though diminished, garrison would be stationed in the Tochi with a central cantonment at Miran Shah, which could only have been constructed at a heavy cost. Similarly, it was intended to maintain a military garrison at Wana in Southern Waziristan for the protection of the Gomal route into Afghanistan. It is true that the eventual withdrawal of the regular troops from Landi Kotal in the Khyber was contemplated. Except in this respect, but little reduction would have been made in the number of troops cantoned beyond our administrative border.

Military matters alone were discussed in the despatch in which these recommendations were conveyed, and since no satisfactory decision could be made regarding the future military administration in the absence of a statement of the general policy to be pursued with reference to the tribes, the Secretary of State remitted the whole question to the Government of India for further consideration.

*Frontier policy  
initiated by Lord  
Curzon.*

Accordingly, the first duty that confronted Lord Curzon upon assuming the Viceroyalty in January 1899, was the reconsideration of these proposals and the substitution for them of a policy that should more correctly answer the double purpose of military concentration and tribal control. He found in Sir William Lockhart, a Commander-in-Chief with an unrivalled knowledge of the North-West Frontier, and in Sir E. Collen, a Military Member possessing an unusual familiarity both with the history of Indian military policy and the organisation of the Indian army. The Council of the new Governor General set to work without delay, and the first nine months of Lord Curzon's first term of office were in the main devoted to the working out of the new Frontier policy on each section of the border from Chitral to Baluchistan. In Lord Curzon's words<sup>(1)</sup> the Government of India set themselves "not so much to prevent war by preparing for it, as to produce peace by creating the requisite conditions." Proposals were submitted to the Secretary of State in a series of despatches dealing with each section in turn: the entire policy being summed up in a despatch dated 26th October 1899,<sup>(2)</sup> which received the approval of Her late Majesty's Government on January 4, 1900.<sup>(3)</sup> The general aims and principles of the scheme for frontier control were summarised somewhat as follows:—

- (a) to avoid locking up regular garrisons in costly fortified positions, at a distance from our base, where the troops themselves are practically lost to the offensive strength of India, and in time of emergency would probably require additional forces to be detached from the Indian army for their protection;
- (b) inasmuch as positions or districts, which had been taken in a greater or less degree under control of the Government of India, could not be left without military protection, to interest, as far as

(1) Viceroy's budget speech of 30th March 1904.

(2) Foreign Department Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 208, dated 26th October 1899 (Appendix No. 2.)

(3) Foreign Department Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 3 Political, dated 4th January 1900 (Appendix No. 2.)



possible, the inhabitants of the locality in their own defence, and at the same time to establish a lien upon their loyalty by enrolling them in varying systems of organisation as a tribal force to supply the local garrisons ;

- (c) to maintain moveable columns of regular troops at bases within or contiguous to the administrative frontier of India, ready to march at a moment's notice to the relief or defence of the advanced positions : further to connect the cantonments in which the moveable columns are quartered with the military resources of India by means of light railways joined to the main railway systems.

The correctness of these principles cannot be controverted ; and the advantages to be gained from following them are manifest. The substitution of levies for regular soldiers in the garrisons of frontier posts is one of practical wisdom. The soldiers are removed from exacting and distasteful service, for which they are not in all cases suited. By relieving the Indian Army from the task of garrisoning and defending these outlying positions, it is possible, when war breaks out on or beyond the frontier, to concentrate the great mass of the troops upon the principal lines of advance. By the enrolment of the local garrisons as levies, militia, or police, the publicity attaching to any proceedings of the regular army upon the frontier can be avoided ; in the event of any contretemps, the commotion and reproach that are invariably excited by any military disaster, can be escaped. The Government of India pay and thereby acquire a hold upon the allegiance of the tribesmen, who, while their local patriotism is conciliated by employment as the guardians of their native lands, develop at the same time, under a *quasi*-military discipline, an ever increasing loyalty to the British *raj*. Lastly, the expenditure incurred is less than that which would be occasioned by the presence of soldiers in these outlying districts. The maintenance of moveable columns of regulars for the support of the Militia and the improvement of communications is an essential part of the scheme ; for, having withdrawn the troops from advanced posts, and having substituted for them native levies, the latter must not be imperilled or destroyed by local risings ; nor can the less important portion of the frontier which they guard be allowed to slip from our control. The possibility of mutiny or disaffection among the men themselves must always be contemplated.

It was obviously essential to proceed with extreme care in the execution of such a policy. The enrolment of the militia battalions, which were eventually to replace the regulars, could be but gradual ; and since these local levies were dependent for support on moveable columns located on or near the frontier, adequate communications had to be provided before the troops could be withdrawn. It was necessary also to prepare for the reception of the regulars in cis-frontier stations. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that the term of Lord Curzon's office has not sufficed for the absolute fulfilment of all his schemes, although in all essentials they have been completed. A change in the strategical value assigned to the Kurram Valley as a main line of advance into Afghanistan, which is due to the increase of the field army, has resulted in the retention of a

*Execution of the  
new frontier policy.*

regular garrison in Fort Lockhart. Further south some smaller forts on the border of Waziristan are partly garrisoned by troops. But a short review of the work accomplished during the last seven years, will indicate how great is the progress which has been made towards the development of Lord Curzon's frontier policy.

In Chitral a local corps of scouts has replaced one-half of the regular force of 1899, and gives promise of considerable military efficiency. The Kila Drosch fort, of suitable defensive strength, accommodates the reduced military garrison. Telegraphic communication has been established between Chitral and Gilgit; the road between these places has been improved. The southern approaches are secured by a strong posts at Chakdara guarding the newly erected and substantial bridge across the Swat river; and also by a fortified position on the crest of the Malakand. Still greater control over these regions has been secured by the construction of a narrow-gauge railway from Nowshera to Dargai, which, by the speedy carriage of stores and provisions, would free advancing troops from the burden of their transport. This line has been linked to the main railway system by a bridge over the Kabul river near Nowshera. The security of the Khyber has been assured by the organisation of two battalions of Khyber Rifles, in replacement of the regular brigade which was quartered at Landi Kotal in 1899. The conduct of the Militia has been thoroughly satisfactory since its embodiment; in spite of the gradual reduction of the Afridis' power over the Khyber route, which has been effected during the last few years, and which might have caused some unrest amongst the tribesmen. The augmentation of the Militia to provide for the safeguarding of the new Kabul river railway, instead of employing regular troops for this purpose, is evidence of the confidence which is felt in the loyalty of the corps. But in addition to the pacification of the tribes, Lord Curzon's Government can claim credit for the notable works in this region which they have carried through or initiated. The railway has been extended from Peshawar to Jamrud; a road passable by wheeled traffic has been made to Landi Kotal, which passes through the friendly Mullagori country and avoids the tract inhabited by Afridis. Sanction has been accorded not only to the construction of a broad gauge railway on the Kabul river bank to a point near the Afghan frontier, but also to the duplication and improvement of the road through the Khyber pass. The inactivity which formerly characterised the proceedings of Government in this region has given place during Lord Curzon's régime to a policy of investigation, resolution and decisive action. A long desired road has been constructed between Peshawar and Kohat, which now carries a considerable amount of wheeled traffic, and affords an excellent means of communication between these cantonments. Kohat itself has been joined to the main railway system of India by a small gauge line, now under process of replacement by a railway of standard gauge which will be carried over the Indus on an important bridge at Khusalgarh. The railway has been extended to Thal in the Kurram Valley, and after a short existence in its lighter form, may be replaced by a broad gauge line of strategic value from Kohat to the Peiwar Kotal on the Afghan border. For this new railway a project has been prepared.

The extension of railway communication has proved an effective and economical substitute for a large cantonment in the Miranzai valley which it was proposed to establish for the support of the garrisons in the Kurram valley

and the Samana. The Kurram Militia, stationed in well-designed defences, have replaced the regulars entirely in the former locality. The garrison alone of Fort Lockhart of all the posts near the Samana ridge is furnished by the Indian Army : the other forts are occupied by the Samana Rifles, and the Border Military Police. Further south the development of Lord Curzon's policy has been even more complete. By an agreement with the local tribesmen unrestricted passage is assured to troops and travellers along the tract lying between Thal, Bannu and the Tochi. The Tochi valley, and the adjoining districts are controlled by the agency of the Northern Waziristan Militia, which has relieved the regulars of the irksome and distasteful work of protecting this unhealthy district from tribal raids. Of the large garrisons of 1899 but a few remnants now remain on the south and south-west frontier of Waziristan in the outposts of Jatta, Zam and Jandola. The rest of the troops have been withdrawn to cis-frontier cantonments, and are replaced by the Southern Waziristan Militia, 1,500 strong, who with their comrades of the Northern force, have already rendered excellent service against their fellow-countrymen during the blockade of 1901-03. A good road, suitable for light wheeled traffic, now connects the head-quarters of this corps at Wana with the station of Tank and with Dera Ismail Khan where a large regular force is cantoned.

Such, in brief outline, are the principal measures of Lord Curzon's system of frontier control : the second portion of this summary\* exhibits them in greater detail. Delays have naturally occurred ; sometimes due to unavoidable causes such as local disturbances, or unfavourable political conditions ; at other times attributable to disinclination on the part of the local officials to incur the responsibility of the administrative changes resulting from the withdrawal of military support. But steady adherence to the principles enunciated in Lord Curzon's statement of 1899 has overcome all difficulties and has resulted in the secure and commanding position which we now occupy in the frontier regions. *Success of Lord Curzon's policy.*

That Lord Curzon's policy has been eminently successful is beyond question. From 1899 to 1905 the peace of the North-West Frontier has remained unbroken by any serious tribal disturbance. It is true that a blockade was enforced against the Mahsud Wazirs, but this was in punishment of a long standing list of offences, some of which were of a date anterior to Lord Curzon's assumption of office. Referring in his speech in the debate on the Budget for 1904-05 to the almost unprecedented tranquillity of the frontier during the previous five years, Lord Curzon was able to say :—

“ It is not without some feeling of congratulation that I look back upon five years, unmarked by a single expedition on the entire North-West Frontier, unless the brief military sallies that were undertaken in order to close the Mahsud Waziri Blockade can be so described. This is the first time that such a claim could be made for a quarter of a century. In the petty operations that have taken place on a frontier over 1,200 miles in length, only 42 of our men have been killed during that time; 67 more lost their lives in the course of the Mahsud Blockade. But I should be reluctant to measure results by

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\* Chapters IV and IX.



lives alone, or even by money alone, although the economies that have resulted both from withdrawal of troops and from absence of fighting have been very great. I would prefer to look at the spirit of increasing harmony and contentment among the tribes and at the relations that are growing up along the entire border."

From a military standpoint the most beneficial result of the policy under review has been the concentration of regular troops in centres whence they can be rapidly and safely withdrawn for operations of major importance, either within or without the confines of the Indian Empire. But it must also be stated that the unwonted sense of security in regard to frontier matters which has been engendered by the absence of serious frontier warfare has afforded an occasion for the reconstitution of the Indian Army on a basis which will render it more capable of meeting the external aggression threatened by the near approach of Russian forces.

The success of the policy from a financial point of view is also undoubted. Although the savings have been very considerable, it cannot be stated exactly how many lakhs of rupees have been saved by the abandonment of the projects initiated by Lord Elgin's Government. In many instances the estimates for the works then contemplated were not completely framed; and experience has shown that on the frontier original estimates are often exceeded. But so far as it is possible to judge from the rough estimates made in 1899 of the extra cost of maintaining regular troops in trans-frontier stations, including the grant of special concessions, clothing, etc., the maintenance of levies in their place will have caused a small annual saving to Government. The changes in the distribution of troops are shown on the maps which accompany this memorandum. The extent to which they have occurred may be realised from the statement that, whereas in 1899, including troops in Chitral, there were more than 15,000 regulars across the administrative border, now the strength of troops so placed does not exceed 4,200. The tribal forces which have taken their place number 10,500 men; and will shortly be increased by 700 more. The troops withdrawn have become available for general service and are quartered in healthy stations, where they can be well trained for war. Without increased expenditure the State had added to its forces a number of well organised local corps, which in the process of time may be expected to work out the regeneration of their own tribes, and the pacification of their districts.

#### INTERNAL CONTROL.

*Army Commission  
of 1879.*

It has already been shown that until a quarter of a century ago internal control was regarded as a dominant factor in the military organisation. The strength, composition and distribution of the Indian forces were in 1879 referred to the Army Organisation Commission of which Sir Ashley Eden, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, was President. At that time the heavy losses to the revenues of India, caused by the unfavourable rate of exchange, rendered extensive reductions in public expenditure imperatively necessary, and the Commission were required to state what in their opinion would be the smallest permanent military organisation which could maintain the internal peace of the country and resist foreign aggression. They estimated that for operations against Russia or Afghanistan a force of two army corps, or 50,000 to 60,000 fighting men, might possibly be necessary, leaving an approximate strength of 40,000 British soldiers and 76,000 native soldiers with 220 guns to garrison the interior.

The army was then still organised and distributed for the purposes of preserving internal peace. But, after the events of 1885, when it was realised that the Indian forces might be called on to face the Russian army, the work of reorganisation and reconstitution was at once begun. Many of the single battalion stations were abandoned in favour of larger cantonments. The Bombay army was reorganised in 1892. Three years later the Bombay and Madras armies were abolished as separate commands and were brought under the direct control of the Government of India. The re-constitution of thirteen infantry regiments soon followed. The officers of the Indian army were placed on a general list and the departments were similarly amalgamated. Meanwhile the construction of railways and roads had been proceeding apace, and each year had disclosed an advance in the facility of maintaining communications, not only between different parts of the country, but also between India and the sources in other countries whence reserves of stores and troops could be drawn. Thus the reinforcement and movement of troops were yearly made more easy. Moreover, with the passing of a generation disturbing elements had been removed, and the pacifying influence of the civil administration had permeated the entire country. The Commission of 1879 had emphasized the necessity for watching and dominating the populations and armies of Native States, which were estimated at 53 millions, and 381,000 respectively. To a great extent this danger had passed away when Lord Curzon came to this country. The chiefs had gained in loyalty; their military power had decreased, not only in numbers, but also in proportion to the improvements made in modern armament, which they lacked. Nor had any cohesion or common feeling arisen between the armies of Native States to compensate for the individual loss of military force.

*Changed internal condition.*

Such was the condition of affairs when Lord Curzon assumed office. Soon afterwards the Boer war broke out. The question of internal control was then carefully reviewed, and in March 1900 the Mobilisation Committee brought to the notice of the Government of India the need which existed for placing the inland defences on a satisfactory footing. Defensive positions were prepared at very moderate cost. Moveable columns had previously been organised and measures were taken by actual inspection to ascertain that they were efficient and ready. Considerable progress was made with a scheme for the defence of bridges on the main lines of railway communication; possible interruption to military traffic was guarded against by the provision of roadways fit for wheeled traffic over important railway bridges. The preparation of armoured trains and the defence of railway workshops was also commenced. Measures were taken to ensure the security of railway communications in time of war by the preparation of emergency Acts, which, on coming into operation, would enforce communal responsibility for damage to railways and secure to Government the control of private lines. By the year 1902 internal control had thus been satisfactorily arranged for. Frontier control was assured by the pursuance of the policy initiated by Lord Curzon. The provision for external defence alone remained unsatisfactory.

*Internal military policy, 1900-1902.*

It had been fully recognised for some years by the Military authorities in India, whose opinion was confirmed by the experience of the South African war, that the field army prescribed by Sir Ashley Eden's Commission would be totally inadequate to resist Russian aggression. Moreover it was evident that the field army could only be strengthened at the expense of the force detailed for internal control. Accordingly, in 1902, as a preliminary measure, the

*Revision of obligatory garrisons in 1902.*

strength of the obligatory garrisons was revised and reduced so as to permit of six divisions being allotted to the field army from the local forces. Shortly afterwards it became possible to undertake still more extensive measures.

Financial restrictions which had hitherto prevented the promotion of large schemes of military organisation and redistribution, now showed promise of becoming less stringent, although no considerable increase to the total strength of the Indian forces might yet be possible. In these circumstances the way was smoothed for the preparation of a scheme of greater magnitude which, while still providing adequately for internal requirements according to the changed conditions of the time, should largely increase the fighting strength of the field army.

*Redistribution  
Scheme.*

The scheme of internal military control which Lord Kitchener produced in October 1903 has been rightly described as a State document of the highest importance, which will influence the military policy of India for the next generation, if not longer. The adoption of his proposals depended on the acceptance of the following main principles:—

- (1) The abolition of the system of obligatory garrisons for stations except in the case of arsenals and factories, and the allotment to defensive areas of bodies of troops from which moveable columns could be organised; the strength of each force being adjusted to the political demands and the facilities for movement and support.
- (2) The intimate association of the volunteers and armed police with regular troops for the local defence of each internal area.
- (3) The utilisation of militia and levies in a similar manner for the defence of frontier districts.
- (4) The abandonment of many cantonments to these auxiliaries in the event of mobilisation.

Detailed proposals<sup>(1)</sup> were given of the forces assigned to each district of the country for internal control, and for certain obligatory garrisons. Estimates were made of the police and volunteer forces which would remain available for the maintenance of order. After consultation with the local Governments, the proposals with some unimportant exceptions, were accepted by the Government of India<sup>(2)</sup> and Secretary of State, with the reservation that the number of troops to be sent into the field out of India must depend upon the internal condition of the country. The Army in India has accordingly been re-organised to suit the new conditions which will provide, as a minimum, in organised and mobile units, a garrison for internal defence consisting of 627 British Cavalry, 9,700 Native Cavalry, 18,600 British Infantry, 44,000 Native Infantry and 102 guns in addition to regimental depôts, etc.

*Internal condition  
after removal of the  
field army.*

It should however be stated that, including 30,000 civilians in the country whom it is proposed to enrol compulsorily and arm by ordinance of the Governor General in the event of a great emergency, the total number of armed Europeans and Eurasians of the minimum garrison prescribed for India, Burma, and Aden, will not exceed 96,000 men of whom more than a third will belong to the latter class. Including regular troops, a proportion of reservists, railway police, militia, civil police armed with fire arms (not necessary

(1) Shown in Part II of the Memorandum, Chapter XIV.

(2) Despatch No. 188 of 29th September 1904 (Appendix No. 12.)

sarily rifles), and the irregular troops of native States, not less than 250,000\* armed natives will be in the country. The odds are somewhat great, but reliance is placed on the disparity in efficiency of the arms possessed by Europeans and by the majority of the natives; on the early supply of reinforcements from England and the Colonies; and also on the increased loyalty of the native army, of Native States, and of the organised police.

*Section (2)—Financial.*

The conflict between Russian and Afghan troops at Penjdeh in 1885 marked the beginning of a large increase of military expenditure in India. *Account of recent Indian Military expenditure.* Peace was preserved, but it was clear that our army was no longer strong enough for the defence of the country. Two million sterling were added to the budget in consequence of an augmentation to the forces; and many measures of reorganisation and reform were undertaken. But in the following years the rate of increase in military expenditure was not maintained. Operations in the recently annexed province of Upper Burma tended to curtail the military grants. The fall in the value of the rupee increased financial difficulties, which were extreme in 1893 before the closure of the mints to silver coinage. No sooner was this crisis passed than frontier wars began, and these, in conjunction with the famine of 1896, caused the reduction of all military estimates to the lowest practicable limits. Measures of the highest military value were postponed; and, though portions of the forces were busily employed in warfare, organisation and equipment suffered from the forced inaction of military administration.

In 1900 the Boer war and Russian menaces made it clear that reorganisation and re-equipment could not be delayed. The revenue at first did not suffice to meet all extra charges, but circumstances combined to render funds available. The money saved by reason of the loan of Indian forces to the Imperial service accumulated in five years to £2,900,000. *Financial Position in 1900.* This large sum was set aside for military requirements. As the troops returned the prosperity of the land increased; and the last three years have witnessed an astonishing expansion of the revenues consequent on the growing yield of State industries and the increased purchasing power of the people. Reduction of taxation has coincided with enhanced military expenditure; nevertheless it has been possible to meet all urgent demands without recourse to loans. *Commencement of military activity.* It must however be pointed out that in recent years expenditure in military operations has fallen greatly. Whilst in the five years ending 1893-94, £1,159,000 were spent, and £4,584,000 in the next quinquennium; during the seven years of Lord Curzon's administration the cost of wars has been but £1,198,635, including the budget provision (£33,333) for the current year.

It has thus been possible to undertake the schemes of the first magnitude connected with the reorganisation and equipment of the army which have been *Expenditure on Re-organisation schemes.*

* Regulars (including cavalry)	...	...	53,000
Reservists (one-half total)	...	...	25,000
Specially enlisted men (36 Regiments at 200)	...	...	7,000
Military Police and militia (with rifles)	...	...	30,000
Civil Police (with smooth-bore)	...	...	48,000
Troops of Native States (excluding Imperial Service troops)	...	...	87,000
Total	...	...	<u>250,000</u>

*Military expenditure debitable to revenue only.*

framed by Lord Kitchener. Irrespective of the outlay on strategic railways, which will be considerable, expenditure on reorganisation measures of not less than 13 crores of rupees is contemplated<sup>(1)</sup>; while the permanent increase of the military budget by 2 crores has also been accepted. In accordance with the principle reaffirmed by the Secretary of State<sup>(2)</sup> the whole of this unproductive expenditure will be charged to revenue; except perhaps, that which relates to the provision of land and buildings. It is not, however, probable that the whole programme can be completed for these sums: estimates of the outlay necessary cannot yet be fully detailed, as many modifications in the original scheme will be necessary.

*Increase of net military expenditure.*

To illustrate the military activity of Lord Curzon's term of office it may be stated that the net military expenditure of India has risen from £15,023,109 in 1898-99 to £20,757,032 estimated in 1905-06, an increase of over 35 per cent. Still greater annual outlay will be occasioned by the progress of the reorganisation scheme.

### *Section (3)—Strength and composition of the Army.*

*Strength in recent times.*

In the foregoing section the recent phases of military policy have been discussed. It remains to indicate the steps which have been taken during Lord Curzon's administration to adjust the military strength of the country to the political requirements of the time. For a considerable period the strength of the Indian military forces had remained fairly constant. Although the financial difficulties following the Afghan war occasioned a review of the military situation which resulted in a slight reduction of strength, this was more than counterbalanced by the subsequent increase caused by the events of 1885. Shortly afterwards the Indian forces comprised 73,600 British troops and 153,000 Native combatants. Although the composition of the army had been somewhat changed, there had been little increase in these numbers when Lord Curzon assumed the Viceroyalty in 1899. India was, moreover, dependent on her own resources. No increase in war-time could be relied on because the specific assurance of reinforcement had been consistently refused by the Imperial Government.

*Adequacy of the force examined in 1900.*

The adequacy of this force for the duties assigned to it came under consideration in consequence of Russian demonstrations in Trans-Caspia and Turkestan during the progress of the Boer War. One year previously it had been estimated that at the expiration of two months, 20,000 Russians might be concentrated at Herat; that 14,000 might be ready to occupy the district of Maizar-i-Sharif, in addition to 4,000 or 5,000 men operating either towards Faizabad or with the second column; that the reinforcements from Europe might have totalled 30,000 men. Early in 1900 it appeared that the Russian garrisons on the Afghan frontier alone had been increased to 100,000 men.

The moment was unfavourable because a considerable number of British troops had been sent to South Africa. Only by withdrawing British units from the obligatory garrisons could the field army be completed to its full strength of 73,000 men (of whom 31,000 were British) and 208 guns, organised in 4 divisions. It was estimated that a force of these dimensions could occupy defensive positions on the Khyber-Kabul or Kandahar-Helmand line of advance.

(1) Order in Council of 15th July 1904.

(2) Despatch No. 143, dated 15th November 1904, from Secretary of State (Appendix No. 13.)

The paucity of troops would, however, render it impossible to maintain the positions without reinforcements owing to the wastage which would occur after mobilisation. As a first reinforcement 30,000 British troops were considered to be necessary: followed in the event of extended hostilities by 70,000 more troops. The need for two additional divisions was clearly recognised.

With this information before them the Government of India did not hesitate to inform the Secretary of State<sup>(1)</sup> that the Indian Army, as then constituted, was inadequate for the prolonged defence of the frontier against the Russian forces, and that it would be vain to contemplate successful opposition to the enemy, except upon the condition of support from the military resources of the Empire—a support of which India had not hitherto obtained specific assurance. It was also stated that the success of a defensive campaign must depend upon the occupation of certain strategic points in advance of the frontier.

His Majesty's Government were most reluctant to give an unconditional pledge of cooperation in the form of the conveyance of troops or munitions of war to India. At the instance of the Secretary of State schemes were prepared for purely defensive warfare in varying conditions; but the local military opinion was strongly averse from the adoption of this system of defence, which did not commend itself to the Government of India, and would not have permitted any diminution of the defending force. Financial reasons rendered it impracticable to add to the permanent British garrison to the extent necessary to secure the discharge of defensive responsibilities. It seemed to Lord Curzon's Government accordingly that, for the successful defence of the frontier, Imperial cooperation must necessarily be assured.

Two further proposals were considered before His Majesty's Government accepted the responsibility imposed upon the Imperial military service by the acceptance of the Government of India's views. It was suggested<sup>(2)</sup> that the permanent garrison of India should be increased by 18 battalions of British troops to permit in any conditions of warfare, of the occupation and retention by the Indian army of Kandahar and Jellalabad. The need for immediate reinforcements from abroad might thus be slightly postponed. A second and later scheme provided for the maintenance of reinforcements in South Africa at considerable cost to Indian revenues. In regard to the former proposal Lord Curzon's Government accepted the desirability of adding 5,200 men to the permanent garrison to allow of the formation of 6 divisions in the field army; but were unable to approve of any further burden on the Indian revenues. The South African scheme was rejected<sup>(3)</sup> not only for financial, but also for practical military reasons.

During this discussion, which extended over a period of nearly four years, the military power of Russia on the frontiers of Afghanistan and Persia had been increasing. The completion of the railway between Orenburg and Tashkent had changed the character of the military situation. It was no longer possible to contend that the unaided army of India, to whatever extent augmented, could successfully oppose the Russian forces in Afghanistan. His Majesty's Government accordingly receded from their former position and definitely accepted responsibility for reinforcing India as soon as the seas

(1) Despatch No. 58, dated 26th April 1900 (Appendix No. 15.)

(2) Despatch No. 4, dated 7th February 1902, from Secretary of State.

(3) Despatch No. 140, dated 30th July 1903, to Secretary of State (Appendix No. 16.)



*Extent of reinforcement.* might be cleared of hostile fleets. Within a year of the outbreak of hostilities a force, including drafts to replace casualties, of nearly 150,000 men will be made available from England for Indian service. Of the sufficiency of such a force it is impossible to judge at present; the matter is now under consideration. But even should this number represent the limit of assistance which Great Britain can afford, Lord Curzon's Government are to be congratulated on the acceptance of the principle for which they have striven, namely, that the defence of the North-West Frontier is a matter of imperial and not of local interest; and on the potential increase of the military resources of the country without additional expenditure from Indian revenues.

*Increase of Native forces.* In this way satisfactory arrangements have been made for the augmentation of the British troops: on their number, the strength of the entire standing army in India primarily depends. An increase of the Native forces is easier to accomplish, but is permissible only if a correct numerical proportion can be observed between the strength of the racial components of each section of the Indian Army, both in peace and war. The application of this principle to the forces as they have recently been organised has been the subject of discussion with the Secretary of State. His final decision has not been made; but a doubt has arisen regarding the desirability of adding further to the standing Native Army in India, without a corresponding increase of the British garrison. An element of weakness has recently been introduced by the removal of the disparity between the armament of British and Native troops, which formerly existed. In the meantime, however, it has been agreed that the reserve of Native troops may be gradually increased to 50,000 men.

*Increase of Native reserve sanctioned.*

*Recruitment of British troops.* Five thousand additional British Troops will be entertained at the close of the five years' reorganisation programme if funds permit. But military force cannot be expressed in terms of numbers only. Much difficulty has been experienced in the recruitment of the British service in late years, and especially since the end of the Boer War. The men obtained have not been of the requisite class and physique. Some such difficulty will perforce arise at the close of a long campaign, owing to the discharge of men who have been retained in the service beyond the terms of their original engagement. To some extent the machinery of recruiting must necessarily be disorganised. The patriotic enthusiasm which causes men to enlist at the commencement of a war is naturally succeeded by a period of reaction in which it is difficult to obtain recruits. From these conditions the British army has suffered during the last few years, and remedial measures have been taken; but the needs of India will not be satisfied until a radical change is made in the existing system of recruitment. Statistics of campaigns, and of ordinary service in peace-time in this country have proved the relative value, if not the absolute need, of seasoned men with six to twelve years' service at their credit, and between 25 and 30 years of age.

In other words India requires a long service army. Proposals to this end were made in May 1900. A uniform system of bounties was then suggested, which at the cost of a slight depletion in the general reserve, would undoubtedly have provided the men required by India. Instead of the application of this simple and effective method, a disproportionate increase of pay has been given to the British soldier, accompanied by a reduction of the period of enlistment, and by ill-considered rules regarding election for continuance of service.

Moreover, to maintain the garrison at full strength it has been necessary to supplement these measures by the hasty offer of bounties and furlough privileges, when these concessions could no longer be withheld. Thus India has been mulcted in heavy expenditure on pay, which, in the view of the Indian Government has been injudiciously applied, and has failed to produce men, either in sufficient numbers or of the requisite type. Moreover the terms of service have been so adjusted by His Majesty's Government that the greater part of the excess expenditure falls upon Indian revenues. Such measures have not been accepted without vigorous protests from the Indian Government, but hitherto these have been unavailing. In one respect, however, matters have recently improved. Except for particular regiments, and for artillery and cavalry, short term recruitment has recently been stopped. But matters are not yet upon a satisfactory basis, and radical reforms in the organisation of recruiting are urgently demanded.

The possibility of forming local regiments from the Eurasian community *Eurasian regiments.* has been discussed. The Government of India have long recognised the claims of this section of the community to a proportion of Government employment; and the desirability of affording an outlet for their military aspiration. Hitherto it has not been possible to adopt this method of relief. Successive heads of the army have been unanimous in resisting proposals to substitute local regiments for those of the Imperial service. It is however possible that this question may be reopened, having regard to the increased cost of the British soldier in recent years and the difficulties of recruitment in England. Reliance is even now placed upon Eurasians for the maintenance of internal control, for they constitute almost a moiety of the entire volunteer force upon whom the safety of the country will largely depend in time of war; and they form a large proportion of the civil community which will be enrolled and armed in the event of an emergency.

The experience of recent campaigns disclosed the total inadequacy of the number of British officers serving with Native troops. It has long been recognised in India that mobilisation of the field army would entirely denude of their officers the regiments detailed for the duty of internal control, but financial considerations had prevented an increase to their number. Without general disorganisation it was impossible to officer the contingent sent to China in 1900, in spite of a recent addition to the Staff Corps. The remedies for such a condition of affairs must however be gradually applied. The need for an increase has been fully recognised by the Government of India and a very considerable augmentation has taken place, not only by the creation between 1900 and 1904 of 500 new appointments, but also by the seconding of officers extra-regimentally employed. If candidates are forthcoming, a further large increase will be effected under the Reorganisation Scheme, as the deficiency in the establishment required for a field army of nine divisions amounts to nearly one thousand officers. The provision of suitable officers, either for the active list or reserve is, however, a problem of great difficulty; qualified candidates are greatly in defect. The matter is now under the consideration of the War Office, who have suggested the Colonies as a possible source for the supply of Indian requirements. *Shortage of officers with Native troops.*

While there has been a deficiency of qualified applicants of British birth for Commissions in the Army, a soldier's career has been entirely closed hitherto to *Commissions for Native gentlemen.* high-born Indian subjects of the King, who have had no prospect of a military



career. The desirability of amending this condition of affairs has been frequently discussed; but the difficulties which attended the grant to Indians of ordinary regimental commissions in His Majesty's forces were felt to be insuperable. Lord Curzon approached the matter from a different stand point. Reopening the question in 1900, he framed a scheme for the establishment of an Imperial Cadet Corps, between 20 and 30 strong, in which youths of the first Indian families should receive a sound military and general education during the most receptive period of their lives, and thereby escape the enervating influences of their normal surroundings. Further, in reward for their submission to discipline and training, he proposed to grant approved cadets commissions in an independent category or reserve of officers, entailing only extra regimental work, but carrying the pay, promotion and pension which British officers enjoy. Lord Curzon's expectations have been amply fulfilled. The Cadet Corps, established in 1902, has justified its existence by the excellent educational work it has performed. Commissions in the Indian Land Forces and suitable appointments have been granted to four cadets who have passed their probationary term with credit. Attempts have also been made to secure a larger proportion of Indian gentlemen as Native Officers of the Indian Army. The field of recruitment for these appointments has been extended to the students of certain educational establishments.

*Recruitment  
Native Officers.*

*Reconstitution in  
the Indian army.*

Important measures of reconstitution have been effected in the Indian forces, more especially in that portion which belonged to the Madras Army. For years it has been recognised that both cavalry and infantry in this presidency were recruited from unwarlike races, and that they could not be relied upon to face a European foe. The prosperity of the people is so great, and the country is so peaceful, that warlike instincts have to a great measure disappeared. Evidence has been accumulating to prove that the physique and stamina of men of Southern races are unsuited to the climate where military operations will occur. Whole regiments have been incapacitated by sickness in Burma, Afghanistan, and on the North-West Frontier in time of war, and even in time of peace. Individual soldiers running *amok* have caused disgraceful panics amongst large bodies of these troops; their conduct in the face of an enemy has been anything but satisfactory. In a modified degree the same remarks may be applied to the Hindustani Mussalman of the Gangetic plain. It is no wonder that drastic measures have been taken to improve the sources of recruitment in many of the native corps and that new fields of supply have been opened out—Punjabis of small stature, who would previously have been rejected as recruits, are now enlisted in certain regiments. A regiment of Hazaras has been formed; and, for the first time, Mahsud Wazirs have been enlisted in the regular forces. There is some doubt whether in the not distant future the limits of recruitment in the Punjab will not be reached. Precautionary measures have, accordingly, been taken to prevent the employment of Punjabis by foreign powers, who may be our rivals in the east; and to regularise the recruitment of these men for Colonial administrations and municipalities.

*Recruitment.*

*Increase of the  
Native army.*

The number of infantry battalions has been increased by five in replacement of those which will be permanently employed in colonial stations of the Imperial service. In other respects the increases to the Indian army have not been important. The formation of railway units, however, deserves remark, in view of the novel system of organisation which has been adopted. The Indian army has gained in military force and efficiency in consequence of the delocali-

*Delocalisation  
of regiments.*

sation of several regiments, and by the incorporation in the general list of the Hyderabad Contingent. The restrictions which rendered these troops of local value only have now been removed, and a large additional force has been made available for general service.

*Section (4)—Marine Defence and Administration.*

In present circumstances the land defence of India cannot be efficiently performed by the local forces at her disposal. If a large measure of military assistance is not forthcoming within a short period after the outbreak of war, defensive requirements cannot be fulfilled. It is therefore of vital importance that the protection of all sea routes should be as efficient as possible : maritime power in eastern waters should therefore be directly controlled by the Imperial authority which is responsible for military reinforcement. *Maritime policy.*

A notable change has recently occurred in the naval policy of the Empire ; the naval forces, formerly somewhat dispersed, have been redistributed and reformed in squadrons of high fighting quality. The secret of efficient protection of shipping and ports is now believed to lie in the capacity for offensive action possessed by mobile and concentrated fleets, rather than in the numerical strength of ships assigned to local duties, or in stationary defences constructed on the shore. The number of naval stations has also been reduced ; bases of the greatest strategic importance alone have been retained. As a result of the development of this policy the Imperial naval forces in Indian waters have been reorganised. The station at Trincomali in Ceylon has been abandoned ; Bombay has taken its place as a subsidiary naval base. The desire to further this policy by relieving the Navy of local duties has found expression in recommendations made by the Admiralty for the reorganisation of naval control of Indian waters, and for the defence of Indian ports. Some of these have not been wholly acceptable to Lord Curzon's Government.

In regard to the former matter the Admiralty have suggested the re-creation of the local naval force, which India formerly maintained, and which was abolished during the financial depression which followed the Mutiny. The Imperial Navy then undertook the defence of the coasts and the protection of the trade in Eastern waters. In return for a contribution based on their cost, India has been allowed the partial control of the movements of a certain number of ships required in the Persian Gulf and off the coast of Arabia. Although the subsidy has not been reduced, the Admiralty have gradually effected a reduction in the size of the vessels detailed for local service and have substituted to a considerable extent natives for Europeans in their crews. This policy of economy has culminated finally in the proposal that three of His Majesty's ships should be transferred to the Indian Government and that the Navy should be relieved of their local duties—in effect that an Indian Navy should be reconstituted. Hitherto the Government of India have expressed no dissatisfaction with the arrangements made for naval defence, except that on several occasions they have sought to obtain authority to arm vessels of the Royal Indian Marine serving in the Persian Gulf for specific objects. Their proposals have hitherto been negatived chiefly because the Admiralty have objected to the existence of armed sea-going vessels belonging to the State unless these were placed under their control. The submission by the Admiralty of a scheme for the maintenance of armed ships by the Government of India *System of marine defence.*

indicates that they have now withdrawn their objection to the arming of Indian Marine vessels, and consequently, in this respect, a settlement of this question, favourable to the interests of this country is likely to be concluded. But the inevitable loss of prestige in Persian and Arabian waters, which would have resulted from the acceptance of the larger project preferred by the Admiralty, was sufficient to justify its rejection by the Government of India<sup>(1)</sup> even without regard to the serious financial disadvantages which it entailed. The matter is now again under the consideration of His Majesty's Government.

*Coast defence.*

In the matter of naval coast defence the Admiralty's proposals have been accepted. For twenty years, two turret ships, two gunboats and seven torpedo craft have been located at Bombay for the defence of that port and of Karachi. On the advice of the Admiralty the whole of this flotilla, except three torpedo boats, has been dispensed with, with a consequent substantial saving. Opinions are at variance regarding the policy to be pursued in respect to the armament of the coast defences. In accordance with a programme adopted in 1902, on the advice of all the authorities concerned, powerful guns of a modern type and capable of rapid firing have been or will shortly be mounted in the more important defences; the system of electric lights and sub-marine mines has also been thoroughly reorganised. The Admiralty and the Colonial Defence Committee are now questioning the need for elaborate and powerful armament in Indian ports; and the former has even recommended the entire abolition of all submarine defences and the removal of the personnel connected with them. These views have met with opposition in India and the question is not yet decided.

*Royal Indian Marine.*

There are few notable events to record in the recent history of the Royal Indian Marine other than the successful and efficient execution of transport work during the progress of the South African campaign, and the China and Somaliland expeditions. In the case of the former war the services rendered were of Imperial importance. The Indian Marine fleet has been greatly improved; the pay and the terms of service of the officers have also undergone very considerable amelioration. It has been agreed that two vessels the "Hardinge" and the "Dufferin" shall be converted into auxiliary cruisers in time of war and placed at the disposal of the Naval Commander-in-Chief. A proposal to bring the crews of these vessels under the Indian Marine Act is therefore under consideration. The efficiency of the Marine Dockyards has been well maintained. The staff has been somewhat augmented and the pay of the members revised and increased.

*Section (5)—Equipment of the Army.*

*Measures for re-armament.*

At the instance of Sir Edwin Collen an elaborate comparison was made early in 1900 between the Russian armament and that of the British forces in India. The results of this enquiry<sup>(2)</sup> afforded but little consolation to the Government of India, for in almost every respect the Russian arms were found to be superior. From this date began the wide reaching measures of re-equipment with which the period of Lord Curzon's term of office will be associated. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that arrangements have been made for the supply to every armed servant of Government, almost without exception, of a weapon superior in efficiency to that which was in his possession in 1899. In

<sup>(1)</sup> Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 5, dated 10th August 1905 (Appendix No. 27).  
<sup>(2)</sup> Despatch No. 51 (Secret), dated 29th March 1900 (Appendix No. 29).

the majority of instances the more modern arm will be supplied before the close of the current year. Where delay has taken place, it has not been due to any want of funds, but to the difficulty of obtaining warlike stores from England.

It is no fault of the Government of India that the artillery have not been entirely re-equipped. The mountain artillery were supplied in 1903 with a jointed gun which proved its value in Tibet. In the same year the horse artillery were re-armed pending the adoption of quick-firing ordnance of entirely new design. Had it been possible to procure guns of the last named type both branches of mobile artillery in this country would have been re-armed with quick firing guns at the present date. Unfortunately, although provision of funds was made to the extent of over £1,600,000 sterling, manufacturing difficulties in England have supervened. It is however satisfactory to note in this connection that, for the first time, the War Office have recognised India's prior claims to armament of the latest type, which none of the batteries of the Imperial service have yet received.

*Artillery.*

In regard to coast defences a great improvement is being effected by the substitution of quick-firing ordnance for muzzle loading ordnance and guns on carriages of the pneumatic type. The power of the Indian coast artillery will soon be fully equal to all probable demands. The defences of inland forts have been reorganised by the removal of smooth-bore artillery, and by the substitution of rifled guns and howitzers. Their defensive power has thus been enhanced notwithstanding a reduction in their garrisons.

*Coast and Land defences.*

The adoption of modern types of ordnance has necessitated, however, the maintenance of much larger reserves of artillery ammunition. The expenditure of ammunition in recent campaigns has been unprecedented. Provision has been made for manufacture on a most liberal scale, and the ordnance factories will be enlarged until they can comply fully with all demands. It is anticipated that these measures will cost not less than £1,000,000.

*Artillery ammunition reserves.*

In the matter of small arms the changes have been no less important. During the last six years 418,000 rifles have been procured for the Indian army at a cost of nearly £1,750,000. The British cavalry have twice changed their weapons. Lee-Enfield magazine carbines were substituted for single loading weapons, and eventually gave place to the short Lee-Enfield magazine rifle with which the British infantry has recently been armed. In regard to Native troops a change of armament involved not only the purchase of new weapons, but a change of policy. Formerly it had been considered necessary that the armament of the Native army should be inferior to that in the hands of the British troops. It was a matter however, of some difficulty to maintain this disparity when the time came to rearm the Native troops in 1900. The use of cordite was essential and it was found impracticable to procure single-loading weapons of the requisite type. Eventually it was decided that the advantages resulting from the Native troops being in possession of a thoroughly efficient weapon outweighed the objections to the equality of the armament of the Native Army with that of British troops. The subsequent despatch of troops to China in the company of international contingents, confirmed the wisdom of this decision. The rearmament of the entire Native army was completed in 1902. A sufficient number of short rifles of the latest pattern

*Small arms.*

have now been procured to rearm all the British and Native troops composing the field army. The ordnance reserve of the new pattern rifle will be provided by the rifle factory which has recently been established at Ishapore.

*Rifle ammunition.* As in the case of artillery ammunition, so it has been found that the expenditure of rifle ammunition during the Russo-Japanese War largely exceeds that which has hitherto been known. The reserve in this country has accordingly been raised by over 75 per cent. at a cost of nearly £500,000. The Indian ammunition factories are probably capable of maintaining this reserve at full strength, even during the progress of a campaign.

*Machine guns.* All British and Native regiments have now been provided with subsidiary armament in the form of maxim machine guns of .303 calibre. Many of the inland forts have been strengthened by the mounting of these weapons. Since 1899 the purchase of no fewer than 333 maxims has been arranged for.

In the period under review the equipment of all of the services has been changed. As a result of bandoliers have been provided in lieu of the ammunition pouches, which proved to be unserviceable during the Boer War, and to cause immense losses of ammunition. British and Native Infantry have now been given the Imperial service pattern of brown leather equipment.

## SECTION (6)—ORGANISATION AND ADMINISTRATION.

### ORGANISATION IN WAR.

*History of military organisation for war.*

The last Afghan War disclosed that the army in this country was not suitably organised for a large campaign. But it was not until 1885 when it was necessary to prepare for war against a European enemy that the deficiencies were fully realised. In the following year the recently formed Mobilisation Committee evolved a project for the formation of two army corps and one reserve division, but the scheme was in the main a paper one. The troops were not equipped and transport was wholly deficient. Moreover reliance was placed for completion of the field strength on reinforcements from England, which the Home Government steadfastly refused to assure. Fresh plans were prepared in 1890 for the mobilisation of about 34,000 men in two divisions of infantry, each supplied with a cavalry brigade and divisional troops. Troops were detailed for two other divisions of equal numbers and for a fifth cavalry brigade; but to the third and fourth divisions no mobilisation equipment was issued until 1893; nor was any transport available for them.

*Necessity for increase recognised.*

The defects in the organisation of the field army and more especially the deficiencies in transport were disclosed by a mobilisation of one division for the Chitral campaign, and by the series of expeditions on the North-West Frontier in 1897-98. Nevertheless financial circumstances precluded at that time any very drastic changes in the military organisation. The Russian pressure on the Afghan frontier, which coincided with the critical stages of the Boer war, caused an anxious review of the scheme for mobilisation, and signalled the commencement of many remedial measures. It was evident that a field army, consisting of only four divisions in the fighting line, could but engage in defence of a passive nature, which would afford no prospect of ultimate success. Reinforcements were needed for the performance of even this secondary rôle. For effective military action it was clearly recognised that the defence of India must be made beyond the frontier limits, and that for this



purpose two more field divisions were absolutely essential. With the principle of this increase to the fighting force Lord Curzon's Government agreed. *Projected increase to 6 divisions.* Measures were taken to permit of its accomplishment; and also for the assurance of Imperial cooperation and support in the defence of the Afghan frontier. The organisation from Indian resources of a much larger fighting force was subsequently rendered possible by the adoption of Lord Kitchener's scheme for the internal control of India in war time, which involved the reduction of the force detailed for garrison duty. The authorised field force of India now consist of nine infantry divisions composed of three brigades and divisional troops; 8 cavalry brigades; and the artillery and other units known as corps *Increase to 9 divisions.* troops. The Imperial Service troops are not included in this organisation; which, with a few but important exceptions can be completed from the forces present in the country.

In the present scheme, the division is the largest unit of command. It is considered that a larger organisation would not be suited to the condition of frontier warfare. A new departure has been made by the constitution of homogeneous in lieu of the mixed brigades, half British and half Native, which have hitherto been formed for Indian warfare. The reason for this change, which has not yet been finally approved, lies in the necessity to adjust the organisation of the field army to that of the reinforcements which may come from England. *Organisation of the field army.*

When present establishments have been completed, the field army will comprise 46,000 British troops and 92,000 Native combatants. In addition there will be 18,000 Imperial Service troops; making a total of 156,000 men. For a fighting force the ratio of British to Indian is somewhat disproportionate; the preponderance of the Native element will, however, be reduced by the arrival of reinforcements from England.

According to the Reorganisation Scheme recently accepted, the garrison of India, in time of war, after the removal of the field army will be organised *Internal Garrison of India.* mainly in moveable columns, leaving obligatory stationary garrisons at certain stations.\* Including officers, regimental depôts and men at Aden, 36,000 British regulars will be retained in India. With them will be associated 34,000 volunteers, mainly for the defence of railways and defensive posts. The native components of the garrison will comprise 55,000 native troops in organised military units; the depôts of native regiments at the front; and 35,000 armed police and levies in organised bodies.

#### ORGANISATION IN PEACE.

The organisation of army into the commands and districts, which were in existence between the date of Lord Curzon's arrival and 1904, was the outcome of the Army Organisation Commission of 1879. At the date of the Commission the force was divided into the armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay; distinct bodies with independent and dissimilar organisations, which rendered impossible any uniform organisation for external warfare. These armies lasted until 1895. There then came into being, in accordance with the recommendation of the Commission, 4 Army Corps, later designated Commands, whose areas were defined, not by the inclusion of any particular field service units, or by equality of troops, but solely by consideration for their geographical position. The troops and consequently the administrative duties were unequally divided by. *History of peace organisation.*

\* *Vide Chapter IV.*

this system of control and in other respects the organisation of the commands inconvenient. For instance, although Burma has no connection whatever of history, geography, race, religion or administration with Madras, the garrison of this province formed part of the Madras Command.

In some respects the organisation of the districts within the command also offered difficulties. The concentration of troops on the North-West Frontier in the nineties disorganised the local system of military administration. Moreover the reluctance to break up the renowned Punjab Frontier Force which was displayed, at first by the Government of India and then by successive Commanders-in-Chief, made it difficult to devise an efficient organisation for the military control of the frontier. It was not until Lord Curzon and Sir E. Elles had suggested the abolition of this force as an organised body, that a satisfactory administrative system could be applied to the frontier districts.

The drastic changes which were being made in the composition of the troops of the Madras Command, and the abandonment or reduction of many of the garrisons in this Presidency, caused the Secretary of the State to raise in 1902 the whole question of the suitability of the organisations of the Commands. The separation of the Burma garrison from Madras resulted from this discussion, as well as transfers of some districts between Commands. It was clearly recognised that by these changes the fringe of the matter only was touched. It was decided, however, that further action should be deferred until proposals had been received from the Commander-in-Chief for the redistribution of the army in accordance with mobilisation requirements. A scheme to effect this purpose, framed in accordance with the principles enunciated by Sir Power Palmer,<sup>(1)</sup> was subsequently presented by Lord Kitchener, and has formed the basis of the reorganisation of the army which is now in progress. The forces in peace as in war, have been organised in nine divisions, each of which will furnish its quota to the field army. Thus, with the least possible dislocation, the units ordered on active service will take their places in the field, leaving sufficient troops behind to control the divisional area. Political and financial considerations preclude the extension of these principles of organisation to brigades. It is not possible to arrange that, like the divisions, they shall be trained by the same officers as will command them in war.

In some respects, also, it has been necessary to modify the original proposals; but on the whole the scheme has been accepted with but little alteration. The system which has been adopted is unquestionably a great advance upon all previous organisations of the Indian Army; and affords a suitable basis for future administrative improvement.

*Organisation of the Staff.*

In less important matters the measures of reorganisation have been very numerous. The staff of the Indian Army has been reorganised with a view to the separation of the routine work of executive commands from the duties of training and preparing the army for war. The last traces of the Presidential armies were removed by a general and consecutive renumbering of the regimental units of the Indian Army; and the abolition of all Presidential titles. The artillery has been organised in brigades to accord with the system adopted in the Imperial Service. Battalions of Native Infantry are organised in double-companies in accordance with the system adopted in European continental armies.

*Regimental charges.*

(<sup>1</sup>) A. G.'s letter No. 2194-A, dated 7-5-1902. (Appendix No. 35.)

Except in connection with the withdrawal of troops from the North-West Frontier, and with Lord Kitchener's scheme for the reorganisation of the Army, the measures of redistribution have not been very important. As occasion offered the opportunity has been taken of locating more British troops in the hills. Outlying detachments of Native Regiments have been withdrawn. In some instances cantonments deprived of their strategical value by altered conditions, have been abandoned. *Distribution of the troops.*

#### HIGHER ADMINISTRATION OF THE ARMY.

The question of army administration in India, both in its higher and lower aspects, has been keenly debated many times. It could not be expected that in a period of military activity, such as commenced in 1900, this important matter should have escaped attention. Sir E. Collen took advantage of the advent of Sir William Lockhart as Commander-in-Chief to revive the question of decentralising the military administration which had for some time been held in abeyance in deference to Sir G. White's wishes. *Decentralisation to Commands.*

Eventually, following the system adopted in most great armies, a scheme of decentralisation was evolved<sup>(1)</sup>, which was designed to effect in the centres of military administration, the separation of the business connected with the actual command of the troops from that which relates to the supply and equipment of the army and the management of military expenditure. These duties, commonly classed as executive and administrative functions, were assigned, the former to the Commander-in-Chief; the latter to the Military Department. At the same time it was proposed that both executive and administrative functions should be combined in the persons of Lieutenant-Generals of Commands, to whom increased powers and responsibilities would have been accorded. A change in the system of working in the Military Department was also contemplated. The principles of this scheme were acceptable to the Secretary of State, and it would probably have been adopted in a modified form had Lord Kitchener agreed. His Excellency's views of military administration were, however, wholly diverse, and involved changes of a radical character. They were embodied in a memorandum written a few months after his arrival in India, which was withdrawn a few days after submission to the Government of India. A second scheme and memorandum on the same subject was prepared by Lord Kitchener a year later, and communicated to His Majesty's Government by Lord Curzon during his visit to England. The Commander-in-Chief's complete dissatisfaction with the present system of military administration thus became known to the India Office, and the Secretary of State took the first opportunity, after Lord Curzon's return, to provoke a formal and complete discussion of the subject. Thereupon there arose the sharp conflict between Lord Curzon's Council on one side and His Majesty's Government and Lord Kitchener on the other, which has resulted in Lord Curzon's resignation of office. Within a very brief period after the receipt of the Secretary of State's communication Lord Kitchener laid before the Government of India an exhaustive indictment of the system in force, and a complete exposition of the methods and procedure, which he proposed to substitute for it. The Commander-in-Chief's minute went far beyond proposing the removal of defects. He insisted that the whole system must be ended. In his view the entire military administration of the *Scheme of decentralisation evolved.* *Lord Kitchener's views and schemes.*

<sup>(1)</sup> Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 143, dated 31st July 1902. (Appendix No. 37.)



Government of India, in all its branches, should be placed under the Commander-in-Chief, who with the official title of War Member of Council should be the sole adviser of Government upon military questions, assisted in the preparation of his schemes by the General Staff of the Army, by a Financial Secretary, and by a Secretary to Government departmentally subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief in his capacity of War Member.

*Views of the Government of India.*

These radical and far-reaching reforms were strenuously opposed by the Military Member of Council and by the Viceroy. An emphatic concurrence with their views was conveyed to the Secretary of State by the Government of India in a despatch <sup>(1)</sup> to which Lord Kitchener appended a short minute of dissent. They refuted Lord Kitchener's allegations regarding the working of the system in force and, with regard to the essential point for determination, the Government of India stated their strong conviction that it was essential for them to possess a second expert opinion upon matters of military importance. In the absence of a second Military Member of Council the Government of India feared the establishment of a military autocracy, whose head would tend to lose touch gradually with the civil administration; and they anticipated the creation of a real danger to the welfare of the country.

*Decision of His Majesty's Government.*

These views were not in accord with those of a Committee of distinguished men <sup>(2)</sup> which was convened by the India Office to consider the matter, and which was presided over by the Secretary of State himself. The opinions of this committee were eventually accepted by His Majesty's Government <sup>(3)</sup> in preference to those of Lord Curzon's Council. Rejecting the proposal made by Lord Kitchener to combine all executive and administrative control in himself, the Committee nevertheless considered that only one expert upon military matters should sit upon the Council of the Governor-General; and that a second member (called the Military Supply Member) should be appointed to deal with questions of a non-military character connected with the working of the subsidiary departments of the army, who should not be qualified to speak as an expert upon military matters pure and simple. Certain safeguards against the failure of a 'one-man' system were suggested, such as the provision of advisers on the Commander-in-Chief's staff, who should have a full knowledge of the idiosyncrasies of the native army, and long experience of the country. It was also laid down that, in the event of a Commander-in-Chief being an officer of the British Service, it was desirable that the Supply Member, who was to be a technical and administrative expert, should also possess these qualities. The qualifications prescribed for the last named official were thus of a somewhat varied and contradictory nature.

It seemed desirable to the Government of India, who adhered to their opinion regarding the absolute need for two military advisers, that the position and character of the Military Supply Member should be defined more closely, and that in other respects the system prescribed by the Secretary of State should be brought into closer accord with the legal constitution of the Government of India. In reply to an expression of these views the Secretary of State conceded to their proposal that the second Military Member might be consulted on all military matters and agreed to their other recommendations, which were stated to be in fulfilment of his intentions. But when Lord Curzon nominated for the appointment General Sir E. Barrow, an officer whose opinion on military

<sup>(1)</sup> Despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 86, dated 23rd March 1905. (Appendix No. 40.)

<sup>(2)</sup> Lord Roberts and Sir G. White were members of the Committee.

<sup>(3)</sup> Despatch No. 86, dated 31st May 1905, from Secretary of State.

matters would have carried weight in Council, the nomination was refused by His Majesty's Government because of the eminent military qualifications which Sir E. Barrow possessed. Abandoning the qualifications they had prescribed in respect of local military experience, they urged the appointment of an officer with technical experience only of manufactures and supply. It was clear that the addition of such an officer to the Governor-General's Council would not provide the Government of India with the second military expert which they desired. Since a second qualified military adviser was in Lord Curzon's opinion a vital necessity under the Secretary of State's scheme, if a military autocracy were to be avoided, and if the system of civil control of the army were not to be subverted, His Excellency was compelled to place his resignation in the hands of His Majesty's Government. Full particulars of the history of this momentous discussion are detailed in the second portion of this memorandum.

#### INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION.

A notable reform has been accomplished by the reduction of the number of military reports and returns; and by the radical revision of the regulations and forms prescribed for the Indian Army. Lord Curzon's advent to office was closely followed by a thorough investigation of the whole system of official administration, both civil and military, which resulted in the saving of much unnecessary clerical labour. The reforms then introduced were carried still further by the revision and reconstruction of the regulations for the army, which had increased to a prodigious extent, and which were distinguished by an entire absence of system and of logical arrangement. The whole military administration in time of peace has been improved and quickened by the completion of this work, which was ably performed by Major-General DeBrath.

The adoption of the schedule system of budgeting for military expenditure in excess of normal outlay has been attended with satisfactory results: thereby Government is kept cognisant of the progress and administration of military expenditure. A similar plan has been adopted to regulate the expenditure on the more important military works. Many reforms have been introduced in the financial administration of the Supply and Transport Corps as the result of a committee assembled in 1902.

Considerable progress has been made towards the prevention of disease by the establishment of efficient sanitary administration and the provision of facilities for medical research. Several appointments have been created with a view to the investigation of maladies and the institution of sanitary reforms. That these measures have proved successful is beyond all question. Except in the matter of enteric fever, which has resisted remedial efforts, the medical statistics show an increasing freedom from disease amongst the troops. Cholera, which formerly occasioned a high mortality, is now almost unknown. Owing to precautionary measures and greater vigilance, the prevalence of venereal disease has been diminished.

There are but few individuals in the Indian service whose pay or condition has not been improved during Lord Curzon's term of office. The promotion of the officers of the Indian Army generally, has been accelerated; and consequently their pay has been improved. Selected officers in each rank may now receive special promotion irrespective of their seniority. The leave rules have been revised and improved. Departmental officers and those of warrant rank have obtained important concessions in the matter of leave and pension;

*Revision of Army Regulations, returns, &c.*

*Financial administration.*

*Sanitary administration.*

*Improvements pay, etc.*

*Officers.*

*Warrant Officers.*

*British soldiers.* the pay of many has been increased. The British soldier has received a considerable increase to his pay; liberal bounties and leave concessions have been given to men to extend their service in this country. *Native soldiers.* Native soldiers have been relieved of arduous and distasteful labour connected with the construction of their lines. By a revision of the clothing regulations, a virtual increase has been made to the pay of careful men of the Native army, without extra cost to the State.

*Ordnance Department.* The terms of service in the Ordnance Department have been greatly improved in the last seven years, both for officers and men. In the majority of cases the pay has been raised, and promotion has been rapid. Similar consideration has been accorded to the personnel of the Supply and Transport Corps. *Supply and Transport Corps.* All ranks of the medical services have received concessions in the matter of pay and promotion. *Medical services.*

### SECTION (7)—MOBILISATION AND CONCENTRATION.

*Need for improved communications.* The determination of our sphere of influence on the North-Western Frontier by the Durand Agreement of 1893, and the experience of the frontier campaigns which followed, accentuated the necessity for improving communications on the North-West Frontier, not only as a means of facilitating military action but also for the purpose of pacifying the tribes. Accordingly the improvement and protection of these communications forms an integral and essential part of the schemes for the administration of our frontier districts which were devised by Lord Elgin's Government and that of Lord Curzon. These measures have recently gained additional importance by the adoption of Lord Kitchener's scheme for the concentration of a largely increased field army on the borders of Afghanistan. The internal communications of the country are equally important from a military point of view, for the success of internal control as well as of external defence depends largely upon uninterrupted communication between our main cantonments, forts and arsenals, and between these places and the sea-board where reinforcements would be landed.

*Communications and defences on the North-West Frontier.* The measures which have been taken during Lord Curzon's administrations for the improvement of the lines of communication on the North-West Frontier are reviewed in detail in another portion of this memorandum. Of the extensive territory which stretches from Gilgit to Nushki in Baluchistan no portion has remained untouched. In every section military and political control has been assured by the construction of railways, roads or telegraphic communications. Schemes have been set afoot for the construction of railways of strategic value for the defence of India. Probably in no previous period of equal duration has so much activity been displayed in the perfecting of communications; nor at equal cost have such successful results been attained. It is noteworthy also that all these important works on roads, railways, and defences have been carried out in such a judicious manner, and have been so well timed that in no single instance has active hostility been encountered in their execution.

*North-East Frontier and Burma.* From a military point of view the works on the other frontiers are less important. The roads to Tibet are still in an unsatisfactory condition. A good alignment for a cart road has been found; but a large outlay will be necessary before it can be constructed. The communications with the French and Chinese frontiers have been much improved.

Nor has the necessity for improving the internal communications and defences of the country been forgotten. Progress has been made towards the filling of the gap of broad gauge railway communication which exists between Bombay and Sind. The strategic importance of this line has been long asserted. The connection of the metre gauge systems of northern and southern India may shortly be effected. The inland defences which serve as *point d'appui* on the lines of communication between the frontier and the sea, have been much strengthened by a revision of their armaments. Measures have been taken to secure the safety of many important railway bridges and tunnels by the construction of defensive blockhouses. To insure that in case of disturbance the rapid movement of troops shall not be hindered, steps have been taken to provide some of the bridges on important line of communication with flooring suitable for the passage of military vehicles. Important railway workshops have been placed in a defensible condition so that they may remain secure from local riots or disturbance.

*Internal communications and defences.*

#### SECTION (8)—MOBILITY.

It is a commonplace that wars are won by mobility, which in a considerable degree may be considered to mean perfect arrangements for Supply and Transport. Owing to the developments of modern warfare, the services which perform these duties have been transformed into, perhaps, the most important branches of the army. In respect to the Indian Army this transformation has but recently taken place. The relative importance of supply and transport was somewhat less before the question of external defence attained its present preponderating influence over the military policy of the country, and when the effective maintenance of internal control constituted the primary consideration of Indian military policy commissariat efficiency in its present sense was not a wholly indispensable adjunct of an army. For many years India has been well equipped with roads and railways which would facilitate internal warfare. The resources of the country in respect to animals are practically unbounded. The need for organised transport was therefore not essential. When the era of frontier wars began the efficiency of the transport became of greater moment; but the resources of the countries adjoining the borders were still available. Lines of communication were comparatively short; the duration of campaigns was not extended. Nevertheless towards the end of this period the need for better organisation became apparent. Since it has been recognised that the army must be prepared for a prolonged war in the defence of India in countries beyond the borders, the relative importance of the supply and transport services has enormously increased. The scene of future warfare is devoid of all railways and telegraphs; even of good roads. The ordinary channels of military transport in civilised countries are therefore lacking, and the need for a perfected system of supply becomes supreme.

*Development of Supply and Transport services.*

These phases have been reflected in the various organisations of the service. It was not until 1895 that the three commissariat departments of the Presidential armies were formed into a single body. The transport remained still unorganised. The experience of the Chitral campaign, and of the expeditions on the North-West Frontier, proved that a system of organised transport units was absolutely essential. Progress with such a scheme was, however, delayed by want of funds, and it was not until the first year of the century that in accordance with the recommendations of General Sanford's committee of 1898, the army transport was formed into organised bodies, at an annual cost of about

*Organisation of Supply and Transport.*

20 lakhs. Since that date further additions have been made on the same lines to provide for the increased requirements of the field army of nine divisions ; other less important measures have also been carried into effect.

*Enumeration and registration.*

It would clearly be impossible for the State to maintain during peace time the animals and men who would be required for transport purposes for a campaign. Arrangements must accordingly be made at leisure for the purchase and collection of transport on the occurrence of an emergency. The enumeration of transport animals in the Punjab, North-Western Provinces and Baluchistan was commenced in 1900. At first in the absence of legal powers to compel registration, the full value of the work was not obtained ; later the system became efficient in the Punjab and North-West Frontier Province, owing to the passing of legislation to this effect. In the United Provinces and in Baluchistan enumeration alone is possible. But the result of the measures of registration and enumeration has been very satisfactory. In the event of war it would now be possible to secure at short notice 2 mule corps, 45 hired camel corps and 50 bullock train corps. A reserve of nearly 4,000 transport mule drivers has also been formed.

*Tests of existing organisation of transport.*

The system of organisation has been tested on service with excellent results. Transport units have been engaged in Somaliland, China, the Waziristan blockade and in Tibet.

*Increase in Supply Branch.*

*Administration of Supply and Transport Corps.*

Concurrently with the increase in the transport, a large augmentation has been made in the personnel of the Supply branch of the Corps ; the system of charges was also revised. Subsequently an important change was made<sup>(1)</sup> in the administration of the Supply and Transport Corps, by which the executive control was secured to the Commander-in-Chief, while in the hands of the Government of India, Military Department, was left financial control and all arrangements necessary to effect the supply of stores and animals. This division of administrative responsibility necessitated a duplication of staffs and a further increase of establishment.

*Medical and Veterinary services.*

The other subsidiary military services which contribute towards the mobility of armies have also been reorganised and re-equipped.

The preparation of the medical services for war has been much advanced in recent years. A corps of ambulance bearers has been formed. The equipment of all classes of field hospitals has been revised and expanded. The Indian field medical equipment, when completed to the authorised scale, will compare favourably with that of any nation. Veterinary field hospitals have been increased in numbers. Stores for Ordnance and Engineer field parks have been procured to the extent required by the increased field army.

### SECTION (9)—SUPPLY OF WARLIKE STORES.

*Establishment of Ordnance factories.*

In no department of the military administration has greater activity been displayed during the period of Lord Curzon's viceroyalty than in the manufacturing branches of the Ordnance Department and the Clothing Factories. Reserves of warlike material and stores have always been kept at a high standard in this country, and in consequence it was possible for India to render material assistance to the British Army in South Africa by the export of ammunition, ordnance stores and clothing at a time when the arsenals of the Imperial service were almost depleted. But the experience gained in the Boer War, and the danger which was then threatening India on the North-Western Frontier, led to

<sup>(1)</sup> Despatch No. 146, dated 18th October 1904, to Secretary of State. (Appendix No. 56.)



a careful investigation of the resources of this country in the matter of warlike stores, and to a comparison between the military value of the armament in India and that of a possible enemy. It was then apparent that in many respects equipment of the Indian forces had become obsolete, and that a supply of modern warlike stores was imperatively necessary. Further inquiries showed that however freely money might be offered, it would be impossible to obtain sufficient war material from England for the rearmament and re-equipment of the forces within a reasonable time. This being the case, the dangers that might arise from even a temporary interruption of communications with England, became still more evident. It was obvious that the safety of the country demanded the establishment of local manufactories and the accumulation of adequate reserves of modern armament and equipment.

In the days before the mutiny, when communication with England was precarious, it had been essential that India should be self-contained in the matter of the supply of warlike stores; provision was made accordingly. Powder factories existed at Madras, Ishapore and Kirkee in the days of the East India Company; guns and mortars were cast at Cossipore; the ammunition factories have long been established. For nearly a hundred years artillery vehicles have been constructed at Fategarh, Madras and Bombay. But the improvement of communications with England, and the increasing complexity of armament and warlike material, led gradually in the latter part of the nineteenth century to dependence upon England for the supply of artillery, small arms and the components of ammunition. The primitive methods of manufacture hitherto practised in this country were then found to be unequal to the production of modern weapons and accessories; financial difficulties precluded the large initial outlay which the establishment of local factories must necessarily entail. The need for keeping India independent of Home supplies was overlooked, and it was not until the early nineties that an effort was made to enlarge the scope of local manufacture. The equipment of the Fuse Factory was then extended to permit of the production of metal fuses, and a great improvement was made in the manufacture of steel at Cossipore; the efficiency of the ammunition factories was steadily maintained. Nevertheless, except in the matter of clothing and saddlery, this country remained dependent in all essential respects upon the outturn of the Imperial factories and of English firms for its supply of warlike stores and equipment. A desire to amend this condition of affairs was awakened ten years ago when it was found that the lack of modern appliances rendered impossible the entire construction of gun carriages in this country. The difficulty and expense of importing cordite shortly afterwards led to experimental manufacture at Kirkee. But little real progress was made with any scheme until the experience of the Boer War caused the condition of India in respect to armament to be carefully reviewed, and until the stress of war disclosed the limitation of the resources of the home manufactories.

*Former arrangements for Ordnance supplies.*

*Recommencement of local manufacture.*

*Recognition of the urgent need of local manufacture.*

To realise the progress that has been made during the last few years it is sufficient to recall that when Lord Curzon assumed the office of Viceroy, India was wholly dependent on England for the supply of artillery of every kind; for the manufacture of rifles; for the most important constituent of ammunition, namely, the propellant; and in a large measure for the component parts of army carriages. It may now be said that in all these matters independence has been achieved, except in respect to the supply of the heavier forms of ordnance which are required for permanent fortifications. In one respect India will still remain dependent on Great Britain. She cannot

yet supply the raw material—such as the steel bullets for guns ; and copper and cartridge metal for ammunition. A sufficient reserve of these commodities is, however, not difficult to maintain. Notwithstanding the extraordinary activity of the military administration in this respect during Lord Curzon's term of office, India has only attained a similar position in regard to these matters as she held fifty years ago. But the conditions are greatly changed. In former days few reserves of arms and but little ammunition were required ; the components of the latter were simple in the extreme. No intricate plant was required for the manufacture of heavy ordnance, while the components of small arms were practically never worn out by use. It is far otherwise at the present time. The necessity for large reserves both of arms and of ammunition is now unquestionable. The manufacture of ordnance is completed only after many processes in which complex machinery is employed ; the components of small arms become unserviceable in a shorter time by reason of the erosive action and the greater power of modern propellants.

*Factory schemes.*

In another portion of this summary\* full details have been given of the schemes for the establishment of Ordnance factories, which have been consummated during the present administration. Of their political importance no doubt can be entertained. Irrespective of their military value, the factories will contribute to the well-being of the population, and will tend to foster local industries, and crafts. The money spent on armament will no longer leave the country ; and there is every reason to hope that for the same results the expenditure will be less. The cheapness of the labour in this country must necessarily reduce the cost of production. When it is stated that the total outturn of these factories probably exceeds 1½ million pounds, the magnitude of their operations is evident. The extent of the augmentation which has taken place in Lord Curzon's period of office may best be realised from the fact that while the grant for the local purchase of stores was under 17 lakhs of rupees ; that for the current year is 45 79 lakhs. In the same period establishment charges have risen from 25·19 to 36·62 lakhs. More than £ 800,000 has been spent on the establishment and improvement of Ordnance factories.

*Officers responsible for the execution of the policy.*

It is desirable to refer to the officers who have been mainly responsible for the execution of these factory schemes. At the time when Sir E. Elles succeeded to the office of Military Member the projects were in their initial stages : but little work had actually been done. It is due to his unceasing interest and energy in administration, in conjunction with the cordial support furnished by the Financial Members of Council, Sir E. Law and the Hon'ble Mr. Baker, that schemes of such magnitude and importance have been accomplished in a relatively small space of time. The control and execution of the projects fell to the heads of the Ordnance Department, Generals Wace and Scott, to whose technical knowledge and experience the successful results may be in a great measure attributed.

*Enlargement of clothing factories.*

Recent investigation has shown the imperative military necessity for increasing largely the potential out-put of the clothing factories at Alipore and Madras and of improving the character of the work. A serious war would occasion demands which the existing establishments would be wholly unable to meet. A thorough reorganisation of the Clothing Department has taken place, and although matters are not yet in a wholly thoroughly satisfactory condition, still the increased accommodation and the projected improvement of machinery and appliances will facilitate supervision and will enable the capacity of the factories to be largely increased.

## SECTION (10)—SUPPLY OF ANIMALS.

The unpreparedness of India in the matter of the provision of horses and mules was apparent when the experience of the South African war became known. The wastage of animals during this campaign exceeded all previous records. An exhaustive investigation into the subject made by Sir Edwin Collen in 1899, showed that, although the operations of Government in remounting the army had been confined to the requirements of mounted British troops, it had never yet been possible to supply sufficient animals of good quality from local sources. Horse-breeding in stud farms had proved entirely unsuccessful; the benefits to Government resulting from the provision of stallions for the service of private mares had not justified the heavy expenditure which had been incurred. The individual only had profited at the expense of the State. Similar difficulties had been encountered in the provision of mules. Donkey stallions were insufficient in number, and difficult to procure even from the European markets. It was clear that no satisfactory organisation could be evolved without the assistance of expert advice. It was accordingly decided to assemble a Commission to advise Government on the whole question of the provision of horses and mules, and on the measures which should be undertaken to improve the indigenous breed of horses. As a result of their report the control of the principal horsebreeding operations in India has been transferred to the Army Remount Department, which will remain responsible also for the remounting of the army. Small studs for breeding horse and donkey stallions have been established; but the most important measure which has been introduced is the establishment of colonies on lands commanded by the Jhelum and Chenab canals. In the former settlement the allotment of Government land to tenants is contingent on their maintenance of a mare fit for breeding remounts. In the Chenab area these terms are applicable to certain *lambarbars* alone. The Jhelum Canal colony has now been in operation for three years, and nearly 4,000 mares are on the land, together with a complement of Government stallions. The produce is regarded as extremely promising, and there seems little doubt but that when similar conditions have been attained on the Chenab Canal, one-third of the remounts required in time of peace will be available from these sources. Repeated trials have shown the futility of establishing large stud farms at Government expense. The canal colonies, however, afford the advantages of an immense State-controlled stud farm without the expenditure and risk which would otherwise be entailed. The existence of the colonies will also largely benefit the Native cavalry, for their sources of remount supply will be enlarged by such locally bred animals as do not attain the standard required for the British service.

*Condition of affairs in India in 1899.*

*Appointment of a Commission.*

*Canal colonies.*

## SECTION (11)—MILITARY LEGISLATION.

The legislation on military subjects during the past seven years has not been of major importance. Difficulties in respect to the maintenance of clear zones of fire around works of defence led to the passing of an Act which gave to the State the necessary powers for the demolition and destruction of obstacles, contingent on the payment of adequate compensation. As the result of twelve years' consideration a measure was passed in the Punjab Legislature in connection with the impressment of transport in the Punjab. Legal powers have been acquired for the purchase of animals in time of war, and for their hire at other times. At the instance of Sir Edwin Collen Emergency Bills have

*Works of Defence Act.*

*Punjab Transport Animals Act.*

*Emergency Bills.*



been prepared which will be held in reserve and passed by the Legislature when occasion arises. These Acts will ensure the Government of India effective control of all railways in the country, whether State or privately owned, and will ensure the better protection of railway property by enforcing communal liability for any damage or attempted damage to a railway. A similar measure which has been framed on the English model relates to the compulsory purchase of horses.

*Cantonment Accommodation Act.*

The vexed question of the provision of accommodation for military officers in cantonments has been solved in part by the legalising of certain cantonment rules, which had hitherto only existed in India Army Regulations, for the control of privately owned houses in cantonments.

*Amendment of Official Secrets Act.*

It was found that the Official Secrets Act was defective in operation because the onus of proof of criminal intention was placed upon the Government and not upon the accused. The Act was accordingly amended in 1903, and the occasion was taken to include in its scope offences relating to the disclosure of official secrets of a civil nature.

## CHAPTER III.

## Miscellaneous.

## CONDUCT OF BRITISH TROOPS IN RELATION TO NATIVES.

Under orders passed by Lord Elgin's Government local officers were required to despatch direct to the Government of India duplicates of the telegrams in which they report to their Local Governments various matters of administrative importance, including collisions between Europeans and Natives. The reports which reached the Government of India seemed to indicate that these affrays were increasing in number and accordingly, at the instance of Lord Curzon, a strict investigation<sup>(1)</sup> was made into the records of the previous twenty years to ascertain whether this was or was not the case. Between 1880 and the end of 1899, no fewer than 189 cases were recorded. Of this number 29 represented serious cases in which British soldiers were accused of robbery or rape, and in which 15 convictions were obtained. Although in some instances there may have been a failure of justice, the figures showed that this class of offence was rare and not increasing. The affrays or robberies of a less serious character, and the woundings caused by rash or negligent acts numbered 38. In regard to assaults of this class on punkah coolies some cause for anxiety was disclosed—two of them which occurred in 1899 had ended fatally. It was however evident that the collisions between natives and soldiers engaged in shooting resulted in more numerous and more serious offences, for not fewer than 81 cases were attributed to this cause. Further, on thirteen occasions, unconnected with shooting affrays, natives were the aggressors. The increasing publicity which was attached to these occurrences; the scandal that was likely to arise from an increase to their number; and the immense importance on every ground of encouraging harmonious relations between the military and civil population called for some remedial action on the part of the Government of India.

*Criminal assaults  
and affrays.*

In the matter of serious assaults the list of offences culminated in a horrible outrage committed in Rangoon on a respectable and elderly Burmese woman by men of the Royal West Kent regiment. The offence was witnessed by a sufficient number of persons to leave no doubt as to its main particulars, and at a court of enquiry important admissions were elicited. But owing in the main to the negligence and apathy that were displayed in responsible quarters in the earlier stages of the investigation the efforts to detect and punish the offenders resulted in complete failure, although the jury empannelled for the trial declared their emphatic belief that some men belonging to the regiment were guilty of the offence. It was impossible for the Government of India to pass by this failure of justice without a formal expression of their opinion; the more especially since the disciplinary action which followed the acquittal of all the accused was necessarily delayed because of the need for a reference to the War Office. Accordingly the Government of India formally placed on record<sup>(2)</sup> their sense of profound horror and repugnance at the incident in question, and appealed to the officers and soldiers of His Majesty's forces to uphold the honourable traditions of the service and to practise that discipline and self-restraint which it is their duty to maintain. The regiment implicated in this affair were sent to Aden as a punishment. The General

*Serious assaults.*

<sup>(1)</sup> Despatch No. 59 of 26th April 1900 to Secretary of State. (Appendix No. 66.)  
<sup>(2)</sup> G. C. O. No. 1124, dated 20th October 1899.

Officer Commanding, Burma District, was severely censured; the Brigadier General in immediate command at Rangoon and the Officer Commanding the regiment were, in effect, compulsorily removed from the service; the Second-in-command and Adjutant of the regiment were also punished.

Unhappily the tale of serious crime committed with impunity was not complete. Three years afterwards an affair occurred in the 9th Lancers lines at Sialkot, which although it lacked the bestial character of the Rangoon outrage, resulted in a similar failure of justice none the less discreditable both to the regiment concerned, which was charged with the wilful concealment of the criminal; and to the authorities, both civil and military, who were charged with the initial investigations. A cook Atu, in the service of the regiment, was severely assaulted at night and received mortal injuries. The man identified his assailants as Lancers, but the regimental authorities were content to assure themselves on wholly insufficient grounds that none of their men were concerned in the affair, and neglected to make such immediate enquiry as alone could have elicited the truth. The proceedings of a court of enquiry composed of junior and inexperienced officers were perfunctory; the civil police were equally apathetic. A further court of enquiry ordered by the Lieutenant-General Commanding a month later produced no definite result, and eventually the proceedings reached the Government of India with an expression of the Commander-in-Chief's opinion that although delay had taken place in the investigation of the crime the regimental authorities were not to blame. Lord Curzon was unable to accept Sir Power Palmer's view, and in accordance with his subsequent suggestion orders were given for a more thorough investigation by the General Officer Commanding the Rawal Pindi District. The report of this officer was of a negative character, and in the opinion of the Government of India displayed evidence of a desire to minimise unduly the evidence against the regiment. It was accompanied by the letter from the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab, which also earned their disapproval in that it was not an impartial and judicial review of the case. In these circumstances no action by Government was possible except the issue of a severe censure upon all the officers and men concerned. But the Commander-in-Chief was directed to take the necessary disciplinary measures towards the regiment. These consisted of the recall to duty of officers and men on leave in India; the stoppage of all leave until 1st June 1903; and extra sentry duty. The civil officers were also censured. At a later date the Officer Commanding the 9th Lancers reported that the two Assistants, who were troopers of the regiment, had confessed their guilt to their comrades. Although this confession was subsequently repudiated by them, and was not capable of being made the basis of judicial proceedings, the Officer Commanding reported that he had no doubt as to the identity of one at least of the culprits.

Offences in re-  
gard to punkah  
coolies.

As regards punkah coolies the Government of India announced their intention of seeking some method of mechanical ventilation of barracks so as to remove from the vicinity of the men the coolies, whose inefficient pulling of punkahs undoubtedly, in the majority of instances, gave rise to these offences. To this proposal the Secretary of State agreed, and during the last five years considerable progress has been made in this direction. But subsequent to the acceptance of this policy serious cases occurred of fatal assault upon punkah coolies, which were followed by miscarriages of justice. One of them must be

related. In January 1900 Private O'Gara of the Royal Scots Fusiliers was tried before the Punjab Chief Court for the murder of a man of this class. The jury acquitted the accused; but there was undoubtedly false swearing for the defence and the prosecution was badly conducted. Subsequently orders were issued that all cases in which there was reason to suspect that a native had met his death at the hands of a British soldier, should be investigated by a European Magistrate or European gazetted police officer; that the magisterial enquiry should be entrusted to none but an experienced European Magistrate; that the *post mortem* examination should be made by the Civil Surgeon in person; that the assistance of Military officers should be sought for the purposes of immediate and full enquiry amongst the soldiers: and that the prosecution should be placed in competent hands.

As regards the crimes which arose from collisions between soldiers on sport-<sup>Affrays while shooting.</sup>ing expeditions and natives, it was manifest that a considerable alteration was required in the rules as they stood in 1900. The necessity for revision had been emphasized by the increasing number of incidents. In the two years ending in March 1900 there were 29 recorded cases of collisions, disturbance, or affray, while the neglect and inefficacy of the rules became patent during the investigations which followed. There was no desire on the part of Government to deprive the British soldier of a legitimate and greatly valued means of recreation; but it was essential in the altered circumstances of the time that he should only continue to enjoy it under safeguards which would prevent the abuse of the privilege, with consequences that affect the entire relations between the governing and subject races in India.

A strong committee under the presidency of the Hon'ble Mr. Raleigh, Legal Member of Council, was appointed to frame a new code of shooting rules.<sup>New shooting rules.</sup> They submitted their report in October 1900. The revised rules provided for the issue of shooting passes, for a limited period, only to private soldiers of good character, in parties of three, accompanied by a native qualified to act as interpreter, who alone should be sent to procure supplies from villages. Injunctions were issued that any breach of the rules, affray with natives, or mishap should be reported at once both to the military and civil authorities. Restrictions were placed on the localities in which bullets might be used; on the nature of ammunition and rifles; and also on the class of animals to be shot. The orders relating to the retention, issue and use of private arms were redrafted; measures were taken to ensure that all concerned should be cognisant of the rules. Finally it was ordered that any soldier shooting without a pass, or any member of a shooting party who might commit a breach of the rules resulting in material damage to person or property, should be tried by court-martial. The rules, approved by the Government of India, were accepted by the Secretary of State, and until the current year have caused a considerable diminution of the number of collisions as the following statement indicates:—

							Serious breaches of shooting rules.	Accidents.	Affrays connected with shooting passes.
1899	...	...	...	...	...	...	7	12	3
1900	...	...	...	...	...	...	7	8	3
1901	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	2	...
1902	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	8	4
1903	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	9	...
1904	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	6	3

Unfortunately during 1905 the increase in the number of accidents attributable to carelessness, neglect, or breach of the rules has been so pronounced, that it has been necessary to draw the attention of the Commander-in-Chief to the subject. In future all offenders will be tried by District Court Martial. Certain modifications<sup>(1)</sup> have been made in the original rules. On the recommendation of Sir Power Palmer, the limitation of time imposed upon shooting passes was slightly relaxed in favour of well-behaved privates. It was also decided in January 1903 that in cases of affrays with natives, the trials should take place before a civil court. Finally the rules were revised on the suggestion of the Home Department, and additional information in relation to native prejudices and superstitions was added to them for the guidance of soldiers. According to the revised regulations<sup>(2)</sup> regimental warrant officers and sergeants were permitted to shoot alone under certain restrictions; the number in a party might exceed three but not six; and the duration of a pass might extend to a month in certain cases.

*Emerson case.*

One other occurrence requires detailed notice. In August 1902 a native forest guard was wounded in the thigh and assaulted by three soldiers of the Lincolnshire Regiment who were shooting near Trichinopoly. The three men identified by the native were placed before the district magistrate who discharged them. The Government of India were not satisfied that a proper investigation had been made and they suggested to the Local Government that the High Court should be moved to revise it. The High Court dismissed the application in regard to one accused, and temporarily reserved orders regarding the other two. Meanwhile by the negligence of the officers in the Madras Command office, who were subsequently censured, Private Emerson, one of the two men concerned, had been allowed to proceed to England on discharge; but as it appeared intolerable that he should be allowed to elude trial through the default of the local authorities, Private Emerson was accordingly brought back in custody from England under warrant and was tried before a jury. Both he and the second prisoners were, however, unanimously acquitted.

MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL INSTALLATIONS IN BARRACKS OF BRITISH TROOPS IN INDIA.

*Cause of installations.*

It was in March 1900 that His Excellency the Viceroy first raised the question of the substitution of mechanical power for human labour in the pulling of punkahs in barracks, in consequence of serious assaults committed by soldiers upon punkah coolies. Experiments with various systems were commenced under the direction of the Director-General of Military Works in various stations. It was not till the commencement of 1901, however, that sufficient experience was gained to justify the expense of installing plant on an extended scale. An expert (Mr. Preece) was brought out to this country later in the year to advise Government on the best method of procedure. After receipt of his report and the preparation of detailed estimates for Jhansi and other stations, a statement was prepared of the probable cost of extending these electrical systems to all the large cantonments in India which suffer from a trying hot weather season. It was decided in Council on the 24th October 1902, that Government should accept the policy of the employment of electricity in this class of cantonment for lighting and the working of punkahs; and that a general scheme should be undertaken involving some 116

*General scheme.*

<sup>(1)</sup> Order in Council of 12th July 1901.

<sup>(2)</sup> India Army Order No. 586 of 28th November 1904.

lakhs (£800,000) of initial expenditure, and an extra annual outlay of 15½ lakhs. The Secretary of State agreed to the allotment of a moderate sum each year for progress with these works.

The first complete installation was made with compressed air as the motive power at Umballa. After experiments in 1901, the punkahs in a portion of the barracks were operated satisfactorily in 1902. Owing, however, to the plant being experimental in its nature, no duplication of apparatus had been attempted, with the result that frequent break-downs occurred in the two following years. Duplicate machinery was provided in the winter of 1904-05, and during the present working season of the punkahs has greatly improved. It cannot be said, however, that this system is wholly successful and, for many reasons, it would not be advisable to instal this plant elsewhere. *Compressed air scheme.*

The first electrical installation on a large scale was designed to pull the punkahs at Bareilly. Many failures occurred and it was not till 1903 that satisfactory working was attained; but the experience gained was valuable, and among other lessons learnt, it was found that a really efficient system would cost considerably more than was originally anticipated. During the past two years, however, the Bareilly installation has operated well. The running charges are comparatively high because of the want of combination of electric lighting with the pulling of punkahs; the plant consequently, as in the case of the Umballa installation, stands idle during the winter months. *Electrical installations.*

Installations for combined electric lighting and punkah-pulling plant have since been erected at Attock, Jhansi, and Fort William. A still larger installation at Meerut is now approaching completion. At Attock the electrical machinery is driven by oil-engines, owing to the high price of coal; elsewhere the machines are worked by steam. The lighting installation at Jhansi has been successful, but the punkah-pulling system installed by the contractor failed. An improved system is now being erected, which it is confidently expected will prove successful. The installation at Fort William has been thoroughly efficient in every respect. In the Dalhousie barracks a new system of punkah-pulling has been installed, which has proved from the commencement a complete success. This system would appear to be applicable to barracks in general, and it is hoped that the problem of punkah pulling by mechanical means has now been finally solved.

The numerous disappointments and failures in punkah-pulling has caused attention to be directed to electrical fans as a means of ventilation in barracks, now that they can be obtained at a reasonable price. When employed in barracks the running expenses of fans are theoretically greater than those of punkah-motors. If, however, a system of supervision and check is organised for the prevention of waste, the excess should not be great. For small quarters, sergeants' rooms, institutes, churches, etc., fans are undoubtedly most suitable and economical; they have been largely used in such buildings. The barracks in Meerut have been fitted experimentally partly with fans and partly with punkah-motors. *Electrical fans.*

The future development of electrical installations depends on financial considerations. There is no question that they are far more costly than the punitive systems of lighting and ventilation which they replace. On the *Development schemes.*



other hand the benefits conferred upon the soldier by these installations are so considerable, and the diminution in drunkenness, crime, and sickness are so marked where the barracks are thus rendered attractive and comfortable, that there is no doubt as to the desirability of proceeding with the scheme as funds permit. Sufficient data have now been obtained to enable estimates to be prepared with considerable accuracy. Working expenses will probably shew a tendency to decrease as the staff obtain more experience. With a view to the enforcement of economy in the installation and working of electrical systems, elaborate rules to regulate the preparation and working of these systems have been brought into force from the 1st October 1904. The expenditure on these installations has already been considerable as is shown below :—

*Statement showing the expenditure on Electrical and Mechanical installations in Cantonments.*

Number.	Station.	Amount of estimate.	Totals expenditure up to 1904-05.	Probable during 1905-06.	REMARKS.
		Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
1	Bareilly,—Electrical punkah-pulling Installation...	1,87,918	1,87,918	...	Original estimate was for Rs 1,36,196, cost of completion Rs. 1,87,918.
2	Umballa,—Compressed air (system) punkah-pulling Installation ...	56,830	62,870	5,100	Completed.
3	Jhansi,—Installation of Electrical Light and punkah-pulling ...	3,92,124	3,17,796	52,900	Will be completed in 1905.
4	Calcutta,—Fort William experimental Electrical punkah-pulling Installation...	15,125	15,571	...	Completed.
5	Calcutta,—Barrackpore Heatly and Gresham's system of punkah-pulling ...	2,200	2,200	...	Do.
6	Calcutta,—Fort William, Electrical Installation in Fort ...	3,87,170	3,66,902	10,500	Will be completed during the year.
7	Calcutta,—Alipore Electrical light Installation at Army Clothing Factory ...	27,922	23,213	294	Ditto ditto.
8	Calcutta,—Alipore Electrical Installation in Station Hospital ...	14,800	14,407	...	Completed.
9	Calcutta,—Alipore. Electrical lights and fans Native Infantry Officers' quarters ...	11,500	5,542	2,800	Will be completed during the year.
10	Bareilly,—Experimental work, etc. ...	7,389	4,152	2,900	Completed.
11	General,—Motors fans and switches for tests ...	5,500	3,500	...	Do.
12	Attock,—Electrical light and punkah-pulling Installation at— ...	1,02,127	98,603	3,000	Will be completed during the year completion report is awaited.
13	Delhi,—Repairs, etc., of Durbar stores ...	13,844	6,694	...	Completed.
14	Delhi, Fort,—Electrical Installation ...	1,18,544	6,469	...	Work stopped by orders of Commander-in-Chief.
15	Roorkee,—Establishment of Electrical Workshop ..	59,500	59,768	...	Completion report is awaited.
16	Meerut,—Electrical Installation in Cantonment ...	4,60,800	1,42,081	2,20,000	Will be completed during the year.
17	Kidderpore Dockyard,—Electrical light and fans Marine House (Deputy Director's quarters) ...	3,560	...	2,400	Ditto ditto.

**PART II.**

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**Departmental History.**





## INTRODUCTORY.

*His Excellency the Right Honourable George Nathaniel, Baron Curzon of Kedleston, P.C., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E., took his seat as Viceroy and Governor-General of India on the 6th January 1899. Between the 1st May and 13th December 1904, His Excellency the Right Honourable Arthur Oliver Villiers, Baron Ampthill, G.C.I.E., Governor of Madras, succeeded to the office during the temporary absence of Lord Curzon, who then resumed his seat as Governor-General until the 18th November 1905, when he left the country.*

*In January 1899 the appointment of Commander-in-Chief in India was held temporarily by Lieutenant-General Sir C. E. Nairne, K.C.B., until the arrival of General Sir W. Lockhart, G.C.B., K.C.S.I., the permanent incumbent who died in 18th March 1900. General Sir A. P. Palmer, G.C.I.E., was then appointed provisional Commander-in-Chief, and was confirmed in the appointment on 19th March 1900. He was succeeded by General Viscount Kitchener, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., etc., on 28th November 1902.*

*At the time of Lord Curzon's assumption of office the Member of Council in charge of the Military Department was the Hon'ble Major-General Sir Edwin Henry Hayter Collen, K.C.I.E., C.B., (appointed G.C.I.E., 1st January 1901). On expiry of his tenure in April 1901, General Collen was succeeded by the Hon'ble Major-General Sir Edmond Roche Elles, K.C.B. R.A., who assumed office on the 11th April 1901. This officer received the order of Knighthood of the Indian Empire on the 1st January 1904, and has held office until the departure of Lord Curzon for Europe.*

*The appointments in the Military Department and in the departments of the Army directly subordinate to the Military Department have been filled by the following officers during Lord Curzon's tenure of office:—*

*Secretary.*

Major-General P. J. Maitland, C.B., I.A.

Major-General Sir E. G. Barrow, K.C.B., I.A.

Major-General E. DeBrath, C.I.E., I.A.

Colonel H. B. B. Watkis, I.A. (Officiating).

*1st Deputy Secretary.*

Colonel E. G. Barrow, C.B., I.A.

Colonel E. DeBrath, I.A.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. B. Wilson, I.A.  
(Officiating).Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel H. Mullaly, R.E.  
(Officiating *pro tem.*)Colonel M. H. S. Grover, I.A. (Officiating  
*pro tem.*)

Colonel H. B. B. Watkis, I.A. \*

Lieutenant-Colonel H. T. Kenny, I.A.  
(Officiating).*2nd Deputy Secretary.*

Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel E. DeBrath, I.A.

Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) F. G.  
Cardew, I.A.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. T. Kenny, I.A.

Major W. A. Liddell, R.E. (Officiating).

Major B. Holloway, I.A. (Officiating).

*Assistant Secretaries.*

Major J. Dallas, R.E.	Captain W. B. Douglas, I.A. (Officiating).
Major H. F. S. Ramsden, I.A.	Captain H. C. Holman (Additional).
Captain C. H. Selwyn, I.A.	Brevet-Major F. J. Moberly, D.S.O., I.A.
Captain F. G. Cardew, I.A.	Captain J. H. Hudson, I.A. (Officiating).
Captain I. Phillips, I.A. (Officiating).	Captain H. W. R. Senior, I.A. (Officiating).
Captain T. A. Harrison, I.A.	Captain S. W. King, I.A. (temporary Additional).
Captain H. T. Kenny, I.A.	Captain H. H. F. Turner, I.A. (temporary Additional).
Captain W. A. Liddell, R.E.	Captain H. G. W. Chandler, I.A.
Brevet-Major W. G. L. Beynon, D.S.O., I.A. (Additional).	Captain R. F. G. Bond, R.E. (Officiating).
Captain A. R. H. Garden, I.A. (temporary)	Major A. H. Bridges, I.A. (Officiating).
Captain B. Holloway, I.A.	

## DEPARTMENTS.

<i>Accountant-General, Military Department.</i>	<i>Director-General of Ordnance in India.</i>	<i>Director-General, Military Works.</i>
Colonel J. A. Miley, C.S.I., I.A.	Major-General R. Wace, C.B., R.A.	Major-General S. C. Turner, R.E.
Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. LeG. Anderson, C.B., I.A.	Major-General C. H. Scott, C.B., R.A.	Major-General W. T. Shone, C.B., D.S.O., R.E.
Brevet-Colonel H. F. S. Ramsden, I.A. (Officiating).		Major-General H. W. Duperier, R.E.
		Colonel S. Grant, R.E. (Officiating).
<i>Director-General, Supply and Transport (late Commissariat Department), now Director-General of Contracts and Registration.</i>	<i>Director-General, Army Remount Department.</i>	<i>Director of Army Clothing.</i>
Major-General T. F. Hobday, C.B., I.A.	Colonel H. Goad, A.-D.-C., I.A.	Lieutenant-Colonel P. A. Buckland, I.A.
Major-General L. W. Christopher, C.B., I.A.	*Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Broome, I.A. (Officiating).	Lieutenant-Colonel H. R. Marrett, I.A.
Major-General H. M. P. Hawkes, C.B.		

*Marine Department.*

Captain W. S. Goodridge, R.N.

Captain G. H. Hewett, R. N.

In the period under review, the following officers have held the principal appointments at Army Head Quarters :—

*Adjutant General.*

Major-General Sir W. G. Nicholson, K.C.B., British Service.  
 Major-General Sir E. R. Elles, K.C.B., British Service (Officiating).  
 Major-General H. L. Smith-Dorrien, D.S.O., British Service.  
 Major-General B. Duff, C.B., C.I.E., Indian Army.

*Quarter Master General.*

Brigadier-General Sir A. Gaselee, K.C.B., Indian Army (Officiating).  
 Major-General G. Henry, Continuous Service Royal Engineers.  
 Major-General Sir J. W. Murray, K.C.B., British Service.  
 Major-General H. O. Sclater, C.B., British Service.

## CHAPTER IV.

## DETAILS OF FRONTIER POLICY.

## Withdrawal of Troops from the North-West Frontier.

## CHITRAL.

In connection with the general organisation of the military forces on the frontier the Secretary of State in January 1898 drew the attention of Lord Elgin's Government to the necessity for concentration, and for the retention of regular troops on the most important lines of communication alone. The Government of India was also asked to consider the advisability of strengthening such posts as might be designed for defence by regular troops.

In the following June the Government of India replied that the reasons which had led to the occupation of Chitral in 1895 would necessitate the retention of troops there for some considerable time. In November of the same year it was, however, stated that the eventual reduction of the Chitral garrison to a single battalion was possible, and that the force should be concentrated in a strongly fortified post at Chitral. If feasible, it was intended that levies should be raised to hold Drosh and certain other posts.

The wisdom of these proposals was questioned by Lord Curzon, who pointed out that the real danger of our position in Chitral lay in the 70 miles of road between Chakdara and Dir, that is in Pathan and not Chitral territory. Consequently in his opinion it was essential that the garrison, reduced to one battalion, should be located as near to the Lowarai pass as possible, preferably at Upper Drosh. To guard against the contingency of a serious attack being made against a single regiment marching in relief of the Chitral garrison, Lord Curzon proposed that the second battalion then quartered in Chitral should, on the occasion of the annual relief, be utilised as escort as far as to the Lowarai Pass, but that it should ordinarily form part of the garrison of the Malakand or of the moveable column at Khar. It was decided, accordingly, that an officer should be deputed to Chitral for the purpose of reporting on the best arrangements practicable for a reduced force of one battalion. For this duty Colonel Thurburn, R.E., was selected, and, pending the receipt of his recommendations, the annual Chitral reliefs were postponed from the spring to the autumn of 1899.

On receipt of Colonel Thurburn's report the following measures were decided on, and subsequently received the sanction of the Secretary of State:—

- (a) The reduction of the garrison of the Chitral Valley by one battalion after the completion of defensive works; the strength of the future garrison being fixed at 1 battalion, 2 mountain guns, and 1 Company of Sappers and Miners.
- (b) The location at Upper Drosh of the whole of the Chitral garrison, except one and a half companies stationed in Chitral fort as an escort to the political officer. It was intended that the fort at Upper Drosh should be enlarged as cheaply as possible, and so designed that it might be defensible by two and a half companies after the moveable column had moved out.

Order in Council,  
dated 3rd March  
1899.

Order in Council,  
dated 21st April  
1899.

Despatch No. 84,  
dated 4th May 1899.  
(Appendix No. 4.)

- (c) The provision of such additional defensive works as were necessary for the greater security of Chitral fort and bridge.
- (d) The constitution of a body of 200 Chitral levies under the already existing tribal system.
- (e) The improvement of the road from Chitral to Gupis by blasting a mule track at the important "*paris*."

Shortly afterwards effect was given to these decisions. The fort at Upper Drosh was reconstructed on the lines proposed at a cost of Rs. 2,67,600. An expenditure of Rs. 75,000 was incurred on the improvement of the road from Chitral to Gupis. The reduction of the Chitral garrison by one battalion and half a field hospital was effected in the autumn reliefs of 1899. Recently the garrison has been still further reduced by six sections of Sappers and Miners.

In 1902 the Defence Committee urged the importance of establishing telegraphic communication between Gilgit and Chitral, already recommended by Colonel Thurburn. Sanction was given in the following year to the construction of the line, which was incorporated in the general system of Imperial telegraphs for working and maintenance.

M. D. letter No.  
644-M. W., dated  
28th February 1903.

#### COMMUNICATIONS WITH CHITRAL AND THE SWAT VALLEY.

Despatch No. 97,  
dated 23rd June  
1898.

In relation to the maintenance of communications with Chitral Lord Elgin's Government proposed the construction of works impregnable against tribal attack, at the Malakand, Chakdara and Dargai, for occupation by 2 battalions of Native Infantry and 1 squadron of cavalry. Moreover since, in their opinion, the scheme of defence would not be complete without a supporting force, they proposed to retain in the position it then occupied the moveable column\* stationed at Khar, a village situated between the Malakand and Chakdara. The future strength and

- \* 1 Squadron of Native Cavalry.
- 1 Mountain Battery.
- 2 Native Infantry battalions.
- 1 Company of Sappers and Miners.

Despatch No. 90,  
dated 25th August  
1898.

location of this force were questions reserved for consideration when matters had reached a more settled stage. It was intimated that the Chakdara bridge would need improvement or re-construction. In sanctioning these proposals the Secretary of State suggested that the supporting force would be more satisfactorily placed at or near Nowshera, from whence the Malakand garrison could be supported promptly and effectively in case of need by the railway which was then projected. It was, however, agreed as a temporary expedient that the moveable column should remain at Khar, pending the opening of the railway from Nowshera to Dargai, and until fanaticism had lost its influence over the tribes in the vicinity.

In the meantime work had progressed on the more urgent buildings in connection with the Malakand and Chakdara defences. Subsequently an estimate was accepted amounting to Rs. 2,27,776, for completing the accommodation and defences of the Malakand Kotā on a much more modest scale than had originally been contemplated.

A year later (1900) the question of the retention of the moveable column at Khar was again raised; but it appeared desirable that the force should remain in the Swat Valley until the close of the financial year of 1900-01, when it was hoped that the Nowshera-Dargai railway would

be open, that the Malakand defences would be complete, and that another relief of the Chitral garrison would have been safely carried out. When the time for withdrawal approached there was some difference of opinion regarding the safety of the measure. Sir Power Palmer, having regard to the approaching completion of the railway, advocated the removal of the column at the end of 1900, and its location at Nowshera ; but the political authorities strongly protested against withdrawal or even reduction. In March 1900, the railway being finished, the Commander-in-Chief again recommended the immediate reduction of the strength of the column: the new Political Agent (Captain Archer), however, urged the necessity for the presence of the troops until the completion of the fort at Dargai, and of the new bridge at Chakdara. Lord Curzon was strongly opposed to these protracted delays and intimated that he was prepared to assume the responsibility which the local and political officers were too timid to undertake. It was however, eventually decided to postpone reduction of the column until after the passage of the Chitral reliefs in the autumn of 1901 ; then the force was reduced to 1 battalion, 1 mountain battery and 1 company of sappers.

Finally, these remaining troops were dispersed in May 1902 because of the danger to which such a small force was exposed, when camped in the open. At this date a fortified serai (costing about Rs. 2,50,000) was in process of construction at Dargai ; and the old bridge at Chakdara was being replaced by a new bridge (cost Rs. 4,62,685), capable of carrying a 2' 6" gauge railway. This bridge was subsequently opened for traffic in March 1903, by His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught. The completion of these roads and defences has rendered communications with Chitral secure. For the immediate support of the Malakand in case of attack a moveable column has been organised, consisting of 1 regiment of Native Cavalry, 1 battery of Native Mountain Artillery, 1 Company of Sappers and Miners and 3 battalions of Native Infantry—in all 3,200 combatants. A reserve column has also been detailed comprising 1 battery, Native Mountain Artillery, 2 battalions of British Infantry, 3 battalions of Native Infantry, 1 Company of Sappers and Miners, with auxiliary units. Combined, these columns will form a field force of nearly 8,000 combatants.

#### THE KHYBER.

After the close of the operations against the Afridis in January 1898, a full brigade of infantry, supported by a battery of mountain artillery and a Company of Sappers and Miners, was stationed at Landi Kotal pending the decision of Government as to the permanent arrangements which should be made for the occupation of the Khyber.

In respect to the Khyber Pass Lord Elgin's Government rejecting proposals for the retention in the place of regular troops, had in July 1898 recommended to the Secretary of State the construction of a fort or strong post at Landi Kotal on the elevation known as Suffolk Hill, together with the improvement of the waterworks and of the existing defensible serai ; as well as the reconstruction or improvement of the defences of other posts on the route. It was intended that these defences should be garrisoned by an irregular corps under British officers, named the Khyber Militia. Exclusive of the light railway which it was intended to construct in the Khyber, the works included in this scheme were estimated to cost about Rs. 15 lakhs ; the fort on Suffolk Hill accounted for 8½ lakhs of this amount.

Despatch No. 106-  
Military, dated 7th  
July 1898.  
(Appendix No. 5.)

The scheme comprised the maintenance for the support of the militia of a moveable column, consisting of the 1st Infantry Brigade of the field army quartered at Peshawar and Nowshera, and of a complement of sappers and miners, artillery, and cavalry from other stations. The troops of the column were to remain in their respective stations unless required to concentrate at Peshawar, where the necessary transport, supplies, etc., would be maintained in readiness.

Despatch No. 18,  
dated 5th August 1898.

The Secretary of State sanctioned any expenditure on works that might be required for the force to be placed eventually in the Khyber, and agreed, subject to such further consideration as might be needed after fuller experience, that both Landi Kotal and the Khyber should be garrisoned by a militia.

Note of 30th  
January 1899.

In January 1899, Sir E. Collen raised the question whether the great expenditure incurred by the up-keep of a brigade at Landi Kotal could not be reduced. The matter was submitted to Lord Curzon who pointed out that it was first necessary to decide the nature of the military and strategical dispositions required to carry out the policy laid down in broad outline by the Secretary of State. Terms had been made with the Afridis, their allowances had been restored, and they had been informed that a militia would be recruited from them; but on the other hand Government retained a free hand to construct roads or a railway through the pass; and to maintain a garrison at Landi Kotal or elsewhere as seemed to them to be desirable. Then, accepting the necessity for two battalions of militia, each 600 strong, on terms of service distinct from those of the regular army, Lord Curzon proceeded to discuss the nature of the fortification which should be constructed at Landi Kotal, and demonstrated the futility of a elaborate fort seeing that the garrison would ordinarily be composed of Afridi irregulars. Finally, in regard to the proposal to make a road-bed for a narrow gauge railway from Peshawar to Landi Kotal, His Excellency pointed out that the Kabul river line must be the true and inevitable line of railway advance, and consequently that the future policy of Government ought not to be compromised by the premature construction of a parallel line in another and less desirable quarter. Moreover it appeared that the advantage gained by the existence of a subsidiary line of railway to Landi Kotal would not be worth the cost of its construction. For political reasons, the offence it would give to the Afridis, the danger of obstruction on their part, and the general effect which would be produced by the permanent occupation of the pass, the construction of a railway on the Khyber alignment was undesirable.

His Excellency proposed that the organisation of the Khyber militia should be proceeded with; that the plans of the defences and works at Landi Kotal should be revised with a view to the reduction of expenditure; that the strength of the regular brigade in the Khyber should be reduced at an early date; and that the Government of India should abandon the proposal to prepare a road-bed for a 2' 6" gauge railway from Peshawar to Landi Kotal. These suggestions were not fully accepted by the Commander-in-Chief, whose opinion had previously been expressed in favour of the garrisoning of Landi Kotal by regular troops. Sir William Lockhart represented the desirability of planting a strong fort, armed with artillery, at Landi Kotal to serve not only as an advanced base, which in the event of a rapid advance into Afghanistan, would permit of a reduction of the number of troops on the lines of communication, and



as a *point d'appui* to a force acting on the defensive : but principally for the purpose of dominating the pass. Should it not be possible to commence a railway by the Kabul River route during the life of Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, Sir William Lockhart recommended the construction of a narrow gauge line from Jamrud to Landi Kotal.

After discussion in Council, the Government of India recommended that the force holding Landi Kotal and the Khyber should be a local force, called the Khyber Rifles, composed of 1,200 men, divided into 2 battalions with a staff of 6 British officers in all. The original proposals were much modified. The contemplated fort on Suffolk Hill was abandoned and, in lieu, improvements in the existing defensible serai were alone suggested, with the addition of four blockhouses in the vicinity; the total cost being estimated at Rs. 1,90,000. A reduction was also promised in the former estimates of 6 lakhs for the posts in the Khyber between Landi Kotal and Jamrud. The extension of the main line of railway from Peshawar to Jamrud was recommended in preference to the proposed road-bed for a lighter line up the Khyber; the construction of a railway towards Dacca along the Kabul river bank being postponed in view of the objection raised by the Amir to the existence of any railway in his territory, and because of the absence of a suitable terminus within our border. The reduction of the Khyber brigade was also proposed.

Despatch No. 81,  
dated 4th May 1899,  
to Secretary of State.  
(Appendix No. 6.)

Despatch No. 141,  
dated 20th July 1899,  
to Secretary of State.  
(Appendix No. 7.)

With the approval of the Secretary of State all these measures were carried out. The Khyber Rifles were duly organised, and have proved entirely satisfactory in their conduct. The defences of Landi Kotal and the pass were eventually completed for a sum of about 3½ lakhs, that is, at a saving of 11½ lakhs on the initial cost of the original proposals. The railway was extended to Jamrud without any opposition on the part of the Afridis, at a time when their attention was diverted elsewhere; no trouble has been experienced in its working. The brigade of troops was withdrawn from the Khyber in December 1899, after the recruitment of the Khyber Rifles to their full strength. Finally four days' supplies for the Khyber moveable columns were stored at Landi Kotal.

Since the withdrawal of regular troops the history of the internal administration of the Khyber has been without serious incident, and therefore has been thoroughly successful. The Afridis have witnessed the decline of their power over the Khyber route in consequence of the construction of a subsidiary communication through the Mullagori country; and more recently still have been confronted with the commencement of the important railway on the Kabul river bank which will entirely destroy all vestige of their control. Nevertheless, so far from showing active hostility to these measures, the tribesmen the Khyber rifles have proved themselves loyal and efficient soldiers of the King in such frontier disputes with the Amir's subjects as have taken place.

For immediate reinforcement of the Militia Garrisons in the Khyber, a moveable column has been organised from the troops in the Peshawar division, consisting of 2 battalions of British Infantry, the same number of Native Infantry, a squadron of Native Cavalry, 1 British Mountain Battery, 1 battery of Royal Field Artillery, 1 company of Sappers and Miners, and other auxiliary units.



## THE SAMANA AND MIRANZAI.

Lord Curzon has summarised as follows the events connected with the locality which took place prior to his assumption of office :—

“ After the termination of the frontier war in 1897, the Government of India entered upon a discussion of their future military and political policy along the entire line of the North-Western border from Chitral to Waziristan. In this discussion the treatment of the position on the Samana Ridge naturally played an important part. A good deal of difference of opinion being displayed at head-quarters, it was decided to appoint an expert Committee to advise the Government on the subject. This Committee reported in May 1898, submitting two proposals, known henceforward as Scheme A and Scheme B.

“ The essence of Scheme A was the maintenance of a strong garrison of one battalion Native infantry, forty gunners, four mountain guns, and two guns of position at one point upon the Samana Range, *viz.*, Fort Lockhart, the occupation of five other posts upon or near to the ridge by police, and the abandonment of the remaining positions. The object of this powerful garrison was that a moveable column of 500 rifles and 4 guns might always be available to move about the ridge. Meanwhile a larger moveable column of two battalions, four squadrons and a mountain battery for the support of the Samana position was provided for by a proposed increase of the garrison of Kohat; and it was suggested that an advanced section of this moveable column, consisting of two squadrons of cavalry, might be detached from their base and kept at Kurram and Hangu, where lines would require to be built for them, and that a reserve of supplies for two months should also be maintained at Hangu under the cavalry detachment to be stationed there. Thus this scheme provided in reality for three moveable columns or detachments of differing strength and motive, *viz.*, (1) a moveable column on the ridge to protect the post on the latter; (2) a small detached moveable column of cavalry below the ridge to support No. 1; and (3) a large moveable column at Kohat to support both No. 1 and No. 2. The cost of these proposals was estimated at 7 lakhs (including 2 lakhs required in any case for new lines at Kohat).

“ The Committee further strongly recommended the construction of a light gauge frontier railway from Khushalgarh to Kohat (32 miles), and expressed a desire to see it extended from Kohat to Thal (61 miles); the estimated cost of such a line from Khushalgarh to Thal (93 miles) being 37 lakhs. The existence of this railway would, they held, enable the force on the Kohat-Kurram line to be ultimately reduced by one battalion of Native infantry.

“ Scheme B was of an entirely different character. It did not propose any moveable column or extensive garrison upon the ridge itself. The latter was to be held by comparatively small posts—two of them (Forts Lockhart and Cavagnari) garrisoned by regulars—the remainder by police; and for their support a moveable column of two battalions, four squadrons, and six guns was to be located at Hangu, Togh, or Doaba, in the Miranzai Valley below the range, Kohat retaining its ordinary garrison. The initial cost of this scheme would be a little under 3 lakhs. But the cost of the proposed cantonment in Miranzai was calculated at 7 to 8 lakhs. A railway from Khushalgarh to Kohat, and if possible to Thal, was a concomitant of Scheme B equally with Scheme A.

"Scheme A was accordingly adopted by the Government of India, and formally recommended by them to the Secretary of State in a despatch dated August 4th, 1898. While stating the reasons for this decision, the despatch nevertheless contained a remarkable paragraph (3) indicating the desire entertained by the Government of India to withdraw our troops from the Samana as soon as such a course could be adopted with dignity and safety.

"Before a reply had been received from the Secretary of State, Sir W. Lockhart, who had succeeded as Commander-in-Chief, \* \* \* signified his acceptance of Scheme A 'in so far as it referred to the Samana Range and Kurram Valley' (*i.e.*, a very small segment of the scheme only), but advocated an increase of the supporting garrisons beyond and above that considered necessary by the Committee, and further recommended the construction of a new cantonment at Togh for a moveable column of two battalions, one regiment of cavalry, and one native mountain battery; Kohat being in his opinion unhealthy and unsuitable for the purposes either of a larger garrison than at present, or as the base of a moveable column. He also advocated the construction of a light railway from Kushalgarh to Kohat. The entire initial cost of Sir W. Lockhart's proposal is estimated at eleven lakhs, or, if we exclude the two lakhs that would, under Scheme A, require to be spent upon new lines at Kohat, nine lakhs; in other words, an excess of 4 lakhs over and above the proposals sent home by the Government of India."

It will be seen that the distribution recommended by Sir William Lockhart more closely approximated Scheme B than Scheme A. This resemblance was accentuated by a later proposal that the garrison of regulars on the Samana should be divided between Forts Lockhart and Cavagnari.

The Viceroy then raised the question whether it was obligatory or desirable that the Samana should remain in military occupation. It had already been admitted that Imperial policy would not be affected by a garrison on the ridge since it would neither assist nor hinder movement by the Kurram valley to or from Afghanistan. Nor in order to protect the Miranzai road and valley was it necessary to locate a force in a position which suffered from so many military disadvantages in relation to configuration of ground and indefensibility of water-supply. This object could be accomplished in other ways. The strongest argument in favour of the retention of a military garrison was the loss of prestige which would be occasioned by retirement. In these circumstances His Excellency opposed any additional expenditure on the fortification of the Samana, other than that which might be essential, pending the transfer of the forts to the border militia or police—a Native force under British officers to whom he proposed to hand over gradually both the Kurram and Samana. But with these proposals he coupled two conditions, namely, the construction of a light railway from Kushalgarh to Kohat and the examination of the question of forming a cantonment in the Miranzai valley, for the support both of the Kurram and the Samana.

On the assumption that the Samana was to be abandoned as a military station, Sir W. Lockhart thought that the forts there might be held by a mixed body called the "Samana Rifles," if organised on the lines of the Khyber Corps. But he considered that the Samana should remain a cantonment because it was healthy and would relieve pressure in stations below, besides possessing obvious

advantages as a military post of observation. The complete abandonment of the ridge would in his opinion injure our prestige and leave the inhabitants of the Miranzai valley exposed to tribal raids, from which they had suffered during many years previous to 1890. He recommended the improvement of the defences of Forts Lockhart and Cavagnari, and the location of the supporting force in the Miranzai valley. Sir E. Collen considered that entire withdrawal from the Samana had become impossible; that it would be looked upon as a sign of surrender and weakness, and would be followed by an extensive series of raids involving costly retaliatory measures. Strategically he did not consider that the Samana had any special value except in a purely local sense; but it protected the Miranzai Valley more efficiently than a chain of posts on the road below; commanded the road into Orakzai and Afridi country; and, moreover, covered the road from Kohat to Thal and the Kurram in a part of the frontier where the road runs parallel to the frontier, and therefore possesses the disadvantage of a line of communication parallel to the enemy's front. He was accordingly in favour of locating a garrison of not less than one battalion and four mountain guns in strong forts on the ridge, and preferred concentration of the whole at Fort Lockhart to dispersion between that post and Fort Cavagnari. He agreed to the formation of a corps of Samana Rifles, and of placing them, in the first instance, in Fort Cavagnari and the minor posts, awaiting events before finally withdrawing the regular troops.

Order in Council  
on the 24th of March  
1899.

It was then decided in Council that a force of 450 military police should be organised for duty on the Samana; that the withdrawal of regular troops both from the Samana and from the Kurram should be contingent on the formation of a new cantonment in the Miranzai Valley for the support of both positions; and that when the police had been raised, the Punjab Government should be asked to advise as to the desirability of withdrawing the garrison of regular troops from the Samana. Subject to the result of enquiries which were being made, it was agreed to recommend to the Secretary of State the construction of a light military railway on the 2' 6" gauge, from Kushalgarh to Kohat.

The Government of the Punjab at once proposed that the garrison of Shinawari (a wing of Native infantry) should be reduced to 70 rifles, and that the withdrawal of this reduced detachment should be effected on the completion of the remodelment of the fort, which should then be handed over to the border police; also that the squadron of cavalry located in the Miranzai Valley, then divided between Usterzai ( $\frac{1}{2}$  squadron), Hangu ( $\frac{1}{2}$  squadron), and Kai ( $\frac{1}{2}$  squadron), should be concentrated at Hangu. In the following month the local Government submitted proposals for the employment of military police in place of regulars for the defence of the Samana, after a period of not less than 18 months, as the ultimate transfer would be contingent on the establishment of a cantonment in the Miranzai Valley.

Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 208-Foreign Department, dated 26th October 1899.  
(Appendix No. 2.)

These decisions and the opinion of the Punjab Government were communicated to the Secretary of State, and with his sanction the measures were proceeded with.

The establishment of a cantonment in the Miranzai Valley had hitherto been considered an essential part of any scheme for the occupation of the

Samana. Accordingly a Committee had been ordered to assemble in April 1899 for the purpose of determining the most suitable site for a moveable column of a Native mountain battery, a Native cavalry regiment, and 2 regiments of Native infantry. The Committee submitted its preliminary report on the 1st May. They chose the Torawari position which, from a political point of view, was pronounced by Mr. L. White-King (Deputy Commissioner) to be all that could be desired; strategically it was well placed, as from thence a moveable column could reach Thal, Shinawari, or the Samana in a single march. The final report of the Committee was received in the Military Department in June 1899, when the total cost of the new cantonment was placed at 20 lakhs approximately. A month later it was reported that the water-supply of the new cantonment would offer great difficulties.

The large increase in the estimates of expenditure which had previously been stated to be about 7 or 8 lakhs only, conjoined with a fresh proposal by the Commander-in-Chief for an increase of the moveable column by one battalion, awakened doubts in Lord Curzon's mind as to the desirability of constructing a new cantonment at Torawari, which is within 50 miles of Kohat. The suitability of the site being also questionable, he proposed the construction only of an experimental camp in the first instance, until experience had been gained of the locality. Sir William Lockhart concurred in this suggestion and, with the approval of the Secretary of State, orders were issued for the formation of a camp of this nature for a garrison of 2 guns, 2 squadrons of Native cavalry and one regiment of Native infantry. The experimental camp, however, on investigation promised to prove to be more expensive than had been anticipated, since it was necessary to provide accommodation of a semi-permanent type, so that the troops might not suffer in health. The expenditure thus threatened to exceed 1 lakh. Accordingly on the 18th April 1900 at a Conference held between Their Excellencies the Viceroy, the Commander-in-Chief and the Hon'ble Military Member, it was decided that the proposed railway would afford the means of supporting the Samana and Kurram posts to a sufficient extent without the establishment of a cantonment at Torawari, and that the experimental camp might be abandoned. Orders for the withdrawal of the troops were issued on the 30th of April. In coming to this decision the Government of India was actuated by the altered circumstances of the case. The cantonment scheme had been the outcome of two main causes—(1) the military necessity for affording support to the militia outposts in the event of trouble, and (2) the alleged unsuitability of the existing cantonment of Kohat for this purpose, owing to indifferent water-supply, and to its distance from the Samana and the Kurram. Conditions, however, had altered. Improvements had been effected in the water-supply of Kohat, which would greatly ameliorate the health of that station. The early construction of the Kushalgarh-Kohat railway, with an extension in the direction of Hangu and possibly to Thal, was contemplated. The military and civil authorities on the frontier at the later date, moreover, were unanimous in the opinion that a more effective support would be given both to the Samana and the Kurram positions, and a greater degree of general security to the Kohat-Bannu section of the border, by the existence of a railway than by the creation of a cantonment at Torawari. The distances between strategic points are small. From Kohat to Hangu, at the foot of the Samana, is only 25 miles; while Thal, in the Kurram

valley, lies only 35 miles further away. A situation on the Samana, or in the Kurram could scarcely be contemplated in which railway connection with Kohat would not supply military relief or support with a celerity adequate to the emergency; and at least equal, if not superior, to that which would be afforded by a cantonment at Torawari. Besides, the addition of a second permanent cantonment within 50 miles of Kohat, whilst entailing very great initial and recurring expense, would also duplicate the possible points of attack upon this portion of the frontier, and would necessitate the shutting up of an additional body of troops for the defence of the cantonment, in the event of a serious rising or emergency. Moreover, it was intended to further strengthen the strategical position of Kohat by the construction of a cart road through the Kohat pass connecting that place with Peshawar.

Military despatch  
No. 82, dated 7th  
June 1900, to Secre-  
tary of State.  
(Appendix No. 10.)

The intention to abandon the proposal for a cantonment at Torawari was communicated to the Secretary of State, and was sanctioned by him. The other measures contemplated by Government for the control of the Samana were meanwhile making good progress. Fort Lockhart, Crag Picquet, Dhar Post and Fort Cavagnari (Gulistan) had by this time been remodelled at a cost of Rs. 78,000; and preliminary arrangements had been made for the railway between Kushalgarh and Kohat. The transfer of the Samana posts from the military to the newly-raised corps of Samana rifles was, however, a question which offered some difficulty. Although they had reached a fair stage of efficiency in drill and equipment by the end of the year 1900, the Government of the Punjab deprecated the withdrawal of the regular troops until the railway had been opened from Kohat to Hangu. The Government of India were however desirous of making a commencement with their policy of transfer, and accordingly two minor posts (Dhar and Sangar) were occupied by the levies in February 1901. Later in the year the Punjab Government again prescribed the same condition as a preliminary to the transfer of the more important posts to the militia, and as they were supported in their opinion by the military advisers of Government, it was decided to postpone action until the spring of 1902. In May 1901 the Punjab Government, being again asked to fix an approximate date for the transference of the remaining posts replied on the 12th August that, although the Samana Rifles were ready to take over at once, it was still considered inadvisable to make the change until the railway had reached Hangu.

In January of the following year the Government of India formally consulted Colonel Deane, Agent to the Governor-General, North-West Frontier Province, regarding the desirability of withdrawing the regular troops from the Samana, and received a report in which he stated that the corps of Samana Rifles were under-officered, that the strength was insufficient to provide adequate garrisons for the Samana posts, and also that the men were underpaid and consequently discontented. He therefore proposed various measures for the improvement of the conditions of service of the men; the appointment of additional officers; and either the increase of the corps or the retention of Shinawari Fort by the regular troops. This report came somewhat as a surprise to the Government of India who had previously been informed that the Corps was in a creditable state of efficiency. They decided that in the circumstances, Fort Lockhart must remain in the hands of regular troops, but that the remaining posts, including Shinawari, should be transferred to

Council Order, dated  
31st March 1902.

Letter No. 876-C.  
to Quarter Master  
General in India.



the Samana Rifles, who were also entrusted for a short time with the duty of guarding the recently constructed line of railway from Kohat to Thal. To this measure Colonel Deane agreed, after the terms of service of the men had been improved; the transfer was duly carried out in May 1902, and reported to the Secretary of State in December of this year. A few months previously the regular garrison of Fort Lockhart had been reduced by 2 mountain guns. The remaining men of the mountain artillery (2 guns) were withdrawn and replaced by a detachment of the Frontier Garrison artillery in July 1904.

Towards the end of 1903 the question of withdrawing the regular garrison from Fort Lockhart came again under consideration. Lord Kitchener, though strongly supporting the general policy of making over frontier posts to militia, hesitated in the case of Fort Lockhart because, in the event of the militia proving disloyal, its great strength might render recapture a matter of difficulty. Considered as troops, the Commander-in-Chief thought that the Samana Rifles were distinctly inferior to other frontier militia corps, and that they were also lacking in training and discipline. Moreover he pointed out that one-half of the force was composed of Orakzais, who could hardly be expected to stand the strain of local influence in case of serious trouble in that quarter. In his opinion the security of the railway was greatly enhanced by the presence of regulars in Fort Lockhart since it lay on the line of retreat of any tribal force which might attempt to sever railway communications. In this opinion the Commander-in-Chief had the support of Sir Edmond Elles as well as of the local military authorities.

The views of Colonel Deane—expressed in March 1904—were in direct opposition. He saw no reason for reversing the opinion he had given after the improvement of the organisation of the Samana Rifles that the transfer might be effected without further delay, and pointed out that the loss of Fort Lockhart itself would in no way augment the difficulty of retaking the Samana, for no Pathan tribal force would contemplate the occupation of such a fort in the face of an attack, as they would thereby place themselves in a position endangering their retreat. Nor did he consider that the presence of troops in Fort Lockhart would have an appreciable influence on the protection of the Miranzai Valley or of the Kohat-Thal railway. It was not as if those troops could constantly move about and intercept raiding parties; for an isolated fort on the top of a flanking mountain, merely occupied by troops, could offer no obstacle to moving gangs of thieves or raiders with the whole country-side open to them.

Agent to Governor  
General's letter No.  
489-P., dated 13th  
March 1904, to  
Foreign Department.

Lord Kitchener, seeing the divergence of opinion which existed between the civil and military authorities, advocated the postponement of the question for a year, when, he hoped, it might be possible to withdraw the military objections to the course recommended by the authorities of the Frontier Province. Lord Curzon was in entire accord with Colonel Deane but agreed to defer further consideration of the question until his return to India in the autumn of 1904.

The matter was again discussed in January and June 1905, but on the first occasion the military advisers of Government deprecated the transfer of Fort Lockhart to the Samana Rifles on the ground that there had been some unrest among the Afridis, and that it would be desirable to await the result of the

Foreign Department  
demi-official  
letter, dated 17th  
July 1905, to Agent  
to the Governor Gen-  
eral, North-West  
Frontier Province.

negotiations of the Dane Mission at Kabul. On the later date Lord Kitchener strongly opposed the measure on the ground that the safety of the Kurram line of communications, which under the new scheme of organisation of the Indian Army had become an essential feature of any advance into Afghanistan, must necessarily be placed beyond doubt in time of war, by the military occupation of the Samana. Sir Edmond Elles suggested a compromise which involved a change in constitution of the Samana Rifles hitherto entirely recruited from the Orakzais, and the gradual change of the garrison. This proposal was not acceptable to Lord Kitchener; and accordingly it was decided to maintain the *status quo*, with the reservation expressed by His Excellency the Viceroy, that the decision should not be held to be binding upon his successors.

In April 1904 the strength of the cavalry detachment at Hangu was reduced from 89 to 25 sabres, at which strength it was to remain as long as a cavalry detachment was maintained at Thal. At this time there were four posts on the Samana—three of which, Sangar, Dhar and Gulistan, were held by the Samana Rifles; the fourth and principal post, Fort Lockhart, being garrisoned by regular troops.

#### THE KURRAM VALLEY.

The Committee of 1898, which, with Brigadier-General Elles as president, dealt with the questions relating to the occupation of the Samana, also made a recommendation regarding the garrison of the Kurram Valley, which like that of the Samana forts, would necessarily rely for support upon the moveable column, stationed at Kohat or in the Miranzai Valley. They recommended the distribution between Parachinar, Sadda and Thal of a regular garrison of 1 battalion, 1 squadron of cavalry and 2 guns, and their proposals were supported by Sir William Lockhart. A detachment of this strength, but with 4 additional guns, was in occupation of the valley when Lord Curzon arrived in the country and when the whole question of frontier policy was under re-consideration.

His Excellency pointed out that as there existed an essential similarity in our positions on the Samana and in the Kurram, they should both be treated in the same way, and he questioned whether we did wisely in maintaining regulars in Kurram at all. On the assumption that the Kurram would never be used again as a main line of advance into Afghanistan, Lord Curzon deprecated the retention of troops in positions so far removed for support as the Kurram, and in a *cul-de-sac* from whence they could not be readily transferred when they were wanted for a forward move into Afghanistan, or for some other service of first-rate importance. He desired to see the Kurram handed over to local militia or police as soon as it could be done with safety; until such a course became possible, he recommended that the posts should be held temporarily by the police and the minimum indispensable garrison of regulars, endowing the forts with such additional temporary strength as might be necessary for their security. The other subsidiary measures involved, *viz.*, the construction of a railway to Kohat-Thal, and a cantonment in Miranzai, have already been referred to under the heading "Samana and Miranzai." With these views the Commander-in-Chief did not agree. Sir William Lockhart considered that under certain conceivable conditions it might be necessary to



use the Kurram route for an advance on Kabul, and that in any case we might be called upon to guard it. Supposing that the Khyber were strongly held by the Afghans aided by tribesmen, a turning movement, *via* the Kurram might give us an immense advantage. The road presents few difficulties for pack transport, except for the fact that the Shutargardan is blocked by snow for a few months in winter. On defensive grounds too, the holding of the Kurram route was, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, essential, for, assuming that our field armies held Jalalabad and Kandahar against an enemy established in Afghanistan, a hostile force might cut in between these two widely separated bodies, and gain our frontier by means of the Shutargardan pass. The location of regular troops in a position such as Togh or Doaba in Miranzai for the support of the Kurram met with Sir William Lockhart's entire approval.

Order in Council  
of 24th February  
1899.

After consideration of proposals made by the Punjab Government for the organisation of militia, the Government of India held that there would be no serious difficulty or risk attending the withdrawal of the regular troops from the Kurram Valley where the population was loyal, and communicated to the Secretary of State their recommendation for an increase to the Kurram militia, in the form of a second battalion, 400 strong, under police officers, the original battalion being given a more military organisation and being provided with additional officers. It was said for the support of both the Samana and the Kurram Valley that a new cantonment would be established in Miranzai. When the Secretary of State had accepted these proposals the organisation of the Kurram militia was proceeded with.

Despatch No. 3-  
Political, dated 4th  
January 1900.

(Appendix No. 3.)

In May 1901 the Punjab Government was asked when it would be possible for the militia to take over the posts, and replied that although the militia could do so at once, it was inadvisable, both in the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor and of the local officers, that such a step should be taken until the railway between Kohat and Thal, then under construction, was in a more advanced state, and until the Kurram posts had been placed in a thoroughly defensive condition. In this opinion His Honour had the support of the military authorities. A further objection to immediate transfer was the fact that the tribes bordering the Kurram were somewhat unsettled. Lord Curzon accepted the postponement only because the transfer might handicap, at its start, the administration of the new Frontier Province, but insisted that withdrawal should be effected in 1902, and that no further delay should take place in the improvement of the posts. Accordingly the works were pushed on with greater despatch, and during the next few months new posts were built at Chapri, Arawali and Teri Mangal in the Kurram Valley, and other posts were remodelled. A new fort was constructed near Sadda, and the defences of Parachinar Fort were also improved. The total cost of the works amounted to about Rs. 92,000.

Colonel Deane, Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province, reported in January 1902 that the slight difficulty with the tribes bordering the Kurram had blown over, and that regular troops might be withdrawn at the end of the following April. His proposal was agreed to with the modification that Thal should continue to be held by regulars until the completion of the railway. However, as the Parachinar and Sadda posts were not expected to be in a

defensible condition till the 15th June, withdrawal was postponed to that date when it was duly carried out. It was, however, decided that Thal, which is the present terminus of the railway, should continue to be held by a regular garrison of  $\frac{1}{4}$  squadron cavalry and 2 companies of infantry after the troops had evacuated Parachinar and Sadda. This is the present strength of the detachment in the fort.

#### KOHAT-BANNU DISTRICT.

It had been decided in 1896 to hand over certain posts and outposts in the Kohat and Bannu districts to Border Military Police, and thus relieve the regular troops of these duties; but the frontier outbreak of 1897 intervening, the transfer was postponed until after the cessation of operations. It was then taken up in connection with the general question of the military administration of the North-West Frontier.

Sanction was given in March 1899 to the substitution of Border Military Police for regular troops in Bahadur Khel, Fort Garnett, Mahomedzai and Latammar posts in the Kohat District. The total regular garrison of these posts had been 26 sabres and 108 rifles. At the same time the transfer of Jani Khel and Kurram in the Bannu District was agreed to, the combined regular garrisons of which were 12 sabres and 59 rifles. The former was not, however, finally handed over until May 1903, and Kurram continued to be held by a small detachment of 12 sabres. In 1904 Kurram was the only outpost held by regular troops in the Bannu district.

Tank in the Dera Ismail Khan District was made over to the Border Military Police on the recommendation of the Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province.

#### NORTH WAZIRISTAN. THE TOCHI VALLEY.

The history of the military occupation of this valley has been thus recounted by His Excellency Lord Curzon in a note, dated 19th June 1899—

“ It was in 1894 that the Government of India first invited the sanction of the Secretary of State to the inclusion of the Tochi Valley within the sphere of British responsibilities. This step was strongly recommended by the military authorities on strategical grounds. By the Tochi, it was declared, lay the most direct and easiest route to Ghazni (about 180 miles from Bannu). Invaders had once, it was believed, marched down to India this way; and upon the assumption, which has for some time underlain our military policy, that in the event of trouble in Afghanistan, we must occupy Ghazni, as well as Kabul and Kandahar, it was argued that by this way also ought we to march up. It was even suggested that there might be a Tochi railway in the not distant future.

“ These strategical considerations were backed by the arguments which have never been wanting in any recorded case of an extension of the Indian frontier, *viz.*—(1) that the inhabitants of the valley, the Dawaris or Dauris in the lower part, and the Darwesh Khel Wazirs further up, were exceedingly anxious for our protection; (2) that the valley was required as a sanitarium for our fever-stricken troops at Bannu.

\*     \*     \*     \*     \*

"Meanwhile I must revert for a moment to follow the parallel (but often, as it seems to me, inconsistent) movements of our policy, in respect of the Tochi, as laid down by the Secretary of State, and as carried out by the Government of India on the spot, from the date when the occupation of the valley was first sanctioned. When Sir H. Fowler in 1894 originally authorised a policy of more effective protection and closer relations with the headmen of the Wazirs, he said (in a despatch, dated August 24th, 1894)—"Since I sanction with reluctance any assumption of fresh responsibilities and any increase of the public expenditure, I do so in this instance on the understanding that your interference with the tribes and your outlay of money in Waziristan will be kept within the narrowest limits that are practicable." The manner in which these intentions were carried out has been as follows. In April 1895 the Maliks of the Dawaris and Wazirs in the Tochi valley asked to be taken under British protection, and to be given service and allowances. In the case of the Dawaris, the Government of India went further; for besides paying their Maliks, and raising tribal levies from their ranks, we took revenue from them, informed them in jirga, through the Commissioner of the Derajat in January 1896, that "the Government of India accepted their offer to remain under the British Government," and thus practically incorporated them in the British Empire. Nevertheless our position required at an early date to be consolidated by some visible evidence of power; and the garrison planted in the Tochi valley, from the time of occupation down to the outbreak in 1897, consisted of 2 battalions of native infantry, 1 squadron of native cavalry, 4 mountain guns and 4 maxims. Detailed proposals for the location of this garrison, \* \* were made to the Secretary of State in May 1895, stress being laid on the strategical advantages of the Tochi, on its salubrious qualities, and on the political results to be secured by a Tochi-*cum*-Wana military occupation. The Liberal Government then went out; and the present Secretary of State, on coming into office in August 1895, reiterated the conditions laid down by his predecessor, and sanctioned the proposed expenditure for Wana and the Tochi, provided that the total did not exceed the sum previously allowed for Wana alone (7-8 lakhs). In the course of 1896, permanent military posts were accordingly established in the Tochi valley at Saidgi, Idak, Miran Shah, Boya, and Datta Khel. The Government of India found, when their estimates were finally drawn up, that these exceeded the limit allowed by the Secretary of State; for, having spent one lakh on the post at Wana, and having estimated for an 8-lakh expenditure upon those in the Tochi, exclusive of cost of land and water-supply, they had to ask the sanction of the Secretary of State in January 1897 for a total expenditure of 10 lakhs, so as to cover the latter items. In a reply, dated March 18th, 1897, the Secretary of State sanctioned an expenditure up to 10 lakhs on the posts at Wana and in the Tochi valley "should it be actually necessary." Meanwhile, disturbances had occurred in the valley in 1896; and with the object of collecting the fines imposed as a punishment for these offences, and of selecting a site for an advanced military post at Sheranni, a party under Mr. Gee marched up the valley in June 1897. It was treacherously attacked at Majzar by the Madda Khels on June 10th—the first spark of that extensive conflagration that presently spread along the entire frontier as far northwards as Swat. A military column was despatched up the Tochi, and did not experience much difficulty in punishing the offenders and in reducing the valley. But a larger garrison was now required, and

its numerical strength was for a time nearly double that which has previously been quoted.

Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 1 (Secret), dated 28th January 1898. (Appendix 1.)

"The campaign being over, a fresh condition of affairs supervened, and the principles which should henceforward guide the conduct of the Government of India were laid down in general terms by the Secretary of State in a despatch, dated January 28th, 1898. In the course of this he said (paragraph 15), with direct reference to the territory now under examination,—“The arrangements and the delimitation effected by the Durand Agreement have made the Protectorate an accomplished fact, and no interference from outside can be tolerated within the territory now distinctly recognised as belonging to the sphere of British influence.” He then quoted the dictum of Sir H. Fowler (in his despatch of August 24th, 1894) that, “in the existing state of our relations with Afghanistan and the tribes, it is essential that the Indian Government should be in a position to maintain, if necessary, an effective control over Waziristan;” and added—“Your responsibilities in connection with the territory delimited cannot be ignored or put on one side.” At the same time he informed us that, in our future dispositions, two main objects must be borne in mind: (1) the best possible concentration of military force so as to enable us to fulfil our responsibilities; and (2) the limitation of interference with the tribes so as to avoid the extension of administrative control over independent tribal territory. \* \* \* \* \*

Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 122 (Military), dated 4th August 1898. (Appendix 8.)

"The Government of India stated their views in reply in a despatch to the Secretary of State, dated August 4th, 1898. The strategical value of the Tochi, and the sanitary argument had now disappeared from view. They said (1) that, in view of our pledges to the Dawaris, it was not possible entirely to withdraw troops from the Tochi; but (2) that they hoped to diminish the garrison, and to concentrate the regulars at Miran Shah, where they asked leave to construct the main post (a request which was sanctioned by the Secretary of State in a telegram, dated September 14th, 1898); that they were considering the holding of minor posts by levies; and that they proposed to keep any troops taken from the Tochi at Bannu (Edwardesabad).

"Meanwhile a correspondence went on with the Punjab Government as to the extent to which the occupation of the valley should be divided between military forces and tribal levies. Sir M. Young was anxious that the regulars should garrison up to Datta Khel, and he proposed levy posts beyond, at Sheranni in the main valley, and at two places in the Kazha valley that comes in from the north. The Government of India replied on September 23rd, 1898, that the tribal levies as at present constituted were not to be trusted, and that Government must be satisfied that, if established, there would be no obligation to support them with regulars. If a reliable militia could be created, it might be a different thing. The Punjab Government was therefore invited to submit fresh proposals.

Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 37 (Secret), dated 25th November 1898. (Appendix No. 9.)

"A little while later, a reply to the Government of India's despatch of August 4th came from the Secretary of State, dated November 25th, 1898. He was not apparently satisfied with the suggestions of the Government of India; and the bent of his mind was perhaps not very clearly, but yet I think sufficiently, indicated by the fact that, in remitting the case to us for reconsideration, he asked that this should be undertaken with due attention to the principle that

administrative control over independent tribal territory should not be extended, and to the general policy that should be pursued by the Government towards the frontier tribes. I take this to mean—when regarded in conjunction with the principles previously laid down in January 1898—that consistently with our obligations (1) to the Dawaris, (2) to the Amir, (3) to the other tribesmen with whom we have entered into engagements, we should slacken rather than tighten our military and administrative control over the Tochi valley, adopting such measures as will, as far as possible, secure peace and order and prevent raiding in the valley, but will at the same time relieve us from the expense and responsibilities of a permanent occupation.

“Such is the problem that we are called upon to decide. Its solution raises three questions, around which a great deal of correspondence and controversy has raged, *viz.*—(1) the extent to which the existing military garrison of the valley requires to be maintained, extended, or reduced; (2) the possibility of its place being taken, either wholly or in part, by a tribal militia; (3) the manner in which such a militia should be organised, *i.e.*, whether the existing tribal levies should be retained, or whether they should be partially or wholly superseded by a force, resembling the Khyber Rifles and the Kurram Militia. I will discuss each of these questions in turn.

“The existing garrison, which has been reduced since the campaign, now stands at 4 mountain guns, 180 native cavalry and  $2\frac{3}{4}$  battalions of native infantry; these troops are stationed at the following places in the order of distance from Bannu—*viz.*, Saidgi, Kajuri, Idak, Miran Shah, Boya, Datta Khel—this, the furthestmost site of a military post, being a little over 60 miles from Bannu. Several other defensible posts are held by the present tribal levies—of whom more anon.

“For a year and a half, in fact ever since the suppression of the rising in 1897, a discussion has been going on as to what the future strength and location of the garrison should be. I will not recapitulate at length the views of the various authorities which may be read under their own names. General Egerton, in two communications, dated August and November 1897, recommended a central cantonment at Miran Shah, where he proposed to build a large fort and barracks for  $1\frac{1}{2}$  battalions with a horn-work for cavalry, 2 squadrons, and artillery (4 mountain guns and 1 maxim). There were to be six other military posts; and the force at Miran Shah was to constitute a moveable column for visiting all parts of the valley in the cold weather. General Bird submitted his views in November 1897. They also involved the continued military occupation of the valley up to Datta Khel, where in addition to a battalion at Miran Shah, he recommended a garrison of 1 battalion, 1 squadron, and 4 mountain guns. There were also to be two English Political Officers (the chief of them under the orders of the Military Officer Commanding the troops) and five Native Assistant Political Officers in different parts of the valley. (Note how far we have gone since Sir H. Fowler's instructions in August 1894.)

“On May 30th, 1898, General Bird, understanding that the scope of our policy in the Tochi would be for the future control of Dawar, made fresh proposals, under which the Tochi garrison was fixed at 2 squadrons,  $1\frac{1}{2}$  battalions of native infantry, 4 mountain guns and 4 maxims. Boya, and not Datta Khel, was to be the advanced military post.



“ Mr. Anderson, Commissioner of the Derajat (July 10th, 1898), was not content with these proposals. He said that in order to protect Upper Dawar, it was necessary to hold both Kanirogha and Datta Khel. The latter of these posts was also necessary to protect the Khidder Khels and the Madda Khels, who inhabit the upper part of the valley, from each other, as well as the Dawaris from both. Nevertheless, in order to lighten the strain, he recommended a Waziri Levy Corps, in addition to the existing tribal levies.

“ Sir M. Young (July 15th, 1898), in a covering letter, recommended no present change in the military arrangements. He defended our positions in the Tochi and Wana as holding the Wazirs in a cleft stick. He interpreted our obligations towards the Amir more strictly than Lord Elgin (in a very forcible note, dated July 21st, 1898) thought admissible, and, if the Tochi was not to be treated as a main line of advance, he recommended the ultimate substitution of militia levies, officered by Europeans, for regulars.

“ The next phase in the evolution of the garrison question was the appointment of an expert Military Committee to examine upon the spot and report on the question of the proposed central post and cantonment at Miran Shah (sanctioned in September 1898 by the Secretary of State), and a secondary post at or near Usiri, between Bannu and Miran Shah, which had lately commended itself to the military authorities. The Committee sat in October 1898 and their report submitted to the Quarter Master General in March 1899, but not referred to the Government of India until May 1st, contained the following proposals : They recommended (1) the construction of a large 2-storied fort at Miran Shah, practically on the same site as the existing fortified serai, at a cost of just under  $3\frac{1}{2}$  lakhs ; (2) the purchase of land around it \* \* \* at a cost of Rs. 45,000 ; (3) the expenditure of an additional Rs. 10,000 upon water-supply, or a total expenditure of 4 lakhs. It was further contemplated to spend a sum of Rs. 4,680 in the purchase of 39 acres of ground for a civil station, at a distance of 500 yards from the fort. The military authorities, however, said that this post ought to be at least 1,000 yards from the fort, in which case, said the Political Officer, it must be a fortified enclosure also. This potential item of expenditure must therefore also be included in any estimate of total charges.

“ The Committee devolved upon a separate Committee the examination and preparation of estimates for the secondary post near Usiri. I understand that a site at Kajuri is preferred, and Sir E. Collen mentions its probable cost as  $1\frac{1}{2}$  lakhs, which must be added to the foregoing estimates, making a total minimum expenditure of  $5\frac{1}{2}$  lakhs or £36,000.

“ The garrison which it is proposed to distribute between these posts, and which is, in future, to hold the Tochi, is to consist of 2 battalions of native infantry, 250 cavalry and 4 mountain guns. I should add that the following expenditure *inter alia* has already been incurred. An excellent cart-road has been constructed up the valley from Bannu to Datta Khel at a cost of 5 lakhs (£32,500) ; and during the past winter a sum of Rs. 60,000 (£4,000) was allotted for the improvement of the various posts still occupied by regular troops.”

In connection with these proposals Sir E. Collen had recommended that regular troops should be withdrawn from Boya and Datta Khel and

that a Waziri militia should be raised without delay. He proposed to abandon the idea of building a large military post at Miranshah in favour of the provision of better shelter for the troops and the improvement of the temporary defences, so as to accommodate four companies, if necessary, retaining six companies of regulars at Miranshah and two companies at Kajuri to stiffen the militia, until such time as the latter force could take over all the posts. Sir E. Collen considered a strong moveable column should be maintained at Bannu.

An exhaustive examination of the case by Lord Curzon, which is epitomised in the following sentences, left no doubt as to the policy which should be pursued. On the authority of Generals Sir Corrie Bird and Egerton, who had been engaged in military operations in the locality since the disturbances of 1897, it was demonstrated that the valley had no strategical value in relation either to an advance into Afghanistan, or for the purpose of defence. The military occupation of the valley would entail the locking up in unhealthy and malarious stations of a large military force, which together with the body of troops in support, would be lost to the offensive military strength of India. The retention of the valley accordingly could not be defended on military grounds, but must find its justification, if at all, in the political advantages accruing from a control of the tribes, either in relation to the security of the administration on the frontier, or the obligations into which India had entered with the Amir. The assurance of protection given to the Dawaris and the introduction into the valley of British administration in however crude a form, and the assumption of the Government of the locality, rendered total withdrawal from the Tochi out of the question. This view was strengthened by the fact that some degree of control had been established, by reason of the presence of our administration in the Tochi, over the Darwesh Khels and the minor Waziri clans—even indirectly over the Mahsud Waziris. But these considerations gave no cause for the assumption that the valley must necessarily be occupied permanently by regular troops: and it remained to be decided whether the objects could not be better effected by another agency than a permanent military garrison. There was thus no reason for remaining in permanent military occupation of any part of the valley; on the contrary, it was clearly preferable to withdraw gradually, as soon as the withdrawal could be effected safely and without loss of prestige, the whole of the troops from the Tochi; and to substitute in their place a Tochi militia, with military support, if required. Lord Curzon's views received the unqualified support of his Military advisers. The policy of Government, which was subsequently approved by the Secretary of State, was clearly and explicitly expressed in the following order in Council which was duly promulgated:—

Despatch No. 278  
(Foreign Department,  
to Secretary of State,  
dated 26th October  
1899. (Appendix 2.)

- (1) That the obligations into which the Government of India have entered under the sanction of successive Secretaries of State, and which have been increased by the Durand agreement of 1893, and subsequent limitation of the frontier, render it impracticable for us to consider the question of the total withdrawal from the frontier.
- (2) That a prolonged or permanent occupation of that valley by troops of the Indian Army is, however, not necessitated either by strategical or by political considerations.



- (3) That in pursuance of the policy already initiated on other sections of the frontier, the regular troops be withdrawn, at as early a date as might be consistent with safety and with expediency, from all positions in the Tochi Valley.
- (4) That the proposals already submitted to the Government of India for the purchase of sites and the erection of a great fortified cantonment at Miranshah should not be proceeded with except in so far as might be absolutely required for the accommodation of the military, as long as the latter should remain in the Tochi; and subsequently of the militia which is to take their place.
- (5) That if the existing fortified enclosure at Miranshah be inadequate for the two last named purposes, it be replaced by a frontier fort of the usual type, erected at a moderate cost.
- (6) That if, and when, the moveable column to be stationed, under the schemes hitherto submitted, at Miranshah shall have been withdrawn, its place be taken by a moveable column at Bannu.
- (7) That a report may be invited as to the steps which require to be taken to improve the sanitation of Bannu.
- (8) That a new militia corps, raised, disciplined and equipped on somewhat similar lines to the Khyber Rifles and Kurram Militia, and commanded by British officers, be enrolled for the future police of the Tochi Valley.

In addition to certain instructions regarding the composition of the militia corps, and the assembly of a committee to advise on details, the Council decided that pending the sanction of the Secretary of State, and the carrying out of the above proposals, the occupation of the Tochi Valley by regular troops be continued.

The report of the Committee indicated in the Council Order reached the Government of India in March 1900. According to their proposals the Northern Waziristan Militia would consist of not less than two battalions of 800 men each, under three British officers, with 50 horsemen for each battalion in addition; the head-quarters would be at Datta Khel and Miranshah. To permit of the progressive withdrawal of the military garrisons, they considered it advisable that the 1st battalion should be raised as speedily as possible with a view to the early relief, as a first step, of the troops in Datta Khel and Boya. The Committee further advocated the opening of the Idak-Thal route, and its protection by an adequate chain of posts, the garrisons of which would be found by the 2nd battalion, when formed. They anticipated that one battalion of militia could be raised and trained in the space of a year, at the end of which period it would be fit to garrison the Upper Tochi, provided the posts were ready for occupation. The preparation of the 2nd battalion would not be complete until the end of the second year and, if the experiment of the 1st battalion had proved a success, the final withdrawal of regulars might then take place conditionally on the moveable column being established at Bannu.

Further details relating to the organisation of the Militia were arranged at a conference between His Excellency the Viceroy, His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, and the local officials held at Dera Ismail Khan

on the 19th April 1900. It was decided that the troops might be withdrawn altogether from above Miranshah when the militia were efficient ; but that for a time, pending the ultimate complete withdrawal of regulars from the Tochi, a combined military and militia occupation of Miranshah might be necessary.

At this date and for some time previously the conduct of the Mahsud Waziris had been thoroughly unsatisfactory. Their offences culminated in an attack in October 1900 on a Border Military post in British territory. A blockade of the tribe was decided on, in the earlier stages of which the military garrison in the Tochi Valley was required to take an essential part by effecting the closure of the Mahsud country to the north ; and, later, by participating in active operations from Datta Khel. In consequence no progress could be made towards the evacuation of the valley by regular troops. It was not until February 1902 that the tribe acceded to our terms, and shortly afterwards the Commander-in-Chief (Sir Power Palmer) expressed his readiness to hand over Datta Khel and Boya entirely, thereby freeing half a squadron and one battalion, provided the militia were fit to replace the regulars. The Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province however desired to defer the transfer until the posts at Datta Khel, Spina Kaisora and Boya had been completed. In the following August, however, the still unsettled state of the Mahsuds compelled him to ask that matters should remain unaltered until the political situation might become more satisfactory. In December, after making a tour in the valley, Colonel Deane expressed his opinion that, if troops remained at Miranshah, all the remaining posts in the Tochi might be entrusted to the militia and in consequence of this recommendation Datta Khel was evacuated the same month and the original military post at that place was demolished.

Idak, Kajuri and Saidgi were taken over by militia in May 1903 ; Boya on the 3rd July. Miranshah only remained in the hands of regular troops, but the withdrawal of the four mountain guns from its garrison was sanctioned in June. In the following January the Government of India sanctioned an increase to the existing strength of the North Waziristan Militia so as to allow of its taking over this post, which would constitute the head-quarters of the whole force. The transfer to the militia (which had been increased to a total strength of 1,200 men) was completed in October 1904. Thus the policy, inaugurated by Lord Curzon five years previously, was successfully carried out in the Tochi in every particular, and with excellent results.

It may be added that a moveable column has been organised from the garrison of Bannu and Kohat, which consists of 1 Regiment of Native Cavalry, 1 Native Mountain Battery, 4 battalions of Native Infantry. In addition half a company of Sappers and Miners will come from Roorkee. The total strength of the column is about 4,000 combatants.

#### GOMAL AND SOUTH WAZIRISTAN.

Lord Curzon has himself recorded the history of the administration of the Gomal and Southern Waziristan in his note of 19th June 1899, which may be quoted here *in extenso* :—

“The history of our military connection with Southern Waziristan has been as follows. We have been tempted into it, not so much, as in the case of the Tochi valley from the east or Indus valley, as from the south. It was the

gradual spread of the Baluchistan Agency, under the vigorous personality of Sir R. Sandeman, over the Zhob country, up to the Gomal border, that first necessitated the adoption of protective measures against the predatory habits of the Waziri tribes. As far back as 1889, allowances were given by Government to the Darwesh Khels of Wana, to the Mahsuds, and to the Sherannis, with a view to the exercise of some control over this turbulent area. In 1892 a military post was for the first time sanctioned at Toi Khula (the junction of the Toi and Gomal Rivers) to check the raids on Zhob. But as Sir R. Sandeman wanted the post to be on the northern bank, and the Government of India insisted on the southern bank, it ended by never being constructed at all.

“In 1893, after the conclusion of the Durand Agreement, the Government of India—under the influence of the strong forward wave which carried them at that time into so many advanced positions in the border mountains, and which was so largely responsible for the subsequent risings in 1897—recommended to the Home Government (though they were not unanimous in the matter) the construction of a strong military post at Wana or Spin, to protect the Gomal. It appears that at that time the Gomal valley occupied in the eyes of Government almost identically the same place, and with about as much or as little justification, as did the Tochi Valley two years later on. Its domination was pleaded as essential for the stoppage of Mahsud raids, for the protection of the Powindah caravans, and for the general control of Waziristan. The sanitary argument, the railway argument, and the strategical argument (*i.e.*, line of future advance into Afghanistan) were also forthcoming. Sir H. Fowler sanctioned the proposal on the ground that it was “essential that the Indian Government should be in a position to maintain, if necessary, an effective control in Waziristan,” but added the customary conditions that every effort should be made to obtain the consent of the tribes to our military occupation, and towards keeping our interference and expenditure within the narrowest limits.

“Accordingly in 1894 orders were issued for the construction of a fortified cantonment at Wana for a garrison of one battalion of native infantry, one squadron of native cavalry, and 4 guns. This was to cost 6 lakhs. A civil post was to cost 1 lakh more. The latter was necessitated by the fact that in October 1894, in response to the familiar invitation from the tribes, Mr. Bruce, Commissioner of Derajat, had been instructed (just as Mr. Anderson was at a later date in the Tochi) to give assurances to the tribes of our continued presence and protection. He told the Wanawals that a military force would be permanently stationed at Wana or Spin, or wherever Government saw fit, and that Wana and Spin would be considered as protected areas, and that strict responsibility would be enforced for offences and crimes. Sanads were further given to the tribes, and the district passed under that rough sort of British administration (resting nominally upon the authority of jirgas, in reality upon the tact and influence of British officers, with the ulterior menace of a cantonment in the background) that is common along this border. Steps were taken at the same time to open the more direct line of access to Wana by the Shahur valley.

“In November 1894, a sudden and treacherous attack was made upon the post at Wana, provoking the Waziri expedition of that winter which, under

the command of Sir W. Lockhart, overran and subjugated the greater part of the Waziri country. The first doubts as to the military value of Wana emanated from that distinguished officer, as early as January 1895, when he reported that "Wana is a *cul de sac*, and, in my opinion, possesses no strategical importance whatever; and any value it has is of a political nature, its occupation tending to a better control over the tribes on this border." At this time military opinion, both as represented in the Waziri Field Force and at Simla, was running strong for the recently discovered and greatly exaggerated merits of the Tochi, and Sir George White, then Commander-in-Chief, in recommending the occupation of the latter, noted in March 1895—"Wana was selected as a leap in the dark, when we knew nothing of the rest of Waziristan. It has served its purpose well; but we know more now, and that later and fuller knowledge puts Wana out of date as a permanent military post." Sir H. Brackenbury, then Military Member, was, however, of opinion that no Tochi post would prevent Mahsud raids into the Gomal and Zhob valleys; and for the moment the idea of establishing the former was dropped. Upon the receipt, however, of a report from Colonel Mason of the Intelligence Department, strongly favouring the Tochi on the various grounds named in my previous note, and pronouncing that "the strategical value of Wana (which is in a *cul de sac*) in reference to an advance into Afghanistan is *nil*," the Government of India decided, while not abandoning the Wana post for political reasons, to adopt the Tochi valley as the superior military position. They accordingly on May 15th, 1895, addressed the Secretary of State, asking his sanction to the planting of a strong post in Upper Dawar, and recommending the following garrisons: for Wana, 1 battalion of infantry, 1 squadron, 4 guns; for the Tochi, 2 battalions, 1 squadron, 1 mountain battery. In this despatch they used the following terms:—"Although the establishment of a military post at Wana is necessary in order to protect the Gomal and prevent Waziri raids into Zhob, its importance is rather of a local character; and a force in a fortified post or cantonment there could not exercise an effective control over the Waziri tribes as a whole. Wana has no strategical value except for the purpose of protecting the Gomal route."

"In the same spring, *viz.*, in March 1895, a military post of 400 native infantry was first planted in the Shahur valley at Barwand, and was subsequently moved to Sarwekai."

"Before Sir H. Fowler had answered the above despatch, his Government had fallen. In August the present Secretary of State approved of the double occupation of Wana and the Tochi, provided that the expenditure upon both was limited to the total (7-8 lakhs) that had been estimated for the former. Until that time 1½ lakhs had been expended upon the Wana post; and Sir W. Lockhart reiterating his former opinions, and for the first time indicating what I hope may be the future of the Wana cantonment, had written to the Government of India on June 14th, 1895:—"I would point out that there are grave objections to holding Wana permanently as a military post, as it is so situated that it possesses no strategic advantage. If Wana is taken over by the civil authorities as a police post, the deep wells and walled enclosure will prove of much value; but I should deprecate any large expenditure on a useless military position."

"In August 1895 Sir W. Lockhart renewed his proposal that Wana should be handed over to the civil authorities; but the Government of India, adhering to their already expressed view that it must still be held by troops—a view to which the Secretary of State had now given his sanction—fixed the garrison at the total already named.

"In the course of the ensuing year, the garrisons of Southern Waziristan became more definitely crystalised in the positions and numbers which they have, with little variation, since maintained. There was a correspondence with the Secretary of State (March to May 1896) concerning the Shahur valley. The Government of India reported that they were divided about the military occupation of this position, some of their number being in favour of a military post at Sarwekai, and of levy posts in the Khaisora valley, others being opposed to any troops in the Shahur. The Secretary of State, in reply, left the question of placing regulars in the Shahur valley to the discretion of the Indian Government (who then decided in the affirmative), but was opposed to posts in the Khaisora valley. The military positions in the Shahur were accordingly fixed at Jandola and Sarwekai, with 3 levy posts in addition. More to the south, those in the Gomal valley, were fixed at Jatta and Kajuri Kach, with Tank as the base of both. The united garrisons of these two lines (exclusive, of course, of Wana) were 2 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 guns. In the ensuing year (1897), the annual extra cost entailed by the maintenance of the entire Waziristan position and its communications, was estimated at from 3½ to 4 lakhs. The Punjab Government in March 1897 pleaded for the construction of a new civil building at Wana at a cost of Rs. 16,000, but the Government of India refused.

"Meanwhile the advantage—in proportion to the heavy cost—of these advanced positions was beginning to be tentatively questioned both in London and in India. In his despatch, dated May 8th, 1896, on the Shahur position, the Secretary of State had asked for a report on the total cost of the cantonments in Wana, the Tochi valley, and the Shahur valley, and on all the tribal posts and allowances for controlling the Waziri tribes, and also as to whether the maintenance of the Wana cantonment was so necessary as to justify the expenditure. In April 1897, Sir G. White went so far as to note:—"In the near future arrangements appear possible for replacing the present garrison of Wana, as well as those on the Gomal, by a local levy or militia."

"In the following months ensued the attack at Maizar in the Tochi; and the entire question was (and has been ever since) suspended. A draft letter to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab asking his opinion upon the questions put by the Secretary of State, was drawn up but never sent. An *ad interim* reply was despatched to the Secretary of State, on September 1st to the effect that, owing to the frontier outbreak, the Government of India must postpone their recommendations.

"No further communication on the matter passed between the two Governments for nearly a year. In the summer of 1898 the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab submitted a memorandum, dated July 10th, from Mr. Anderson, Commissioner of the Derajat, in which he gave his opinions on the Wana question as well as on the Tochi (previously quoted). In both cases, Mr. Anderson laid great stress upon our obligations—which he had himself in



part been the officer authorised to create—and upon the advantages resulting from the Wana cantonment, in preventing attacks upon the Gomal and the powindahs, and upon the Zhob, and in diminishing Waziri lawlessness in general. Sir M. Young in his covering letter of July 15th generally defended our military positions both at Wana and in the Tochi, on the ground of the control that they gave over the Mahsuds, of our obligations to the Amir, and of our pledges to the Wana Ahmedzais; but nevertheless agreed that “a Waziri Militia Corps, if officered by Europeans, might in time replace in whole or in part the military garrisons now maintained in the border-land, and would obviate to some extent the locking up of troops and the breaking up of regiments into detachments.” He did not, however, advocate any immediate change in the military arrangements, and thought that, before any such were adopted, the Government of India should settle the strategical question as to whether either the Tochi or the Gomal are required for a military advance upon Kabul, and should fully consider the policy of instituting tribal militia in the place of regulars. No fresh enquiry in either direction seems to me to be necessary. I understand that the first question has already been decided, in the place of both lines of possible advance, in the negative. It is to the second that—in so far as it has not already been fairly tested by the experience of the Khyber and the Kurram—I am now inviting the attention of the Government of India.

“On August 4th, 1898, the Government of India once again addressed the Secretary of State on the subject of Waziristan, and in reference to the Wana position recorded their opinions as follows: They said that the presence of troops at Wana, together with those in the Tochi, had prevented a general Waziri rising in the frontier campaign; that Wana has a local importance, as protecting the trade routes by which caravans reach the Gomal; and that the establishment of a cantonment there had checked Waziri raids into Zhob. They could not, therefore, at present recommend the withdrawal of regulars from Wana; but they were in favour of the concentration of troops, and the organisation of levies for subsidiary posts. I gather from the notes that this persistence in favour of Wana (as well as of the Tochi) was to a large extent the outcome of the personality of Lord Elgin, who, since the date at which he first occupied both, argued with great tenacity and ability for their military retention.”

Despatch No. 122 to Secretary of State, dated 4th August 1898. (Appendix No. 8.)

“This was the despatch that was remitted to us by the Secretary of State on November 25th, 1898, for reconsideration with especial reference to the question of our future relations with and policy towards the tribes, and the desirability of not extending our interference with them. The case therefore, like that of the Tochi, is now in our hands for fresh examination, and we are free to submit what proposals with regard to it we please.”

Despatch No. 87 from Secretary of State, dated 25th November 1898. (Appendix No. 9.)

“Before I venture to advise, let me give the figures of our present military forces in South Waziristan. On the Shahur line there were on January 1st, 1899, at Jandola and Sarwekai, 359 native infantry and 48 cavalry. In the Wana cantonment were 910 infantry, 79 mountain battery with guns, and 102 cavalry. In the Gomal valley there were at Nili Kach 43 infantry, and at Kajuri Kach 214 infantry and 31 cavalry; or a total of regular troops in South Waziristan of 1,786 (as compared with 2,387 at the same date in the Tochi valley). There were also 396 South Waziristan levies organised upon the same methods as those already described in the case of the

Tochi. It must further be remembered that, while Wana consumes an entire regiment, which is therefore not available for service elsewhere, the smaller detachments in the Shahur valley and on the Gomal line, whose head-quarters are at Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan, respectively, and are reinforced or relieved therefrom, have the similar effect of breaking up two other regiments; so that the price in men that we are paying for our South Waziri position is a permanent loss of three regiments to the strength available for service of the Indian army.

"Next let me view the Waziri position in the effect which it has exercised upon the general disposition of our troops upon this section of the frontier since it was first taken up some five years ago. I will contrast the figures of January 1st, 1890, before any of these forward movements had begun, and when our frontier posts were still at Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Dera Ghazi Khan; and when Border Military Police and Levies had not yet been invented. At that date there were upon the section of the frontier from Bannu to Dera Ghazi Khan 6,583 regulars (infantry, cavalry, and artillery). On January 1st, 1899, there were upon the same section and in its advanced posts 9,871 regulars, 722 Border Police, and 1,131 tribal levies, or a total force of 11,724 men. Of course ever-increasing responsibilities mean more men. Equally of course must the soldiers of the Indian army be stationed somewhere, whether it be on the plains or in the border mountains. But no such considerations—whether of inevitable progress, or of normal disposition—are adequate to explain this prodigious rise, which clearly indicates a new policy and a sustained advance. It is not for that reason to be deprecated or condemned. But when we recollect that in the event of a march to Kabul or to Kandahar, a large proportion of the 9,871 regulars now tied down upon this section of the frontier would not be available for the advance, and would thus be lost to the offensive strength of India, we are, I think, forced to consider whether we cannot by fresh dispositions or by the creation of some sort of substitute mitigate what has already become an almost perilous strain."

Lord Curzon then proceeded to detail his proposals for the future administration of this territory. "My argument must have been inconclusive and obscure, if it has not already foreshadowed the conclusion that we ought in my opinion to solve the South Waziri problem by the same methods that I have already advocated for the North Waziri question. The parallelism is indeed almost exact. In both cases we have taken up an advanced position, originally in the main upon strategical grounds which have turned out with fuller knowledge to be fallacious. Neither the Gomal nor the Tochi is essential to us for a future military advance into Afghanistan. In both cases we have given rather premature and ill-judged, but nevertheless definite, promises to the tribesmen from which we cannot in honour recede. In both cases some positive benefit has resulted from our interference and our military stations, in the protection of routes, and in the prevention of lawlessness, highway robbery, and raiding. The advantages of our policy have in fact been political rather than military; and on the whole they are sufficient to preclude the consideration (quite apart from prestige) of anything like retreat.

"For my own part, however, I cannot see why these advantages should not still be secured, our pledges vindicated, and our prestige retained, by some



other than a purely military occupation. Indeed it seems to me that there has been a tendency to exaggerate the results of that occupation, or at least imperfectly to distribute its causes. If in practice our main line of access to Wana is by the Shahur valley, then I see no reason for the military occupation of the Gomal. If both lines can be made secure by a tribal militia, then I see no reason for the military occupation of either. If Wana has every aptitude for a civil, and none or but little for a military, post, then I see no reason why we should not divert it, as the present Commander-in-Chief long ago proposed, from the latter to the former use."

These proposals were fully supported by all His Excellency's advisers and were summarised in an Order in Council, dated 30th June 1899, which was duly promulgated as follows :—

- (1) That as in North so in South Waziristan a tribal militia under British officers be raised at as early a period as possible, to take over the whole or the majority of the posts now occupied by regular garrisons.
- (2) That Wana be the head-quarters of the new corps.
- (3) That the garrisons at Wana, and in the Gomal and Shahur valleys, be progressively reduced as the new militia becomes capable of taking their place, and, if possible, be ultimately altogether withdrawn.
- (4) That the advice of the Punjab Government and of the Committee\*  
\* \* \* \* be sought as to the numbers, location, and composition of the proposed militia corps. Powindahs and other tribesmen would probably have to be included as a check upon the Waziris. The existing 400 Sillahdari levies \* \* \* might supply a nucleus with which to begin.

The Secretary of State accepted the scheme in outline, pending the receipt of detailed recommendations, which it was intended to frame after the local committee had submitted its report. It was not until the following March that this report reached the Government of India, with recommendations not supported by the Punjab Government, that the posts on the Gomal route should be garrisoned by the Wana militia. As for Northern, so for Southern Waziristan the Committee recommended that two battalions of militia should be raised, each 800 strong (in addition to 50 sowars attached to each battalion), with Headquarters at Wana and Sarwekai respectively. The total withdrawal of troops was said to be practicable eventually and, so far as Wana was concerned, the Committee considered that the regulars might be withdrawn from there as soon as half the first battalion of militia had been properly organised. When the second half of the battalion had been prepared a further withdrawal from the Gomal might take place; the other posts being similarly transferred as the second battalion of militia formed. These recommendations were made on the understanding that a moveable column would be located at Dera Ismail Khan, and that the two roads to Wana, namely, from Murtaza *via* the Gomal (Kajuri Kach, and Ngandi Oba) and from Tank *via* the Shahur Valley (Shahur Tangi, Jandola and

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\* Appointed to consider the question of the Tochi Militia, *vide supra*, page 66.

Sarwekai) would be left open. In forwarding the report the Punjab Government recommended the abandonment of the line of communication from Tank through the Shahur Tangi, and the substitution of a good road from Murtaza *via* Sarwekai to Wana.

At the Conference under His Excellency the Viceroy held at Dera Ismail Khan on the 19th April 1902 it was provisionally decided to raise a militia battalion 800 strong, with 50 mounted men, having its head-quarters at Wana; which would be distributed in about equal numbers between Wana, Sarwekai, and the existing levy posts and those needed on the new road from Murtaza to Sarwekai.

It was decided that Haidari Kach and posts in the Shahur Tangi should be given up, in view of the projected abandonment of this route: and that Jandola, Kajuri Kach and Nili Kach should be held by regulars pending further consideration. It was also agreed that the existing levy and military posts should be used as far as possible for the militia, the organisation of which was to commence without delay. Progress with the raising of the corps was however much delayed owing to the necessity for establishing a blockade against the Mahsud Waziris, from whom the militia would be largely recruited. The blockade was proclaimed in December 1900, and more troops were drafted to the Gomal and Wana territories, as well as a regiment of pioneers who had been employed upon the construction of a new road from Murtaza to Wana, in lieu of that originally proposed by the Punjab Government.

It had been anticipated that the South Waziristan Militia would be ready to take over Wana from the troops by October 1901 should the blockade of the Mahsud Waziris have proved effective, and with this object sanction had been given to the remodelling of the fort. Subsequently the Commandant of the militia reported that the corps would be unable to take over the fort until an increase of strength has been sanctioned. The withdrawal of troops was, however, precluded in any case by the change in the nature of the Waziri blockade which passed from a passive to an active phase in November 1901. When operations had ceased and the tribe had come to terms, the military authorities represented (May 1902) that the time had arrived for the commencement of a progressive reduction in the military garrisons\* of Waziristan and proposed a withdrawal from Wana and some of the subsidiary posts.

\* 2 Squadrons, Native  
Cavalry.  
2 Battalions, Native  
Infantry.  
2 Guns.

Colonel Deane however held the opinion that the Militia could not take over Wana until the fort there had been completed; so far the plans for it had not been sanctioned. In addition, the political horizon in Waziristan being clouded, he could not then recommend the withdrawal of regular troops from Wana. By November the Mahsuds were in a more settled condition, and Colonel Deane stated that he was prepared to advise the withdrawal of troops from Wana in the spring of 1903, provided certain alterations which he had suggested for the Wana post were sanctioned, and the work put in hand at once. From Sarwekai he recommended withdrawal as soon after the evacuation of Wana as militia could be provided to garrison it. He considered that regular troops should continue to hold Kajuri Kach and Nili Kach until the militia was established at Wana and Sarwekai, and until men could be enlisted later and trained for these posts. To permit of these measures being carried out an increase of about 25 per cent. was sanctioned to the strength of the Militia. It was further arranged that small additions should be gradually made to the force so as to allow of a progressive withdrawal of regular troops.

Wana was actually transferred to Militia in January 1904 and Sarwekai in the following April ; the transfer of Kajuri Kach and Nili Kach followed in October of the same year.

The financial effect of the substitution of Militia for regular troops in Northern and Southern Waziristan can be deduced from a statement prepared by the Foreign Department in September 1904, which shows the cost of the Militia. The strength of the Northern force is now 1,308 men ; and that of the Southern force, 1,560 men.

Foreign Department despatch to Secretary of State, No. 178, dated 15th September 1904.

In Northern Waziristan the initial expenditure on equipment and transport was Rs. 51,140, and that on defences and accommodation Rs. 1,40,500 ; Rs. 1,91,640 in all. The total annual recurring cost of the Militia was estimated at Rs. 3,55,151.

In Southern Waziristan, the similar initial expenditure was Rs. 63,044 and Rs. 46,000 respectively ; while the total recurring charges were put at Rs. 4,78,872. The total initial charges for the Waziristan area were therefore Rs. 3,00,684, and the recurring expenditure Rs. 8,74,023.

This statement affords an interesting comparison with the estimates made in October 1899 of the abnormal annual expenditure, in addition to the pay and ordinary maintenance of the troops, which was incurred by the retention of regulars in the Tochi and Wana districts. This outlay was put at Rs. 8,22,000 for the Tochi, and Rs. 3,26,000 for the Wana and Gomal districts—a total of Rs. 11,48,000. Thus the annual saving exceeds 3 lakhs, and moreover a large number of troops have been rendered available for military operations of the first importance.

Despatch No. 208, dated 26th October 1899, to Secretary of State. (Appendix No. 2.)

The moveable column detailed for the support of the Militia in Southern Waziristan comprises a regiment of Native Cavalry ; a Native Mountain Battery ; 4 battalions of Native Infantry ; all from the garrisons of Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan, and Multan ; in addition to a half company of sappers from Burki. The combatants number 4,000 men.

## DETAILS OF INTERNAL POLICY.

### System of internal control.

Lord Kitchener's scheme for the increase of the field army depended on the reduction of the numbers hitherto allotted to the internal garrison of India during the progress of a campaign. Instead of distributing the latter forces as obligatory garrisons of certain places, the requirements of each area of the country were considered in succession. To each was assigned such number of troops as was considered essential as a controlling force. The following table exhibits the total number of troops prescribed for each district :—

*Areas of control and the strength of the armed forces in each.*

Areas of control.	Native States in each area, with their local military force..	Volunteers in each area.	Militia and Levy Corps in each area.	Military Police in each area.	Armed Police, organised in formed bodies, which will be in each area.	Military Garrisons allotted to each area.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Peshawar Valley ...	<i>Nil</i> ...	<i>Nil</i>	1,492	512	<i>Nil</i>	<p><i>For the Peshawar Valley.</i></p> <p>1 Battalion, British Infantry. 3 Battalions, Native Infantry. 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry. 1 Battery, Field Artillery.</p> <p><i>For the Malakand Posts.</i></p> <p>2 Battalions, Native Infantry. 4 guns, Mountain Artillery.</p>
Special for Chitral ...	Chitral and other petty Hill States.	<i>Nil</i>	A corps of scouts, 600 strong.	<i>Nil</i>	<i>Nil</i>	1 Battalion, Native Infantry. 2 guns, Mountain Artillery.
Kohat-Kurram ...	<i>Nil</i> ...	<i>Nil</i>	1,858	549	<i>Nil</i>	1 Battery, Mountain Artillery. 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry. 3 Battalions, Native Infantry.
Bannu and Northern Waziristan.	<i>Nil</i> ...	<i>Nil</i>	834	409	<i>Nil</i>	1 Battery, Mountain Artillery. 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry. 3 Battalions, Native Infantry.
Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan and Southern Waziristan.	<i>Nil</i> ...	<i>Nil</i>	974	1,072	<i>Nil</i>	1 Battery, Mountain Artillery. 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry. 3 Battalions, Native Infantry.
Baluchistan ...	Kelat and Las Baysa - 286 Cavalry, 852 Infantry, 20 Artillery, and 14 serviceable guns.	239	2,978	<i>Nil</i>	<i>Nil</i>	1 Battalion, British Infantry. 2 Battalions, Native Infantry. 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry. 1 Battery, Mountain Artillery.
Sind ...	Petty States—180 Cavalry, 379 Infantry, 2 Artillery, and 29 serviceable guns.	1,114	<i>Nil</i>	<i>Nil</i>	Hyderabad (Sind) ... 300 Sukkur ... 200 500	1 Battalion, British Infantry. 1 Battalion, Native Infantry. 2 Companies, Garrison Artillery.
From the Indus to Sialkot and Gujranwala.	Kashmir on the North with—106 Cavalry, 2,819 Infantry, 208 Artillery, and 215 serviceable guns. Kashmir would, however, be controlled in case of rebellion, by a part of the field army.	460	<i>Nil</i>	243	Jhelum 900	1 Battalion, British Infantry. 1 Battalion, Native Infantry. 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry. 1 Battery, Field Artillery. 1 Company, Garrison Artillery.
From Gujranwala and Lahore to Ambala.	Patiala, Jind, Naba, Kapurthala, Maler Kotla, Faridkot and the Hill States—2,174 Cavalry, 5,199 Infantry, 747 Artillery, and 180 serviceable guns.	1,096	<i>Nil</i>	<i>Nil</i>	Lahore ... 400 Amritsar ... 850 Ambala ... 500 Total ... 1,750	1 Battalion, British Infantry. 2 Battalions, Native Infantry. 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry. 1 Battery, Field Artillery. 1 Company, Garrison Artillery.
Montgomery, Mooltan, and Muzaffargarh Districts.	Bahawalpur—157 Infantry, and 13 serviceable guns.	121	<i>Nil</i>	<i>Nil</i>	Mooltan ... 700	1 Battalion, Native Infantry. Detachment of Native Cavalry.
Behilke and Kumaon.	Rampur and Tehri - 140 Cavalry, 1,259 Infantry, 108 Artillery, and 28 serviceable guns.	862	<i>Nil</i>	<i>Nil</i>	Bareilly ... 620	1 Battalion, British Infantry. 1 Battalion, Native Infantry. 1 Squadron, Native Cavalry. 2 Guns, Field Artillery.
Meerut, Delhi and Agra.	Dholpur, Bharatpur, Alwar and Jaipur—1,617 Cavalry, 8,908 Infantry, 1,322 Artillery, and 500 serviceable guns.	1,204	<i>Nil</i>	<i>Nil</i>	Meerut ... 670 Delhi ... 750 Agra ... 720 Total ... 2,040	1½ Battalions, British Infantry. 2 Battalions, Native Infantry. 3 Squadrons, Native Cavalry. 4 Guns, Field Artillery. 1 Company, Garrison Artillery.
Jhansi to Nagpore ...	Gwalior, Bhopal and other minor States in Bundelkhand and Baghelkhand—2,321 Cavalry, 9,417 Infantry, 1,532 Artillery, and 397 serviceable guns.	655	<i>Nil</i>	<i>Nil</i>	Jhansi ... 210 Saugor ... 400 Jubbulpore ... 500 Hoshangabad ... 400 Nagpore ... 700 Raipur ... 400 Total ... 2,610	1 Battalion, British Infantry. 3 Battalions, Native Infantry. 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry. 1 Battery, Field Artillery.

*Areas of control and the strength of the armed forces in each—contd.*

Areas of control.	Native States in each area with their local military forces.	Volunteers in each area.	Militia and Levy Corps in each area.	Military Police in each area.	Armed Police, organised in formed bodies, which will be in each area.	Military Garrison allotted to each area.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Ondh ...	<i>Nil</i> ...	1,630	<i>Nil</i>	<i>Nil</i>	Lucknow ... 670 Cawnpore ... 860 Fyzabad ... 503 Gorakhpur ... 460 Total ... 1,990	1½ Battalions, British Infantry. 2 Battalions, Native Infantry. 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry. 1 Battery, Field Artillery.
Allahabad to Dinapore	<i>Nil</i> ...	1,868	<i>Nil</i>	<i>Nil</i>	Allahabad ... 460 Benares ... 460 Patna ... 500 Mozufferpore ... 200 Ranchi ... 500 Total ... 2,120	½ Battalion, British Infantry. 1 Battalion, Native Infantry. 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry. 4 Guns, Field Artillery. 1 Company, Garrison Artillery.
Bengal ...	Cooch Behar, and other petty States—20 Cavalry, 2,102 Infantry, 9 Artillery, and 22 serviceable guns.	7,018	<i>Nil</i>	<i>Nil</i>	Khargpur ... 500 Asansol ... 500 Dacca ... 500 Jalpaiguri ... 500 Cuttack ... 300 Chinsura ... 350 Naibati ... 350 Total ... 3,000	1 Battalion, British Infantry. 1 Battalion, Native Infantry. 2 Guns, Field Artillery. 1 Company, Garrison Artillery. 1 Company, Native Coast Artillery.
Assam (including Chittagong).	Manipur—400 Infantry.	786	<i>Nil</i>	3,684	Chittagong ... 200	1 Battalion, Native Infantry.
From Ajmere and Jodhpur to the Tapti	Rajputana States, excluding Dholpur, Bharatpur, Alwar and Jaipur; Indore and other small States in Central India; the States in Cutch and Kathiawar; and Baroda—8,811 Cavalry, 29,440 Infantry, 2,891 Artillery, and 758 serviceable guns. The large majority of these forces are in Rajputana and Kathiawar, about which see paragraph 14. The real centres to be watched in this area are Indore and Baroda.	911	<i>Nil</i>	<i>Nil</i>	Ahmedabad ... 500	1 Battalion, British Infantry. 3 Battalions, Native Infantry. 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry. 1 Battery, Horse Artillery.
Surat to Belgaum ...	Petty States in the Deccan—691 Cavalry, 3,402 Infantry, 80 Artillery, and 109 serviceable guns.	1,289	<i>Nil</i>	<i>Nil</i>	Dholia ... 450 Poona ... 150 Satara ... 400 Belgaum ... 500 Total ... 1,500	1 Battalion, British Infantry. 2 Battalions, Native Infantry. 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry. 1 Battery, Field Artillery.
Special for Bombay ...	<i>Nil</i> ...	2,213	<i>Nil</i>	<i>Nil</i>	147 of the city police are armed with firearms, and can be used as required.	1 Battalion, British Infantry. 2 Battalions, Native Infantry. 2 Companies, Garrison Artillery. 1 Company, Native Coast Artillery. Cavalry Brigade.
Hyderabad Territory ...	Hyderabad—958 Cavalry, 4,495 Infantry, 392 Artillery, and 17 serviceable guns.	859	<i>Nil</i>	<i>Nil</i>	<i>Nil</i> ...	1 Regiment, British Cavalry. 1 Battery, Horse Artillery. 2 Regiments, Native Cavalry. Infantry Brigade.
Madras ...	Mysore, Travancore, Cochin and certain petty States—548 Cavalry, 4,082 Infantry, 77 Artillery, and 22 serviceable guns.	6,024	<i>Nil</i>	<i>Nil</i>	Tinnevely ... 200 Madura ... 200 Trichinopoly ... 450 Vellore ... 450 Bellary ... 450 Bezwada ... 300 Rajamundry ... 250 Vizianagram ... 400 Malabar Coast ... 800 Total ... 3,500	1 Battalion, British Infantry. 2 Battalions, Native Infantry. 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry. 1 Battery, Field Artillery. 1 Company, Garrison Artillery.
Burma ...	<i>Nil</i> ...	2,704	<i>Nil</i>	15,980	Rangoon ... 615 Toungoo ... 167 Irrawady Division. ... 400 Akyab ... 300 Mintu ... 400 Mandalay ... 300 Sagaing ... 400 Yamethin ... 400 Total ... 2,982	3 Battalions, British Infantry. 6 Battalions, Native Infantry. 1 Battery, Mountain Artillery. 2 Companies, Garrison Artillery.



*Distribution of troops.*—The actual distribution of the military garrisons designed for internal control, as approved by the Government of India, and the moveable columns which will be available for the pacification of the country, are shown in the table subjoined :—

Division or District.	STATIONS AT WHICH TROOPS ARE OBLIGATORY.		Available for moveable column.
	Station.	Obligatory Garrison.	
Peshawar Division ...	.....	.....	1 Regiment, Native Cavalry. 4 Guns, Royal Field Artillery.
	Peshawar ...	2 Guns, Royal Field Artillery. 4 Companies, British Infantry.	4 Guns, Native Mountain Battery. 4 Companies, British Infantry. 5 Battalions, Native Infantry.
	Chitral ...	2 Guns, Native Mountain Battery. 1 Battalion, Native Infantry.	Nil.
Kohat, Banna and the Derajat.	.....	.....	3 Regiments, Native Cavalry. 3 Native Mountain Batteries. 9 Battalions, Native Infantry.
Rawalpindi Division ...	.....	.....	1 Regiment, Native Cavalry. 1 Field Battery.
	Rawalpindi... {	1 Company, Garrison Artillery (a). 2 Companies, British Infantry.	6 Companies, British Infantry. 1 Battalion, Native Infantry.
Lahore Division ...	.....	.....	1 Regiment, Native Cavalry. 1 Field Battery.
	Mian Mir and Lahore ...	2 Companies, British Infantry.	.....
	Ferozepore ... {	1 Company, Garrison Artillery. 2 Companies, British Infantry.	2 Battalions, Native Infantry.
	Fort Govindghur (Amritsar)	2 Companies, British Infantry.	
	.....	.....	Detachment, Native Cavalry.
	Multan ...	2 Companies, British Infantry	1 Battalion, Native Infantry.
Meerut Division ...	.....	.....	1 Regiment, Native Cavalry.
	.....	.....	1 Field Battery.
	Delhi ... {	1 Company, Garrison Artillery. 2 Companies, British Infantry.	1 Battalion and 4 Companies, British Infantry. 3 Battalions, Native Infantry.
	Agra ... {	1 Company, Garrison Artillery. 2 Companies, British Infantry.	
	.....	.....	
Mhow Division ...	Sitabuldi Fort (Nagpur) ...	1 Company, British Infantry.	2 Regiments, Native Cavalry. Equivalent of 1 Horse Artillery Battery. 1 Field Battery. 2 Battalions, British Infantry. 6 Battalions, Native Infantry (including Malwa Bhil and Meywar Bhil Corps.)
	Jubbulpore ...	2 Companies, British Infantry.	
OUDH.			
Lucknow Division ...	.....	.....	1 Regiment, Native Cavalry.
	Lucknow ... {	2 Field Guns ... 4 Companies, British Infantry.	4 Field Guns. 4 Companies, British Infantry.
	Cawnpore ...	2 Companies, British Infantry.	2 Battalions, Native Infantry.

(a) Such portion of this company as may be considered necessary will be located at Attock. But half the company must always remain at Rawalpindi.

Division or District.	STATIONS AT WHICH TROOPS ARE OBLIGATORY.		Available for moveable column.
	Station.	Obligatory Garrison.	
Lucknow division—contd.	ALLAHABAD TO DINAPORE.		
	.....	.....	1 Regiment, Native Cavalry.
	.....	.....	4 Field Guns.
	Allahabad ...	1 Company, Garrison Artillery.	4 Companies, British Infantry.
	Fort William ...	2 Companies, British Infantry.	1 Battalion, Native Infantry.
	Dum Dum ...	4 Companies, British Infantry.	1 Company, Garrison Artillery. 1 Company, Native Coast Artillery.* 1 Battalion, Native Infantry.
	Barraokpore ...	2 Companies, British Infantry	
	Barraokpore ...	2 Field Guns.	
	Barraokpore ...	2 Companies, British Infantry	
	ASSAM.		
	.....	.....	1 Battalion, Native Infantry.
Quetta Division ...	.....	.....	1 Regiment, Native Cavalry. 1 Mountain Battery.
	Quetta ...	4 Companies, British Infantry	4 Companies, British Infantry. 2 Battalions, Native Infantry.
	Karachi ...	2 Companies, Garrison Artillery.†	1 Battalion, Native Infantry.
Poona Division ...	Bombay ...	1 Battalion, British Infantry.	.....
	Bombay ...	2 Companies, Garrison Artillery. 1 Company, Native Coast Artillery.‡ 1 Battalion, British Infantry.	2 Battalions, Native Infantry.
	Satara ...	1 Company, Native Infantry	
	Poona and Kirkee ...	2 Field Guns.	1 Regiment, Native Cavalry. 4 Field Guns.
Aden District ...	Aden ...	4 Companies, British Infantry.	4 Companies, British Infantry. 2 Battalions, British Infantry.
	Aden ...	2 Companies, Garrison Artillery. 1 Company, Native Coast Artillery. * 1 Battalion, British Infantry.	
Secunderabad Division ...	Aden ...	2 Battalions, Native Infantry	.....
	HYDERABAD TERRITORY.		
	Secunderabad ...	1 Horse Artillery Battery. 1 Regiment, British Cavalry.	.....
	Secunderabad ...	1 Battalion, British Infantry.	
	Secunderabad ...	2 Regiments, Native Cavalry.	
Secunderabad Division ...	Secunderabad ...	3 Battalions, Native Infantry.	
	MADRAS AREA.		
	.....	.....	1 Regiment, Native Cavalry.
	Madras ...	4 Field Guns. 4 Companies, British Infantry.	4 Field Guns. 4 Companies, British Infantry.
	Wellington ...	2 Battalions, Native Infantry.	2 Battalions, Native Infantry.
Burma District ...	Madras ...	2 Field Guns. 1 Company, Garrison Artillery. 2 Companies, British Infantry.	.....
	Wellington ...	2 Companies, British Infantry	.....
	MANDALAY AREA.		
	Mandalay ...	2 Companies, British Infantry	1 Mountain Battery.
	RANGOON AREA.		
	Rangoon and Port Blair ...	2 Companies, Garrison Artillery. 1 Battalion, British Infantry.	6 Companies, British Infantry. 6 Battalions, Native Infantry.

\* When the corps of Native Coast Artillery has been formed.

† The second company will be sent to Karachi in the event of war with a European Power.



## TOTAL GARRISON FOR ALL INDIA.

1 Regiment, British Cavalry.	9 Batteries, Field Artillery.	3 Companies, Native Coast Artillery.
16 Regiments, Native Cavalry.	6 Batteries, Mountain Artillery.	19 Battalions, British Infantry.
2 Batteries, Horse Artillery.	14 Companies, Garrison Artillery.	53 Battalions, Native Infantry.

*Comparison with garrisons previously authorised.*—The total of the force allotted for internal control is compared below with that assigned for this purposes by the Army Commission of 1879, and with that which existed at the date of the submission of Lord Kitchener's scheme.

	Army Com- mission, 1879.	Sanctioned in 1903.	As approved in 1904.
Bengal Horse Artillery ... ..	1½	4	3
Field Batteries ... ..	17	21	9
Mountain Batteries ... ..	7½	5½	6
Garrison Companies ... ..	15	14	17*
British Cavalry Regiments ... ..	1	3	1
Native Cavalry Regiments ... ..	14½	20½	16
British Infantry Battalions ... ..	25	24	19
Native Infantry Battalions ... ..	64½	85½	53
Sapper Companies ... ..	8	3	Nil.

\* 3 Native units.

Letter No. 2805-A.,  
dated 5th November  
1903, from Adjutant  
General in India.  
Letter No. 473-  
M. C., dated 17th  
February 1904, from  
Quarter Master  
General in India.

*Action on the Reorganisation Scheme.*—It is necessary to describe briefly the action taken on the important schemes submitted by the Commander-in-Chief in November 1903, and the following February for the reorganisation, redistribution, and preparation of the Indian army for war. The principle of the former scheme was accepted in Council in February 1904, and the Local Governments were then consulted regarding the adequacy of the arrangement proposed for internal control, on which the whole scheme would depend. With few exceptions the replies were favourable; the only modifications made in deference to local opinion were: the garrisoning of Satara by a company of an up-country native infantry regiment; the location of a Madrassi infantry battalion at Dinapur; the maintenance of obligatory garrisons, of two companies of British infantry each, at Amritsar and Multan, and of one company of British infantry in Sitabuldi fort; the agreement that the force for the maintenance of internal order in Hyderabad should be stationed at Secunderabad, and that the escort of the Resident there should be strengthened on mobilisation; and the retention for the present of the Deoli regiment at Deoli.

The Local Governments and the Government of India differed in opinion regarding the efficiency of the volunteers in Madras; the necessity for an European garrison at Satara; the reduction of the *peace* garrison of Burma by one British infantry battalion; the alleged inadequacy of the force detailed to keep order in Baluchistan; the location of a cavalry brigade in that province and the withdrawal of the garrison from Fort Sandeman.

Secretary of  
State's telegram of  
1st September 1904.

In September with the sanction of the Secretary of State authority was given to the Commander-in-Chief to appoint Commanders to corps,

divisions and brigades; to all units, transport and stores in accordance with the new organisation; to prepare fresh schemes for the mobilisation of the army; and to revise scheme of internal defences. The Madras Command was then abolished; the Lieutenant-General Commanding (Sir C. Egerton) retaining his status and pay.

Secretary of State's telegram of 28th September 1904.

Two months later the Secretary of State formally notified his acceptance of the principles of the reorganisation scheme and asked for a detailed statement of the requirements of the reorganised army. Hitherto it has not been possible to comply with his wishes; but a report has been forwarded to him, showing the progress with the scheme, and the modifications which are necessary.

Despatch No. 148, dated 18th November 1904, from Secretary of State. (Appendix No 13.)  
Progress report, dated 12th October 1905. (Appendix No 14)

## DETAILS OF FINANCIAL POLICY.

*Loans for Military purposes.*—In the autumn of 1899, after the outbreak of the Boer war, the advisers of Government put forward a statement of unfulfilled military requirements, which it was essential to meet. Provision was made for some of these measures to the extent of 60 lakhs in the estimates of 1901, but the Secretary of State was informed that additional expenditure could not be met from revenue, and that unless the cost be spread over a large number of years—a prospect which the military advisers regarded with anxiety—some other method would have to be devised of supplying the requisite means. The military situation was again reviewed in the spring of 1900, when a threat of Russian aggression rendered war a possible contingency, and again later by the Commander-in-Chief and the Military Member in the following September. All military authorities agreed that the Indian field army could not be efficiently prepared for war, until the execution of those measures of reform, which, owing to financial reasons, had been retarded. Fortunately funds now became available. Savings had accrued from the absence of troops in South Africa and China; by utilising these and by provision in the estimates of 1901-02, the most urgent necessities were met. As to the rest it was decided that since it appeared likely that such non-recurring military expenditure as Council would be prepared to accept, could be met out of revenue within a reasonable period, no question of a loan need be raised.

Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 193, dated 2nd November 1899.

Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 58, dated 26th April 1900. (Appendix No. 15)

Order in Council, dated 15th March 1901.

Simultaneously the Government of India had been discussing the principle of meeting extraordinary military expenditure by raising loans. For this action, numerous English precedents were adduced, namely, Lord Palmerston's Defence Loan of 1860; the Military Forces Localisation Act, 1862; the Military Defence Act of 1888; the Barracks and Military Works Loans of 1890 and 1897. Though it was then impossible to state what sum would be required to place the army on a sufficiently strong footing to enable it to meet the military forces of Russia, a capital expenditure of four or five millions sterling in addition to large annual charge was anticipated. According to the military advisers of Government the extreme danger of deferring adequate preparation for war precluded reliance on annual revenue surpluses. These views met with opposition in the Finance Department. It was contended that there were special conditions in India which made it less necessary to resort to loans for such purposes than for other countries to do so. In England it might be expedient to lay down a fixed programme of some important department of armament, which should extend for several years, and thus be independent of parliamentary coalitions or passing changes in public feeling. The Government

of India was free from such influence. Moreover English and Indian conditions were dissimilar, the unproductive debt of India had remained virtually stationary; whereas in England in 14 years the National Debt had been notably decreased. As a result the policy in India had aimed at minimising the unproductive debt so as to avoid the financial and political risks of any increase of taxation. For these reasons proposals to borrow money for military purposes in India had been vetoed in the days following the Mutiny, and again in 1888.

Subsequently the discussion was reopened, and Sir Edward Law, who had succeeded to the Financial Membership, stated that as a first principle of sound finance, unproductive expenditure should be provided for from the ordinary sources of revenue; the incurring of debt by raising loans should be restricted to provision for expenditure of a productive character. But he admitted that circumstances might arise in which it might become a matter of necessity to depart from this principle, and in case of emergency to borrow money for unproductive expenditure. This procedure had been followed in 1900 to meet the very heavy demands resulting from the severe famine.

The decision of Council of the 15th March, however, rendered it unnecessary then to pursue the matter further. The question was raised four years later in connection with the schemes for the reorganisation and redistribution of the army, which were presented by Lord Kitchener. It was then anticipated that under normal conditions and on the existing basis of taxation, the two and a half crores of extra expenditure could be met from revenue. It was agreed if possible that this procedure should be followed. The Council were prepared to borrow in furtherance of these schemes, such sums as were not obtainable from revenue. These views were not accepted by the Secretary of State. It has now been ruled that provision should be made from revenue for reorganisation measures; except in respect of the expenditure on buildings and lands, for which estimates are awaited before it is decided whether these shall be provided from loans.

Despatch No. 138  
of the 29th September  
1904, to the Secretary  
of State,  
paragraph 19.  
(Appendix No. 12.)

In the case of the Special Defence Programme of 1902, which it was estimated would entail an initial expenditure of about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  crores of rupees, it was also decided that all charges incurred on these defence works should be met from revenue (*vide* Chapter VI).

*Savings resulting from the employment of troops of the Indian Army in South Africa, China and Somaliland.*—It was agreed in 1900 that the savings which resulted from the relief of India from the ordinary cost of maintenance of the troops employed on Imperial Service in South Africa, should be devoted to the financing of measures undertaken for the improvement of the Indian Army. The amounts which thus became available were little less than three million pounds sterling, as shown below:—

						£
1899-1900	...	...	...	...	...	353,000
1900-1901	...	...	...	...	...	852,000
1901-1902	...	...	...	...	...	817,000
1902-1903	...	...	...	...	...	565,000
1903-1904	...	...	...	...	...	241,000
1904-1905	...	...	...	...	...	102,000
Total						2,980,000

*Financial procedure in connection with the Reorganisation Scheme.—*

The estimates included in the schemes submitted by Lord Kitchener for the reorganisation and redistribution of the army amounted to a total of  $7\frac{1}{2}$  crores initial and one crore recurring expenditure. In putting the case to Council the Hon'ble Member in the Military Department pointed out that the estimates were greatly under-stated, and asked for a sum of 10 crores for initial and 2 crores for recurring expenditure, within the five years which His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief considered should be the maximum period allowed for the completion of the scheme. At the same time he pointed out that we were already committed to a considerable expenditure within this period on measures unconnected with reorganisation schemes, and that other similar outlay would be inevitable. Sir E. Elles considered that we should require a total of 3 crores on this account irrespective of any grant made for reorganisation measures. This sum is even likely to be largely exceeded since many proposals which affect the preparation of the army for war, but which are not included in the reorganisation programme, will require to be financed. For instance the rearmament of our horse and field artillery is estimated to cost some 250 lakhs, while there will also be a considerable expenditure on armament for heavy batteries.

The Government of India agreed to spend 13 crores (10 initial and 3 recurring) in five years on reorganisation measures, with an ultimate permanent annual recurring expenditure of 2 crores. They decided that the Military schedules for measures other than reorganisation should be limited within these five years to a total of 3 crores; that the measures should be carried out in five years; that under normal conditions and on the existing basis of taxation at least  $2\frac{1}{2}$  crores could be met annually from revenue, and that the expenditure should, as far as possible, be met from revenue in each year; that it was necessary and advisable to borrow for the purpose such sums as could not be provided from revenue; and that unspent balances should not lapse at the end of each financial year.

Council Order of  
the 15th July.

On the 9th July, the Secretary of State enquired whether, if Lord Kitchener's scheme were accepted *en bloc*, funds were available to meet it within three or five years without resorting to increased taxation. On the 15th July he was informed in reply that it would be necessary to provide 3 crores a year for five years to meet the cost of the scheme and of military schedules; and that if normal conditions continued, at least  $2\frac{1}{2}$  crores could be provided annually out of revenue on the existing basis of taxation, the annual balance, if any, not found from revenue being met from borrowed funds.

Shortly afterwards the Secretary of State agreed to an expenditure of 1 crore, during 1904 on mobilisation stores. Two thousand additional horses were also purchased, and the organisation of 13 new mules transport units was sanctioned. The cost of these measures, estimated at 56 lakhs, brought the total grant for reorganisation in 1904-05 up to 156 lakhs initial expenditure. An annual recurring expenditure of 24 or 25 lakhs has also been caused thereby, which will render it difficult to limit the total recurring expenditure within the next five years to the amount prescribed by Council, namely 3 crores.

Telegram of 22nd  
July 1904.

Secretary of State's  
despatch No. 148 of  
18th November 1904.  
(Appendix No. 13).

The Secretary of State has not accorded his sanction to the whole of the expenditure accepted by Council. He has, however, agreed to the provision of 3 crores in the budgets of the current year, and also to the utilisation of any unspent balance of 156 lakhs granted in 1904-05. He has also accepted the principle that proposals for each year shall be framed on the assumption that 3 crores will be available for expenditure, in addition to the unspent balance of the previous year.

The total of the estimates for the items at present entered\* in the schedule of reorganisation measures amounts to some 10 crores initial and  $2\frac{1}{2}$  crores annual recurring expenditure, exclusive of the greater part of the building programme in the Redistribution Scheme, which will, if completely carried out, cost not less than 5 crores. Many of these items may be revised and some will probably be eliminated. In these circumstances it is quite impossible at present to frame a reliable estimate of the expense involved, but there is every indication that the amount agreed to by Council will be insufficient to cover the cost of the original proposals. The original 5 years' programme was probably underestimated in the scheme by not less than 5 crores (£3,333,000). It must, however, be stated that Government have never accepted the estimates as accurate.

To enable the Secretary of State to exercise general supervision over the scheme, the Secretary of State has prescribed the submission of a list of requirements for the next five years with the best obtainable estimate of the cost involved, and has also ordered before the beginning of each financial year the submission, for his approval, of a detailed statement of the reorganisation expenditure to be incurred in that year.

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\* Including provision for artillery armament and other items not included in the reorganisation schemes.

The Military expenditure of India during Lord Curzon's term of office is shown in the following four statements:—

*Statement No. I showing the military receipts and expenditure in England for each of the past five years.*

	1899-1900.	1900-01.	1901-02.	1902-03.	1903-04.	1904-05. (a)
	£	£	£	£	£	£
<b>EFFECTIVE.</b>			<b>EXPENDITURE.</b>			
Payments to War Office in respect of British Forces serving in India.	739,423	700,000	64,010	851,994	627,109	644,552
Furlough Allowances and Pay during Voyage of British Forces serving in India.	98,645	50,207	94,074	112,750	141,132	124,668
Furlough Allowances of Officers of the Indian Service.	217,265	183,518	216,620	250,605	261,115	269,745
Indian Troop Service ... ..	130,794	86,286	196,521	345,499	360,039	370,944
Passage of Officers and others not charged to Indian Troop Service.	15,989	24,671	7,927	21,831	10,467	11,559
Miscellaneous ... ..	42,296	20,921	24,663	53,230	44,818	53,462
Stores for India ... ..	399,326	988,773	1,428,445	1,290,949	1,174,100	1,472,531
Total effective ...	1,638,738	2,054,876	2,032,260	2,926,858	2,618,780	2,947,461
<b>NON-EFFECTIVE.</b>						
Payments to War Office for Retired Pay, etc., of British Forces for service in India.	556,601	533,235	554,562	615,037	659,895	729,615
Pay of Non-effective Colonels of Royal Artillery.	24,503	23,120	22,479	20,769	20,270	18,585
Pay and Pensions of Non-effective and Retired Officers of the Indian Service.	1,725,197	1,687,398	1,650,391	1,602,887	1,580,924	1,543,153
Miscellaneous Pensions, etc. ... ..	83,352	83,883	83,661	83,305	85,259	87,067
Indian Military Service Family Pensions ..	32,253	35,282	39,706	41,801	46,287	48,992
Contributions towards Pensions of Indian Native Soldiers lent for Imperial Service, refunded.	...	...	...	...	...	9,940
Total, Non-effective ...	2,422,206	2,384,918	2,350,799	2,363,799	2,392,635	2,437,352
<b>REORGANISATION.</b>						
Stores for India ... ..	...	...	...	...	...	686,372
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b> ..	<b>4,060,944</b>	<b>4,439,294</b>	<b>4,383,059</b>	<b>5,290,657</b>	<b>5,011,415</b>	<b>6,071,185</b>
<b>EFFECTIVE.</b>			<b>RECEIPTS.</b>			
Contribution by the Imperial Government in respect of —Cost of the Transport of Troops.	...	...	130,000	130,000	130,000	130,000
Military Charges for Aden ... ..	...	...	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000
Value of Clothing, Accoutrements, etc., in possession of Regiments on their transfer from the Indian to the British Establishment; proceeds of sales of unserviceable stores; receipts on account of the Indian Troops Service; recoveries on account of messing, etc.	66,015	16,152	25,487	103,733	172,632	98,199
Total effective ...	66,015	16,152	255,487	333,733	402,632	328,199
<b>NON-EFFECTIVE.</b>						
Subscriptions towards Indian Military Service Family Pensions, etc.	17,562	16,793	21,278	24,935	25,222	26,786
Contributions towards Pensions of Indian Native Soldiers lent for Imperial Service.	...	...	...	34,330	22,532	...
Total, Non-effective ...	17,562	16,793	21,278	59,265	47,774	26,786
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b> ...	<b>83,577</b>	<b>32,945</b>	<b>276,765</b>	<b>392,998</b>	<b>450,386</b>	<b>354,985</b>
<b>Net, Home expenditure</b> ...	<b>3,977,367</b>	<b>4,406,349</b>	<b>ABSTRACT.</b>			
			4,100,294	4,897,659	4,561,029	5,716,200

(a) The figures for 1904-05 are approximate.



Statement No. II showing the military receipts and

Grants.	1899-1900.	1900-1901.	1901-1902.	1902-1903.	1903-1904.	(a) 1904-1905.
EFFECTIVE.	Rs.	Rs. RECEIPTS.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
III.—Regimental pay, allowances and charges	62,997	60,624	68,978	72,456	65,137	72,993
IV.—Supply and Transport ...	46,45,234	49,24,627	42,52,578	44,01,060	40,09,792	42,35,956
V.—Remount and Veterinary establishment, supplies and services.	6,78,085	24,18,952	11,93,879	2,63,085	5,17,754	1,22,206
VI.—Clothing establishments, supplies and services.	9,89,659	8,11,479	10,47,862	9,19,514	8,80,258	7,41,896
VII.—Barrack establishments, supplies and services.	31,550	23,451	26,648	20,658	26,567	23,484
IX.—Medical establishments, supplies and services.	4,31,597	5,10,584	3,99,554	4,25,468	4,20,338	5,22,162
X.—Ordnance establishments, stores and camp equipage.	15,68,861	19,39,996	21,39,073	35,77,233	19,28,842	16,04,508
XII.—Education ...	15,670	15,775	18,311	19,443	16,653	24,427
XIII.—Sea transports charges ...	21,041	48,317	41,013	43,340	26,027	25,818
XIV.—Miscellaneous services ...	1,55,622	1,46,018	2,69,336	75,540	2,87,677	3,16,000
Total, effective ...	86,00,316	1,09,00,023	94,47,232	98,17,797	81,81,045	76,89,450
NON-EFFECTIVE.						
XVI.—Rewards on Military services ...	2,808	2,296	2,757	3,164	8,269	4,102
XVII.— ...	...	...	...	...	...	...
XVIII.— ...	6,199	2,830	96	2,215	2,16,366	29,396
XIX.— ...	8,73,454	8,61,964	10,61,872	11,56,655	11,79,954	13,11,563
Total, Non-effective ...	8,82,459	8,61,430	10,64,725	11,62,034	14,01,589	13,45,061
Military operations ...	55,811	3,476	404	50	...	...
Reorganisation ...	..	...	...	...	...	95
GRAND TOTAL ...	95,38,586	1,17,64,929	1,05 12,361	1,09,79,881	95,85,634	90,34,606

(a) The figures for 1904-05 are approximate only—the accounts will not be finally closed till December.



*expenditure in India for each of the past five years.*

Grants.	1899-1900.	1900-1901.	1901-1902.	1902-1903.	1903-1904.	(a) 1904-1905.
EFFECTIVE.	Rs. EXPENDITURE.	Rs. EXPENDITURE.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
III.—Regimental pay, allowances and charges.	53,38,221	54,12,087	54,99,691	57,56,973	58,32,699	60,00,917
IV.—Supply and Transport ... ..	20,59,259	20,27,721	20,57,132	21,14,140	22,14,935	22,25,403
V.—Remount and Veterinary establishments, supplies and services.	7,85,49,869	7,18,58,253	7,85,63,254	8,25,96,895	8,85,44,754	9,80,77,351
VI.—Clothing establishments, supplies and services	3,73,06,113	3,90,48,972	4,09,61,916	4,19,46,895	4,19,01,868	4,24,62,363
VII.—Barrack establishments, supplies and services.	35,21,627	61,67,939	39,80,995	45,77,980	46,79,969	49,65,011
IX.—Medical establishments, supplies and services.	22,76,579	24,93,396	25,94,599	27,95,414	31,84,885	29,98,136
X.—Ordnance establishments, stores and camp equipage.	22,24,949	17,61,644	19,43,837	20,55,257	20,94,399	21,58,607
XII.—Education ... ..	3,91,277	3,76,649	3,75,579	3,49,454	3,56,278	3,28,742
XIII.—Sea transport charges ... ..	68,56,073	69,49,998	68,67,642	75,65,888	88,31,781	89,34,068
XIV.—Miscellaneous services ... ..	74,33,281	71,02,726	96,46,025	1,12,99,554	1,00,25,486	1,17,94,780
	3,07,227	2,99,597	3,67,748	3,81,843	4,03,270	4,21,200
	4,70,321	4,73,079	4,71,110	4,56,648	5,06,614	4,52,515
	8,79,438	17,64,209	11,26,755	6,99,634	5,12,235	7,42,109
	34,59,841	28,03,507	48,40,314	56,13,544	95,53,855	1,22,41,278
	20,15,821	21,44,503	22,08,254	23,52,032	25,03,985	24,75,812
	—89,480	—1,83,771	—1,36,760	4,23,851	6,67,856	...
Total effective ... ..	15,30,00,416	15,05,06,518	16,13,71,691	17,09,85,032	18,27,14,858	19,62,78,292
NON-EFFECTIVE.						
XVI.—Rewards on Military services ... ..	1,63,175	94,454	1,05,528	1,16,240	2,10,205	1,48,264
XVII ... ..	9,80,139	9,30,396	10,66,684	12,96,331	10,52,424	11,42,325
XVIII ... ..	71,05,987	72,11,158	72,65,889	75,11,269	73,71,446	77,72,290
XIX ... ..	2,20,156	2,24,587	2,39,535	2,53,118	2,70,077	2,85,885
	6,46,082	6,43,234	6,49,458	6,60,057	6,87,896	7,26,867
Total Non-effective ... ..	91,15,539	91,03,829	93,27,144	98,37,015	1,00,92,048	1,00,75,631
Military operations ... ..	2,48,287	42,221	14,254	13,971	...	...
Reorganisation ... ..	...	...	...	...	...	59,35,381
GRAND TOTAL ... ..	16,23,64,242	15,96,52,568	17,07,13,089	18,08,36,018	19,28,06,906	21,22,89,304
		Abstract of net expenditure.				
Net expenditure ... .. Rs.	15,28,25,656	14,78,87,639	16,02,00,728	16,98,56,137	18,32,21,272	20,32,54,698
Net expenditure in sterling ... .. £	10,188,377	9,859,176	10,680,048	11,323,743	12,214,751	13,500,313

(a) The figures for 1904-05 are approximate only—the accounts will not be closed until December 1905.

STATEMENT III.—TOTAL EXPENDITURE ADMINISTERED BY MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

The net expenditure (Home and Indian) under Military, Military Works and Special Defences, and Marine, from 1899-1900 to 1905-06, is shown in the following statement :—

Year.	NET EXPENDITURE.							TOTAL.
	India Military.	Home Military.	Military Works (Home and India.)	Special Defences (Home and India.)	Total.	India Marine.	Home Marine.	
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1899-1900 ...	10,188,877	3,977,867	801,782	873	14,968,399	49,890	327,355	15,345,144
1900-01 ...	9,859,176	4,406,349	747,187	6,864	15,019,576	74,522	351,0 <sup>6</sup>	15,445,134
1901-02 ...	10,680,048	4,106,294	917,140	...	15,703,582	118,688	313,936	16,136,101
1902-03 ...	11,323,748	4,897,659	1,058,368	...	17,279,770	77,402	247,042	17,604,214
1903-04 ...	12,214,75	4,561,029	989,571	27,054	17,792,405	56,318	280,631	18,129,354
1904-05 (Approximate Estimate.)	13,550,313	5,716,200	987,600	147,866	20,498,199	67,733	272,000	20,827,932
1905-06 (Budget Estimate)	13,374,266	5,980,500	1,149,066	253,200	20,757,032	114,468	281,600	21,153,100

STATEMENT IV.—MILITARY WORKS AND SPECIAL DEFENCES.

Military Works.—During the period under review the gross expenditure on Military Works (exclusive of Special Defences) has been :—

	Rs.
1899-1900 ...	1,25,48,429
1900-01 ...	1,17,44,120
1901-02 ...	1,44,71,736
1902-03 ...	1,64,40,894
1903-04 ...	1,55,19,798
1904-05 ...	1,47,15,743
1905-06 (budget grant)	1,72,36,000

Special Defences.—The following statement shows the expenditure on works and armaments connected with the programmes of 1885, and 1902\* :—

	Rs.
1899-1900 ...	13,110
1900-01 ...	1,02,960
1901-02 ...	Nil.
1902-03 ...	Nil.
1903-04 ...	4,05,816
1904-05 ...	19,30,291
1905-06 (budget grant) ...	37,98,000

There was also expenditure to the extent of Rs. 5,91,145 under the head 46—Army on account of Special Defence armaments prior to the opening of the head 47—Special Defences, 1902.

\* See Chapter VI, Coast Defences.

## CHAPTER V.

## STRENGTH OF LAND FORCES IN INDIA.

In explanation of the development in the strength of the army, actual and potential, which has taken place during Lord Curzon's term of office, it is necessary to make a short retrospect.

The sudden attack by Russia on the Afghans in 1885 led to the adoption of many defensive measures by the Government of India, including the addition to the army of 10,000 British and 20,000 native troops. A scheme was prepared for the mobilisation of two army corps, and a reserve division, which involved a certain measure of help from England. In connection with this plan the War Office specifically stated that, while India might rely upon every possible assistance on Great Britain in the event of a mutiny or threatened invasion, any scheme for the mobilisation of the army should be based on existing conditions, because it would be dangerous to ignore the contingency that the army in England would be fully occupied.

Despatch No. 131-  
Military, dated 12th  
May 1887, from Sec-  
retary of State.

It is even on record that in an important Cabinet minute of 1888, defining the object for which the British army is maintained, no mention was made of the obligation to provide India with reinforcements in case of emergency. Two years later the necessity for making arrangements which would render India independent of Great Britain on mobilisation was again emphasized by the India Office. The reason for the assumption of this attitude by the Home Government lies in the fact that it was then considered by the War Office and Foreign Office that the true objective of Russian policy lay in South-East Europe towards the Bosphorus, and that an attack by Russia on Afghanistan would be of the character of a feint, made only with the purpose of distracting attention from a Western theatre of war, and of thus dividing the forces at the disposal of the British Empire. Moreover it was thought that Russia would not be likely to stir, save at a favourable opportunity and when she had secured the assistance of France. The political condition of Europe was such as to preclude the possibility of a serious attack on Afghanistan or India, for England was then disposed to side with the Triple alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy against the combined forces of Russia and France. Russia was moreover obliged to devote her attention in a great measure to her European frontier, and had not been able to consolidate her strength in Central Asia.

Despatch No. 119-  
Military, dated 17th  
May 1888, from Sec-  
retary of State.

Despatch No. 20-  
Military, dated 30th  
January 1890, from  
Secretary of State.

Letter from Lord  
Cross to Lord Lans-  
downe, about May  
1891.

It was at this juncture that Lord (then Sir F.) Roberts represented to the Government of India the danger that would be incurred by the adoption of a passive defence on the North-West Frontier. He urged the abandonment of the Indus as a defensive frontier, and the occupation of the Kabul-Kandahar line, should Russia in any circumstances cross the borders of Afghanistan, notwithstanding that it was clearly realised that defence of this character would involve the despatch from England of not less than 30,000 men from England; in addition to the drafts required to keep the whole British garrison (altogether 100,000 men) at full strength. Lord Roberts pleaded that the engagements entered into with the Amir, and publicly proclaimed, constituted a pledge before the world that no foreign power would be allowed to interfere with Afghanistan—a pledge which India was then powerless to perform in view of the consolidation of Russian power in Central Asia, and the transfer of her base from the Orenburg-Tashkent route to that of the Caspian.

Government of  
India Despatch No.  
180-Military, dated  
15th September 1891.

Secretary of State's  
despatch No. 18,  
dated 8th April 1892.

In answer to this representation Lord Cross repeated the instructions previously given that the plans for the defence of India must be based upon the force actually under the control of Government of India; and that without consultation with His Majesty's Government, no forward policy should be laid down which might contemplate the necessity for reinforcements from England for its accomplishment, which it would not be possible to despatch until the Navy had cleared the seas of hostile fleets. To this pronouncement the Government of India was able only to reply, that India had gone as far as her finances permitted in the direction of maintaining an army to resist Russian aggression, and that, in these conditions, the responsibility must rest upon His Majesty's Government to provide whatever reinforcements might be needed in the event of the invasion of North Afghanistan by Russia. The Government of India expressed their willingness to consider all matters which might tend to the increased efficiency of the army, but could not, in existing financial conditions, agree to an increase of the forces.

Despatch No. 20-  
Secret, dated 9th  
June 1893.

The reply of the Secretary of State contained no concession to the views of the Government of India, and the discussion was closed with the expression of opinion by the War Office and India Office that "if the occupation of South Afghanistan is necessary for the passive defence of India, the Government of India should make arrangements to maintain in time of peace a force in India sufficient for that purpose. The employment of that portion of the Indian army not permanently allocated for the defence of selected positions will, in times of emergency, be directed by the Cabinet of the day. It would not be desirable to permit India to adopt any policy based on reinforcements which it might prove impossible to provide." In this condition matters were allowed to rest. Since India was limited to her own resources, it remained only to reorganise and reconstitute the army and render it a fitter instrument for modern warfare. Financial considerations precluded any permanent increase, or indeed any drastic changes in the constitution of the forces.

Despatch No. 5,  
dated 23rd February  
1900.

Despatch No. 58,  
dated 26th April  
1900, to Secretary of  
State. (Appendix  
No. 15).

Despatch No. 16  
of 13th July 1900.

Despatch No. 137,  
dated 20th September  
1900.

During the winter of 1899-1900 owing to the large number of British forces absent in South Africa, it appeared not unlikely that advantage might be taken by Russia of our difficulties to make a forward move in Central Asia. Reports and rumours were rife of large forces having been despatched to Transcaspia. The whole question of defence was then re-opened by the Secretary of State by an enquiry regarding the scheme of defence prepared in India. In reply the Government of India forwarded the detailed proposals of the Mobilisation Committee, but deferred comment on them until they were in possession of the views of His Majesty's Government on the larger issue regarding the measure of support from England which could be counted on. In this respect the Mobilisation Committee had assumed a reinforcement by 30,000 British troops on the outbreak of war, with 70,000 to follow. The Secretary of State then pressed for information regarding the measures necessary for the defence of the Indian frontier without the immediate assistance of troops or stores from England, leaving the possibility of reinforcement for discussion when the military system of Great Britain should come under revision at the close of the Boer War. Another scheme for the passive defence of the Indian frontier, jointly prepared by the Commander-in-Chief (Sir A. P. Palmer) and the Military Member of Council (Sir E. Collen) was forwarded in reply. But it was pointed

out that the original project, which provided for the occupation of certain points of vital strategic importance beyond the frontier, offered far greater prospect of success in a defensive campaign, than a restricted policy of defence, by which our troops would be confined to positions in our possession, on or behind the frontier line. Moreover a purely defensive scheme of this nature would demand the employment of as many, if not more, troops to ensure success; as well as the construction of many strategic lines of railway; and the provision of defensive works on the lines of advance. The memorandum concluded with a strong expression of opinion that, in the event of a Russian advance into Afghanistan, whether the defence be active or passive, at least 30,000 British troops must be sent to India at once. In the event of prolonged hostilities, 70,000 more would be required.

A request then was sent for the preparation of a scheme for the defence of India on the assumption that Afghanistan would be unfriendly or hostile, and that it would be impossible for some considerable time to augment the number of European troops at the disposal of the Government of India. The probable disposition of the army in these circumstances was stated to the Secretary of State, but it was added that a policy framed on this assumption would involve an addition to the forces in India, the cost of which should be borne largely, if not wholly, by the Imperial exchequer.

Despatch No. 1-  
Secret of 4th January  
1901.

Despatch No. 85,  
dated 13th June  
1901, to Secretary of  
State.

At this stage the matter was referred to a Joint Committee of the War Office and India Office, with Lieutenant-General Sir William Nicholson as president. After a careful review of the resources of Russia and India, and the preparation of a forecast of the action which would be taken in the event of a hostile advance by Russia into Afghanistan, this Committee recommended, in addition to various defensive works and strategic railways, the permanent increase of the British infantry in India by 18 battalions; adding that adequate reinforcements from England would none the less be necessary at the earliest safe opportunity after war had been declared. This report was considered in India by a Conference over which His Excellency the Viceroy himself presided, and whose conclusions were adopted by the Government of India. They disputed the necessity for so large an increase of the permanent garrison to carry out the proposed scheme of defence, and pointed out the enormous additional expenditure which would be involved. It was, however, agreed that each battalion in India should be increased by one company, which would be equivalent to an augmentation of 5,200 men. This addition to the forces would enable India without reinforcement to put six divisions into the field instead of only four. In dealing with the financial aspect of the question, the Government of India urged strongly that the extra expenditure involved by the increase of the British forces in India should be charged to the Imperial exchequer, in view of the fact that it was Imperial policy which necessitated the increase.

Despatch No. 4,  
dated 7th February  
1902, from Secretary  
of State.

Despatch No. 160,  
dated 21st August  
1902, to Secretary of  
State.

No specific reply was received to this statement of views, but nearly a year afterwards a telegram was received from the Secretary of State stating that the question of reinforcing India had been considered. The War Office proposed to keep a garrison of 25,000 men in South Africa, and to hold half that number available for despatch on emergency, provided that a proportion of the extra expense were borne by India. It was suggested that the Indian annual

Telegram, dated  
15th July 1903.



contribution should be £400,000. This project was even publicly announced in Parliament before the receipt of the views of the Government of India, who immediately entered an energetic protest against the scheme, both on account of the extra charge which would be laid on Indian revenues, and because of the belief that it would not be possible for many years to reduce the garrison of South Africa to the strength (12,500 men) which was prescribed as the obligatory minimum. The Government of India renewed their representations that the cost of increasing the Indian garrison should be debited to Imperial funds, and restated their opinion that a permanent addition of 5,200 British troops would suffice for immediate requirements.

Despatch No. 110  
of 30th July 1903,  
to Secretary of State,  
(Appendix No. 16).

Apparently the views of the Government of India were acquiesced in for the South African project was abandoned. The Reorganisation Scheme which was presented by the Commander-in-Chief in the February following, contained proposals for the addition of 5,200 men to the British service, organised in three battalions of infantry, three battalions of mounted infantry and two telegraph and signalling companies. It has since been decided however that the first named troops shall not be added to the army until the Reorganisation Scheme is practically complete; but that the remaining units should be constituted in 1907-08.

Despatch No. 12,  
dated 4th March  
1904.  
(Appendix No. 17).

Despatch No. 104,  
dated 22nd September  
1905.

The necessity for reinforcements to India as soon as the seas are open has at length been definitely acknowledged by the Home Government, and has been publicly announced by the Prime Minister in Parliament. Moreover for the purpose of proceeding with the necessary arrangements, the Committee of Imperial Defence have assumed, as a provisional basis, the supply of reinforcements to India to be:—2 Cavalry brigades, 8 Infantry divisions, 3 battalions of Infantry to complete 9 Indian divisions, 5 battalions of Mounted Infantry, 2 Railway Companies, Royal Engineers, and 2 divisions of the Telegraph battalion, Royal Engineers—in all 96,664 men and 16,652 horses. In addition to replace one year's wastage it has been calculated that drafts totalling 51,469 men will be required. Provided Great Britain should hold the command of the sea, an assurance has been given that this force, fully equipped, could be landed in India at the rate of two divisions bi-monthly after the outbreak of war; except that Infantry officers and men will now be respectively 1,900, and 19,000 in defect. After the expiry of a year it is hoped that the latter deficiency may be reduced to 6,000. The Indian demands for reinforcements in the event of a war with Russia have not yet been specifically stated—they may range from 100,000 to 160,000 men.

From this record of the discussions of the Government of India with the Imperial Government it will be seen that during Lord Curzon's term of office arrangements have been made for the eventual permanent augmentation of the British forces in India by over 5,000 men, and also for a potential increase of the force which will probably not be less than 75,000 men, and which after a year may exceed that number by 13,000. It is however to be hoped that in the event of a really serious emergency these numbers would be largely augmented, and also that we should obtain from the Colonies a generous measure of assistance. It has yet to be ascertained to what extent help from this quarter will be available; no steps have hitherto been taken to organise the supply of colonial reinforcements.

*Relative proportion of British to Native troops in the Indian army.*—This subject has been discussed by the Royal Commission of 1859 and by the Government of India in 1893. At the earlier date the proportion was fixed at 1-2 for the Bengal, and 1-3 for the Bombay and Madras armies. In 1893 it was decided to adopt a general proportion for cavalry and infantry soldiers throughout India of 1 British to 2½ Native. At that time the numbers of native troops, levies, military and other police armed with breech-loading rifles were well within the accepted ratio. The improvement in the position of the para-mount power between 1859 and 1893 was, amongst other things, ascribed to the presence of 11,000 Gurkhas in the army: the custody of arsenals and control of ammunition supply by European troops only; the absence of native field artillery; the improved facilities of communication; and the relative inferiority of the weapons issued to Native troops. In 1903 the position was again reviewed by Lord Curzon's Government in connection with the increase of the native army reserve. Neglecting political changes which were wholly favourable, the British position had still further improved by the addition of 4,000 Gurkha to the army, and the very considerable increase of railways (26,331 miles as against 18,504) and other communications. The disparity of artillery was well maintained by the retention in British hands of 468 field guns, with ammunition columns, as compared with 68 mountain guns manned by the Native Artillery and Imperial service troops. Moreover the volunteers had increased in strength from 24,700 to 31,800. As the army stood in 1903, after withdrawing the authorised field army (28,000 British 47,500 Native troops and 11,000 Imperial Service troops); the force left in India would be constituted of British and Native troops in the following proportions:—Regulars only, 1: 2·90; or including volunteers on the one side and levies and police on the other, 1: 2·15. It was argued that, although these proportions would be modified by the increase of native reservists to 50,000, in addition to the extra recruitment (about 200 men for each infantry battalion) which had been sanctioned on mobilisation, still the increase to the native strength would not be simultaneous, and that in any case it would be necessary to take some internal risks in time of war in preference to incurring danger at the front.

Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 200 of 20th September 1893.  
Secretary of State's Despatch No. 47, dated 1st December 1893.

Despatch No. 210, dated 5th November 1903, to Secretary of State.

The Secretary of State replied that the effect of the improvement in armament of the native army had probably been underrated; whereas the value of the volunteers might have been placed at too high a level—on this point further information was desired regarding their constitution and efficiency. The conclusion, however, was forced upon him that any further increase of the Native army would be inadmissible, unless accompanied by a corresponding increase of British troops in India, or some provision for their prompt reinforcement on an emergency.

Secretary of State's Despatch No. 6, dated 29th January 1904. (Appendix No. 18).

In urging a reconsideration of this ruling the Government of India recounted at length the change of conditions which had taken place since the date of the Royal Commission, by whom the proportionate limits of native troops had originally been fixed. Emphasis was laid on the power of rapid reinforcement from without. Since it was to be regarded as an axiom that, in the event of a great war, every native regiment not required for the maintenance of internal tranquillity would be sent to the front, acceptance was demanded of the proposition that no addition to the Native Army, which is designed to increase the force in the field, can be regarded as adding to the

Despatch No. 52, dated 29th April 1904, to Secretary of State. (Appendix No. 19.)



danger in time of war, since that peril is to be measured only by the number of armed natives left in garrison in India. The Government of India went on to say that on the outbreak of war it was contemplated to enrol and arm, compulsorily, all Europeans and Eurasians who might not already be volunteers, to the number of 30,000. In calculating the proportion of British to Natives, they proposed that these should also be taken into account.

Despatch No. 115,  
dated 26th August  
1904, from Secretary  
of State.

In these calculations 43,000 native police armed with smooth bores were omitted as being without military value: and for the same reason 70,000 armed troops of Native States were also neglected and were not mentioned in the despatch. The Secretary of State was unconvinced. The increase of the native army reserve to 50,000 men was sanctioned; but a final decision on the question of the proportion of British and Native troops to be maintained was deferred until receipt of the views of Local Governments regarding the internal garrisons proposed in the Reorganisation Scheme; and until the conditions of the Indian Volunteers become more fully known.

It transpired that of a present strength of 33,472 Volunteers, 16,167 are Europeans, and 14,357 Eurasians; the balance, 10 per cent. of the whole, are of Native birth. The Inspector General of Volunteers in 1904 reported that 2,500 men were inefficient.

#### RECRUITMENT OF BRITISH TROOPS.

Despatch No. 68,  
dated 13th June,  
1901, to Secretary  
of State.  
(Appendix No. 20)

The maintenance of British power in India depends in the last resort upon the supply of the British private soldier. The terms and manner of his recruitment are therefore of primary importance. Unless he is procured in sufficient numbers and of the proper physique, no organisation can be of avail. It was found on the occasion of the North-West Frontier operations of 1897-98 that of a strength of 21,500 men belonging to corps ordered on field service, more than 2,000 were left behind sick, of whom 1,000 were suffering from venereal diseases. In addition 600 men went sick during the campaign from the same cause. But apart from this matter, one-third of the total strength of regiments were sent to base hospitals during the campaign, and only about ten per cent. of the total rejoined their regiments on service. The desirability of having a larger proportion of seasoned soldiers in the ranks was proved by an examination of the medical statistics which showed that men between 25 and 30 years of age were less adversely affected by service conditions than younger soldiers. The Government of India accordingly proposed that, although the reserve might be reduced thereby, the inducements of a bounty should be offered to 3,000 men annually to extend their Indian service instead of returning home on their 8 years' term of engagement.

The issue of a bounty as a temporary expedient had already been suggested by the Commander-in-Chief at the beginning of the previous trooping season in view of the large number of seasoned soldiers (15,000) who would be due to return to England for transfer to the Reserve when the army was demobilised. The war was then still in progress. Simultaneously it was intimated by the War Office that sufficient drafts for infantry regiments could not be provided when

demobilisation took place. Accordingly bounties of £5 for each additional year were offered to 1,470 men only of certain British regiments who would extend for periods up to 3 years' service. The extension of bounties to the whole of the British infantry was then urged by the Government of India, and as a further inducement it was suggested that furlough should be given gradually to re-engaged men. The Imperial Government were unwilling to agree to this proposal, but in the following August, when demobilisation was imminent, a bounty of £10 was offered to men of all branches of the service for the completion of 12 years with the colour; together with furlough for not less than two months in England, or £16-10 in lieu. In all 16,000 men accepted these terms, and of them over 2,250 proceeded on furlough: the others received in all £26-10 each as gratuity.

Telegram No. 209-A,  
dated 20th January  
1901.

Telegram, dated 17th  
August 1901.

New terms of service for the British army were introduced in 1902 in consequence of the deficiency in the establishment of the army. Enlistment was authorised for 3 years with the colours and 9 years' service with the reserve, but those who after 2 years' service elected to complete 7 or 8 years with the colours would receive daily 6d. extra as service pay.

Telegram, dated 27th  
February 1902, from  
Secretary of State.  
(Appendix No. 49).

It was not long before the refusal of the men enlisted under these terms of service to re-engage caused a shortage of the Indian drafts and embarrassment to the War Office. It was found necessary to send to India not only men who had not more than 3 years to serve with the colours, but men under the new terms of service who re-engaged on the condition that they should receive the extra service pay of 6d. a day some months before they would ordinarily become entitled to it. About 3,400 men in the first category were sent to this country, and in August 1904, there were over 6,000 men in India who might claim transfer to the Reserve on the completion of 3 years' service. This state of affairs was so serious as to elicit a vigorous protest from the Government of India against any men being sent to India who had not at least 5 years to serve.

Despatch No. 130,  
dated 15th September  
1904.  
(Appendix No. 21).

The same difficulty was probably experienced in regard to drafts for the larger colonial garrisons. Accordingly the terms of service were modified by the War Office in November 1904; for infantry to 9 years with the colours and 3 years with the reserve: and in the following January for cavalry to 8 years with the colours and 4 years with the reserve. The War Office have again notified their inability to furnish a sufficient number of drafts in the trooping season of 1905-06 and the offer of bounty to soldiers who are due to return to England is now under consideration. It is stated that the drafts will be deficient by about 5,000 men.

The unsatisfactory nature of these transactions with the Home authorities needs no comment. By a decision of the Arbitrator between the India Office and the War Office, to which more detailed reference is made elsewhere, India has been required to pay the whole of the extra pay involved by the introduction of the terms of service of 1902, while the India Office have also agreed to pay on her behalf a moiety of the bounties and of the cost of furlough to re-engaged men. In return there have been provided drafts of inefficient short service men, amounting to nearly 10 per cent. of the whole garrison, who are under contract to be returned to England before they can be acclimatised and rendered efficient soldiers.

*Formation of Eurasian Regiments.*—In response to an enquiry from the Secretary of State the Government of India in 1899 stated their opinion regarding the formation of regiments of domiciled Europeans and Eurasians for local service. It was contended by the representatives of the Eurasian community that such a measure would open up a new field of employment for these classes, and for this reason the matter was sympathetically investigated by the Government of India. Three corps of Eurasians had been formed in 1857 and 1858 but were all disbanded by 1870, for the reasons that they cost practically as much as British troops, and required as elaborate commissariat arrangements, inspired less confidence, and were difficult to recruit. All successive Commanders-in-Chief in India have opposed the measure; while on political grounds it has received support from other members of the Governor-General's Council who considered that the claims of the Eurasian population had increased, while their appeal to be employed in the service of the Crown had gained in force and intensity. Moreover it was pointed out that the Eurasians had rendered good service in the mutiny; and even now formed a large part of the volunteer force in India.

Despatch No. 55,  
dated 30th March  
1899, to Secretary  
of State.  
(Appendix No. 22).

The Secretary of State while desiring to provide, if possible, an outlet for the aspirations of the Eurasian community, rejected the proposal, mainly, on the grounds that since such a regiment could only be maintained in addition to and not in substitution for any part of the Garrison of India, a fresh burden would be imposed on the revenue in return for which no commensurate result in the shape of increased military strength would be obtained.

Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 6,  
dated 18th January  
1900.  
(Appendix No. 23).

#### INCREASE TO THE BRITISH TROOPS IN INDIA.

##### ARTILLERY.

*Horse and Field.*—The establishment of 27 batteries of the field artillery has increased in 1900 by nearly 600 horses in order to provide for the formation of ammunition columns. Five Royal Horse Artillery and seven half-horsed ammunition columns were subsequently formed. The establishment of 5 batteries, Royal Horse Artillery, and 21 batteries, Royal Field Artillery, was increased so as to enable them to take the field without extraneous assistance. A Brigade division of three howitzer batteries were added to the Indian army in 1901.

Six signallers were added in 1904 to each of the batteries detailed for the field army.

*Garrison.*—The establishment was increased by one company in 1901. The numbers of native lascars attached to forts manned by the garrison artillery was increased in the previous year, and they were accorded the privileges of fighting men.

##### ENGINEERS.

A Balloon Section was organised at Rawal Pindi in 1902, the necessary *personnel* and stores being taken over from the Imperial Service on the conclusion of the China Expedition.

India Army Circular,  
No. 848, dated 15th  
April 1902.

The formation of 2 submarine mining and 4 Electrical Engineer Companies of Volunteers at Calcutta, Rangoon, Bombay, and Karachi was sanctioned in April 1902, as an economical method of reinforcing the Royal Engineer Companies of the Indian Submarine Corps, which were found to be numerically insufficient for the dual duties of submarine mining and the control of electric

search-lights. Subsequently an additional company was constituted at Madras; only to be disbanded a little later as the electric-lights had not arrived from England. The submarine mining company at Rangoon, found to be inefficient, shared a similar fate in 1904. The Admiralty have recently proposed that the submarine defence of Indian ports should be abandoned.

Military Department  
letter No. 2878-B.,  
dated 16th September  
1908.

#### INCREASE OF ROYAL ENGINEER OFFICERS.

By a process of reduction of 10 officers a year which had been ordered by the Secretary of State in 1898, the establishment of Royal Engineer officers was lowered to 320 in 1903, in spite of the representations of the Indian Government. At this point reduction was stayed in consequence of the formation of fresh units in the Engineer arm in India. An increased establishment of 340 officers was eventually agreed to. The augmentation of the field army to 9 divisions has caused the acceptance of a further permanent increase of the establishment by 25 officers; 27 officers have also been temporarily added to the strength to supervise the military works involved by the Redistribution Scheme. The total authorised strength has therefore been raised from 320 officers in 1903 to 392 officers in 1905; but hitherto it has not been possible to complete this complement.

#### INCREASE TO THE RESERVE OF THE NATIVE ARMY.

The investigation in 1885 of the requirements of India in the event of a serious war made it clear that it would not be financially possible to keep with the colours in time of peace all the men who would be necessary for the maintenance of the Native Army at fighting strength in time of war. Moreover it was realised that there would be a difficulty in obtaining recruits for the Native Army when they would be most required, that is, after a few months of campaigning. A reserve of 25,000 men was sanctioned, as an instalment of a larger measure, and in 1903 the establishment was nearly up to full strength. The Commander-in-Chief then proposed that the reserve should be increased gradually to 50,000 men. The experience gained in the South African war of the wastage of men which occurs during a campaign had shown that reserve of about 23,000 men would be wholly inadequate for the demands of a force of 145,000 men, the present strength of the Native Army. The financial advantages gained by the institution of a reserve on low rates of pay are obvious. Moreover, since reservists are unarmed until they are in the ranks for training or service, an increase to the potential strength of the Native Army can be effected, at any rate in time of peace, without effecting the proportions which is maintained between the numbers of Native and British soldiers.

Adjutant General's  
letter No. 1560-B.,  
dated 10th June  
1903.

The scheme as recommended to the Secretary of State and accepted by him provided for the completion of the establishment in about 10 years; for the reduction of reserve pay from Rs. 3 to Rs. 2 a month; for the permissive transfer of men to the reserve after 3 years' service; and for a biennial training of two months. The annual cost of the measure, exclusive of pensionary charges, was estimated to rise progressively from Rs. 4 lakhs in the first year to about 16 lakhs in the tenth year, and eventually thenceforward to diminish to a permanent annual charge of 14½ lakhs.

Despatch No. 211,  
dated 5th November  
1903.  
(Appendix No. 21).

### INCREASE TO ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE UNITS OF THE NATIVE ARMY ON MOBILISATION.

Despatch from Secretary of State, No 135, dated 22nd November 1900.

In accordance with a recommendation of the Mobilisation Committee, sanction was accorded in November 1900 to the enlistment on mobilisation of 100 men in excess of the peace establishment of each Native infantry regiment taking the field; and 10 per cent. in excess of the peace establishment of each Native cavalry regiment, company of Sappers and Miners, battery of Native artillery, and of Native drivers of British artillery, in similar circumstances.

Despatch No. 81, dated 13th February 1902, to Secretary of State.

Subsequently the Commander-in-Chief proposed that the strength of Native infantry battalions should be largely increased in time of peace, so as to counteract the effect of the large numbers of men on furlough, sick, and recruits. Financial reasons rendered the acceptance of this proposal impossible; but in lieu it was agreed that the authorised establishment of each Gurkha, Pioneer, Punjab and Burma battalion taking the field should be increased by 256 men, and that of all other Native infantry battalions by 128 sepoy. By prompt action in recruiting after mobilisation it may be possible to counteract the difficulty which will inevitably be felt in obtaining recruits after a campaign has been in progress for some time.

Secretary of State's despatch No. 65, dated 2nd May 1902.

### ADDITIONAL OFFICERS FOR THE NATIVE ARMY.

Secretary of State's despatch No. 85, dated 15th March 1900.

The difficulty in finding British officers for the 5 brigades of Native troops which were sent to China, notwithstanding an addition of 92 officers sanctioned in 1900, brought very forcibly to notice the impossibility of mobilising the Native Regiments detailed for the field army without denuding to a dangerous extent those battalions remaining in India. The Commander-in-Chief (Sir Power Palmer) pressed for recognition of the need for 15 officers in each regiment, whereas there were then only 11 officers in Punjab and Bengal Native infantry regiments and 10 in those of Madras and Bombay. Since sick officers and those on leave and temporary duty were not replaced, the actual number of officers with their regiments rarely exceeded seven. An increase in the regiment

Secretary of State's despatch No. 78, dated 5th July 1901.

al establishment to the number proposed by the Commander-in-Chief would have entailed an addition of nearly 700 officers. To this extent the Government of India and the Secretary of State were unwilling to proceed, but agreed to an addition of one British officer to each Native infantry regiment, except those serving in the Colonies.

Secretary of State's despatch No. 150, dated 11th December 1903.

In the following year the question was reopened: the Staff Corps was augmented by 64 officers in May 1902, and on the grounds that 15 officers would eventually be required for each Native corps, the Commander-in-Chief in the following August pressed for a further increase of 110 officers with effect from the 1st April 1903, to bring the number of officers with the Native Army to 12 in every regiment, with one officer in addition for those of the Punjab Command. This increase was duly sanctioned.

Adjutant General's No. 478-M. C., dated 17th February 1904.

In the Reorganisation Scheme, submitted in February 1904, the deficiency in the number of British officers required for the mobilisation of 9 divisions, including the requirements of the departments and staff, reached the formidable total of 938, allowing each Native regiment in the field 12 officers and the remainder 10 apiece. The Commander-in-Chief proposed in the first place to

increase the existing establishment by 350 officers so as to permit of the provision of Punjab regiments with 15 officers in time of peace and other regiments with 14. It is now intended that 270 appointments should be created in 1906 and the balance in the two following years. The extra expenditure is Rs 95,500 in 1905-06, rising to 15.45 lakhs in 1908-09, and ultimately to over 30 lakhs per annum. The average monthly cost of each officer throughout his service is now estimated at Rs. 567.

The number of officers doing duty with native regiments has also been increased by about sixty in consequence of the introduction of rules regulating the employment of officers on extraneous duties, and providing for the provision of substitutes in the regiments affected. By these rules no officer may be detailed for extra-regimental duty if the number of officers present for duty with his regiment is less than eight. Moreover, an officer is seconded if his absence seems likely to extend over a year.

Army order No. 84  
of 1904.

#### COMMISSIONS IN HIS MAJESTY'S SERVICE FOR NATIVE GENTLEMEN.

The question of providing an outlet for the military aspirations of Indians of noble birth, which had often attracted the attention of the Government of India, was again, in 1900, brought under their notice in a memorandum by the Viceroy. It was recognised that it would not be suitable to grant commissions in the regular army to any natives of India, however well qualified by birth or military attainments. The difficulties resulting from habitual contact between young British and Native officers in a regimental mess could not be ignored; and it was believed that few Native nobles or gentlemen would persevere with the ordinary irksome routine of regimental duty. But as an alternative it seemed possible to grant selected Indians, who had passed through a probationary period in the Imperial Service Cadet Corps, commissions constituting an independent category or honorary reserve, confirming upon the officers so honoured, the rank, pay and prospects of promotion enjoyed by officers in His Majesty's service and entailing the obligations, not of ordinary regimental service, but of military employment in extra-regimental billets.

The proposals of the Government of India, based on these principles, were accepted by the Secretary of State, and were followed by the successful constitution of the Imperial Cadet Corps in the latter part of 1900. Seven cadets have passed through the full course of training. Four of them, who passed the final examination, have received their commissions as 2nd-Lieutenants of the Indian Land Forces. Three have been appointed Aides-de-Camp to General Officers Commanding divisions; the fourth is Commandant of the Bhavnagar State Lancers.

Despatch No. 103,  
dated 9th July 1900,  
and enclosure.  
(Appendix No. 25).

It was found desirable in 1900 to lay down a fixed proportion to govern the number of direct commissions in the Indian Army granted to the sons of Native gentlemen. With the exception of Gurkha regiments and Punjab Pioneers, the proportion prescribed in the infantry was 1 to 4 commissions granted for service in the ranks; and in the cavalry 1 to 3. The Principals of certain educational colleges were authorised (in 1902) to recommend to Lieutenant-Generals Commanding for direct commissions as jemadars in the native army such young students of these colleges as might be qualified by caste, physique, and character. A military career was thus rendered possible for those who were excluded from the Imperial Cadet Corps, which is reserved for men of the highest birth in India.



## RECONSTITUTION OF THE INDIAN ARMY.

Many of the components of the Indian Army have been reconstituted, sometimes with a view to greater efficiency, by the elimination of men who do not belong to the fighting classes; in other cases for political reasons by the inclusion of men from new recruiting areas. The Madras Army has suffered the greater number of changes in consequence of the conclusion, arrived at after prolonged enquiry, that the indigenous population of Madras could no longer furnish a sufficient number of suitable recruits for the regiments on the establishment of the Madras Command. The 17th and 25th Madras Infantry were reorganised as class regiments entirely composed of Moplahs in 1900; while two years later the 11th Madras Infantry were converted into a class regiment of Coorgs. The latter measure was avowedly an experiment and failed signally. The want of recruits and the disadvantages which result from the impossibility of removing a local corps from the vicinity of their homes led to the disbandment of the battalion in 1904. The 8th Madras Infantry was transformed into a Burma Gurkha battalion in 1902, and the same and the succeeding year witnessed the removal of all Madrasis from the 2nd, 6th, 7th, 9th, 14th, 16th, 22nd, 24th, and 27th Madras Infantry and their replacement by Punjabi Mohamadans, Jats, Sikhs and Rajputs. The only men of southern India left in the three regiments of Madras Lancers, after the reconstitution which took place at the same time, were those of 3 squadrons of Madras or Deccani Mohamadans. The 65th Carnatic Light Infantry was mustered out in 1905 in consequence of a disgraceful exhibition of cowardice on the part of a large contingent of the regiment in connection with a sepoy running *amok*. In its place there was formed a 2nd battalion to the 6th Gurkhas.

Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 184, dated 7th November 1901.

Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 185, dated 7th November 1901.

## RECRUITMENT.

The enlistment in the regular army of Mahsud Wazirs was for the first time permitted in 1903. It was hoped thereby that better relations would be established with the tribe, which has for many years borne the worst of reputations on the frontier. Recruitment was limited to in the first instance to two companies of the 130th Baluchis. A still more important experiment was made by the enlistment of Hazaras in a Pioneer battalion raised at Quetta in 1904 to which reference is made elsewhere.

*Enlistment of Natives of India by Foreign Powers.*—In connection with the alleged scarcity of Sikh recruits for the army, attention was drawn in the Indian Press in 1902 to the recruitment as police, etc., of Sikhs by various powers and municipalities in the East, more particularly in China. The undesirability of Sikhs taking service under the German, French and Russian Governments, was evident, and enquiries were made of the extent to which emigration had taken place. In opposition to the views of the recruiting staff officers, it was held at Army Head Quarters that the necessity for restricting recruiting for the colonies and Burma had not yet arisen. Shortly afterwards the Secretary of State forwarded correspondence with the Foreign Office regarding the desirability of checking the increasing employment by Foreign Powers in China of Natives of India, in which the matter was regarded from a political stand point. Lord Curzon in noting on the subject differentiated between the various classes of employment in the East; (a) that of British colonies and

Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 150, dated 7th October 1902.

settlements; (b) that of foreign and cosmopolitan municipalities, such as Shanghai; (c) that of weak or friendly States such as Johore and Siam; (d) that of rival Powers in the East. In addressing the Secretary of State the Government of India recommended that—

- (a) permission should be given to the recruitment of Indians by colonial or other British Administrations conditionally only (1) on repatriation; or (2) enlistment through the Government of India in which case their term of service would begin and cease in India; Despatch No. 68, dated 9th April 1903.
- (b) in the event of recruitment through the Indian Government, the men should be warned of the penalties they would incur by continuing to serve a Foreign Power at war with England;
- (c) re-emigration from the Straits Settlements to ports further East should be restricted.

After consulting the Foreign Office and the Colonial Governments and Administrations concerned, it was agreed that recruiting for the Hong-Kong, Shanghai and Tientsin police should be conducted through the Indian Army recruiting staff, and that the period of service of the men should in every case terminate in India. Arrangements were made by the Government of the Straits Settlements to prevent classes from which recruits are drawn leaving Singapore for ports further East. The repatriation of the Indian police in this colony has still to be arranged. Finally, the Government of India re-affirmed their opinion that it was necessary to issue warnings to men regarding service under a Foreign Power. The Secretary of State was, however, disposed to doubt the expediency of the action proposed. Secretary of State's despatch No. 160, dated 25th December 1903.  
Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 61, dated 8th June 1903.

#### CLASS COMPOSITION OF REGIMENTS.

No very vital changes have been made in the internal composition of regiments during the last few years, except where they have been entirely re-constituted. The class composition of the following regiments has, however, been altered:—3rd Skinner's Horse, 6th Cavalry, 7th Lancers, 32nd Lancers, 38th and 39th Central India Horse, 33rd Punjabis, 40th Pathans, 5th, 17th and 18th Bengal Infantry. Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 194, dated 16th October 1902.  
Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 179, dated 12th December 1902.

It was found in 1902, that the conditions of the three last named regiments and of the 12th Bengal Infantry, which had been recruited from Hindustani Mussalmen, left much to be desired. The Secretary of State agreed to the constitutional changes advocated by the Government of India, but drew attention to the desirability of making the most of whatever material suitable for military employment is to be found outside the Punjab.

#### INCREASE TO THE NATIVE ARMY.

*Cavalry.*—The Secretary of State has approved, of the constitution, when funds can be made available, of two new cavalry regiments—one from the nucleus of the single squadrons attached to each of the Deoli and Erinpura infantry regiments:

*Artillery.*—A corps of Native Garrison Artillery, composed of gunners and drivers drawn from British and Native Mountain Batteries, was formed in 1902 for manning the guns in the forts on the North-West Frontier. The Punjab Garrison Battery was incorporated in this corps.

*Indian Coast Artillery.*—The Government of India agreed, in June 1902, to take over the Hong-Kong, Singapore and Ceylon-Mauritius battalions of Royal Artillery. At the same time the question of the formation of Native garrison companies for Indian defended ports was considered, and a combined scheme was drawn up for the formation of a corps of Indian Coast Artillery for service at Indian defended ports and eastern Imperial coaling stations. The scheme received the sanction of the Secretary of State in 1904, but its execution has been held in abeyance for the present. The addition of one Native Mountain Battery was sanctioned in 1899-1900, and the establishment of Mountain Batteries, both British and Native, was raised.

*Engineers.*—The strength of the Bombay Sappers and Miners was increased in 1902, by the addition of two service Companies and a fortress company for service at Aden. A detachment of Mounted Sappers was formed in 1903, and added to the establishment of the Bengal Sappers and Miners.

Secretary of State's  
telegram No. of  
22nd April 1902.

In consequence of the recommendations of the Committee on light military railways, a railway company was organised in 1902. The want of a technical unit of this nature had been severely felt during the China expedition in connection with the working of the Shanhai Kuan-Pekin railway. The system of organisation now adopted avoids most of the objections to a large military railway corps. The unit during peace time is a small one on a semi-military basis, and consists of one section equipped for the construction, maintenance and survey of a short length of railway. On mobilisation a traffic and locomotive section, composed of European and Native reservists, is added to the nucleus of the regular unit, while civil artificers and labourers are collected and also attached to the company when, and in such number as are required for special bridge or earthwork. The permanent unit has proved itself technically efficient and the formation of another company has been recently sanctioned. Legal difficulties, not yet surmounted, have prevented the enrolment of European reservists.

India Army Circulars of 15th October 1900 and 1st September 1901.

*Infantry and Pioneers.*—The demands upon the British Infantry at the time of the Boer war and the China expedition led to the temporary substitution of Native infantry battalions for those of the Imperial service in the garrisons of Mauritius, Hong-Kong and Singapore. This arrangement was made permanent in 1900, and five new regiments of Bengal infantry, namely, the 41st (Dogras), 46th (Punjabis), 47th (Sikhs), 48th (Pioneers) and 49th (Garhwal Rifles), were raised in September 1901 at the expense of the Imperial Government.

Despatch No. 195,  
dated 29th October  
1903.

On the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief a pioneer regiment of Hazaras was raised at Quetta in 1904. The men of this tribe have long been in the custom of seeking work on railways and roads in India; their capacity for this class of heavy work is remarkable. The desirability of establishing the friendly relations with Hazaras which would result from their enlistment in considerable numbers, has for some years been recognised by the Government of India: their country may become strategically important, and as Shiahhs they will be a valuable counterpoise to the Sunni Pathans in the service.

#### CONVERSION OF INFANTRY REGIMENTS INTO PIONEER CORPS.

The recent frontier campaigns indicated the need for additional pioneer regiments which has been partly met by the conversion of the 12th Bengal Infantry, and of the 7th and 21st Bombay Infantry.

## DELOCALISATION OF REGIMENTS.

The disadvantages of localised regiments have long been recognised, and in the last few years several battalions have been delocalised and added to the strength of the army for general service. The 42nd Gurkhas were removed in 1900 from Assam and added to the Punjab frontier force. The 21st Bombay Infantry, known as the Marine Battalion, which had been hitherto entrusted with the duty of furnishing detachments at the Persian Gulf stations, and whose head-quarters had been permanently stationed in Bombay city, was delocalised in August 1903. The battalion was then converted into a Pioneer Corps.

But the most important measure of this nature was the conclusion in 1903, of an agreement with the Nizam, by which the constitution of the Hyderabad contingent was entirely changed. Under the terms of the former treaty of 1853, the force was to consist of not less than 5,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry and 4 batteries of field artillery, commanded by British officers and controlled by the Government of India through their representative, the Resident at Hyderabad. Two of the battalions were always to remain near to the capital of Hyderabad, and were therefore not available for general field service. Except in time of war the whole force was to be stationed in perpetuity in His Highness's territories. The many disadvantages of this system were apparent.

In consequence of the new agreement, the Hyderabad contingent as a whole was delocalised, and transferred to the control of the Commander-in-Chief; the four cavalry regiments each composed of three squadrons became three regiments of four squadrons, and were transferred to the establishment of the Bombay Command; the four batteries of Field Artillery were disarmed and converted into ammunition columns; the infantry became six regiments of the Madras Command; and the special administrative staff at Hyderabad was abolished.

Additional measures of delocalisation resulted from the acceptance of the need for the organisation and concentration of the Native infantry into brigades, so as to train them for external warfare. This was one of the guiding principles of Lord Kitchener's scheme for the re-distribution of the army. Its recognition naturally involved the abandonment of several of the smaller cantonments, and the delocalisation of the regiments which had hitherto garrisoned them. The 7th Gurkhas, a local regiment, were withdrawn from Assam to the Punjab, and the 2nd Battalion, Gurkha Rifles, were moved from Burma to Quetta in pursuance of this scheme. The Bhopal battalion, which was reorganised in 1903 and assimilated in constitution to a regiment of Bengal infantry, was delocalised in 1904. The Meywar and Marwar Bhil Corps will shortly be converted into military police and transferred to the civil administration. The Erinpura, Deoli and Merwara Irregular battalions are now the only local regiments remaining in the Indian Army.

## INCREASE OF DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY.

*Ordnance Department.*—The establishment of the Ordnance Department was increased by eight officers in 1903; and in the same year the number of military subordinates was also augmented by 45.

*Military Works Services.*—In 1899, the total strength of Royal Engineer Officers in the Military Works Service was fixed at 120, and in the following

year an increase of ten officers was made in consequence of the transfer to this administration of the civil and military works in the North-West Frontier Province. A further augmentation to 142 officers was approved during the execution of the special defences programme. Again, the permanent establishment was fixed at 149 in 1905, and 32 additional officers were demanded as a temporary reinforcement to cope with the works entailed by the Reorganisation Scheme.

*Supply and Transport Corps.*—The details of the augmentation of this corps will be found in Chapter X.

*Military Accounts Department.*—In consequence of the recommendation of the Special Committee on military accounts and audit, 10 officers were added to the department, in addition to 2 probationers, and 4 Accountants.

## CHAPTER VI.

**Marine defence and administration.****NAVAL POLICY IN INDIAN WATERS.**

*Subsidy to His Majesty's Navy, and services rendered by His Majesty's ships.*—In 1861, when the mutiny had been quelled, the financial condition of India was unsatisfactory. The country was then maintaining a navy of her own at a cost of £300,000 a year. It was suggested to the Secretary of State that His Majesty's Government should place a squadron at the disposal of the Indian Government for the naval defence of India, which should never be withdrawn without their consent; and that the cost of the force should be in part defrayed out of the revenues of India; that the Indian navy should be abolished, and that a transport service should be created in its place. The Admiralty objected to the proposal for giving India control over the withdrawal of the ships but eventually undertook the naval defence of the country, the protection of her trade generally, and the suppression of the slave trade, without any contribution from Indian revenues.

Seven years later the Commissioners of the Admiralty proposed that a subsidy of £70,000 should be paid for the maintenance of the ships in the Bay of Bengal, the Arabian and Persian Gulfs and the Red Sea. Subsequently in 1887, when the number of ships in the East India Squadron was diminished, this amount was reduced to £38,500, *plus* a contribution towards the cost of a vessel in the Persian Gulf. Again in 1895 it was agreed, in accordance with the terms of an award made by Lord Rosebery, as arbitrator between the India Office and Admiralty, that the contribution should be £100,000 *per annum*; that India should be consulted as to the number and class of ships required in the Persian Gulf and off the Coast of India; and that these vessels should not be employed beyond certain fixed limits except with the consent of the Indian Government. It was arranged also that the cost of the repairs of the special vessel (the *Sphinx*) maintained in the Persian Gulf, would also be payable by India; as well as the cost of coal of the subsidised vessels when employed under requisition by the Indian Government. Four vessels (the *Marathon*, *Brisk*, *Pigeon* and *Sphinx*) were nominated as the vessels under the partial control of India, and except with the consent of the Government of India were not to be removed from Indian waters, defined as a line from Cape Guardafui to Point de Galle, and thence south of the Nicobar Islands to Cape Salang.

Secretary of State's  
letter (paragraph 1),  
No. 10, dated 23rd  
January 1896.

In 1903, the Secretary of State agreed with the Admiralty that vessels of smaller draught should be substituted for the larger vessels subsidised by India for service in the Persian Gulf; and accepted the employment of not more than three vessels (including the *Sphinx*) in the Gulf; and the substitution of a considerable number of natives for Europeans in their crews. To this arrangement the Government of India assented. Subsequently, a proposal was made by the Naval Commander-in-Chief that the limit of Indian waters for the three ships detailed for duty in the Persian Gulf, should be a line between the Straits of Babel Mandeb by Socotra to Bombay, and that one ship in turn should be stationed



Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 8, dated 8rd November 1904.

at Colombo from May to September each year for musketry and to recruit the health of the crews. To this measure the Government of India agreed provisionally, but represented to the Secretary of State the necessity for the constant presence of a third vessel of light draught in the Persian Gulf.

*Arming of Royal Indian Marine vessels.*—It is necessary at this stage to refer to the question of the arming of Royal Indian Marine vessels as auxiliaries to the subsidised ships of His Majesty's Navy, which had been discussed simultaneously. After the abolition of the Indian Navy in 1862, India maintained for some years an armed vessel in the Persian Gulf. The need for armed auxiliaries on special occasions has been repeatedly experienced since that date, and the Government of India have made several vigorous attempts to obtain the concurrence of the Home Government to the maintenance of armament on the Royal Indian Marine vessels, more particularly on the *Lawrence*, for the suppression of the illicit traffic in arms. The proposals have been negatived because of the opinion held by the Admiralty that it was not desirable that any sea-going vessel belonging to the State should be in commission unless she remained under their control; and also because it was ruled by the Law Officers of the Crown that unless special legislation were undertaken, the Royal Indian Marine ships could only be armed in the event of a war with a foreign power.

Secretary of State's despatch No. 53-Military, dated 5th May 1905.  
(Appendix No. 26.)

*Reconstitution of an Indian Navy.*—It was accordingly with some surprise that the Government of India in 1905, received proposals from the Admiralty for the termination of the agreement regarding the performance of naval duties in Indian waters by ships of His Majesty's Navy, in return for a subsidy, and the devolution of these duties upon the fleet of the Royal Indian Marine, which would be reinforced by the transfer of His Majesty's ships *Sphinx*, *Lapwing* and *Redbreast*. By making this proposal, which amounted in effect to the reconstitution of an Indian Navy, the Admiralty indicated the withdrawal of their objection to the existence of an armed naval force over which they had no control.

Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 5, dated 10th August 1905.  
(Appendix No. 27.)

On investigation, however, it was clear that the Admiralty scheme offered no tangible advantages to this country, either from a political, administrative or financial point of view, while the many advantages of the existing system, by which the Royal Navy is employed to defend and police Indian waters, were manifest. The inevitable loss of prestige in the Persian and Arabian waters, which would have resulted from a lowering of the status of the naval force employed by India, would alone have secured the condemnation of the scheme. Accordingly, the proposal was strongly opposed by the Government of India, and it was replied that they deprecated any change in Indian naval policy other than that which they had previously urged, namely, the authority to arm at any time, and for any specific purpose connected with the control of the Persian and Arabian Coasts, such vessels of the Royal Indian Marine as might be required as auxiliaries to ships of His Majesty's Navy.

*Abolition of the Indian harbour defence squadron.*—The Government of India maintained at Bombay, since 1871, two turret ships, which would have been commissioned in time of war as ships of the Royal Navy. In 1885 the Defence Committee, which was then investigating the defensive requirements of Indian ports, recommended the re-armament of the turret ships and the provision of a number of gun boats and torpedo boats for

the defence of the various ports. Eventually, in addition to the turret ships, 2 gun boats, and 7 torpedo boats were provided in 1890-2; the flotilla being manned by officers, and men of the Royal Navy. The arrangements for the control of this squadron offered difficulties and was under discussion until 1892. It was finally decided that although the vessels had been provided and maintained for the express purpose of the defence of particular ports, and at the sole charge of the Government of India, who paid to the Admiralty a subsidy of £60,000 a year, *plus* the cost of repairs, they would be placed at the disposal of the Naval Commander-in-Chief in time of war to be used according to his discretion. The Governor-General in Council might, however, veto the removal of all or any of the vessels from the ports to which they had been allotted.

In 1901, at the instance of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State suggested that these harbour defence vessels should no longer be maintained by India since their utility was doubtful if the land defences were armed with modern guns, properly served. Acting on the advice of the Indian Defence Committee the Government of India recommended the retention of the turret ships for one year only, pending the revision of the defences at Bombay; the retention of one torpedo gun boat (the *Assaye*) and of 7 torpedo boats for 3 years; and the sale to the Admiralty of the remaining gun-boat (the *Plassy*). The Commissioners of the Admiralty, however, adhered to their opinion, that, even in the unfinished state of the Bombay defences, the retention of the *Assaye* and torpedo boats would be a waste of money; and they repeated their recommendation that the turret ships should be disposed of at once. Finally, it was decided on the advice of a special committee of Honourable Members of Council, who were assembled in conference on the subject of the improvement of the coast defences, that only 3 torpedo boats of the entire squadron should be retained after April 1903, and that these should be dispensed with after the defences of Bombay had been equipped with light quick-firing guns and electric lights. These torpedo boats are kept in reserve and exercised once a year in manœuvres.

Telegram to Secretary of State, No. 628, dated 11th September 1902.

As indicated above, the annual saving resulting from the abolition of the defence squadron is £60,000, *plus* the cost of repairs, which in the case of these obsolete vessels would shortly have become considerable.

#### COAST DEFENCES.

The need for modernising the coast defences in England and those of the Imperial coaling stations became apparent during the progress of the Boer War, when it was not unlikely that England might be engaged with a naval power. At a conference between representatives of the Admiralty and War Office in January 1899, it was recommended that steps should be taken at once to replace the obsolete muzzle-loading guns in these coast defences, by breech-loading and quick-firing ordnance. Vigorous measures were taken to re-arm all-defended ports of the Imperial Service with guns of this description; the need for considering the complete revision of the armament of Indian coast defences was also brought to the notice of the Government of India, for at the time a large number of the guns mounted in Indian coast defences were of the muzzle-loading type. Enquiries were made from the Secretary of State regarding the nature of the

probable attack on Indian ports, and it was ascertained that, in the opinion of the Admiralty, Calcutta and Rangoon being situated some distance from the mouth of rivers were practically secure against any form of naval attack. The armament at Aden, Bombay and Karachi was considered by them to be sufficiently heavy to make attack by a considerable squadron hazardous to the assailant. It was thought to be doubtful whether hostile ships would expend their ammunition on the batteries at Madras. These opinions were based, however, on the assumption that the existing defence organisation would be kept complete and ready; and it was also stated that the scheme of defence should comprise measures for preventing torpedo boat attack upon His Majesty's ships inside a port.

On these principles a scheme for the reorganisation of the Indian port defences was framed locally; and with it was associated, following the precedent of a similar scheme in 1885, certain other requirements in connection with frontier defence, the construction of barracks at Aden and Karachi, and the provision of a break-water pier near the Indian Marine dockyard at Bombay. After consultation between the Admiralty and War Office, these proposals were submitted for examination by a conference of Hon'ble Members of Council, whose recommendations regarding coast defence, with some minor exceptions, received the approval of the Government of India, and were sanctioned by the Secretary of State. It was, however, decided to excise from the scheme provision for the armament of the Quetta defences, and the works which it was proposed to execute near Landi Kotal. The total expenditure recommended to the Secretary of State was approximately 115 lakhs of rupees (£766,666), and it was anticipated that the works and re-armament would be completed in six years from the date of commencement.

Despatch No 218,  
dated 30th October  
1902, to Secretary of  
State.  
(Appendix No. 28.)

The general scheme, as finally approved, included the provision of 7.5-inch B.-L. guns and 4.7-inch Q.-F. guns of the latest pattern; the conversion of the 6-inch B.-L. guns already existing in the batteries to a newer type to permit of more rapid firing; and also a change in the design of their mountings. New batteries were contemplated only at Hooghly Point near Calcutta and Madras, but the existing batteries were to be remodelled where necessary. Provision was made for additional search lights at Aden and Bombay, and for a new installation at Madras. The construction of a pier at Bombay and of barracks at Manora for a company of garrison artillery were also included in the scheme. The original proposals will be somewhat modified in consequence of the change in the political situation in Eastern waters, resulting from the destruction of the Russian fleet, the alliance with Japan and the friendly understanding with France. At the instance of the Admiralty the naval policy of the Empire has also undergone some modification in regard to the matter of port defence. As a consequence a reduction will be made in the number of batteries at Aden, Calcutta and Bombay, while the armament at Rangoon and Madras may eventually be changed. The total cost of this scheme of special defence is now estimated to amount to 122 lakhs of rupees.

Progress with the scheme has been delayed by the failure to supply from England 7.5-inch B.-L. guns and their mountings. In other respects the coast defences will be completed by the end of the current year, by which time the subsidiary works at Quetta will also be finished. The outlay incurred by the 31st March 1906, will be approximately about half of the total expenditure.

The Admiralty have recently raised the question of the necessity for any submarine defences in Indian ports, and have finally recommended that the Royal Engineer Submarine Mining Establishment should be abolished. It is probable that their wishes will be acceded to. Any submarine defence which is necessary will, in these circumstances, devolve upon the Royal Navy.

#### SUBMARINE COMMUNICATIONS.

Enquiry was made from the Government of India regarding the measures taken for selecting sites for the landing places of cables with a view to the convenient defence thereof. A recommendation was made that two of the three cables landed at Perim, which would be denuded of its garrison in time of war, should be removed and connected directly with Aden. In respect to the Ceylon cable the Government of the island undertook to furnish repairing staff if any damage were done. The landing places at Karachi, Bombay, Madras and Aden were found to be secure against attack.

Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 23 of 21st February 1901, No. 10 of 16th January 1902.

After some discussion it was agreed that India should contribute £12,000 yearly as subsidy towards the cost of linking Ceylon with the new cable between Durban and Perth in Australia. It was decided for strategical reasons that the junction should be made by a line from Colombo to Diego Garcia and Rodrigues, instead of the route originally proposed *via* Cocos-Keeling-Colombo.

Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 40 of 27th July 1905.

#### CONDITIONS OF SERVICE OF OFFICERS OF THE ROYAL INDIAN MARINE.

*Training of Royal Indian Marine Officers in the Royal Navy.*—The abolition of the Indian defence squadron disorganised the former system of training the Marine officers in the Port defence ships at Bombay. The desirability of such instruction was, however, recognised, both on the ground of increased efficiency, and also because in time of war certain vessels of the Royal Indian Marine would become auxiliary cruisers. It was decided, accordingly, with the approval of the Secretary of State, that one senior and four junior officers should be sent home every alternate year for courses of instruction at Greenwich, and that two of these officers should, on their return to India, be posted to vessels of the East India Squadron. Special allowances were granted to officers under instruction.

*Pay and terms of service of officers of the Royal Indian Marine.*—A very considerable amelioration of the pay and terms of service of the officers of the Royal Indian Marine has been effected during Lord Curzon's term of office. The pay of Sub-Lieutenants of two years' service was increased, and their promotion to the rank of Lieutenant assured after four years' satisfactory service. In consequence of a recommendation from the Government of India the Secretary of State agreed to the grant of Rs. 750 in aid of passage money, to any officer of the Royal Indian Marine below the rank of Commander or Chief Engineer who might be granted leave on medical certificate to England. The executive officers petitioned the Viceroy in a body in the autumn of 1902 for an increase of pay; for a change of the existing system of grading Commanders; and for better allowances on furlough. It was eventually decided by the Secretary of State, on the recommendation of the Government of India, that

Secretary of State's Despatch No. 102, Military, dated 21st September 1899.

Secretary of State's Despatch No. 137 dated 20th September 1900.

Despatch No. 26, dated 12th February 1904.

Secretary of State's  
Military letter No.  
90 (paragraph 5),  
dated 4th April 1905.

the pay of Lieutenants of 8 years' service in that rank should be increased by Rs. 50 *per mensem*; and that the furlough allowances given under the rules of 1892 should be raised in some cases by 25 to 30 *per cent*. Subsequently, some officers who had elected for the leave rules of 1884, were allowed the benefit of these increased rates of furlough pay. In the present year revision has been made of the establishment of Commanders, and the numbers in each of the first and second grades have been increased by one.

The leave reserve both of executive and engineer officers has been enlarged, while the conditions of service of the latter class have been improved (a) by an increase from 3 to 4 of the number of Chief Engineers in the higher grade drawing Rs. 400 a month; and also (b) by a ruling that, irrespective of the numbers serving in that grade, Engineer officers who were in the service previous to 1902 should be promoted to the Rs. 400 grade after a total of 20 years' approved service, or on completion of 5 years' approved service as Chief Engineer. A more liberal scale of allowances for the charge of engines has also been sanctioned.

An increase has been made to the pay of some of the shore appointments under Local Governments, connected with the administration of the commercial Indian ports, which are held by officers from the Royal Indian Marine. In regard to the branch of the service which is entrusted with the Marine Survey of Indian Coasts it has been recognised that, in future, the head of the survey may be chosen from the Royal Indian Marine if a duly qualified officer is available. Hitherto officers of the Royal Navy have possessed the monopoly of this appointment.

The construction of Government quarters for many of the officers and subordinates serving in the dockyards at Bombay and Calcutta (Kidderpore), has proved a great boon to them, and is equivalent to a considerable increase to their pay.

#### TERMS OF SERVICE OF THE MEN OF THE ROYAL INDIAN MARINE.

The Government of India have now under consideration the enrolment of lascars, stokers and other ratings under the Indian Marine Act of 1884, so as to provide crews for the vessels (at present the *Hardinge* and *Dufferin*) which would be converted into auxiliary cruisers in time of war. Such service would be pensionable, and it is hoped by the attractions of a pension to secure a more satisfactory class of men for the Indian Marine. Hitherto, excluding men in the service prior to 1883, the employment of all ratings has been classed as temporary and non-pensionable, except in the case of the crews of the submarine mining flotilla whose enrolment was approved in 1900.

#### RENOVATION OF THE ROYAL INDIAN MARINE FLEET.

The more important units of the fleet of 1899 will, almost entirely, have been replaced by the end of the current financial year. The *Hardinge*, which was built in place of the shipwrecked *Warren Hastings*, was added to the fleet in 1901. She is a fine fast ship of 5,434 tons, with long voyage accommodation for 1,100 European, or 1,300 Native troops. Half as many again could be carried on voyages of short duration. Her speed on trial was 19 knots. The *Dufferin* which replaced the *Clive* in the beginning of 1905, is slightly larger and possesses the same speed. A new troopship of the size of the *Warren Hastings* is under

construction in England in replacement of the *Canning*. Arrangements have been made for the immediate purchase of a ship from the Admiralty as a substitute for the surveying vessel *Investigator*; while the withdrawal and replacement of the smaller survey boat *Nancowry* has also been approved.

#### USE OF INDIAN COAL AND PRODUCTS.

An investigation by the Military Department in 1902, disclosed unsatisfactory conditions in the matter of the supply of coal to Royal Indian Marine ships. It was also found that high priced Welsh coal was being used where Indian coal would have sufficed. Subject to the exercise of the discretion of the Director, Royal Indian Marine, in special cases, it was ordered that the use of Indian coal should be universal. The policy of purchasing indigenous products and manufactures in preference to those which are imported has been followed, generally, with satisfactory results.

#### DOCKYARDS AND TROOPING.

*Transport work performed by the Royal Indian Marine.*—The transport work entrusted to the service has been most satisfactorily and efficiently performed. The South African campaign, and the China and Somaliland expeditions caused great pressure upon the marine dockyard establishments, and gave employment to a very large number of merchantmen as hired transports. These were all fitted for the work at the Government dockyards. The speedy and satisfactory despatch of the Indian contingent to South Africa in 1899, was the principal cause of the successful opposition to the Boer advance in Natal. The forty-eight hired vessels, transported from Bombay to South Africa in 59 voyages over 14,000 officers and men, and more than 8,000 animals without serious mishap. A still heavier task was allotted to the Royal Indian Marine in respect to the China expedition, 1900, when 53 ships were fitted at Calcutta for the transport of 37,000 officers, men and followers, and nearly 10,000 animals; the majority of which were brought back again to this country in the following year by the same agency. The Royal Indian Marine has also been concerned with the fitting of hired transports for the Aden Delimitation Commission (1902), and the Somaliland expedition (1902-03), in addition to the ordinary trooping work performed by Government vessels.

*Dockyard Establishments.*—The subordinate staff of the Bombay and Kidderpore dockyards were re-classified in 1903, for purposes of pay, and in many instances their emoluments were increased. The abolition of Trincomali in Ceylon as a naval station which was decreed in 1904, will increase the naval importance of Bombay, and has already led to an enlargement of the depôt at that place, and to a reorganisation of the Marine dockyard staff, which is entrusted with the maintenance of naval stores.

Despatch No. 102,  
dated 30th April 1903,  
to Secretary of State.





## CHAPTER VII.

### Details of the Equipment of the Army.

#### ARTILLERY ARMAMENT.

*Mountain Artillery.*—The necessity for a new mountain gun to replace the obsolete 2·5" R. M. L. type was recognised in 1897, when Sir G. White suggested the provision of a ten-pr. jointed gun at a cost of £25,000 (Rs. 3,75,000). The urgency of the matter was repeatedly represented by the Government of India but the experimental guns made in the ordnance factories at home proved unsatisfactory, and it was not until February 1901 that a pattern was approved. The construction of the carriages then presented fresh difficulties; however, all the batteries were armed with the new weapon by 1903.

*Re-armament of Horse and Field Artillery.*—At the time when Lord Curzon came to this country, the Horse and Field artillery were armed with the same gun, 7 cwt. in weight and called variously the 12-pr. or 15-pr. according to the shell fired. The need for an improved and lighter Horse artillery weapon was debated in 1899, but no action was taken in view of the contemplated adoption of a quick-firing (Q.F.) gun in the Imperial service. This measure was, however, postponed by the War Office until the experience gained in the South African War could be fully recorded; but alterations were made in the gun then in use which permitted of an increased rate of fire, and an improved pattern of the same type of gun (12-pr. R. B. L., mark IV) was also brought into manufacture. At the urgent instance of the Commander-in-Chief the re-armament of all Royal Horse Artillery batteries in this country with this weapon, was undertaken.

Adjutant General's  
No. 4634, dated 6th  
November 1900.

Five batteries of Royal Horse artillery armed with these guns were transferred from the Home Establishment in replacement of batteries and stores sent from India at the time of the South African War, and six more batteries were ordered, before it became known that Lord Roberts had condemned this type of weapon. The India Office then suggested, and the Government of India agreed to the purchase, in lieu, of six batteries of Erhardt (German) guns. The last-named equipment, however, proved unsatisfactory under trial in England. Accordingly the German order was cancelled, and six batteries of 12-pr., Mark IV, and certain reserve guns and carriages were ordered. With these the remaining batteries of Royal Horse Artillery were armed in 1902 and 1903.

Here the matters rested until the Secretary of State intimated in December 1903, that the War Office had approved of new pattern Q.F. guns for the Royal Horse Artillery and Royal Field Artillery, with projectiles weighing 13½ and 18½ pounds respectively; and that, in recognition of the urgency of India's needs, they were willing to transfer to India the first 3 Royal Horse Artillery and 18 Royal Field Artillery batteries that were made. This offer was accepted, and subsequently, when the Secretary of State represented the necessity for completing the re-armament in two years instead of three, it was agreed that India should

Despatch No. 34,  
dated 28th March  
1905.

purchase additional guns for 24 batteries (8 Royal Horse Artillery and 16 Royal Field Artillery). The guns thus supplied will be sufficient to complete the re-armament of all service batteries in 1905-06; the Ordnance reserves will be gradually completed by manufacture at the Cossipore factory, which is now in working order. The total expenditure connected with the armament of the Royal Horse Artillery and Royal Field Artillery is estimated at Rs. 2,42,06,178 (£1,613,745). The supply of guns has just commenced, having been delayed greatly by manufacturing difficulties in England. No ammunition has, however, been supplied, and it seems doubtful whether any batteries will actually be re-armed until the end of the current year.

#### ARMAMENT OF COAST DEFENCES.

In 1899, a considerable proportion of the heavy artillery in both the Imperial and Indian Coast defences was of the breech-loading type. In the opinions of the War Office and Admiralty it was considered essential that, to cope with swift moving vessels, the artillery should be capable of firing more rapidly. Complete protection to gun detachments was deemed a secondary consideration. Accordingly, to replace the obsolescent armament, 21—7·5" B.L. guns of the newest type, with their mountings, were ordered from England; 6" B.L. guns have been converted into rapid firers; and 4·7" Q.F. guns have also been mounted. In addition, a subsidiary armament of 12-pr. Q.F. guns which are designed to repel torpedo boat attack, have been provided. The total cost of the armament and ammunition is estimated to be Rs. 55,55,000, of which about half has already been spent. The Colonial Defence Committee have, however, recommended, recently, certain reductions in the proposed armament and the matter has been referred to the Secretary of State for decision.

#### RESERVE OF ARTILLERY AMMUNITION.

The maintenance of an adequate reserve of ammunition is as important as the provision of the guns themselves. The experience of South Africa showed that as many as 175 rounds could be expended by one gun in a day; but the later reports from Manchuria gave evidence of an expenditure of ammunition which had hitherto been quite unprecedented in warfare. In 1903, the question was considered by a Committee which recommended the storage of 1,000 rounds per gun for all batteries detailed for the field army and for all mountain batteries; that 450 rounds should be maintained for other batteries; and that the capacity of the Ordnance factories should not be less than 1,000 rounds for each field-piece of 3" calibre and under, which might be detailed for the field army. Provision was made in Lord Kitchener's scheme for the organization of the army for the supply, on half this scale, of reserve ammunition for the increased number of artillery units in the field army; contingent on the assumption that the Ordnance factories would be given the manufacturing power for which the Committee stipulated, and, in addition, could produce 500 rounds per gun for heavy batteries. Investigation, however, showed that the required result could be obtained more economically by adopting the scale of reserve (1,000 rounds per gun) proposed by the 1903 Committee, except that 500 rounds per gun would suffice for heavy batteries and siege artillery; and by providing for an annual manufacturing capacity of 500 rounds only for each gun of the field army, (heavy batteries and siege guns 250 rounds) and 50 rounds for each of the other guns in the country.

Despatch No 163,  
dated 10th November  
1904, to Secretary of  
State.

(Appendix No. 30.)

These proposals which were sanctioned by the Secretary of State involved an estimated initial expenditure of Rs. 1,54,00,000 and recurring charges amounting to Rs. 8,87,000, of which it was intended that Rs. 35,00,000 should be expended in the current financial year.

The changes advocated in the authorised reserves of ammunition maintained for coast defences were not important; the necessity for some increase of manufacturing power was indicated, but it was decided to defer consideration of this question.

#### RE-ARMAMENT OF THE ARMY WITH RIFLES AND CARBINES.

In 1899, the small arms in the possession of the troops were of diverse patterns. The substitution in the hands of the British Cavalry of Lee-Enfield Magazine carbines for the Lee-Enfield single loading carbine, and for the Martini-Henry carbine, '450 calibre, was being gradually effected. The artillery were being re-armed with '303 Martini-Enfield carbines, that is, single loading Martini-rifles converted and fitted with '303" barrels. The British Infantry had been provided since 1891, with the Lee-Metford Lee-Enfield magazine rifle which, except in regard to the stopping power of the bullet, had worked satisfactorily in the Tirah campaign. The volunteers were still armed with the single loading Martini-Henry rifle of '450 bore, firing black powder; while similar arms, rifles and carbines of older pattern (Mark II) fitted with barrels which were nearly unserviceable, constituted the armament of the Native infantry and cavalry, respectively.

*Re-armament of the Native Army.*—The contemplated introduction of the manufacture of cordite into this country, and the desirability of an uniform class of ammunition for all troops, hastened the consideration of the question of the armament to be provided for the Native forces. Hitherto it had been an accepted theory that the armament of British troops should show a marked superiority over that of the Native army. In accordance with this principle, and in consideration of the fact that the theatres of war in which Indian troops would be engaged in the next few years would probably not afford opportunities for the use of magazine fire, Sir William Lockhart expressed his preference for the Martini-Enfield (a single loading rifle with Martini-Henry action and Enfield barrel) into which the weapons in the hands of the troops would be converted at about three-quarters of the cost of a new Lee-Metford (Magazine) rifle.

Despatch No. 189,  
dated 2nd November  
1899, to Secretary  
of State.

Manufacturing difficulties, however, arose, and after full discussion, a recommendation was sent to the Secretary of State that the troops should be armed with the short single loading Martini-Enfield which would constitute an arm of modern pattern, somewhat inferior to the weapon held by British troops. In his reply the Secretary of State stated that he had come to the conclusion that it was undesirable that the Native troops should be armed with a less effective weapon than that which would be in the possession of any possible enemy. He considered that the objection to the equality of armament with British troops were of less weight than the advantages gained by the consideration above-mentioned, and the existence of a uniform system for the whole army.

Telegram from  
Secretary of State,  
dated 24th January  
1900.

Military Department letter No. 112-G., dated 27th March 1900.

It was at first the intention that the re-armament of the Native Army should be spread over a period of 5 years, and accordingly a demand was preferred on the India Office for 41,000 Lee-Enfield and 13,500 carbines which it was anticipated could be provided by the 31st March 1901; the Native Infantry Battalion of the 1st and 2nd Divisions and all Sappers and Miners companies being supplied at once with Lee-Metford rifles from the reserves maintained in India for British troops. It was decided to postpone the re-arming of the Volunteers until the Native regiments of the field army had received the new weapons. The necessity for the more vigorous prosecution of all defensive measures was, however, then accepted by the Government of India, and a recommendation to the Secretary of State was made that the whole Native Army should be re-armed in 3 years. The despatch to China of the Native contingent of 11 Native Infantry regiments again emphasized the necessity for speedy re-armament, and the savings which were accruing by reason of the debit to Imperial funds of the cost of the troops, made funds available. Consequently, 20,000 more rifles and 10 millions rounds of ammunition were demanded; but the rifles could only be supplied in dribblets, and the order was not completed until the autumn of 1901. At this period the total requirements were estimated to be 30,252 carbines, and 174,280 rifles; total 204,532 weapons. These requirements were communicated to the Secretary of State, and it was stated that it would not be possible to begin until 1902-03, the re-armament of the volunteers, who would require 32,431 rifles of the short Lee-Enfield pattern. The need for extending the re-armament to the Imperial Service Troops was also accepted, because of the inclusion of a large portion of this force in the field army; but the date of the re-armament could not be fixed.

Despatch No. 165, dated 1st November 1900.

*Supply of arms from England.*—As stated above the War Office did not actually supply the original demand for 13,500 carbines and 61,500 rifles until September 1901. They also intimated that the maximum output of rifles which could be made available for India in 1901-02 would be 62,000. In view of the impossibility of complying with Indian demands owing to the simultaneous pressure in the factories which would be occasioned by the introduction of the new short rifle, and the conversion of those in the hands of the troops in the Imperial Service, the War Office suggested that the Government of India should establish in India itself a small arms factory. This important suggestion was favourably received in view of the constant delays and failure of the War Office to keep their promises regarding dates of delivery. The establishment of an Indian small-arms factory is dealt with in Chapter XI of this memorandum.

War Office letter No. 57-General-3202, dated 20th February 1901.

The limited power of the home factories in the matter of rifle manufacture caused the demands for 1902-03 to be restricted to 50,000 rifles of the shorter pattern; but these again the War Office was unable to supply, so a similar number of the long rifles were ordered instead. The re-armament of the Native Infantry in the Bengal and Punjab Commands was nearly completed in March 1902; arms were available for the remainder, and also 62,410 rifles in addition.

Adjutant General's No. 349-E., dated 3rd May 1902.

*Arming the Cavalry.*—It was then represented by the Commander-in-Chief (Sir A. P. Palmer), that it would be necessary to re-arm the British and Native

Cavalry with the magazine Lee-Enfield rifle instead of the carbine of the same pattern, in view of the experience in the South African War. His Excellency proposed to utilise the arms which were returned to store in arming the volunteers and Imperial Service Troops. This proposal was agreed to with some modification, but the difficulty of determining the pattern of the equipment for carrying the rifles caused considerable delay.

*Ordnance reserve.*—The question of establishing an ordnance reserve also arose and it was decided to fix the number of rifles in this reserve at 50,000; in addition to which 29,000 rifles for the troops were still deficient. An attempt was made to obtain in 1903-04, rifles of the newest pattern for the reserve, but the War Office again expressed their inability to supply them, and accordingly 50,000 arms of the former type were again ordered. However, it was possible to introduce some slight improvements in these rifles.

*Increased requirements of the Reorganisation Scheme.*—A supply of 72,000 short rifles had been ordered for 1904-05; but the whole question of re-armament was re-opened in the Reorganisation Scheme submitted by the Commander-in-Chief in February 1904. It had been recognised to be necessary to establish a reserve of rifles for the Imperial Service Troops; for additional Native Infantry recruits who would be enlisted on mobilisation; and for British Army reservists but not for the volunteers. For the increased field army a total reserve of 140,000 rifles was thus indicated as compared with the number previously authorised, 72,000 rifles.

Adjutant General's  
No. 473-M. C., dated  
17th February 1904.

The total requirements were thus tabulated :—

Regulars (less 5 Colonial battalions)	...	...	265,633
Imperial Service Troops	...	...	11,440
			<hr/> 277,073

*Reserve of weapons :—*

$\frac{1}{4}$ of 277,073	...	...	...	92,358
Extra recruits	...	...	...	23,552
British Army recruits	...	...	...	25,000
				<hr/> 140,910
			Total	...
				<hr/> 417,983

It was calculated that the deficiency of 68,000 rifles would be completed by the Ishapur factory by 1908. In October 1904, this position was accepted by Lord Kitchener. Two months later he pressed for the immediate supply of 70,000 additional short rifles on the ground that the 72,000 rifles due in 1904-05 would serve for the re-armament of half the field army with the latest rifle, and that popular opinion would be adverse if India took the field with two patterns of weapons. It was ascertained that some lakhs had lapsed in the home estimates, and it was decided in Council to devote this money to the purchase of additional rifles of the newest pattern. This expenditure together with the provision previously made in the budget allowed for the purchase of 93,000 rifles in England, and left 47,000 rifles to be manufactured in this country. All the rifles of English supply have been received. The Factory at Ishapore will shortly commence to turn out completed rifles, 6,000 in the current year and 25,000 in succeeding years, until the ordnance reserve is completed.



## RESERVE OF RIFLE AMMUNITION.

The stock of ammunition in reserve in India at the time of the submission of Lord Kitchener's proposals for the reorganisation of the army was 124 million rounds. The annual outturn of the ammunition factories in this country was 75 million rounds. His Excellency considered it necessary to increase the stock by 86 millions, and thus provide a reserve of 210 million rounds. He proposed that the capacity of the factories should be enlarged until they should be able to manufacture annually 185 million rounds. The calculation of reserve stock was based on a scale of 1,000 rounds for each rifle in the field army (except Sappers), and 30,000 rounds for each maxim gun; while for internal defence the scale of reserve proposed was 300 rounds for each rifle, and the same amount for each maxim; half this amount being allowed for the annual expenditure of ammunition during a campaign.

Despatch No. 160,  
dated 10th November  
1904, to Secretary of  
State.  
(Appendix No. 81.)

The cost of increasing the manufacturing capacity of the factories to this extent proved to be prohibitive, and the Commander-in-Chief at first agreed to a reduction of the reserve to 174 millions. At a later date, however, he pressed for the increase of the reserve to the figure originally proposed, 210 millions, and for the immediate purchase of 52 millions from England in 1904 and 1905 at a cost of £271,700. In consequence of this purchase the full reserve will be completed by the close of the current financial year, but the expenditure will be considerably more than if the ammunition had been manufactured in India. It is not proposed to increase the manufacturing capacity of the ammunition factories; steps have been taken, however, to increase the store of raw material so that, on mobilisation, the annual outturn of ammunition may be increased in the first year by 23 million rounds.

## MACHINE GUNS.

*Maxim Guns.*—It was originally proposed in 1899, just before outbreak of the Boer war, that in accordance with the urgent request of the War Office all British regiments in India should be armed with one Maxim .303 calibre gun, the number required being 54 in addition to 50 guns already in hand. In the following year, when satisfactory pack mountings had been designed, the Commander-in-Chief on the advice of the Mobilisation Committee, stated that in all about 300 guns would be required, on the assumption that 2 guns should be provided for each regimental unit whether British or Native, in the field army; and one gun for each similar unit detailed for internal defence. Provision was also made in this number for the ordnance reserve, for Volunteer corps, and for internal defence. The absence at this stage of troops in China, made funds available for 82 small calibre Maxim and 18 Vickers-maxim guns, together with a supply of ammunition for the latter, and these were ordered accordingly; the War Office having decided, that the type of gun to be provided should fire the ordinary rifle ammunition, in spite of Lord Roberts' opinion that a heavier bullet and longer ranged gun was necessary.

Subsequently in 1901, a doubt again arose regarding the best type of machine gun, and in the year 1901-02 only eight machine guns were ordered as an Ordnance reserve to those already in store, besides pack mountings for the 120 guns already in hand. It was finally decided to adhere to the former

·303 calibre pattern. Savings resulting from the employment of Indian troops in China, Somaliland, etc., were then utilised to provide additional guns, with the result that by the spring of 1904, 287 maxims had been provided for the army and ordnance reserve. In Lord Kitchener's scheme of reorganisation the total requirements were estimated at 530; the increase over the original demands being due to the augmentation of the field army. Accordingly, to reduce the deficiency of 240 guns, 100 additional maxim, with mountings will be provided in the current financial year, leaving 143 guns for future supply.

It will be thus seen that since 1899, an increase of 333 maxims has been arranged for at a total cost of about Rs. 8½ lakhs or £55,555.

*Machine Guns of larger calibre than ·303.*—Six Vickers-maxim (1-pr. Q. F.) guns (commonly known as Pom-Poms) were supplied to this country in 1902, and were issued to Royal Horse Artillery batteries in the following year for experimental trial. Two jointed guns of the same calibre and type were supplied to mountain batteries at the same time. The results were not such as to justify the heavy expenditure (Rs. 38 lakhs initial and Rs. 9 lakhs recurring), which would have been incurred in forming special sections for the working of this type of armament.

#### EQUIPMENT OF CAVALRY AND INFANTRY.

*Bandolier Equipment.*—In 1899, the Infantry in this country both British and Native carried their ammunition in pouches, but following the lead of the Imperial service, and in consequence of the experience gained in the Boer war, the Commander-in-Chief recommended the adoption of the bandolier equipment for the whole army in India, at an estimated cost of Rs. 22,85,000. The exact pattern was, however, difficult to determine, and in July 1902, it was agreed that the existing (Mackenzie) equipment should be modified, and that a bandolier should also be carried by the Native Cavalry and Infantry soldier and the Sappers and Miners. The free issue to the Native Cavalry of equipment for carrying rifles instead of carbines was also approved, but the pattern of equipment was not found to be satisfactory. The issue of bandoliers to British Cavalry Regiments was sanctioned later in the year.

*Patterson Equipment.*—Subsequent'y, the Commander-in-Chief (Lord Kitchener) recommended the adoption of the Patterson equipment for Native cavalry, which consists of a saddle attachment provided with a clip for securing the rifle, and a metal slab to be secured to a special waist belt. It was stated that the equipment had been tested by exhaustive trials. The Government of India duly accepted His Excellency's proposals which entailed an expenditure exceeding 1 lakh, exclusive of the cost of leather in stock. A sum of nearly £1,000 (Rs. 14,850) was also paid to the inventor as royalty on 23,000 sets manufactured in this country. It has, however, transpired that the equipment has not proved at all satisfactory on further trial. So much damage to the rifles has been occasioned by its use, that it will not be adopted for British Cavalry and may shortly have to be abandoned by Native Cavalry. The loss to the State will, therefore, be considerable.

*War Office pattern equipment for Infantry.*—The equipment of the infantry in India had been held over pending the settlement of a pattern

Adjutant General's  
letter No. 3430-D,  
dated 30th November  
1900.

Adjutant General's  
No. 731-E, dated  
19th July 1902.

Adjutant General's  
No. 914-D, dated  
25th May 1903.

Despatch No. 215,  
dated 12th November  
1903.

for the Imperial Services, and as the matter had been under deliberation by the War Office since October 1901, the Government of India proposed that the equipment of British Infantry should be assimilated to that of Native Infantry which had proved satisfactory. The War Office, however, protested against this measure and stated that large quantities of a pattern recently decided on had been ordered for the infantry of the Imperial Service. It was accordingly suggested that the new British pattern made of brown leather, which included a bandolier, should be adopted for all infantry in India, both British and Native. This suggestion was accepted, and the substitution of the new equipment for the old will be carried out at once in the case of British troops, and gradually in that of Native Infantry as the stores of the existing pattern become exhausted. The volunteers have also been equipped with bandoliers of the Native infantry pattern as they became available.

*Cavalry bandoliers.*—An additional recommendation on the part of the Commander-in-Chief resulted in the provision for each man of British and Native cavalry, of a bandolier of the War Office pattern with 50 rounds of ammunition, which will be carried round the horse's neck.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### ORGANISATION.

#### ORGANISATION IN TIME OF WAR.

*Original organisation of a field army.*—The Mobilisation Committee was instituted in August 1886, and from this time may be dated the first serious attempts to provide India with a thoroughly organised force for external defence. A scheme was prepared in the following year for the mobilisation of 2 Army Corps (the second being organised according to its destination, Kandahar or Kabul) and 1 reserve division : but dependence was placed, for some of the component forces, upon the supply of reinforcements from England. Repeated instructions were, however, issued by the Secretary of State that no forward policy should be contemplated which would involve the necessity of reinforcements for its accomplishment. Accordingly, the scheme was revised in 1889. The authorised field army was then limited to such forces as India could herself produce, and consisted of two divisions of the Field Army, about 34,000 men, which were equipped with mobilisation stores, but not fully with transport. It was, however, stated by Sir H. Brackenbury in 1891, that owing to the want of reserves this number of men could not be mobilised. In addition there were two divisions detailed on paper, but they remained without equipment. In 1895, the 3rd and 4th divisions were provided with their mobilisation from a special grant of money made for this purpose. The organisation of 1889, thus amended, lasted until the arrival of Lord Curzon in the country. The force consisted in all of 32,000 British troops, 61,000 native troops and 240 guns. Each division consisted of 3 mixed brigades of British and native troops (4 battalions in a brigade), one cavalry brigade and divisional troops. The remaining troops in India furnished an additional cavalry brigade, reserve artillery, and some native cavalry and infantry for the lines of communication. The first division (reconstituted) of this force was actually mobilised for the Chitral expedition disclosing many deficiencies in the transport establishment.

*Increase of the field army.*—The first move towards an increase of the field army was made by the Mobilisation Committee in 1900, who proposed the provision of stores and of equipment for two additional divisions. Indents for the stores required for a division of all arms were prepared and sent to the Secretary of State. Moreover, during the discussion regarding the defence of India which took place in the early months of 1901, His Excellency the Viceroy ordered the consideration of the question whether, instead of increasing the present armed strength of the country, it would not be possible to release more of the existing internal garrison for active service. A scheme accordingly for the constitution of six divisions in the field army was evolved at Army Headquarters ; contingent on the reduction of obligatory garrisons of British troops in various stations. Official proposals in regard to the latter measure were put forward and sanctioned.

Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 40, dated 27th February 1902. (Appendix No. 32.)

*Field Army now authorised.*—As will be shown in the following account of the peace organisation of the army, the scheme for the redistribution of the

army, which was prepared a few months later under Lord Kitchener's orders, provided for the internal control of the country by a much smaller garrison than had hitherto been considered necessary. There remained available for the field army the following units :—

8 British cavalry regiments,	10 Native mountain batteries,
23 Native cavalry regiments,	14 Heavy batteries,
9 Horse artillery batteries,	36 British infantry battalions,
33 Field batteries,	9 Mounted infantry battalions,
3 Howitzer batteries,	117 Native infantry battalions,
8 British mountain batteries,	18 Companies, Sappers and Miners,

besides Imperial Service troops and the departmental services. From those troops it has been agreed that a field army shall be formed consisting of nine divisions, each composed of a British infantry brigade of 4 battalions and 3 native infantry brigades of a similar strength ; in addition to divisional troops consisting of :—1 regiment of native cavalry, 1 battalion of mounted infantry, 1 battalion of pioneers, 3 field batteries, 2 mountain batteries, 1 heavy battery, 2 companies of Sappers and Miners, and the necessary units of subsidiary medical and engineer services, besides ordnance and the engineer field parks. In addition 8 cavalry brigades, consisting each of 1 horse artillery battery with an ammunition column, 1 British cavalry regiment, 2 Native cavalry regiments, Small Arm Ammunition Columns and field hospitals will also be formed. The corps troops comprise 1 horse artillery battery, 2 field artillery brigades and howitzer brigade (each accompanied by their ammunition columns) and 5 heavy batteries. It is intended to add to these units 2 British and 2 Native telegraph companies. The organisation of the Field Army, as accepted by the Government of India, contains no provision for the inclusion of the Imperial Service troops in any organised units. It has been decided that they shall be moved out of their States (even if only one or two divisions were mobilised) by using railways which are not required for the main lines of concentration, and that they shall be concentrated at forward stations [Ferozepore, Multan, and Hyderabad (Sind)], where they would be available for transfer to the front.

For lines of communication and special services, the Commander-in-Chief originally proposed to assign 9 Native infantry brigades taken from the garrison detailed for internal control as they became available by reason of the substitution in internal garrisons of reservist battalions for these units. It was, however, doubtful whether the battalions of this class could be considered as satisfactory substitutes for permanently organised units, and for the present, the addition of these 9 special service brigades to the field army is in abeyance.

The following units are at present deficient, and will require to be added to the Indian establishment to complete the organisation of the field army—3 battalions of British infantry, 1 regiment of native cavalry, 6 batteries of mountain artillery. The necessity for adding 5,200 British infantry to the Indian establishment has already been recognised. The units already mentioned will take the place of this increase when supplemented by 4 telegraph companies (2 British and 2 Native).

Military Despatch  
No. 160, dated 21st  
August 1902.

#### ORGANISATION OF TACTICAL UNITS.

Despatch No. 148,  
dated 10th October  
1904.

*Brigading of British and Native Infantry.*—The principle of forming homogeneous instead of mixed brigades of British and Native Infantry was referred

by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to Government and accepted in Council. The Hon'ble Member in the Military Department, however, recorded his opinion against the measure, since it would prevent the intimate association of British and Native troops in action. The Secretary of State has stated that Indian civil and military opinion at home is averse to the proposal, and he has asked for the opinions of the Indian officers consulted and the reasons on which the decision was based. Up to the present these have not been furnished to the Government of India.

Telegram of the  
17th November 1904.

## ORGANISATION IN TIME OF PEACE.

### COMMANDS.

*Frontier Commands.*—The concentration of troops on the North-West Frontier during the numerous expeditions between 1890 and 1898, rendered anomalous the system of military administration and organisation of the troops, which had been designed to control the frontier when it was, with the exception of Peshawar, garrisoned only by the troops of the Punjab Frontier Force. In 1897, the Government of India rejected Sir G. White's recommendations for a revised administration which would have entailed the breaking up of this corporate association. Two years later Sir William Lockhart made proposals for the constitution of a 1st class district extending from Abbottabad to Dera Ghazi Khan, to be commanded by an officer entitled General Officer Commanding the Punjab Frontier Force. Directly under his orders there would be the troops at Abbottabad, the Malakand, Mardan and the Khyber; and also the troops at Kohat and in the Kurram Valley under a Colonel on the Staff. Those at Peshawar and in the Derajat would be commanded by Brigadier-Generals subordinate to the General Officer Commanding the Punjab Frontier Force. To meet the cost of these measures it was proposed to replace the General Officer Commanding the Rangoon district by a Colonel on the Staff.

Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 215, dated 28th December 1899.

This scheme was brought into operation in April 1900, but was found to work unsatisfactorily owing to the insufficiency of the district staff to cope with the work resulting from the extensive Frontier Command, and because of the delays which were occasioned by the interposition of the Frontier Force office between the Brigadier-Generals at Peshawar and Derajat and the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab.

Accordingly, less than two years later the Commander-in-Chief put forward revised proposals, by which the General Officer Commanding the Frontier Force was still retained, but the number of Brigadier-Generals was increased by one. Lord Curzon, however, pointed out the unnecessary succession of authorities which would be imposed on frontier units. Sir P. Palmer accepted the necessity of eliminating the General Officer Commanding Punjab Frontier Force, and suggested that the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab, should control directly a 1st class district consisting of Nowshera, the Malakand and Abbottabad; and a 2nd class district composed of the troops at Peshawar and the Khyber; while the Punjab Frontier Force, also a 2nd class district, would be stationed mainly at Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. Subsequently, in accordance with His Excellency the Viceroy's suggestions, the Commander-in-Chief accepted the division of the Punjab Frontier Force District into two District commands, and the consequent dissolution of the Frontier Force.

According to this administrative system Peshawar was constituted a 1st class district, with station commanders and staff at Peshawar, Nowshera, Abbottabad, Attock, Mardan and Malakand. The Kohat Frontier district of

Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 186, dated 2nd October 1902.



India Army Circular, Clause 50, dated 1st May 1903. the 2nd class, comprised Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. After his assumption of office Lord Kitchener proposed to divide the latter district into two Brigadier-Generals' commands, pending a general redistribution of the districts in India. His recommendation was accepted : and this system of administration was continued until the introduction of the general Reorganisation Scheme in 1904.

Secretary of State's despatch No. 27, dated 21st February 1902. (Appendix No. 33.) *Distribution of districts among commands.*—In the early part of 1902, the Secretary of State raised the question of re-arranging the commands in India, and made certain suggestions which did not meet with the approval of Lord Curzon's Government. In respect to Burma, however, it was agreed to be desirable that the Burma District should be separated from the Madras Command, the Officer Commanding being given the rank and powers of a Lieutenant-General Commanding. The Nagpur District was also transferred to Madras from the Bombay Command; which received the Narbudda District in lieu from the Bengal Command.

Adjutant General's letter No. 2194-A, dated 7th May 1902., to Secretary, Military Department. (Appendix No. 35.) But in dealing with the Secretary of State's proposals, the Commander-in-Chief raised a question of much wider scope, and enunciated principles of organisation, which formed the basis of the scheme subsequently elaborated by Lord Kitchener for the redistribution of the army. Sir Power Palmer recognised that the existing distribution of troops in India was by no means suited to modern requirements or to the altered conditions produced by railway extensions, and the general scheme for mobilisation. The principles he advocated were stated in these words. "The object that should be aimed at is a redistribution of troops followed by a fresh grouping of Districts and Commands, which would enable each military area to provide its definite quota to the field army with the least possible dislocation, with districts and brigades, if possible taking their places in the field under the Commanders who had trained the various units in peace, and leaving sufficient troops in obligatory garrisons to hold the country in rear."

With these views Lord Curzon expressed his agreement, concurring in the opinion that a radical reform of military organisation was necessary. He awaited the preparation of a project, which Sir Power Palmer was understood to be preparing, and which was subsequently presented by Lord Kitchener.

This scheme for the reorganisation and redistribution of the army, is framed in strict accordance with these principles, so far as financial considerations permit and is based on the divisional organisation, which is held to be the best suited to the requirements of warfare in the areas on or beyond the North-West Frontier. The army will thus pass from peace to war smoothly and without undue disturbance. Arrangements have been made that, as far as possible, the units of each field service division shall be located in the same divisional area as are the troops which will be left behind for the purpose of internal control. The organisation of the Indian forces in time of peace, as originally proposed by the Commander-in-Chief, is indicated in the following statement. In some respects it will be necessary to modify the original proposals. A provisional distribution of commands has also been made pending the provision of accommodation at certain stations, where it is now deficient.

It will be observed that in many instances the peace and mobilisation stations are not identical. Moreover, several of the brigades are not commanded in peace by the men who would lead them in war. Financial and political considerations preclude exact compliance at present with the abstract principles of organisation.

Organisation of Brigades in time of peace.	Stations in each peace command.	ALLOTMENT OF GARRISON.		REMARKS.	
		FOR FIELD ARMY.			FOR INTERNAL DEFENCE
		Mobilisation station.	Units.		Units.
		<b>Peshawar Division.</b> <b>INFANTRY DIVISION.</b> <i>Infantry Brigade.</i> Khyber, Peshawar, and Nowshera. 4 Battalions, British Infantry. <i>Infantry Brigade.</i> Khyber and Peshawar. 4 Battalions, Native Infantry. <i>Infantry Brigade.</i> Nowshera. 4 Battalions, Native Infantry. <i>Divisional troops.</i> Peshawar, Khyber, and Nowshera. 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry, 1 Battalion, Pioneers, 3 Batteries, Field Artillery, 2 Batteries, British Mountain Artillery, 1 Heavy Battery. 2 Companies, Sappers and Miners. <b>CAVALRY BRIGADE.</b> Mardan. 1 Battery, Horse Artillery, 1 Regiment, British Cavalry, 2 Regiments, Native Cavalry.		<i>For the general defence of the area.</i> 1 Battery, Field Artillery, 4 Guns, Native Mountain Artillery, 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry, 3 Battalions, Native Infantry.  NOTE.—One British Infantry Battalion is required for the defence of this area. <i>Special for Malakand and posts.</i> 2 Battalions, Native Infantry.	
Khyber ( <i>Infantry Brigade</i> ).	Khyber ...				
Peshawar ( <i>Infantry Brigade</i> ).	Peshawar, and Jumrood.				
Nowshera ( <i>Infantry Brigade</i> ).	Nowshera ...				
.....	<i>Other stations.</i> Cherat, Malakand and posts.				
Mardan ( <i>Cavalry Brigade</i> ).	Mardan ...				
		<b>Rawal Pindi Division.</b> <b>INFANTRY DIVISION.</b> <i>Infantry Brigade.</i> Rawal Pindi, and Sialkot. 4 Battalions, British Infantry. <i>Infantry Brigade.</i> Abbottabad, and Rawal Pindi. 4 Battalions, Native Infantry. <i>Infantry Brigade.</i> Jhelum. 4 Battalions, Native Infantry. <i>Divisional Troops.</i> Rawal Pindi, Sialkot, Rawal Pindi, Murree Hills, and Campbellpore. 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry, 1 Battalion, Pioneers, 3 Batteries, Field Artillery, 2 Batteries, British Mountain Artillery, 1 Heavy Battery and 2 Companies, Sappers and Miners. <b>CAVALRY BRIGADE.</b> Sialkot. 1 Battery, Horse Artillery, 1 Regiment, British Cavalry, 2 Regiments, Native Cavalry. <b>AVAILABLE AS CORPS TROOPS.</b> Attock. 2 Heavy Batteries. <b>AVAILABLE FOR THE LUCKNOW DIVISION.</b> Abbottabad. 2 Batteries, Native Mountain Artillery.		<i>For the general defence of the area.</i> 1 Battery, Field Artillery, 1 Company, Garrison Artillery, 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry, 1 Battalion, Native Infantry.  NOTE.—One British Infantry Battalion is required for the defence of this area.	
Murree Hills ( <i>Infantry Brigade</i> ).	Murree Hills, and Abbottabad.				
Rawal Pindi ( <i>Infantry Brigade</i> ).	Rawal Pindi ...				
Jhelum ( <i>Infantry Brigade</i> ).	Jhelum ...				
.....	<i>Other stations.</i> Campbellpore ...				
Sialkot ( <i>Cavalry Brigade</i> ).	Sialkot ...				
.....	Attock ...				



ALLOTMENT OF GARRISON.						REMARKS.
Brigades.	Stations in each peace Command.	FOR FIELD ARMY.		FOR INTERNAL DEFENCE.		
		Mobilisation station.	Units.	Units.		
<b>Lucknow Division.</b>						
INFANTRY DIVISION.						
Infantry Brigade.						
Lucknow ( <i>Cavalry Brigade and Infantry Brigade</i> ).	Lucknow ...	Lucknow and Cawnpore.	3 Battalions, British Infantry.	1 Battery, Field Artillery, 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry, 1½ Battalions, British Infantry, 2 Battalions, Native Infantry.	(a) When formed.	
Fyzabad ( <i>Infantry Brigade</i> ).	Fyzabad ...	Fyzabad ...	1 Battalion, British Infantry.			
From Allahabad to Dinapore.						
Infantry Brigade.						
Cawnpore ( <i>Infantry Brigade</i> ).	Cawnpore and Allahabad.	Cawnpore, and Lucknow.	4 Battalions, Native Infantry.	4 Guns, Field Artillery, 1 Company, Garrison Artillery, 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry, ½ Battalion, British Infantry, 1 Battalion, Native Infantry.		
Other stations.						
.....	Benares, Dinapore, Fort William, Alipore, Barrackpore, Dum Dum, Darjeeling, and Bangalore.	Lucknow and Fyzabad.	4 Battalions, Native Infantry.	For Bengal.		
Divisional Troops.						
.....		Fyzabad, Allahabad, Fyzabad, Abbottabad and Bangalore.	1 Regiment, Native Cavalry, 1 Battalion, Pioneers, 3 Batteries, Field Artillery, 2 Batteries, Native Mountain Artillery, 1 Heavy Battery, 2 Companies, Sappers and Miners.	2 Guns, Field Artillery, 1 Company, Garrison Artillery, 1 Company, Native Coast Artillery (a), 1 Battalion, British Infantry, 1 Battalion, Native Infantry.		
CAVALRY BRIGADE.						
.....	Lucknow ...	Lucknow ...	1 Battery, Horse Artillery, 1 Regiment, British Cavalry, 2 Regiments, Native Cavalry.	For Assam. 1 Battalion, Native Infantry.		
<b>Quetta Division.</b>						
INFANTRY DIVISION.						
Infantry Brigade.						
Quetta ( <i>Two Infantry Brigades</i> ).	Quetta ...	Quetta ...	4 Battalions, British Infantry.		(a) The second company will be located at Karachi when it is released from Aden on the formation of the Corps of Native Coast Artillery.	
...	Quetta ...	Quetta ...	4 Battalions, Native Infantry.			
Infantry Brigade.						
Mastung ( <i>Infantry Brigade</i> ).	Mastung ...	Mastung ...	4 Battalions, Native Infantry.			
Divisional Troops.						
...	Harachi and Hyderabad (Sind).	Quetta, Mastung, Karachi, Hyderabad.	1 Regiment, Native Cavalry, 1 Battalion, Pioneers, 3 Batteries, Field Artillery, 2 Batteries, British Mountain Artillery, 1 Heavy Battery, 2 Companies, Sappers and Miners.	1 Battery, Native Mountain Artillery, 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry, 1 Battalion, Native Infantry, 1 Battalion, Native Infantry.		
Other stations.						
...	Loralai and outposts			NOTE.—One additional British Infantry Battalion is required for the defence of this area.		
CAVALRY BRIGADE.						
Mastung or in its neighbourhood. ( <i>One Cavalry Brigade</i> ).	Mastung or in its neighbourhood.	Mastung ...	1 Battery, Horse Artillery, 1 Regiment, British Cavalry, 2 Regiments, Native Cavalry.	Special for Karachi. 2 Companies, Garrison Artillery, (a) 1 Battalion, British Infantry, 1 Battalion, Native Infantry.		
AVAILABLE AS CORPS TROOPS.						
...	...	Quetta ...	1 Heavy Battery.			

ALLOTMENT OF GARRISON.					
Brigades.	Stations in each peace Command.	FOR FIELD ARMY.		FOR INTERNAL DEFENCE.	REMARKS.
		Mobilisation station.	Units.	Units.	
<b>Mhow Division.</b>					
INFANTRY DIVISION.					
Infantry Brigade.					
Nasirabad (Infantry Brigade)	Nasirabad, and Ajmere	Nasirabad, and Jubbulpore.	4 Battalions, British Infantry.		
Infantry Brigade.					
Mhow (Cavalry Brigade).	Mhow and Indore ...	Nasirabad, Mhow and Indore.	4 Battalions, Native Infantry.		
Infantry Brigade.					
Jhansi (Infantry Brigade)	Jhansi and Nowgong	Jhansi and Jubbulpore.	4 Battalions, Native Infantry.		
Divisional Troops.					
Jubbulpore (Infantry Brigade)	Jubbulpore ...	Jhansi Nowgong, Nasirabad.	1 Regiment, Native Cavalry, 1 Battalion, Pioneers, 3 Batteries, Field Artillery.		
		Nowgong and Poona.	1 Heavy Battery, 2 Companies, Sappers and Miners.		
CAVALRY BRIGADE.					
.....	Mhow ...	Mhow ...	1 Battery, Horse Artillery. 1 Regiment, British Cavalry, 2 Regiments, Native Cavalry.	From Ajmer and Jodhpur to the Tapti. 1 Battery, Horse Artillery. 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry. 1 Battalion, British Infantry, 1 Battalion, Native Infantry. 1 Battalion, Native Infantry. 1 Battalion, Native Infantry.	
Other stations.					
.....	Deesa, Neemuch, Ahmedabad, Baroda and Sehore.	Jubbulpore and Jhansi.	3 Batteries, Field Artillery, 3 Howitzer Batteries.		
AVAILABLE FOR THE SECUNDERABAD DIVISION.					
.....	.....	Nowgong ...	1 Heavy Battery ...		
<b>Poona Division.</b>					
INFANTRY DIVISION.					
Infantry Brigade.					
Poona (Infantry Brigade).	Poona and Kirkee ...	Poona, and Ahmednagar.	4 Battalions, British Infantry.	From Jhansi to Nagpur.	
Infantry Brigade.					
Ahmednagar (Infantry Brigade).	Ahmednagar, and Aurangabad.	Poona, and Ahmednagar.	4 Battalions, Native Infantry.	1 Battery, Field Artillery, 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry, 1 Battalion, British Infantry, 1 Battalion, Native Infantry, 1 Battalion, Native Infantry, 1 Battalion, Native Infantry.	
Infantry Brigade.					
Belgaum (Infantry Brigade).	Belgaum ...	Poona, and Belgaum.	4 Battalions, Native Infantry.	For the general defence of the area.	
Divisional Troops.					
		Poona, and Ahmednagar.	1 Regiment, Native Cavalry, 1 Battalion, Pioneers, 3 Batteries, Field Artillery, 1 Heavy Battery, 2 Companies, Sappers and Miners.	1 Battery, Field Artillery, 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry, 1 Battalion, British Infantry, 2 Battalions, Native Infantry.	
Other stations.					
	Bombay and Deolali			Special for Bombay.	
AVAILABLE FOR THE MHOW DIVISION.					
		Poona ...	2 Companies, Sappers and Miners.	2 Companies, Garrison Artillery, 1 Company, Garrison Artillery (a), 1 Battalion British Infantry, 2 Battalions, Native Infantry.	(a) When formed.

Poona Division.

Brigade.	Stations in each peace Command.	ALLOTMENT OF GARRISON.			REMARKS.
		FOR FIELD ARMY.		FOR INTERNAL DEFENCE.	
		Mobilization Station.	Units.	Units.	
<b>Secunderabad Division.</b>					
INFANTRY DIVISION.					
<i>Infantry Brigade.</i>					
Secunderabad (One Cavalry Brigade and two Infantry Brigades).	Secunderabad and Bolaram.	Secunderabad, Bangalore and Wellington.	4 Battalions, British Infantry.	<i>For Hyderabad Territory.</i> 1 Battery, Horse Artillery, 1 Regiment, British Cavalry, 2 Regiments, Native Cavalry, 1 Battalion, British Infantry. 3 Battalions, Native Infantry.	
		<i>Infantry Brigade.</i>			
		Secunderabad ...	4 Battalions, Native Infantry.		
<i>Infantry Brigade.</i>					
Bangalore (One Cavalry Brigade and one Infantry Brigade).	Bangalore ...	Bolaram and Bangalore.	4 Battalions, Native Infantry.	<i>For the Madras area.</i> 1 Battery, Field Artillery, 1 Company, Garrison Artillery, 1 Battalion, British Infantry, 1 Battalion, Native Infantry, 1 Battalion, Native Infantry.	
		<i>Divisional Troops.</i>			
		Secunderabad, Trichinopoly, Secunderabad, Nowgong and Bangalore.	1 Regiment, Native Cavalry, 1 Battalion, Pioneers, 8 Batteries, Field Artillery, 1 Heavy Battery, 2 Companies, Sappers and Miners.		
CAVALRY BRIGADE.					
...	...	Bangalore ...	1 Battery, Horse Artillery, 1 Regiment, British Cavalry, 2 Regiments, Native Cavalry.	<i>For Hyderabad Territory.</i> 1 Battalion, British Infantry, 1 Battalion, Native Infantry.	
		AVAILABLE FOR THE LUCKNOW DIVISION.			
		Bangalore ...	2 Companies, Sappers and Miners.		
AVAILABLE AS CORPS TROOPS.					
...	...	Bangalore ...	3 Batteries, Field Artillery.	<i>For the Poona Division.</i> 1 Battalion, Native Infantry.	
		...			
		...			
<b>Burma District.</b>					
SURPLUS.					
Mandalay	Mandalay, Maymyo and Meiktila.	Mandalay ...	1 Company, Sappers and Miners.		
		...			
		...			
...	Shwebo, Bhamo, Rangoon and Port Blair.	Mandalay ...	1 Company, Sappers and Miners.		
		...			
		...			

CHITRAL, KOHAT AND THE DERAJAT.

Brigade.	Station.	ALLOTMENT OF GARRISON.		REMARKS.
		For Field Army.	For internal defence.	
.....	Chitral, ...	Nil	2 Guns, Native Mountain Artillery, 1 Battalion, Native Infantry.	
Kohat	Kohat and outposts	Nil	1 Battery, Native Mountain Artillery, 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry, 3 Battalions, Native Infantry.	
Bannu	Bannu and outposts	Nil	1 Battery, Native Mountain Artillery, 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry, 3 Battalions, Native Infantry.	
Dera Ismail Khan	Dera Ismail Khan and outposts.	Nil	1 Battery, Native Mountain Artillery, 1 Regiment, Native Cavalry, 3 Battalions, Native Infantry.	



## STAFF.

India Army Orders  
Nos. 168 and 363,  
dated 28th September  
and 30th November  
1903.

*Tenure of Staff appointments.*—Consequent on the changes in the tenure of staff and regimental appointments in the British Army, the term of certain staff appointments in India was, with effect from the 1st April 1903, reduced to three years, extendible to five. A similar limit has been adopted for departmental staff appointments.

India Army Orders  
of 11th April 1904.

A redistribution of the staff in Military Districts in India was on the advice of Lord Kitchener, carried out in 1903-04 in order that the ordinary routine work of staff officers might be kept distinct from their more important duties of training and preparing the army for war. Two Assistant Adjutants-General and one Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General were appointed to each first class district; two Deputy Assistant Adjutants-General and one Brigade-Major to the Bombay, Derajat, Sirhind and Rohilkhand Districts; and one Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General and one Brigade-Major to the remaining second class districts.

A Corps of military staff clerks was organised in 1901 with a view to provide trained and reliable clerks for military staff offices in peace and in the field.

## REGIMENTAL ORGANISATION.

*General numbering.*—Units of the Indian Army previous to 1903 were numbered and named on the Presidential army basis. With the abolition of the presidential system in 1895, the old numbering became obsolete, but was nevertheless allowed to continue for sentimental reasons. It was considered by the Commander-in-Chief that confusion and serious mistakes might arise on service from the propinquity of troops bearing the same numbers, and only distinguishable from each other by the addition of presidential titles. Accordingly the Indian Army was renumbered as a single force in 1903.

Military Despatch  
No. 170, dated 24th  
October 1901.

*Artillery.*—The arrangements for the efficient training and mobilisation of the Artillery in India were pronounced to be unsatisfactory, and during the period 1901-04 the Brigade Division system obtaining at Home was, with certain modifications, gradually introduced into India.

*Native Cavalry.*—The three regiments of Madras Cavalry were grouped in 1903 so as to constitute the regiment or regiments left in India as a reserve for those which might be sent on service.

*Infantry.*—Prior to 1900 each regiment of Native Infantry was organised in wings and companies. The system was defective, because wing officers had no well defined duties, and British officers generally were not as closely in touch with their men as was desirable in the interests of efficiency. Accordingly in 1900 the "Double Company" organisation was introduced, under which the battalion was subdivided into four double companies, each placed directly under the command of a British officer, assisted by a "double company officer." The duties of the Native officers remained unchanged.

## ORGANISATION OF RESERVISTS INTO BATTALIONS FOR TRAINING.

The proposal originally made in 1885 to form reservists into provisional battalions was negatived by the Secretary of State who proposed a scheme by which all reservists joined the regiment in which they had served with the

colours. Accordingly, until 1900, reservists were trained with the battalion of the regimental group (of two, three or four battalions) stationed at the regimental centre. In time of mobilisation they joined the dépôt of their own battalion.

It became evident, however, that the unorganised reservists would be too numerous for dépôts to train efficiently; and that the training would be better performed in a battalion organisation, whence the men would be drafted to their regiments in the field; and further as a subsidiary matter that these reservist battalions would be useful for replacing service battalions for garrison duty. Accordingly a scheme was sanctioned in 1900 by which these measures were instituted. According to present arrangements reserve battalions up to the number of 30 would be formed on mobilisation: such a formation, however, takes place only when one of the group regiments is mobilised. Proposals have recently been received for the modification of this system of organising and training reservists.

Despatch No. 18,  
dated 25th January  
1900, to Secretary of  
State.

### VOLUNTEERS.

The Calcutta Naval Volunteers were converted in 1899 into a coast defence unit under the title of the Calcutta Port Defence Corps. It comprised three distinct branches, *viz.*:—Two naval divisions, (200 men); one company garrison artillery (100 men); one company of submarine mining engineers (100 men). One company of Electrical Engineers was subsequently added.

The Volunteer Corps in Oudh were reorganised in 1903. A separate corps was formed of employés of the Oudh and Rohilkhand Railway and designated "Oudh and Rohilkhand Railway Volunteer Rifles"; the Rohilkhand Volunteer Rifles were abolished; and the designation of the Oudh Volunteer Rifles was changed to "Lucknow Volunteer Rifles."

### DEPARTMENTAL ORGANISATION.

*Ordnance Department.*—The last few years have been marked by a centralisation of administration in the Ordnance Department and by the closure of redundant arsenals and dépôts. The Ordnance Department was reorganised in two circles in 1900, namely, the Northern Circle comprising the Bengal and Punjab Commands, and the Southern Circle including the Bombay and Madras Commands. Previously four circles had existed, corresponding to the four Commands.

Military Despatch  
No. 83, dated 7th  
June 1900.

In 1901 the arsenal at Bellary was abolished in consequence of the development of railway communication. The stations dependent on Bellary were henceforward supplied from the Madras Arsenal and the Trimulgherry dépôt. The first class dépôt at Mandalay was, in 1902, reduced to a second class dépôt, as the improved communications in Burma permitted of the expeditious supply of stores from Rangoon. Its abolition took place in the current year.

In 1900 the status of the arsenal at Rawal Pindi was raised from second to first class on account of the increase of the work devolving on it, and in 1901 the Trimulgherry dépôt was similarly treated. For many years it has been represented that the retention of the arsenal at Bombay is undesirable on account of want of space for enlargement; the liability to naval attack; and the injurious effect of the climate on stores. In replacement the construction of a very

extensive and well equipped arsenal at Kirkee has been sanctioned, on the site of the former gunpowder factory. The works are now in progress, and are estimated to cost Rs. 13 lakhs, including quarters for the numerous subordinates. On completion of the work, not only the Bombay Arsenal but the Ordnance depôt at Poona will be closed; and a reduction will be made in the status of the depôt at Mhow. In 1904 the ordnance depôt at Dera Ismail Khan was abolished.

*Military Works Services.*—The Military Works Department was reorganised in 1899 on the basis of the system obtaining in the Imperial service by which officers are graded, generally, in accordance with their seniority and not by their length of service in the department. The scale of pay of the officers was revised and somewhat reduced. The organisation was thus placed on a regimental instead of a departmental footing and was styled the “Military Works Services.” At the same time the administration was adjusted to the military system of command.

*Supply and Transport, Medical and Veterinary Departments.*—The changes in the organisation of these departments are dealt with in Chapter X, as they are nearly concerned with measures for increasing the mobility of the army.

#### CLOTHING DEPARTMENT.

*Supply of stores.*—In 1902 the Stores Department of the India Office undertook the supply of cloth and clothing stores to the Indian factories, which had previously been entrusted to the Royal Army Clothing Department.

*Reorganisation of the Clothing Department.*—It was found desirable in 1904 to remove the Clothing Department from the control of the Director General, Supply and Transport, to appoint the Superintendent of the Alipore Factory the head of the Army Clothing Department, and to render him responsible for the administration of the department as a whole. In many respects the connection between the factories and the Supply and Transport Corps had been nominal. Simultaneously the Clothing Department was reorganised, and an Assistant Superintendent was added to the staff of each factory. A change, with substantial economy, resulting, was also made in the system of supply of clothing to troops, and in the grant of compensation for clothing not issued in kind.

Despatch to the  
Secretary of State,  
No. 87, dated 10th  
March 1904.

*Supply of regimental necessaries.*—The system was abolished in 1904 of supplying necessaries to British troops in India on indents from England. In lieu the necessaries were stocked at Army Clothing Factories and supplied on demand.

#### DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS.

*British troops.*—It was found that the British Mountain battery at Darjeeling suffered in efficiency, by reason of the unfitness of the rules, and the absence of training ground. A transfer to Quetta was sanctioned in 1900, where the battery would be better placed for mobilisation. The ill-health of the battalion at Dum Dum, led to the reduction in 1901, of the strength of that station to four companies, and to the removal of the remainder of the men to Lebong near Darjeeling, when barracks have since been erected at a cost of about 9 lakhs of rupees to accommodate six companies. Eventually the garrison

of Dum Dum was further reduced by one company. For a similar reason the Company of Royal Garrison Artillery at Barrackpore and half the Company at Fort William have been moved to the hills annually since 1903.

The garrison of Benares was reduced from 4 to 2 companies of British Infantry in consequence of ill-health, and a redistribution of the British Infantry in the vicinity was also sanctioned. For mobilisation reasons a battery of Royal Field Artillery was transferred from Deesa to Hyderabad (Sind), and the British Infantry at the latter station was reduced by one company to make room for it. The fort at Mandalay has been notoriously unhealthy for many years. It was decided in 1903, after the experimental occupation of the site by a company, to remove a wing of the battalion of British Infantry thence to the fine elevated plateau of Maymyo at a cost of Rs. 7 lakhs. Subsequently the transfer of the Native Mountain battery from Mandalay Hill to the same place was agreed to. The construction of buildings is now in hand. Quite recently it has been agreed to build lines for a full battalion at Maymyo, and to place 2 companies of another battalion at Mandalay Hill a few miles from the fort, which will be evacuated by British troops.

Military Department letter No 2621-C, dated the 5th November 1902.

*Native troops.*—The withdrawal of Native troops and detachments from outlying stations has been in progress for many years, as occasion might offer. The Native Infantry detachments at Thana, Malegaon and Jacobabad were withdrawn to the head-quarters of these regiments in December 1899. The garrison of Dera Ghazi Khan was gradually reduced from one regiment of Native Cavalry to one battalion of Native Infantry in 1896; until the troops were wholly withdrawn in 1903. The continued encroachment of the Indus, and the consequent rise in the water level rendered the cantonment unhealthy, and it was not possible to maintain the obligatory garrison of one battalion, Native Infantry, and two squadrons, Native Cavalry, in 1900. The Local Government opposed the removal of the troops, but eventually it was arranged in compensation to increase the Border Military Police by 300 men. The unhealthiness of Peshin, due mainly to an indifferent supply of water, caused the withdrawal to Quetta of the Native Infantry battalion and a squadron of Native Cavalry formerly quartered in Peshin Fort. The extension of the Bengal-Nagpur Railway to Raipur and Sambulpur permitted in 1902 the abandonment of these stations, formerly each garrisoned by four companies of Native Infantry. In the same year the prospect of early communication by railway between Tinnevely and Quilon, and the indifferent condition of the lines, caused the surrender to the Darbars concerned of the cantonments of Quilon, Trichur and Trivandrum.

The garrison of Assam previous to 1899 consisted of three Gurkha battalions and one Bengal Infantry regiment. In this year one Gurkha battalion was withdrawn and replaced by a second Bengal Infantry regiment. Again in 1902 one Native Infantry battalion was withdrawn without replacement, and the remaining two battalions of Gurkha and one British Infantry regiment were distributed between Shillong, Dibrugarh, Manipur, Kohima, and Silchar. The last named place was evacuated at the instigation of the civil authorities, who pointed out that it had lost its strategical value, owing to the extension of the frontier. Lastly one Gurkha battalion was removed in 1904 and transferred to the Punjab, being replaced by a Bengal Infantry regiment.

*Location of troops withdrawn from the North-West Frontier.*—A more important scheme of redistribution was inaugurated in consequence of the

execution of the policy, instituted by Lord Curzon, for the withdrawal of regular troops from beyond the North-West Frontier. This measure entailed consideration as to where the troops should be posted, as no barrack accommodation was available in the Punjab, since, by the Army Reorganisation of 1895, the garrison of the Punjab had been increased to 40 battalions, and the actual number in the province was 42, whereas the number of lines was only  $35\frac{1}{2}$ . This deficiency had not been felt so long as the trans-frontier positions were garrisoned by regular troops.

Sir Edwin Collen suggested in September 1900 that, as a beginning, new lines should be built at Nowshera and Kohat, and pointed out that every new cantonment meant more dispersion instead of concentration, besides involving an expenditure far larger than the mere building of lines. In February 1901 the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab, recommended that at least two of the regiments to be withdrawn should be stationed on some convenient cis-Indus site in preference to increasing the Kohat garrison. He suggested Kundian as a suitable spot. The Commander-in-Chief held the same view, considering that the establishment of an entirely new cantonment, which he would prefer to locate at Mianwali, would come cheaper in the end than buying up expensive land on the outskirts of Kohat, as had been proposed by a local Committee. Either scheme entailed a new cantonment, although in the case of Kohat, as the proposed site was only two miles from the centre of the existing station, there would be the less expenditure on roads, water-supply, etc.

Note, dated 20th  
May 1905.

Lord Curzon pointed out that the questions discussed raised "a much larger issue than that of the accommodation of the regulars about to be withdrawn from frontier or trans-frontier positions," and that they involved, in fact, the entire problem of frontier defence. No examination had been made of Kundian as regarded its suitability for a cantonment and equally little was known of Mianwali. Should a cantonment be placed at either spot, it would be necessary to provide means for crossing the Indus, or the value of the garrison as a support to Bannu and Tank would be sacrificed. The river in this neighbourhood was most unfavourable for bridging, and the cost of such an operation would be enormous. Sir J. Browne had estimated the cost of such a bridge at 110 lakhs and of a steam ferry at 25 lakhs. In addition to this bridge or ferry, for the support of the frontier, a railway, or more probably several railways, to Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Tank would be necessary at a cost of some 61 lakhs. Adding 20 lakhs for the new cantonment, the grand total, substituting the ferry for the bridge, would reach over 106 lakhs.

The reason assigned for this project being the accommodation of the few regiments to be withdrawn from the Tochi and the Gomal, and the support of the garrisons of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, His Excellency held that the disparity between the means and the ends was overpowering, and that the proposal was based upon premises which it was quite impossible to accept; namely, that the Waziri Section of the frontier is a part upon which it will be necessary in the future, to concentrate a large force—a contention already rejected when the Government of India declined to consider the scheme of passive defence recommended by the Secretary of State; and that the support of the garrisons of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan cannot be adequately pro-



vided for except by having troops on or near to the Indus, with railway communication to the front. In Lord Curzon's opinion it would have been a mistake to waste money and concentrate strength upon the middle section of the Indus frontier. All that was needed were the means of pushing out flying columns to punish outrage or prevent risings in the Tochi or the Gomal. In the event of an expedition the troops would march to their objective by the same routes as had always been employed. Surveying the future military position on the frontier Lord Curzon pointed out that the existing garrison of Kohat was acknowledged to be sufficient, when the railway was completed for the support of the Samana and the Kurram. He refuted the prevalent idea that the Kohat-Thal railway would be useless for the support of Bannu. This could not be the case were the Thal-Idak road constructed, and the relieving or supporting garrisons brought by rail within 40 miles of the scene of action. Moreover it had been already decided that, on the military evacuation of the Tochi, the Bannu garrison, equipped as a moveable column, would suffice for the support of the local levies. Similarly for the support of the South Waziristan Militia the existing garrisons of Tank and Dera Ismail Khan, slightly augmented perhaps, would appear to be sufficient, especially as the latter would always be in close and easy connection with the enlarged garrison at Multan. His Excellency could see no reason for planting the released garrisons in the neighbourhood of the frontier. For some of their strength accommodation was being provided at Nowshera and Multan. The remainder might be arranged for by rebuilding the condemned central lines at Kohat, and possibly by increasing the garrison of Dera Ismail Khan.

At a Conference held on the 6th June 1901, at which were present the Commander-in-Chief, the Military Member, the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General and the Officiating Secretary in the Military Department, it was agreed, that on the completion of the 3rd set of infantry lines (Central Infantry Lines rebuilt on a new site) no more lines should be built at Kohat, and to abandon the Kundian or any cis-Indus cantonment scheme. It was also accepted that the Tochi might be reinforced from Thal *via* the Thal-Idak road; but the conference held that Dera Ghazi Khan could not be considered as a supporting station to Southern Waziristan. Accordingly in order to furnish adequate supports to Northern and Southern Waziristan, it was thought necessary to construct new lines for a third Native Infantry regiment both at Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan: and also that in addition to the accommodation sanctioned for extra troops at Nowshera and Multan, lines were required for an extra Native mountain battery. Abbottabad was recommended as a site. To these proposals Lord Curzon assented on the 28th June 1901.

Provision was made in the 1902-3 estimates for two battalions of Native infantry and one Native Mountain battery at Nowshera and for one battalion of Native infantry at Multan. In the estimates of the following year funds were provided for progress with the works which were completed in 1904.

*Removal of troops from Burma.*—Another distribution measure resulting from the application to Burma of the policy of concentrating military force, is the withdrawal of a battalion of regular infantry from Kengtung on the Mekong, and the substitution of military police. The Gurkha battalion thus rendered surplus to the Burma garrison has been transferred to Lansdowne temporarily, with a view to its eventual location at Quetta.



## TRAINING AND EDUCATION.

*Indian Staff College.*—The War Office agreed in 1875 to the admission annually of a limited number of officers of the Indian Staff Corps to the Camberley Staff College; but after some years it became evident, that this arrangement was insufficient to meet the requirements of the Staff in this country, and from 1889 to 1891 correspondence took place in which the Secretary of State, on the representation of the Government of India, urged unsuccessfully on the War Office the necessity for increasing the annual number of Indian vacancies at Camberley. The experiences of the South African campaign and of frontier warfare emphasised the want of special training for staff employ. Sir E. Collen in 1901 laid stress on the necessity for greater facilities for educating staff officers, and recommended the subject of an Indian Staff College for discussion.

In 1903, the Commander-in-Chief submitted proposals for the establishment of such an institution at Quetta for the training of officers of both the British and Indian services. By the abolition of the existing garrison classes he was able to do so at small extra expense. These proposals met with cordial reception from Government; for, as remarked by Lord Curzon, the Staff College course at Camberley was unduly expensive both to India and to the individual officer; and offered an education which, whatever its theoretic or scientific advantages, was not closely correlated with the conditions likely to be assumed by Indian warfare—or at any rate warfare conducted by the Indian Army—in the future. After several months' delay the Secretary of State informed the Government of India that the Army Council deprecated the idea, and considered that the money would be none profitably employed in the enlargement of the Camberley college and in the grant of additional allowances to Indian Army officers attending it. These views the Government of India declined to accept.

In a second communication, the War Office suggested that the curriculum and system of teaching should be approximately the same for Camberley and Quetta; that a proportion of the professors at the latter college were to be in possession of Camberley certificates; that the examinations for both colleges should be simultaneous; and that certificates for both colleges should be issued by the Chief of the General Staff. All these conditions, except that referring to simultaneous examinations, were accepted by the Government of India, subject to such modifications in the curriculum as might be necessitated by local conditions. Finally the War Office agreed to the initiation of the Staff College in India on the understanding that arrangements for subsequent courses and the final settlement of administrative details were not prejudged by this preliminary approval. The first examination for entrance to the Indian Staff College was held in May 1905, and a class of 24 students was established in temporary quarters at Deolali in the following July. The course will last 2 years; provision has been made for 48 officers in all.

Telegram of January 1905.

Secretary of State's telegram of March 1905.

The question of simultaneous examinations for entrance to the Indian and Home Colleges, and some minor administrative details still, remain to be settled with the War Office. In the meantime the buildings at Quetta, commenced in 1904, are being erected as rapidly as possible, and it is hoped that they may be ready for occupation next year.

*Camps of exercise.*—The annual grant for Camps of Exercise and Instruction in the four Commands was increased in 1900 from Rs. 1,00,000 to Rs. 2,00,000 in order to provide for more extended manœuvres at a distance from cantonments.

*Gymnastics.*—Gymnastic training in the Native Army was encouraged in 1900 by the grant of Rs. 150 per regiment of Native Infantry for the purchase of apparatus. The appointment at the Central schools of native instructors for training classes of native soldiers, and the issue of staff pay for two regimental instructors, were also sanctioned. The supervising staff of gymnasia in India was reorganised. A field officer of the British service was appointed as Inspector of Gymnasia for all India with his head-quarters at Lucknow, and four Superintendents of Gymnasia (Captains or Lieutenants of the British service) were placed in charge of the four Central schools.

*Signalling.*—Special classes for the instruction of native troops in army signalling were abolished. In lieu schools of instruction were established at various stations in each Command, for Native Non-Commissioned Officers who will undertake the regimental instruction of Native corps.

*Mounted Infantry.*—Mounted infantry schools were established in 1901 at Sialkot, Umballa, Poona, Bangalore, and Fatehgarh to which detachments are sent from the British and Native Infantry. Battalions and companies of mounted infantry will be formed on mobilisation from the men trained at these schools.

*Cooking.*—It was decided in 1903 that, for sanitary and practical reasons, British soldiers in India should do their own cooking, except during the hot season at stations in the plains. Sanction was first accorded to the provision of cooking ranges at certain hill stations; and to the appointment of specially trained non-commissioned officers to supervise the duties of soldier cooks. A school of army cookery was also established at Poona. This system has recently been extended to all British units in the country.

*Rifle ranges of regular troops.*—The need for long range rifle practice has caused a revision of all ranges used by the regular army. Considerable sums have been spent in 1903-04-05 on improvements and extensions.

*Volunteer Training, Rifle ranges and armouries.*—The general issue of the valuable and far-ranging Lee-Enfield rifle to the Volunteers, rendered it imperative to complete the requirements of corps in the matter of armouries, magazines and improved rifle ranges. It was accordingly arranged, with the sanction of the Secretary of State, to make initial grants to meet the essential requirements of corps, which were estimated approximately to cost Rs. 5,33,000; and to discontinue the annual grants of Rs. 40,000, which had previously been allowed for all Volunteer Corps in India. Rupees 2,50,000 were provided for the purpose in 1903-04 and Rs. 1,00,000 in 1904-05 and 1905-06.

*Inspector-General.*—The appointment of an Inspector-General of Volunteers was sanctioned in 1901 as an experimental measure for three years, and was made permanent in 1904.

## ADMINISTRATION.

*Military appointments.*—The power of disposing of certain classes of cases appertaining to the Adjutant-General's Department, which had hitherto been referred to the Military Department by Army Head Quarters, was delegated to the Commander-in-Chief in 1902. These cases included nominations to certain high appointments to the staff of the army in India which it was decided should, in future, be submitted direct by Army Head Quarters to His Excellency the Viceroy—in some cases for approval, and in others for information before notification.

*Decentralisation of Administration.*—In its present form the question of army administration was first raised by the Secretary of State in March 1896, by a suggestion that steps should be taken to reduce the work at Army Head-Quarters to the extent contemplated in 1894 when the presidential armies were abolished, and when the Indian army was unified. As the results of the subsequent discussions on this subject have proved so profoundly important, not only to the army, but to the whole system of Indian administration, it is necessary that the history of the matter should be related in considerable detail. On receipt of this communication from the India Office, Sir E. Collen in an exhaustive note traced the various efforts which had recently been made towards decentralisation of military authority by the Government of India. They had enhanced the power of the Commander-in-Chief by delegating to him certain financial authority, by making the heads of the Ordnance, Military Works, Commissariat, and Remount Departments his advisers on all technical matters, and by the transfer of the Principal Medical Officer, His Majesty's Forces, to his staff. Sir E. Collen pleaded for a similar devolution of authority in military matters to Lieutenant-Generals of the Commands. Sir G. White was, however, unwilling to move in the matter, except in regard to the amendment of the procedure in connection with certain appointments, holding that further decentralisation of authority would destroy the unity of command which was necessary to ensure the efficient administration of the army by the Commander-in-Chief. The matter therefore dropped until Sir W. Lockhart became Commander-in-Chief. In consequence of his experience in the Punjab Command, this officer favoured a policy of devolution of power and responsibility. With the concurrence of His Excellency the Viceroy, a Committee\* was accordingly appointed to attempt a decentralisation of work at Army Head-Quarters and in the Military Department. In relation to executive and disciplinary powers, the Committee's proposals proved unimportant. They held that no large measure of decentralisation could be introduced unless the Lieutenant-Generals of the Commands were allowed a moderate and reasonable increase of financial power. Subsequently in November 1900 a subsidiary Committee was convened to consider the question of enlarging the powers of General Officers Commanding Districts. The report of this second Committee, which met under the presidency of General Burnett, was received by Government in January 1901. It comprised two schemes—(1) for the continuance of the present system of army administration; General Officers Commanding Districts being granted certain additional administrative, disciplinary, and financial powers; (2) for the establishment of a novel organisation by which General Officers would be supreme in their own districts, the departmental officers in each district becoming staff officers of their

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\* Secretary, Military Department, Adjutant-General in India, Quartermaster-General in India.

Generals and being rendered independent of the control of their departmental superiors. The latter scheme was rejected as impracticable. Additional powers were, however, given to the Commanders of districts, following some of Committee's recommendations.

In the meantime a scheme had been sketched out in the Military Department to give effect to Sir Edwin Collen's views regarding the decentralisation of military administration. These were based on the separation of administrative from executive control, and comprised the adoption of the following main principles:—(a) That each Command should have its own budget of local expenditure, and that the Lieutenant-General Commanding should exercise the same powers within the limits of this budget as the Military Department of the Government of India possessed; (b) that the heads of the administrative departments under the Military Department should, in future, occupy the position and exercise the powers of a Deputy Secretary in the Department; (c) that a clear distinction should be drawn between the executive and administrative work of the army; the former being dealt with by the Commander-in-Chief, in direct communication with the Viceroy; the latter by the Military Department. The preparation of a detailed scheme on this basis was entrusted to a departmental Committee, whose proposals when accepted by the Government of India were embodied in a draft Governor-General's Order and India Army Circular and were forwarded to the Secretary of State in July 1902.

Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 143, dated 31st July 1902. (Appendix No. 37.)

In his reply the Secretary of State agreed generally to the principles which underlay these proposals. He offered no criticisms on those parts of them which related to the disposal of executive business by the Commander-in-Chief and the issue of the orders of Government by the heads of the Military Administrative Department. But he pointed out that, under the scheme, Lieutenant-Generals would attain only such administrative control over the local budget as was exercised by the Military Department in regard to the military budget as a whole; and that responsibility for the construction of the budget itself would still remain with the Government of India. Since, therefore, the Lieutenant-Generals would not really be entrusted with the entire management and control of local budgets, the Secretary of State doubted whether so large a financial organisation would be necessary at the head-quarters of each Command as had been proposed. The matter was therefore remanded to the Government of India for reconsideration. At this stage Lord Kitchener assumed command of the Army. He was in favour of an entirely different system of administration, and submitted in May 1903 a memorandum on the subject, which was, however, shortly recalled at the instance of His Excellency the Viceroy. But in view of Lord Kitchener's unwillingness to proceed with the matter, no further steps were taken in connection with the decentralisation scheme.

Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 172, dated 5th December 1902. (Appendix No. 38.)

*Administration of the Supply and Transport Corps.*—A year later the question of administration was again raised in connection with the control of the Supply and Transport Corps. The concentration of troops at the Delhi Durbar had caused an expenditure on Transport and Supply largely in excess of the estimates, which had been prepared by the Commander-in-Chief and passed by the Government of India. In spite of close investigation there was a difficulty in fixing the responsibility for this excess upon any individual or department. Lord Kitchener attributed this fact to a division of responsibility for the working of the corps, and proposed that

the entire Supply and Transport Corps should be transferred from the control of the Military Department to himself; that all powers exercised by the Director-General, Supply and Transport, should in future be exercised by the Quartermaster-General in India; and that appointments to, and promotions in, the Supply and Transport Corps, which were made by the Government of India, should be made in future by the Commander-in-Chief. This proposal was strongly opposed by Sir Edmond Elles who pointed out that the Supply and Transport was an administrative and spending department; and as such should not be placed under the executive head of the army, but under the Military Member who is concerned with administration and finance. Sir E. Elles insisted on the necessity for maintaining, as in all other armies, a clear division between executive and administrative functions with reference to Commander-in-Chief's contention that, because a commander in the field has full power over Supply and Transport Services in time of war, a similar control should be exercised in time of peace, the Hon'ble Member demonstrated the measure of control which the Commander-in-Chief already exercised in peace time through Lieutenant-Generals of Commands, and deprecated the overburdening of the Commander-in-Chief by details of departmental administration. Eventually, after a full discussion, a compromise was arrived at, by which the executive control of the corps was transferred to the Commander-in-Chief; while the Military Department retained the control over financial expenditure, and over all arrangements for the supply in bulk of stores and animals. The discussion, which preceded this important innovation, raised many important questions in connection with the administration of the army. Moreover, Lord Kitchener's dissatisfaction with the existing system of military administration had already been brought to the notice of the Secretary of State by a minute which the Commander-in-Chief wrote and entrusted to Lord Curzon before the Viceroy returned to England in April 1904. In this minute a considerable change of the present system of administration was advocated. Before resuming the Viceroyalty in November 1904, Lord Curzon, however, informed His Majesty's Government of his entire disagreement with Lord Kitchener's proposals.

Telegram to Secretary of State, No. 17, dated 19th August 1905. (Appendix No. 46.)

Despatch No. 153, dated 2nd December 1904, from Secretary of State. (Appendix No. 39.)

**Higher military Administration.**—Shortly after Lord Curzon's return, the Secretary of State addressed the Government of India pointing out that in the discussion on the working of Supply and Transport Corps it had been alleged that the present military organisation constituted a system of dual military control, the efficiency of which had never been tested by a general mobilisation. In view of the recent recommendation of the Government of India to transfer the control of a part of an administrative department to the Commander-in-Chief, a review of the present system appeared *prima facie* desirable, and it also seemed necessary to enquire whether the military executive and administrative departments were working harmoniously. In view of the divergence of opinion which was known to exist on the question referred by the Secretary of State, the Commander-in-Chief was asked, on receipt of this despatch, to state his views in the form of a minute to be laid before Council. Lord Kitchener's memorandum dealt with the subject in considerable detail. In his opinion the system was faulty, inefficient, and incapable of the expansion necessary for a great war. According to his view the Member in charge of the Military Department being responsible for the administration of the army and being entrusted with the communication of orders to the army, together with a

Lord Kitchener's views.



position in Council equal to that of the Commander-in-Chief, had become omnipotent. His Excellency suggested that this system was framed to meet peace requirements only, and that in consequence essentials had been disregarded. Lord Kitchener held that military progress and efficiency had not kept pace with the times. Unable to state a definition which should separate administrative from executive functions, terms which were used in India to differentiate between the duties of the Commander-in-Chief and Military Member, Lord Kitchener contended that in an army the true functions of a Commander-in-Chief consisted in the administration and control of all branches and services of the forces.

Enclosure to Despatch No. 36, dated 23rd March 1905, to Secretary of State. (Appendix No. 40.)

His Excellency then proceeded to detail the defects he found in the existing system which he characterised as one of dual control and divided responsibility; and termed "a system of want of trust." To it he ascribed delays, endless discussion, and duplication of work. Instances of want of co-ordination were alleged, and he stated that even his proposals for training soldiers were unduly criticised and rejected. His Excellency accused the Military Department having issued regulations which were unnecessarily diffuse, and which in consequence hampered initiative. In his opinion the services on which our army depends for its subsistence in time of war should necessarily be trained under the officer who will command them in the field.

Lord Kitchener urged that the success of a system in small engagements constituted no proof that it would succeed when strained by greater efforts. In respect to the fear that had been expressed that the Commander-in-Chief would acquire too much power, and might embark on rash proposals, or ill-considered innovations, His Excellency pointed to the firmly established civil control exercised by the Governor-General and his Council, and by the Secretary of State. In reply to a possible objection that the work imposed upon a single head of the army would be more than one man could perform, he stated his belief that removal of the duplication of duties would reduce work. Lord Kitchener then proceeded to formulate a scheme in substitution for the dual system of administration by which the sole representative of the army in the Governor-General's Council would be the Commander-in-Chief and War Member of Council, to whom should be subordinated all the various branches of military administration, including the organisation of military finance. According to his views the Secretariat duties would be entrusted to a Secretary in the Department.

*Sir E. Elles' Minute.*—Sir E. Elles criticised the Secretary of State's remarks which appeared to attribute to the want of preparation in India for a big war and to the existence of a dual system of control. He demonstrated that the existing system of administration was in no way a system of dual control; nor was there any division of authority between the Commander-in-Chief and the Military Member. A division of responsibility however existed. Sir E. Elles pointed out that the army in India has only one head, the Governor-General in Council, and that the Military Member of Council is his representative in respect of all business which is not brought before the Council collectively. The Commander-in-Chief commands the army according to rule and practice. Sir E. Elles laid emphasis on the desirability of separating administrative from executive functions—a system practised by the Japanese Army, and advocated by the Esher Committee, on whose report the War Office had been reorganised.

Enclosure to Despatch No. 36, dated 23rd March 1905, to Secretary of State. (Appendix No. 40.)



The Hon'ble Member refuted the accusation of delaying work by unnecessary criticism which had been levelled against the Military Department. He not only instanced several cases where large schemes had been rapidly passed, but gave examples where criticism had proved effective. The lack of co-ordination between Army Head-Quarter and the Military Department which had existed since Lord Kitchener's advent was attributed to the failure of the Commander-in-Chief to take the Department into his confidence and to assemble the Mobilisation Committee which hitherto had co-ordinated the various branches of military administration. In his opinion the Commander-in-Chief, who had studiously ignored the Military Member, and had refused to consult him, was solely responsible for any lack of co-ordination. Sir E. Elles expressed his belief that no man, however able, could deal with the mass of business which now demands, or should demand, the attention of the Commander-in-Chief and Military Member. Moreover, in his opinion, the business could not be decreased except by decentralisation, which would not be found possible unless financial powers were also decentralised.

Sir E. Elles dwelt upon the danger of ill-considered proposals emanating from a single military adviser, and upon the need for the constant presence of a responsible military adviser with the Governor-General in Council which, under Lord Kitchener's scheme, could not be ensured during the absence of a Commander-in-Chief on tours of inspection. He demonstrated the effectiveness of the control of military expenditure exercised by the Military Department, and criticised the scheme submitted by the Commander-in-Chief for the administration of the army, pointing out that thereby the "Commander-in-Chief and War Minister" would combine all administrative and executive duties and occupy a position which finds no parallel in any of the armies of the Great Powers. Such a scheme would in fact establish a military autocracy. The Hon'ble Military Member laid stress upon the danger which would result in case of war from a Commander-in-Chief taking the field with all his principal staff officers.

Enclosure to Despatch No. 26, dated 23rd March 1905, to Secretary of State. (Appendix No. 40.)

*Lord Curzon's Minute.*—Lord Curzon's minute followed. After a reference to the previous discussions on the subject, His Excellency pointed out that the Government of India, of which the military system is only a part, was without parallel or analogy in the world, and that consequently comparisons with foreign practice were not of much importance. His Excellency proceeded to discuss the dual system of administration in these words:—

"Neither does it seem to me of practical value to argue the matter from the abstract standpoint. It is easy to contend that a dual system must be pernicious, and will not stand the test of emergency. This depends upon the materials of which the dualism is composed and their constitutional and personal adjustment to each other. Dualism of some sort enters into every branch of British administration, which has invariably sought to divide labour and to prevent the abuse of authority by the provision of adequate safeguards. The Government of India is itself the most notable illustration of such a dualism in the respective parts that are played in it by the Governor-General in Council and the Secretary of State in Council. By these means a check is provided against the creation of an autocracy which in the case of military matters is more dangerous than elsewhere, owing to the difficulty experienced by the civil power, from lack of professional knowledge, in exerting efficient control. I am

not therefore myself impressed with the argument that it must be an unwise or unsound thing to submit the proposals of the Commander-in-Chief in India to independent military criticism before they are accepted by Government. The sole criterion appears to me to be—What is the best method of enabling the Governor-General in Council, who is by Statute invested with the supreme command of the Army in India (a power which I consider that it would be disastrous to subvert), to conduct the military administration of this country in times of peace, and to control military operations in war? Objections to the theoretical symmetry of our system would not weigh with me if I felt that it was yet the best available instrument for the purpose in view."

Lord Curzon then remarked upon the magnitude of the measures which had been carried out during Lord Kitchener's term of office and demonstrated that their execution had only been rendered possible by the support which he had received from all Members of the Governor-General's Council. His Excellency repudiated the assertion that the military administration of the Government of India had been a focus of perpetual dissension, and defined in these terms the present position of the Military Member of Council, and that which would be attained by the Commander-in-Chief under Lord Kitchener's proposals:—

"Not only, however, does the Commander-in-Chief's complaint appear to me to be unjustified by the facts; it is based, in my opinion, upon a complete misconception of the constitution of the Government of India. The Military Member does not criticise or accept or refuse his proposals as an independent military authority, but as the constitutional representative of the Government of India. He has no other functions and no other existence. I have already observed that the Government of India is by law invested with the supreme control of military affairs. The terms of the Charter Act of 1833 are remarkable in their wideness: "The superintendence, direction, and control of the whole Civil and Military Government shall be and is invested in the Governor-General in Council." This being so, Government must possess an office and a ministerial establishment, and an officer of high rank at the head of the Department for purposes of communication with the Secretary of State, for the issue of orders, for the maintenance of continuity of administration, and for the necessary adjustment of military requirements with other branches, and more especially the financial branch, of Government. The head of that Department may be either a soldier or a civilian. In some countries he is the latter, in the majority the former. In India it has been considered wise that the Government in the administration of so vast and complex a machine should receive the guidance of a military officer in preference to a civilian. If a soldier were no longer appointed to the post, his place must be taken by a civilian—a conclusion which was clearly foreseen by Lord Lytton, the only Viceroy who has advocated the abolition of the Military Member. When, therefore, Lord Kitchener proposes to destroy the latter without even substituting a civilian in his place, his proposal is in reality one not to disestablish an individual or even a department, but to subvert the military authority of the Government of India as a whole, and to substitute for it a military autocracy in the person of the Commander-in-Chief.

"That such will be the result is, I think, abundantly clear. Lord Kitchener explains that he would transfer to the Commander-in-Chief the whole of the services (transport, remounts, food, clothing, armaments and munitions of

war) now under the Military Member. In paragraphs 27 to 30 he sketches in outline his new scheme of administration. The Military Department has now entirely disappeared, and there stands forth as supreme head of the substituted organization the "Commander-in-Chief and War Member of Council." Every branch of the service and every military department of the Government will be subordinate to him: every officer will look to him alone for orders, for prospects, and for promotion. The Advisory Council who are to co-operate with him will be a Council, not of colleagues or equals, but of subordinates. The Commander-in-Chief will not only be the source of all initiative but the sole instrument of execution. No curb of any sort will exist upon his authority except such as is supplied by the check in financial matters of the Financial Department, and the final authority, in cases requiring Government sanction, of the Government of India; and these ostensible safeguards will be of little avail, since the Government will be left without the expert assistance and advice which are essential to render them effective."

Again, while accepting the necessity for continuing the office of Commander-in-Chief and his seat in Council, Lord Curzon's experience had shown him that the Commander-in-Chief should not be the sole military adviser of Government.

"Nevertheless, I hold not less strongly that the Commander-in-Chief ought not to be the sole Military Member of Council, or the sole military adviser of Government. Lord Kitchener has more than once employed in his minute an analogy that appears to me to be misleading and to rest upon a misunderstanding of the essential difference between civil and military affairs. He asks why it is not thought necessary to have a dual control in our civil administration. The answer is that the control is already multiple. But it is quite easy to explain why a single military head, if he were to propose such measures, would be more difficult to control and would constitute a greater danger than a single civilian. The reason is that discipline in the Military branch of the service is interpreted in a wholly different sense from discipline in the Civil branch. In both cases it means loyal obedience to orders; but in the former it means also, in a peculiar degree, the subordination of private judgment to higher authority. The present system provides an opportunity for hearing two sides of a case; and military questions, like others, are capable of having two sides, particularly in instances where a Commander-in-Chief may not happen to possess Indian experience, and where it is of supreme importance that the point of view of Indian tradition and practice should receive becoming attention. I am far from saying that under the organization proposed by the Commander-in-Chief these would be intentionally ignored. But I do say, that their chance of full consideration would be dangerously weakened, that criticism would be stifled and subdued, that what the Commander-in-Chief thought would be what the entire military organization would tend to think, and that the Government of India, deprived of the opportunity of hearing the different aspects of a case—for by the time that it reached them all dissent would have been eliminated—would be in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief in a sense absolutely impossible in the case of the civil administration.

"This is indeed, in my view, the greatest danger of the proposed change. It may at first sight seem paradoxical to contend that one Military Member

in Council would be more powerful than two, and yet unquestionably this would be the case. For military affairs are so largely a matter of expert knowledge, and civilians are as a rule so loth to offer an opinion upon them, that the proposals of the Commander-in-Chief when submitted to them could hardly be contested except by the assumption of a knowledge or authority which they would be the last to claim. Upon the Viceroy would in practice be thrown the entire brunt of accepting or rejecting the proposals of his principal colleague. If he sided with the Commander-in-Chief the matter would in all probability be carried. If he opposed him opportunity for undesirable friction would be introduced. At present, if the military authorities in Council are united, it is scarcely conceivable that the case will be contested on military grounds; and it will be because of political, financial, or administrative considerations that the proposal is rejected, if it be rejected at all. If they disagree, Council has no greater difficulty in pronouncing between them than is felt by any jury that has listened to the opinions of rival experts. In the interests of my successors, no less than of myself, I deprecate a change that would throw upon the Viceroy a responsibility which the head of the Government ought not to be asked to assume. In any case it must immensely aggravate his anxiety and labours. If he were a strong Viceroy, he would incur the risk of finding himself in conflict with his Commander-in-Chief. If he were a weak Viceroy, he would be the tool of the latter, and military considerations would tend to sway the counsels of Government and to dispend revenues of the State. As was clearly foreseen by Lord Dufferin, with whose masterly minute on this subject I am in entire agreement, under any such arrangement "the Viceroy would be without any adviser save the representative of the army who would be more specially interested in pressing proposals involving expenditure or changes in organisation," and "the revenue of the country would be at the mercy of the Commander-in-Chief."

"It would not be difficult for me to name instances within my own experience in which the Viceroy has been saved from what might have been serious mistakes by having a second military adviser, of high rank and authority, to whom to turn. I have known military proposals put forward at Army Head-Quarters which were inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the policy of Government, or with the facts of the situation. A department which is charged with the custody of the records and traditions of Government can issue a warning against any such errors. The chain of subordinate authority proposed by the Commander-in-Chief could not be trusted to offer any such safeguard, since the corresponding officers under the existing system have, in the cases referred to, failed to supply it. Let me take the most ordinary probable illustration. We will suppose that some large scheme emanates from the Commander-in-Chief, upon the policy of which a decision is first required. This will be referred to the Viceroy with the powerful imprimatur of its author. Unless he is himself an expert in the matter, how is the Viceroy to learn that there may be more than one aspect of the case? It will be useless for him to send for any of the subordinate officers in the new Department. They will already have assisted to prepare the scheme, or will feel compelled by a sense of discipline to support it. The Viceroy will be bereft of any independent opinion under this organisation; and the autocracy of the Commander-in-Chief will be unchallenged."

Lord Curzon dwelt upon the drawbacks resulting from the absence of the Commander-in-Chief on tours of inspection, which would not necessarily synchronise with those of the Viceroy; and also upon the dangers which would attend, in time of war, such a system of administration as Lord Kitchener had proposed. In Lord Curzon's opinion, moreover, the combined duties of Commander-in-Chief and Military Member were such that no single man could undertake them. His Excellency's opinion of the Lord Kitchener's scheme of administration was finally stated in these words:—

“With great reluctance therefore, but without hesitation, I am compelled to advise against acceptance of the Commander-in-Chief's proposals. This is the first occasion on matters of the first importance on which I have dissented from him. But larger issues than the authority or views of any individual are at stake. In my view the entire constitution of the Government of India in relation to military matters is involved: and it is our duty to consider the position of Government as a whole as well as of the Military Commander, and of our successors as well as ourselves. With a sufficiency of tact and conciliation I believe that the present system can be worked both efficaciously and harmoniously. Either it or something like it appears to me to be essential to the proper military and political administration of the Indian Empire. Any reasonable reform or readjustment in it we would willingly consider. But no such proposals are before us; and the Commander-in-Chief, in designing his new edifice, is not satisfied until he has completely demolished the old. I cannot recommend that it should be swept away on this single and unsupported indictment, or that there should be substituted for it an organisation which will, in my opinion, be injurious to administrative continuity, and control in time of peace, and will expose us to even graver risks in time of war.”

Despatch No. 36,  
dated 28rd March  
1905, to Secretary of  
State. (Appendix  
No. 40.)

*Views of the Government of India.*—The Government of India then forwarded to the Secretary of State an expression of their matured opinion after consideration of the merits of the case as presented in the minutes. It was first stated that the question at issue was a much larger one than was indicated in the Secretary of State's despatch. From this document it might have been inferred that failure to provide the Indian army with a scheme of mobilisation, equal in scope to that which was in course of execution, might be attributed to a system of dual control. The Council re-affirmed the opinions expressed by the Viceroy and Sir E. Elles regarding the true character of the existing administration, and explained that the failure to provide for mobilisation on the scale recently accepted had been due to the absence of funds. The Government of India maintained that the maximum rate of advance which they could possibly hope for in practice was fully capable of being realised from the existing system, and that it would not be more speedily or effectively realised under any other. Stress was laid on the advantages which the existing organisation afforded for a reasonably close and effective control over military expenditure. Such control would be wanting under the scheme devised by the Commander-in-Chief. As to the smooth progress of mobilisation, they considered that there was no reason why the existing system should fail in this respect. The Government of India expressed their full conviction of the correctness of the arguments advanced by the Viceroy and Hon'ble Military Member, which had their cordial and entire acceptance; and also their complete satisfaction with the explanation offered by the latter in regard to the charges which had been



levelled against the Military Department. The Government of India were also unable to find any serious foundation for the charges which had been brought against the working of the existing system of military administration. They were as much in disagreement with the argument of the Commander-in-Chief in its constitutional aspect as in its mere critical features and regarded his scheme as revolutionary, in that thereby the Governor-General in Council would be deprived of the control of the army, and the Commander-in-Chief would be established as a military dictator. In respect to the crucial question at issue it was said :—

“Is it desirable that the Government of India should possess only a single and supreme military adviser controlling the entire military organisation, or that they should continue, as now, to have a second expert opinion upon matters which in the ordinary course of administration come before them for decision? We feel no hesitation in answering this question. We cannot too strongly express our conviction that the Military Member is an essential element in the Government of India.”

After stating the administrative reasons for this opinion, the despatch proceeded :—

“But there is an aspect of this case which strikes us as even more grave.” Under a system of military autocracy, such as is advocated by Lord Kitchener, the tendency would, in our opinion, be for the head of the Military machine to become less and less in touch with the Civil Government; for even if the Commander-in-Chief were able to cope with his double duties (which seems to us impossible), he would certainly have no time for Civil administration. He would be led insensibly to regard all military questions exclusively and not merely primarily from the military standpoint, and the principle that the army exists for the country, and not the country for the army, would tend to drop into the background. We conceive that in a country like India, where the Military and Civil administrations are so closely interwoven, and where military counsels of perfection require so frequently to be subordinated to civil or political exigencies, this might develop into a source of considerable danger. In fact we can imagine no part of the British Empire where a military despotism would be less desirable or more fraught with possibilities of mischief than here.”

*India Office Committee.*—On receipt of this communication from the Government of India the Secretary of State for India assembled a Committee of seven members presided over by himself to consider the following questions :—

Proceedings of an  
India Office Com-  
mittee of May 1905.  
(Appendix No. 41.)

- (1) Whether it is advisable that army administration in India (subject to the Viceroy in Council) be under two separate heads of departments, (2) whether it is advisable that more than one member having the charge of military business, and speaking as an expert in military matters, should sit on the Viceroy's Council, (3) if either or both of these questions be answered in the negative, then to devise what modifications in the present system should be adopted, and more particularly, (4) if a single member of Council be nevertheless made responsible for army administration whether that member should be the Commander-in-Chief, and (5) whether it is advisable to provide that proposals of the single



member, responsible for army administration, shall be subject to independent military criticism for the benefit of the Viceroy in Council, and if so, how this can best be accomplished ?

The Committee considered that it had been established that in recent years a greater responsibility had been taken by the Military Department, and that the so-called Military Member had tended more and more to become an expert adviser than a civil administrator: also that the difficulties, which from time to time had been apparent between the two departments, though staved off temporarily by the good management of individuals, are incidental to the system and must continually recur under existing conditions. They realised that in questions of principle, the Military Department had endeavoured to meet the proposals of the Commander-in-Chief in a practical and uncontroversial spirit, of which the best evidence was the passing of the Reorganisation scheme within a few months. Considering that the Government of India had adduced strong reasons for believing that the system suggested by Lord Kitchener would be unworkable, the Committee considered two possible courses of action towards reform and readjustment—

- (1) The assumption by the Commander-in-Chief of the duties of Military Member, except those of the Finance and Accounts Department, which would be transferred to the Finance Member of Council.
- (2) The retention of the main duties of supply, military works, remounts and other departmental services, together with the control of the manufacturing departments; under a Member of Council, who would stand, however, in a distinctly different relationship to the Commander-in-Chief from the present Military Member.

Alternative (1) was discountenanced as opposed to all modern principles in regard to armies and impracticable. The Committee inclined to the second proposal, by the adoption of which they hoped to provide machinery to the Commander-in-Chief to be relieved of duties which might be performed by a Civil Department, which would not constitute a check upon him in regard to military matters. They thought that advice might, however, be given by the second Military Member of Council on matters of expenditure and political questions. At the same time the Committee considered it desirable that, in the event of the Commander-in-Chief being an officer of the British Service, the Military Member should be an officer of long Indian experience and administrative capacity, and intimately acquainted with the conditions and idiosyncrasies of the Native Army. Also, in the same contingency, that the majority of the staff of such a Commander-in-Chief should be of the Indian Service. The Committee expressed their opinion regarding the references which had been made to them in the following terms:—

- (1) It is advisable that the strictly military portions of army administration should be under the exclusive control of the Commander-in-Chief, subject only to the Governor-General in Council: but the subsidiary departments which are not of a military character should, in our opinion, be left under the charge of another Member of Council.
- (2) It is not desirable that any Member of Council, except the Commander-in-Chief, should speak as an expert on military problems,

pure and simple, but subject to the conditions laid down in the Sub-Committee's report, we think that there should be another member, having charge of the business, specified in that report and sitting on the Governor-General's Council.

The Committee adopted the recommendation of a Sub-Committee which had been appointed from its members to prepare a scheme of organisation based on these principles.

Despatch No. 66,  
dated 31st May 1905,  
from Secretary of  
State.  
(Appendix No. 42.)

*Decision of His Majesty's Government.*—Its report, dated 26th May 1905, received the approval of His Majesty's Government and was within five days incorporated in a despatch to the Indian Government. After reference to previous discussions and evidences of friction between Army Head-Quarters and the Military Department, the Secretary of State placed on record his conviction that there had been no deliberate opposition to, or delay of the Commander-in-Chief's proposal by, the latter. He took exception, however, to the system of administration by which the proposals of the senior military authority in India were criticised and submitted to Council by officers of junior standing, namely, the Military Member and Secretary of the Military Department. In reply to the assertion of the Government of India that the adoption of Lord Kitchener's scheme of administration would amount to a military autocracy, the Government of India referred to the checks, financial and otherwise, which exist in the Councils of the Governor-General and the Secretary of State for India. Mr. Brodrick stated that His Majesty's Government were forced to the conclusion that, while there were strong reasons against the adoption of the whole of the Commander-in-Chief's proposals, it was necessary to undertake a reform and readjustment of the system of military business in accordance with the principles stated by the Advisory India Office Committee. The decisions of His Majesty's Government were thus expressed :—

"The Commander-in-Chief will be directly responsible to the Governor-General in Council for command, staff, and regimental appointments, promotion, discipline, training, organization, distribution of the army, intelligence, mobilisation, schemes of offence and defence, peace manœuvres, war preparation (excluding supply of matériel) and the conduct of war. As regards the Supply and Transport Department, in which matters of personal and matériel are alike concerned, the arrangement which has recently been made will be adhered to. Such material, ammunition and store as are required for mobilisation will be entrusted to a personnel directly responsible to the Commander-in-Chief."

Paragraph 17 of  
despatch.

"The functions of the Military Department, in charge of another Member of your Council, will be limited to responsibility to Government for the control of army contracts, the purchase of stores, ordnance, and remounts, the management of Military Works, the Clothing and Manufacturing Departments, Indian Medical Service, and Indian Marine. The recent development of the Manufacturing Departments, which will, as Your Excellency informs us, be shortly employing 15,000 to 20,000 skilled artisans, will make a special demand upon the time and administrative ability of the Member in charge."

Paragraph 19 of  
despatch.

"With regard to Military Finance, it has been suggested that it would be very advisable to transfer the departments of the Military Accountant-General and of the Controllers to the Finance Department of Your Excellency's

Government. This, it is urged, while strengthening the financial control of your Government over all military proposals, would diminish the probability of friction between the Commander-in-Chief's Department and the Department of Military Supply, and would give to the latter some useful relief. I request that Your Excellency will consider this proposal in Council, and will favour me with your opinion upon it."

Paragraph 19 of  
despatch.

"When effect is given to these provisions, the work of the present Military Department will be distributed between two departments, one of which, dealing with the subjects specified in paragraph 17, will be known as "The Army Department," and will be in charge of the Commander-in-Chief as Member of Council; while the other, to be called "The Department of Military Supply," will deal with the subjects mentioned in paragraph 18, and will be in charge of another Member of Council; and each of these departments will have its own Secretariat."

Paragraph 20 of  
despatch.

"Apart from the apportionment of duties as indicated above, the procedure to be followed in conducting business between the Army Department and the Military Supply Department is very important, since it appears that the friction, which has occurred of late years, is due to the methods of the Military Department as well as to the principles on which it has worked. The Member in charge of the Military Supply Department should realise that his duties are more of a civil than of a military nature, and that his business is to assist the Commander-in-Chief in his endeavours to render the army in all respects fit for war, within the limits of financial considerations."

Paragraph 23 of  
despatch.

"The Member of Council in charge of the Military Supply Department will specially advise the Governor-General in Council on questions of general policy as distinct from purely military questions, and it will be desirable in the event of the Commander-in-Chief being an officer of the British Service, that the Member should be an officer of considerable Indian experience and of administrative capacity, and intimately acquainted with the characteristics of the Native Army. His functions will be essentially those of a civilian administrator with military knowledge and experience."

"The changes which it is proposed to introduce into his Department will make it necessary to dispense with some of the officials in the Department whose numbers have considerably increased in the last twenty-five years, and to employ officers of a rank not so high as at present, but equal to that of their predecessors in earlier years, while the Secretary should not in future be of higher rank than that of Colonel. Some reduction of staff will also be possible which will go towards meeting the additional cost of the changes which are recommended at Army Head-Quarters, and which I now bring to Your Excellency's attention. I am of opinion, therefore, that it is essential that, under the arrangement proposed, an additional officer of superior rank should be appointed as Chief of the Staff to the Commander-in-Chief."

Paragraph 25 of  
despatch.

"This addition will make it possible in future to lay down that, as vacancies occur, when the Commander-in-Chief is an officer of the British Army, two out of the three chief officers under him—the Chief of the Staff, the Adjutant-General, and the Quartermaster-General—shall be selected from the Indian Army, while, when the Commander-in-Chief is an Indian Army officer, two

out of the three Staff officers may be drawn from the British Army. While it is desirable that the Commander-in-Chief should be the sole expert adviser of the Government on purely military questions, it appears to be of great importance that adequate experience and advice should be ready to his hand at the inception of all his proposals."

On receipt of these instructions the Government of India telegraphed their opinion that the scheme, unless modified in important particulars, would be unworkable in operation, and that it would imperil the control of the Governor-General in Council. It would also impose a heavy burden upon the Viceroy while depriving him of indispensable advice. They considered that the duties of Supply Member could only be properly discharged by a soldier. Further, in regard to the stipulations in paragraphs 23 and 25 of the Secretary of State's despatch the Government of India considered that the Supply Member should be available for official consultation by Viceroy on all military questions without distinction and not only upon questions of general policy or on cases marked for Council. It was stated to be the intention of the Government of India to bring all the cases connected with the Native Army before the Mobilisation Committee for discussion; the rank of Major-General was prescribed for the Secretary, Army Department; and a schedule of cases was to be drawn up which would invariably be submitted to the Viceroy. His Majesty's Government, thereupon, apparently realised the unconstitutional effect of their original instructions concerning the limitations placed on the consultation of the Military Supply Member, and accepted these proposals with the proviso that neither Army and Military Supply Members should have any special claim to be consulted or to note in the proposals of the other.

Telegram to Secretary of State, dated 6th July 1905.  
(Appendix No. 43.)

Telegram from the Secretary of State, dated 14th July 1905.  
(Appendix No. 44.)

The object of this reference regarding the duties of the Military Supply Member was to secure for the Indian administration a second military adviser of Government, with a charge befitting his position and responsibilities: and hence, to ensure not only that the Military Supply Department should be a substantial department of Government, but also that the Member in charge should possess the requisite authority and qualifications. The Government of India had, from the first, strongly insisted upon the necessity for a second competent military adviser. In passing his original orders, the Secretary of State had stated that the Military Supply Member (paragraph 23 of despatch) should advise the Governor-General in Council on questions of general policy as distinct from military questions; and also (paragraph 25) that the Commander-in-Chief should be the sole expert adviser of Government on purely military matters. By accepting the telegraphic proposals of Lord Curzon's Council, His Majesty's Government apparently receded from their original position, since they replied that the Member of the Military Supply Department would advise the Viceroy on any subject, but would have no special claim to be consulted or to note upon the proposals of the Army Department.

Telegram to the Secretary of State, dated 20th July 1905.  
(Appendix No. 45.)

*Resignation of Lord Curzon.*—Since then it was necessary to find an officer who would be qualified to give military advice by reason of his knowledge of military affairs, who would possess not only considerable Indian experience and administrative capacity, but also be intimately acquainted with the characteristics of the Native Army (paragraph 23 of Secretary of State's despatch), His Excellency the Viceroy nominated Major-General Sir E. Barrow for the post. His Majesty's Government, however, declined to accept the nomination, as they considered General Barrow

Telegram of 11th  
August 1905, from  
Secretary of State.  
(Appendix No. 4c.)

unfitted by reason of his military qualifications and the probability of his future military employment. The Secretary of State considered that it would be well to choose a Military Supply Member with technical rather than military experience—thus abandoning the position he had formerly taken up in regard to the necessity for the Military Supply Member to have an intimate knowledge of Native troops and be, therefore, capable of offering sound advice on military matters. This change of front revealed to Lord Curzon the fundamental difference of opinion which existed between His Majesty's Government and himself. As he could not undertake the responsibility of introducing a new system of military organisation which he considered unsuitable and mischievous, Lord Curzon was compelled to ask that he might be relieved of his duties.

Telegram of 10th  
August 1905, to Sec-  
retary of State.  
(Appendix No. 4c.)

*Scheme of administration proposed by Lord Kitchener.*—The telegraphic correspondence which ended in His Majesty's acceptance of Lord Curzon's resignation contained a summary by His Excellency the Viceroy of the system of administration proposed by Lord Kitchener on July 28, 1905, in accordance with his interpretation of the Secretary of State's orders. The Viceroy's summary may be here reproduced :—

- (1) All stores, whether mobilisation or peace, to be transferred to Commander-in-Chief.
- (2) The Director-General of Ordnance and 44 officers, with all arsenals, to be transferred to Commander-in-Chief, leaving Inspector-General of Ordnance, Factories, and 25 officers under Military Supply Department, the whole to be administered by Director-General of Ordnance.
- (3) In Supply and Transport Department, Military Supply Member only to superintend contracts and registration, with 55 officers. Commander-in-Chief to control everything else with 218 officers.
- (4) Army Remount Department to be transferred to Commander-in-Chief, Military Supply Member only to purchase horses with a borrowed officer.
- (5) Existing Staff at Army Head-Quarters to be increased by Chief of Staff, one Brigadier as Director, three Assistant Adjutant-Generals, and three Deputy Assistant Adjutant-Generals.
- (6) Army Department to contain a branch of Financial Department under a new Civilian Financial Secretary to Government with two Assistant Secretaries, the Commander-in-Chief also to have a separate military honorary adviser. Total strength of the finance section, including accounts, nine officers, 63 clerks.
- (7) New Secretary to Government in Army Department to have no functions beyond conducting correspondence with Secretary of State and Local Governments and signing papers.
- (8) Rules of business for Army Department to convert leading Staff Officers of Commander-in-Chief into officers of Government of India, with power to convey orders of Government excepting orders sanctioning expenditure.
- (9) Total strength of Army Department, exclusive of finance section, to be 63 officers and 268 clerks.

(10) Military Supply Department to consist of three officers and 16 clerks, subordinate officers at head-quarters, 13 officers, 76 clerks.

(11) Military Supply Member not to criticise opinions recorded by Commander-in-Chief on military questions.

The Commander-in-Chief contested the accuracy of this description of his scheme, but each statement was substantiated in detail by Lord Curzon in a note of 23rd August 1905, which, together with Lord Kitchener's repudiation, was subsequently published for general information. Published correspondence regarding army administration. (Appendix No. 47.)

No steps were taken to give effect to the new system of administration until Lord Curzon had left the country.

#### INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION.

The army being divided into 9 executive divisional commands with the outlying districts of Burma and Aden, it was necessary to provide a suitable organisation of the staffs for peace administration and the efficient training of the troops for war. It was recognised to be impracticable for financial reasons to organise all brigades in time of peace completely on the same footing as they would assume in time of war with a brigadier and complete brigade staffs. Arrangements have therefore been made for the commands of troops at head-quarter stations and of detached stations, which cannot be conveniently allotted to any brigade, to devolve upon a divisional commander. The army has been organised in the following way :—

#### NORTHERN COMMAND.

*Lieutenant-General Commanding, with Staff.*

Divisions.	Major-Generals Commanding the Divisions, with their head-quarters.	Brigadier-Generals, with their head-quarters.	Colonels on the Staff, with their head-quarters.
First (Peshawar) Division	Peshawar	Khyber Nowshera	Mardan.
Second (Rawalpindi) Division	Rawalpindi	Jhelum Sialkot	Murree Hills.
Third (Lahore) Division	Lahore	Jullundur Umballa	Simla Hills. Ferozepore.

#### WESTERN COMMAND.

*Lieutenant-General Commanding, with Staff.*

Fourth (Quetta) Division	Quetta	Mastung	Quetta. Karachi.
Fifth (Mhow) Division	Mhow	Jhansi. Jubbulpore. Nasirabad.	
Sixth (Poona) Division	Poona	Ahmednagar Bombay	Belgaum.



## EASTERN COMMAND.

*Lieutenant-General Commanding, with Staff.*

Seventh (Meerut) Division	...	Meerut	...	{	Garhwal	...	...	{	Kumaon.
					Bireilly	...	...		
					Fyzabad	...	...		
Eight (Lucknow) Division	...	Lucknow	...	{	Cawnpore	...	...	{	Lucknow.
					Calcutta	...	...		
					Bangalore	...	...		
Ninth (Secunderabad) Division	...	Secunderabad	...	{	Secunderabad	...	...	{	Madras.

Burma Division, commanded by a Lieutenant-General, consists of 2 brigades (Rangoon and Mandalay) commanded by Colonels on the Staff. The Brigadier-General commands the force at Aden and each of the three brigades in the Derajat and Kohat borders.

Military Despatch  
No. 197, dated 26th  
October 1903 to Sec-  
retary of State.

*Revision of India Army Regulations and forms.*—In 1902 the attention of the Government of India was directed to the great number and enormous bulk of the regulations of the Army. These consisted of 33 volumes of regulations (exclusive of departmental and drill handbooks), totalling 6,300 pages, and 17 volumes of Equipment Tables comprising 1,200 pages; or a grand total of 50 volumes of 7,500 pages. It was also found the forms used by the Army had attained the number of 3,200. The duty of revising the books was entrusted to Colonel DeBrath, C.I.E., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, who commencing work on the 1st May 1902, with a staff of selected officers, completed it on the 31st March 1904. The revision, which has been thoroughly successful and satisfactory, has reduced the peace regulations of the Army to 12 volumes of regulations totalling 1,200 pages, and 17 volumes (1,000 pages) of Equipment (redesignated Army) Tables. The forms are now only 1,850 in number. Many abuses were exposed during the investigation of the regulations, and military administration was generally placed on a better footing by enforcing uniformity of rules and practice.

*Army reports and returns.*—The number of army reports and returns furnished by all branches and departments of the service in India were found in 1899 to be excessive. Instructions were issued on Lord Curzon's initiative to Army Head Quarters and heads of departments under the Military Department to appoint specially selected officers or small committees to ascertain what reductions could be effected. This measure resulted in the abolition of a considerable number of reports and returns and the consolidation and amalgamation of others.

## FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION.

*System of budgeting for additional expenditure.*—For some years previous to 1899 authority to expend money on measures accepted in principle by the Government of India, was withheld until the time of closing of the budget,—namely, the middle of February of each year. Then, according to the funds which were available, final sanction was given to the measures of most urgent importance. It was however found in practice that many more measures were provisionally approved than could be financed at the close of each year. As

a result both time and energy were wasted. The schedule system now in force was introduced in 1899. Proposals involving extra expenditure which the Government of India are prepared to accept are listed; when information has been received from the Finance Department as to the total additional amount which will probably be available for the military budgets of the succeeding year, and after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief, the most urgent items are selected by Council for incorporation in the next year's budget. Orders are then issued to all concerned. The schedules are prepared and considered in September and February of each year.

*Administration of the grant for Military Works.*—In 1880 it was decided by the Government of India to apply to the Military Works grant the principle already approved in connection with productive public works, of a fixed annual allotment, in addition to the grant of the unspent balance of the preceding year. The total grant was then fixed at one crore; in subsequent years the amount was increased from time to time. But the want of definition of the scope of the works which the grant was intended to cover; and the unforeseen circumstances which compelled the allotment of additional funds at frequent intervals for special purposes, made it clear that this system of finance was unsuitable.

After a lengthy investigation on matters connected with the administration of the grant for Military Works, a committee was assembled, with General Shone, Director-General of Military Works, as President, to investigate the assignments which would be required annually during a quinquennial period for

- \* Less important new Major Works.
- Minor works.
- Repairs.
- Establishment.
- Tools and Plant.
- Barrack furniture.

the '*ordinary demands*'—being those requirements,\* which would not vary greatly from year to year: and also to define the scope of the works covered by the annual allotment which would be made under this head.

It was the intention of Government to treat all the larger requirements in the way of major works as '*special demands*' and to make an annual assignment on this account according to the actual requirements of the time, and having due regard to general financial conditions. With a few unimportant modifications the report of the committee was accepted. The change in the system of budgeting and the amount of the annual assignment for '*ordinary demands*' (93½ lakhs) were eventually approved by the Secretary of State.

*Simplification of the system of Military Accounts and Audit.*—A committee was assembled in 1902 to investigate the system under which the accounts of the army and its departments were prepared and rendered to the Military Accounts Department. Various measures of simplification and improvement were subsequently adopted, more particularly in connection with Commissariat accounts and contracts, which had for long been in an unsatisfactory condition. Under the new rules executive officers of this department are allowed a greater measure of freedom in arranging contracts; on the other hand their responsibilities are more closely defined.

#### SANITARY ADMINISTRATION.

*Sanitary officers*—Three specially qualified officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps were appointed as sanitary officers in 1898 to investigate the cause

Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 31, dated 1st March 1900.

of disease and to advise on sanitary questions, more particularly those connected with the health of British troops. Two years later their number was increased to four—one in each Command. Further, small laboratories were established at the head-quarters of each district for chemical and microscopical investigation, etc. Subsequently a fifth officer was appointed a sanitary expert at Army Head Quarters.

*Measures adopted for checking venereal disease among the troops in India.*—In consequence of venereal disease among British troops in India having assumed alarming proportions, revised rules under the Cantonments Act (XIII of 1889) were brought into operation in October 1897. By these rules venereal was classed as an infectious and contagious disease, and persons known to be suffering from it were liable to exclusion from cantonments. Penalties were also imposed for concealment of disease. Orders were also issued prohibiting, as far as possible, the employment of women in, or near, the lines of British troops. The annual Government grant-in-aid to the Army Temperance Association was increased. An order was published by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in July 1897 appealing to soldiers to avoid vicious habits and warning them of the deplorable consequences which follow the contraction of venereal disease. A similar memorandum was also published by the War Office in April 1898, for issue to all troops proceeding to India. Instructions were issued providing for the medical inspection of soldiers, and the enforcement of punishment under the Army Act for the concealment of venereal disease. During Lord Curzon's term of office additional measures were taken to prevent disease. Special washing compartments or ablution rooms were provided, as an experimental measure in the first instance, in the lines of British troops at certain selected stations. The measure was subsequently extended to all stations garrisoned by British troops. Seventy cantonment hospitals were re-established at stations where British troops were quartered. These hospitals although they are not specifically allotted to patients suffering from venereal disease, are available for the treatment of venereal patients amongst others. Wherever necessary and possible the new cantonment rules were extended to areas adjoining cantonments.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief (Lord Kitchener) also in July 1904, issued a circular letter to General Officers regarding the necessity for enforcing responsibility for the due observance of rules upon the officers concerned. Lastly, a Medical Officer has been appointed (1905), provisionally for one year, to make special inspections of troops and cantonments with a view to the prevention of contagious diseases. The results of these measures are satisfactory. Venereal disease has largely decreased during the last decade.

As regards native troops, cantonment hospitals have been established at Dharmasala and Abbottabad as an experiment, in order to ascertain the effect the measure may have in reducing the high rates of venereal disease among the native troops at these stations. If the hospitals prove successful the desirability of establishing similar institutions at other stations will be considered.

#### CHANGES AND IMPROVEMENTS IN PAY, TERMS OF SERVICE, ETC.

*Indian service officers.*—The officers of the Imperial service received rapid promotion as a result of the augmentation of establishment which took place during the Boer war. To equalise matters a reduction of two years

was made for officers of the Indian Army in the period of service needed to qualify for promotion to the ranks of Major and Captain. These periods are now 18 and 9 years respectively. Simultaneously with this acceleration it was decided to abolish the system of temporary promotion of officers holding the appointment of second-in-command. The rule requiring 8, 6, and 4 years' service in the Indian army before promotion to the ranks of Lieutenant-Colonel, Major, and Captain was also cancelled.

G. G. O. No. 718 of 1901.

G. G. O. No. 1156 of 1901.

*General Officers' appointments.*—The Royal warrant of 5th November 1900 introduced a system in the Imperial service by which promotion to the rank of Lieutenant-General, and Major-General, except for distinguished service in the field or other exceptional service, would be governed by selection to fill specified appointments. The provisions of this warrant were made applicable to the Indian army in 1903, and the maximum number of General Officers was limited to 3 Generals, 5 Lieutenant-Generals, and 22 Major-Generals. An age limit was imposed on the appointment of officers as Colonel on the staff or to the command of a 2nd class district; special rules were made for promotion to the ranks of Lieutenant-General and General; and for compulsory retirement. The abolition of the Madras Command removed one of the appointments carrying the rank of Lieutenant-General, and in 1905, it was decided to revert to the principle that promotion to this rank should be made by selection to fill a vacancy on an establishment of 5 Lieutenant-Generals, for which officers holding divisional commands should be eligible.

Secretary of State's Despatch No. 78, dated 30th June 1905.

*Special promotion in the Indian Army.*—In 1902 Sir P. Palmer, detailing the disadvantages which result from promotion by length of service only, proposed that promotion in the Indian army should be regulated by a Board, and that brevet promotion should be given annually to a few exceptionally efficient Captains and Majors; whilst the advancement of inefficient officers should be retarded. The principles of this scheme were accepted by the Secretary of State, who referred the matter again to India for further consideration. Lord Kitchener's views comprised the substantive promotion of officers holding regimental appointments, *e.g.*, a squadron or double company commander to Captain, a second-in-command to Major, the commandant of a regiment or certain specified staff appointments to Lieutenant-Colonel. His Excellency proposed to discontinue the military promotion of officers in civil employ: to restrict the period of command of native regiments in the case of inefficient officers; and to give facilities for exchange between officers of the British and Indian services.

Adjutant-General's letter No. 8619-A, dated 29th July 1902.

Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 199, dated 29th October 1903.

In the end the Secretary of State sanctioned the special promotion to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel of Majors who might hold the command of regiments, or certain specified appointments; and also the promotion in each year of 5 Captains and 5 Lieutenants to the next higher rank if they possessed certain qualifications. The retardation of the promotion of inefficient officers was also prescribed. The tenure of regimental commands was limited to five years extensible to 7 years.

Despatch No. 60, dated 22nd April 1904.

*Combined leave.*—A very great boon was conferred upon all officers of the Indian military service by permitting them to take consecutively, and in combination, privilege leave (on full pay) and furlough up to a limit of 8 months. This system had been introduced in the civil service of Government to obviate the necessity of frequent transfers of officials. Previous to this concession an

Army Order of 1st February 1904.

officer was obliged to return to duty at the conclusion of his privilege leave. The change is also to the advantage of the State because it curtails the period that an officer is absent from duty, and generally, ensures his presence with his regiment during the training season.

*Officers' quarters.*—The scale of accommodation to be allowed for officers in Government quarters was revised and greatly improved. The scale now makes allowance for the existence of a certain proportion of married officers in the junior ranks.

#### WARRANT AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF INDIAN DEPARTMENTS.

*Commutation of pensions.*—The privilege of commuting, under certain safe-guards, one-sixth of their pensions was extended in 1901 to departmental officers with honorary rank and warrant officers of the Indian Army Departments; and also to those departmental non-commissioned officers who are granted pensions under Indian Rules.

*Increase of pay.*—The prospects and terms of service of all subordinate officers in departments have been improved. In 1901, the pay of conductors and sub-conductors of the Ordnance Department and Supply and Transport Corps was raised by Rs. 20 and Rs. 15 a month. An increase was also made to the leave pay of Deputy Assistant Commissaries, Conductors and Sub-Conductors of all departments and of Senior Assistant Surgeons; while to all departmental non-commissioned officers was extended in 1903 the concession of privilege leave.

*Increase of pensions.*—The pensions of departmental officers with honorary rank and warrant officers of Indian Army Departments, were enhanced with effect from 1st April 1904.

*Quarters.*—The scale of accommodation for departmental commissioned, warrant and non-commissioned officers, which was fixed in 1861, has been revised, and a more liberal scale has now been adopted.

#### BRITISH SERVICE.

*Officers.*—In 1901 officers of the mounted branches were allowed the concession, previously given to cavalry officers serving at Home and in the colonies only, of the use of a troop horse as a charger on payment of £10 yearly.

#### BRITISH SOLDIERS.

*Increased pay.*—His Majesty's Government sanctioned the following additions to the pay and emoluments of soldiers of the British Army:—

*From 1st April 1902.*—2d. a day to make good the average stoppages on account of kit, washing, hair-cutting, etc.

*From 1st April 1904.*—Further daily increases of pay styled "service pay" @ 4d., 5d., 6d. or 7d. to efficient soldiers according to a special classification laid down for this purpose.

Telegram from Secretary of State, dated 27th February 1902.

(Appendix No. 49.)

Telegram to Secretary of State, dated 8th March 1902.

(Appendix No. 50.)

Military Despatch No. 107, dated 1st August 1902, from Secretary of State.

(Appendix No. 51.)

Military despatch No. 212, dated 30th October 1902, to Secretary of State.

(Appendix No. 48.)

The Government of India entered a strong protest against the extra cost involved in the proposal, which, for India, was estimated at £226,000 per

annum during 1902-03 and 1903-04, and of £786,000 in the following year, being wholly borne by Indian Revenues. The matter was finally referred to an arbitrator, the Lord Chief Justice of England, who decided that India was liable for the whole cost of the extra pay to men on the Indian establishment.

*Married men's quarters.*—The scale of accommodation allowed to the married non-commissioned officers and men of regimental units has undergone revision in 1905, and has been enlarged.

#### ROYAL ENGINEERS.

*Officers.*—With the concurrence of the War Office it was decided to abolish the system of election for continuous service for Royal Engineer Officers in India which had been in force for nearly 20 years, and which failed to secure the prolongation of the officers' service in this country which it was designed to effect. The majority of the officers of the corps declined to bind themselves at an early stage in their career to serve continuously in India. The new terms of service allow of reversion, with due notice, to the Imperial Establishment at any time after completion of a tour of service; but also provide for increased pension, based on Indian Army rates, after an officer has to his credit 20 years' qualifying service in this country.

Secretary of State's  
despatch No. 12-C,  
dated 8th October  
1903.

*Men.*—The terms of service and pay of the Royal Engineer men of the Indian Submarine Mining Corps were revised in 1903, and were assimilated to those of men serving in companies in the colonies.

#### VOLUNTEERS.

*Additional allowances.*—To increase the popularity and improve the efficiency of the Volunteer Forces in India, an annual allotment of Rs. 1,02,800 was sanctioned in 1901 to meet the cost of the following measures:—(a) Proficiency allowance to officers. (b) Allowance for officers passing the prescribed examination in tactics. (c) Increased allowance of free ammunition. (d) Assistance towards the construction of rifle ranges. (e) Band allowance to corps between 250 and 300 strong at Rs. 100 per mensem. (f) Prizes for rifle shooting to non-railway corps on the same conditions as prescribed for railway corps. (g) Special allowance of Rs. 25 per mensem to Sergeant Instructors in Assam.

*Officers.*—An outfit allowance of Rs. 100 was sanctioned in 1899 to each officer gazetted to a commission in the Volunteers, who might serve for three years.

#### NATIVE ARMY.

*Labour in the construction of lines.*—For many years it had been recognised in regard to the lines of Native Infantry regiments that the sepoy was the owner of his hut and responsible for his own shelter, towards which the State made a small grant; but for which it accepted no further liability. As, however, a better and more sanitary type of lines became a necessity, this principle was gradually abandoned, and the State assisted the reconstruction of the old and inferior type of lines by means of special grants. The construction of lines of modern pattern demands the employment of skilled labour, which the sepoy is not qualified to supply. His assistance is accordingly limited to the making of bricks, and the carriage of materials. This duty was most unpopular amongst the men. In view of the high standard of modern military



training it was held undesirable to employ the men of the native army upon work of this nature, and it was therefore decided that the labour of the sepoy in connection with the construction of lines should be confined to levelling the site; and, in the case of reconstruction, to demolishing the old lines.

Desp. No. 102, dated 29th Sept. 1902, to Secretary of State.  
Q. M. G.'s letter No. 1254 B. dated 23rd June 1904.

The wisdom of this decision was questioned by Lord Kitchener who proposed that troops should be taught to undertake skilled work and in time become capable of the entire work of construction, including carpenters' and blacksmiths' work. This proposal was negatived by the Government of India. Eventually it was settled that troops might be given a certain amount of instruction in the principles of the construction of huts.

*Clothing of the Native Army.*—A scheme of great importance to the Native Army has been introduced in the current year by which, instead of being supplied in addition to kit money on enrolment, with a free issue of full dress clothing at intervals, with half mounting allowance at Rs. 5 *per mensem*, and with compensation on certain other accounts, a native soldier will receive on enrolment and quarterly henceforward, allowances equivalent to the value of the clothing and payments formerly issued to him. By the operation of the scheme a careful man will save money from his allowances, or at any rate will purchase the clothes he actually requires; on the other hand the State will not expend money on issues of full dress uniform which were frequently not really necessary.

#### NATIVE OFFICERS.

G. G. O. No. 1, 1st Jan'y. 1903.

*Honorary rank on retirement to native officers.*—Sanction was accorded in 1903 to the grant of the honorary rank of Captain to all Risaldar-Majors and Subadar-Majors in possession of the 1st. Class Order of British India; and that of Lieutenant on all other native officers in possession of a similar decoration.

In accordance with the wish of His Majesty the King, six selected native officers of the Indian army were sent to England in 1903 for duty as His Majesty's orderlies. In the following year the number was reduced to four, and the period of their retention in England was curtailed to three months.

#### DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY. ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

Desp. from the Secy. of State, No. 27, dated 13th Feb. 1903, clause 28, I. A. C., dated 1st Apl. 1903.

*Selection for continuous Indian Service.*—In 1904 the establishment of continuous service officers in the Ordnance Department was reconstituted. Twenty-five specified senior appointments are reserved for officers who have elected for continuous service, and officers filling them may be selected for continuous service. The incumbents of junior proof and factory appointments, and officers in the lower grades may, to the number of 15 be eligible for selection for continuous service, if they have served 10 years in the Ordnance Department.

Desp. from the Secy. of State, No. 27, dated 13th Feb. 1903, clause 28, I. A. C., dated 1st Apl. 1903.

*Increase of pay.*—To improve their position the staff salary of the three ordnance officers, 1st Class, was increased from Rs. 500 to Rs. 600 per month; that of the lowest class of ordnance officers from Rs. 200 to Rs. 250 a month; and the staff salary of superintendents of factories was raised from Rs. 600 to Rs. 700 a month after 5 years' service as such, with a further increase to Rs. 800 a month after 10 years' service in that position. These measures were adopted in 1903.

Desp. from the Secy. of State, No. 90, dated 9th Aug 1901, clause 185, I. A. C., dated 1st Dec. 1901.

The European civilian employés of the Ordnance Department were classified in grades in 1901 for the purposes of pay and allowances.

The establishment of departmental warrant and non-commissioned officers in arsenals, was increased in 1903 by 45 in order to provide for leave and other vacancies; as well as to meet requirements for field service. The expenditure involved was Rs. 3,11,666 initial and Rs. 97,272 recurring.

Desp. from the Secy. of State, No. 27, dated 18th Feb 1903, clause 28. I. A. C., d. 1st Apl. 1903.

In order to secure a better class of men, the pay of first and second class stores lascars of the Ordnance Department in India was increased by one rupee a month.

M. D. No. 2753-D, dated May 1900.

#### SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT CORPS.

Owing to the growing unpopularity of service in the late Commissariat Transport Department, as evinced by the deficiency of officers, various measures were adopted with a view to attract candidates. The designation of the department was changed to that of Supply and Transport Corps, and a distinctive uniform for the officers was prescribed. A system was introduced by which promotion was made from grade to grade after a certain specified period of service in each grade, instead of on the occurrence of vacancies. Additional administrative appointments were created, such as those of Deputy Director-General for Supply, and Deputy Inspector-General, Supply and Transport, in each Command on Rs. 1,800 a month; while the pay of Inspectors-General, Supply and Transport, Deputy Director-General for Transport and Administrative Supply and Transport in Burma was increased. The staff pay of officers in the lowest grade was raised from Rs. 200 to Rs. 250 a month, and certain alterations were also made in the rules regarding the admission, promotion, etc., of officers. The corps has been thrown open to officers of the British service, including those of the Army Service Corps, under the same conditions, as regards admission, position, pay, promotion, etc., as apply to officers of the Indian Army.

Despes. from the Secy of State, No. 59, dated 10th May 1900, and No. 55, dated 17th May 1901.

I. A. C., clause 5 of 1900.

Despatch to Secy. of State, No. 169, dated 24th October 1901 (Appendix No. 52).

Desp. from the Secy. of State, No. 25 dated 14th Feb. 1902.

M. D. No. 253-E, dated 7th July 1906.

#### MEDICAL SERVICES.

The pay of Lieutenant-Colonels of the Royal Army Medical Corps and of officers below the rank of Major has been increased and a charge allowance varying from Rs. 60 to Rs. 240 a month according to the number of beds has been authorised for officers in charge of station hospitals. A similar increase has been made in the pay of officers of the Indian Medical Service in military employ, together with certain concessions regarding promotions, retirement, etc.

I. A. C., clause 61 of 1903.

G. G. O. No. 104 of 1903.  
G. G. O. No. 33 of 1905.

Specialist pay at Rs. 60 a month has been sanctioned for 55 officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps and 50 Indian Medical Service officers in military employ, below the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, performing duties connected with special sanitary or medical work.

Desp. to Secy of State, No. 67, dated 22nd June 1905.

Provision has been made for the grant of study leave, which is to count as service for promotion and pension, to officers of the Indian Medical Service. The duration will not exceed 12 months during an officer's service.

Desp. from Secy. of State, No. 23, dated 8rd March 1905.

*Military Assistant Surgeons.*—The conditions of service of Military Assistant Surgeons has been improved by the abolition of the grade carrying Rs. 60 monthly pay and the classification of the appointments into four grades on Rs. 85, Rs. 110, Rs. 150 and Rs. 200 a month, respectively. Promotions from grade to grade are now regulated by fixed periods of service, instead of on the occurrence of vacancies. The rates of pay during leave out of India have been revised.

G. G. O. No. 514, dated 12th May 1899.

G. G. O. No. 678,  
dated 6th July 1901

*Military Hospital Assistants.*—Hospital Assistants have benefited from the following measures, which were authorised in 1900 :—(a) The division of the grade of senior hospital assistants into two classes, the first carrying the relative rank of subadar with a salary of Rs. 110, and the second the relative rank of jemadar on Rs. 80 a month. (b) The grant to other hospital assistants of native warrant rank. (c) The improvement of barrack accommodation of senior hospital assistants and hospital assistants, 1st class. (d) Certain other concessions in the matter of pension, clothing, passage, etc., were also recommended to the Secretary of State in 1905.

Desp. from Secy.  
of State, No 80, dated  
16th May 1902, para.  
10.

I. A. C., clause 58  
of 1903.  
I. A. C., clause 69  
of 1902.

The war reserve of military hospital assistants has been increased from 15 to 25 per cent. of the sanctioned appointment.

*Army Hospital Corps.*—Improvements were made in the conditions of service of the Army Hospital Corps, which is organised for menial duties in hospitals for British troops. The personnel of the corps was also increased from 2,799 to 3,410 men.

## CHAPTER IX.

## Details of measures taken to facilitate Mobilisation.

In rendering an account of the action which has been taken in Lord Curzon's time to improve and facilitate mobilisation and concentration by the improvement of military communications throughout the country, it will be convenient, after a description of general measures, to recount, firstly, work on roads, railways, and the defended pivots of these communications, which has been done in each region of strategic importance on the North-West Frontier from Chitral to Baluchistan; secondly, that on our North and East Frontiers from Tibet to the Mekong, and thirdly, the measures by which the safety of our main inland communications has been secured.

MEASURES RELATING TO COMMUNICATIONS CONNECTED WITH EXTERNAL  
DEFENCE AND FRONTIER CONTROL.

*Gauge of military railways.*—The battle of the gauges has raged in India for many years, and in 1890 it was proposed that future extensions of main lines of railways should be of the standard (5' 6") gauge, the employment of the metre gauge being confined to the country occupied by railways of this type. Lord Cross expressed concurrence in this opinion but declined to lay down any rule in respect to feeder lines. The necessity for proceeding on a uniform system with a view to the provision of stock on emergency for military lines was, however, recognised. In accordance with the views of a Railway Conference of 1897 the Government of India recommended the adoption of the 2' 0" gauge for military and hill railways. In the following year the Secretary of State communicated the opinion of the War Office in favour of the 2' 6" gauge, which had been adopted in the Imperial military service, and which was also preferred by the military authorities in India, since it would not be possible to transport guns and animals on a railway of lesser dimension. The construction of a railway from Nowshera to Dargai was then under consideration, and following the decision made in respect to this line, and having regard to the reasons already enumerated, the Government of India decided that 2' 6" gauge should be the general gauge for all military railways on the frontier.

Despatch No. 121-  
Railway of 11th No-  
vember 1897.

Order in Council,  
dated 3rd March  
1899.

To this decision Lord Kitchener has taken exception on account of the small carrying capacity of this type of railway. He has urged that all future railways on the frontier, made in time of peace, shall be of the 5' 6" gauge, and that the smaller gauges shall only be employed, during the progress of a campaign, for linking advanced positions with the main railways.

## STORAGE OF MILITARY RAILWAY PLANT.

Consequent on the decision of 1899 the Government of India demanded on indent the supply as mobilisation stores of plant of the Decauville type for 50 miles of 2' 6" railways. As there was some difference of opinion regarding the details of the plant, the question was referred to India before complying with the indent. A joint committee of military officers and railway engineers having been consulted, the Government of India ordered 50 miles of light railway material 2' 6" gauge, together with a proportion of rolling stock and some accessories—4 traction engines to assist in railway construction, and ten 6" cables for spanning ravines. Subsequently 90 miles of track was obtained in 1901 on the recommendation of a second and similar Committee which had been assembled to advise on the material and working of light military railways. Their

Despatch No. 97,  
dated 18th May 1899.

Quartermaster-  
General's letter No.  
1337-V., dated 17th  
June 1908.

further recommendation to purchase rolling stock to complete a sufficient reserve for the transport of 400 tons of stores over 100 miles of railway was only partially complied with, because in June 1903 Lord Kitchener advised no further purchase of material of this character. The materials actually provided consisted of 140 miles of track (4 sleepers to the 12-foot rail), 20 tank locomotives, 240 3-ton trucks, besides 150 of a smaller pattern for use on construction work, 22 brake-vans, 4 traction engines and 10 cable ways. The cost of the stock was about 4 lakhs. The material has been stored at Quetta (15 miles), Peshawar (60 miles), Thal (40 miles), while the balance (25 miles) has been distributed between the corps of Sapper and Miners for instructional equipment. The rolling stock has been proportionately divided in storage, except that all the locomotives are stored at Rawalpindi.

#### MOBILISATION CAMPS.

The opening of the Southern Punjab railway necessitated an alteration in the scheme of mobilisation and the formation of large new mobilisation camps at Samasata and Bhatinda. It was also necessary to provide for additional platforms, sidings, sanitary furniture, and water-supply at the other places where troops would be halted, on their way to the frontier—namely, at Umballa, Rawalpindi, Mian Mir, Quetta, Sibi and Sukkur. Further, the Commander-in-Chief represented the need for tramway material in the advanced camps at Chaman and Kachagarhi (Peshawar). This material was purchased in 1901, and by two years later all the mobilisation requirements included in the original scheme had been fully met. A very large mobilisation camp was established at Chaman previous to Lord Curzon's arrival, and subsequently was furnished with an important system of water-supply. Six crossing stations will be constructed in the current year between Ruk and Sibi, at a cost of 2 lakhs, to facilitate mobilisation. After a discussion lasting for 5 years, regarding the necessity for increasing the rolling stock of the North-Western Railway to provide for the contingency of a simultaneous mobilisation at Peshawar and Quetta, it has been decided to rely on the Emergency Bill\* which will be passed when necessary. This measure will place the rolling stock of all railways in India at the absolute disposal of the Government of India.

#### CHITRAL.

*Communications with Chitral.*—The maintenance of effective communication with our outpost garrisons in Chitral and Kila Drosh has frequently occasioned anxiety. As already stated in Chapter IV it was decided to concentrate the Chitral garrison at Kila Drosh, with the exception of 1½ (later 2) companies who were required as escort to the Political Officer at Chitral Fort. The Kila Drosh fort was re-constructed in an inexpensive manner during 1899-1900 at a cost of Rs. 2,67,000, the original estimate being largely reduced. The road between Chitral and Gilgit was improved in 1899-1900 by work at the 'paris' at a cost of Rs. 75,000, and three years later the stations were connected by a telegraph line, thus establishing communication with the Indian telegraph system.

On the south side the road over the Lowarai pass between Kila Drosh and Chakdara has been kept in good order in accordance with an arrangement made with the local levies; the camping-grounds have been improved, and one minor bridge has been replaced. The Chakdara temporary suspension bridge which was constructed in 1895 at the time of the Chitral Expedition as a field-work, and which fulfilled its purpose admirably, has now been replaced by a

\* Vide Part II, Chapter XIII.

steel girder bridge capable of carrying light railway traffic. This work was commenced by the Military Works Services in 1901 and finished two years later at a cost of about  $4\frac{1}{2}$  lakhs, when it was opened, formally, for traffic by His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught, and named the Connaught Bridge. The road between the river and the Malakand has also been improved.

The passage over the Swat river has been secured by the improvement of the Chakdara fort, and the construction of two strong blockhouses in its vicinity which were completed in 1899. In the following year the revision of the works on the Malakand Kotal was accomplished. In both cases the defences are amply strong. Accommodation was also provided in 1899-1901 at the Malakand, in permanent barracks, for one complete battalion of Native Infantry inside the fortified enclosure.

*Nowshera-Dargai railway.*—Considerable difficulties had been experienced in reinforcing the Malakand on the occasion of the attack in the hot weather of 1897. Accordingly the first railway to be undertaken after the settlement of the disturbances on the North-West Frontier was that between Nowshera and Dargai at the foot of the Malakand Pass. The work was commenced in the summer of 1899, and completed at the end of 1900. It was decided that the gauge should be 2' 6"—that chosen for all military and hill lines in India for which the standard gauge would not be suitable; but the rails were comparatively heavy for a railway of this class, namely, 35 lbs. to the yard.

It was not originally contemplated that the river should be bridged, but shortly after the opening of the line it was decided to construct a bridge suitable for a broad gauge railway, and decked for the passage of troops and military carriages. This work was completed in October 1902. In connection with the provision of additional sidings and platforms at Nowshera station, which were considered to be necessary for the transhipment of military stores, a question arose in 1904 regarding the desirability of converting the line to standard gauge, but it was decided not to do so.

*Dargai Fort.*—The safety of the terminus of the line at Dargai was assured by the construction in 1901-02 of a fortified serai, at the cost of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  lakhs, which was designed to protect the railway station and provide shelter for transport and convoys proceeding to the Malakand.

*Khyber Railway.*—The need for a railway in the vicinity of the Khyber has always been recognised. In 1879, at the conclusion of the Afghan war, a survey for a metre gauge railway from Peshawar to Jellalabad was made by Mr. (afterwards Sir G.) Molesworth. His survey was limited to the Khyber valley, and he was prevented, by political and military considerations from examining the Kabul river or Loi Shilman routes. An alternative route to Kabul by the Kurram valley was then investigated, but the project was abandoned at a later date to be revived in 1890, when, on Lord Roberts' advice, a survey for a broad gauge line along the Kabul River route was made by Captain Macdonald, R.E., who had surveyed in the previous year the alignment for a road to Landi Kotal through the same country. The only result of this survey was the collection at Peshawar of permanent-way materials for the first section of the line from Peshawar to Ursak on the bank of the Kabul river opposite Michnai, whence Captain Macdonald's trace followed the course of the river closely until



reaching Dakka. It was decided in 1892 that the project should be held in abeyance for an indefinite period.

Foreign Department  
Despatch No. 95,  
dated 22nd June  
1898.

In 1898 the Khyber was again re-occupied by regular troops after temporary abandonment at the commencement of the Tirah campaign. Captain Craster, R.E., was ordered to make a survey of the Khyber Pass to ascertain whether a standard gauge line would be practicable, and also to determine the best alignment for a light line. As a result of this survey the Secretary of State, on the advice of the Government of India, agreed to the construction of a road-bed for a light railway of 2' 6" gauge up the Khyber. No action was, however, taken because the political and military problems involved in the future administration of the district were then under settlement.

Note of 30th Jan-  
uary 1899.

Matters were in this condition when Lord Curzon arrived—and on his initiation it was decided to defer the construction of a light railway up the Khyber, and to await the result of a reference to the Amir regarding the construction of a broad gauge line along the Kabul river. The reasons which prompted this action are briefly these:—the ultimate objective of a railway would be Jallalabad, and perhaps Kabul, and accordingly it should be a constituent part of the Indian system, similar in gauge, rolling-stock and equipment, and capable of transporting large quantities of stores and troops from the Indian base to an advanced position in Afghanistan. A line of this character could not be constructed in the Khyber; and in any case it would be a disadvantage to carry a railway to the level of Landi Kotal only to encounter the fall from thence to Dakka. The plea in favour of the construction of a light line as subsidiary means of communication pending the completion of a broad gauge railway was rejected because it would prove too valuable a hostage in the hands of the Afridis, who would also be incensed at the permanent occupation of their lands; and also because the existence of a light railroad to Landi Kotal would not materially alter the conditions of transport if an advance were made in force into Afghanistan.

Foreign Department  
Despatch No. 141,  
dated 20th July 1899,  
(Appendix No. 58).

The reply of the Amir was unfavourable to any extension of the railway into Afghanistan; and as it was not possible to find a suitable terminus within British territory, the construction of the Kabul river railway was held in abeyance. In communicating their decision to the Secretary of State the Government of India said that, in case of need, a light line would be constructed up or parallel to the Khyber, after the commencement of a campaign; it would not be designed for the immediate purposes of an advance, but only for the supply of stores to troops at the front. It was, however, decided to extend the railway from Peshawar to Jamrud and this short length of line was completed in July 1900 without difficulty or opposition on the part of the Afridis.

Report of 18th  
September 1902.

The matter rested here until the report of the Light Military Railway Committee regarding the storage of railway material again drew attention to the need for more definite arrangements for providing a railway communication on the Khyber route. The Committee stated that they would not recommend the storage of any matériel for a Khyber line because of the impossibility of making a road-bed in a reasonable time after the commencement of a campaign. Some doubt was felt as to the accuracy of the Committee's conclusions, and accordingly the opportunity was taken of a visit made by the Political Agent

Khyber (Major Roos-Keppel) to the Mullagori country in October 1902 to send experts (Colonel Macdonald, Major Walton, and Major Dundee of the Royal Engineers), to report fully upon the constructions of roads and railways in the vicinity of the Khyber. Their report confirmed the statement made by the Light Military Railway Committee, that it would be impracticable to construct a light railway up the Khyber after mobilisation and showed the urgent need for early improvement of our communications. After consulting Lord Kitchener, who had visited the country to be traversed, the Government of India decided to continue with the scheme for the construction of a broad gauge line towards Dakka, following the alignment originally selected by Captain Macdonald up to Kam Shilman, and probably diverging thence to the Loi Shilman valley and Shilman Gakhe Pass instead of following the route by the river bank, which would be subject to interruption by the tribes. Action was however, postponed pending the definition of the frontier which might result in the acquisition of a suitable terminus near Smatzai. A detailed reconnaissance of the further section (Kam Shilman—Shilman Gakhe) was still necessary, and this when carried out between July and October 1904, proved the practicability of a railway on this alignment. The commencement of work was, however, again postponed pending the result of the negotiations by Mr. Dane's Mission at Kabul, by which it was hoped to obtain from the Amir land either at Dakka or at Kam Dakka for a satisfactory terminus.

Although no definite arrangement for a terminus was made with the Amir, he raised no objection to the construction of a railway, except in the immediate vicinity of undemarcated frontier. Consequently the Government of India recommended to the Secretary of State the commencement in September 1905 of the construction of a broad gauge line from Peshawar to the head of the Shilman Gakhe Pass, leaving the further section involving the descent to the Dakka plain for consideration in the light of future relations with Afghanistan. The Home Government, however questioned the desirability of the Loi Shilman-Khula-Shilman Gakhe Pass alignment as compared with that of the Kabul River route, and accorded sanction to the construction only of the portion of the railway which is common to both routes, namely, the section between Peshawar and Loi Shilman Khula. The alignment to be followed for the rest of the route is still under discussion.

Foreign Department telegram to Secretary of State, dated 9th June 1905.

*Roads in the Khyber.*—The improvement of the road communications in the Khyber has also received much consideration. It was decided in February 1902, with the approval of the Secretary of State, to make a camel road, serviceable for cart traffic through the Mullagori country, north of the Khyber Pass when circumstances became favourable. The urgent necessity for a second road was also clearly shown in the proceedings of Colonel Macdonald's Committee. Orders to commence the work on the section between Landi Kotal and Kam Shilman were issued in the following October, and after some hesitation regarding the alignment of the lower portion of the road, whether by the Dabbar Kotal or the track of the projected railway on the bank of the Kabul river, it was decided to adopt the former route to the Peshawar plain at Shahgai. The road as first constructed was an 8-foot camel road, made at a cost of Rs. 1,03,000, and completed by the summer of 1903. In the following winter the road was widened to 16 feet, and provided with metalling 12 feet wide, the total expenditure being about Rs. 4 lakhs. In March 1905 the Government of India on the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief agreed to the construction of a branch on the same specification as the Mullagori road from the

Secretary of State's despatch No. 6 (Foreign), dated 28th February 1903.

Foreign Department Despatch No. 147, dated 11th August 1904, to Secretary of State.

Quartermaster General's letter No. 545-C, dated 11th February 1905.

upper portion of the Kam Shilman valley to near the frontier at Shilman Gakhe, and also the metalling and duplication of portions of the Khyber road, whenever necessary, for the passage of heavy traffic. Funds have been provided in the current year for a commencement of the latter work which, when completed, will cost nearly 2 lakhs.

*Khyber defences.*—The security of the Khyber route has been assured by the re-modelment of the Landi Kotal Serai and the construction of block houses in its vicinity. The defences of Ali Musjid have also been improved, and six picquet posts have been constructed in the Pass. These works were completed before the withdrawal of the regular troops in the spring of 1900, at a cost of Rs 3½ lakhs.

#### KOHAT PESHAWAR ROAD.

For many years communication between Kohat and Peshawar had been open by agreement with the Adam Khel Afridis who live in the vicinity of the Kohat pass; but the track was most indifferent and was scarcely passable for wheeled traffic. The necessity for a better road became very apparent during the Tirah Campaign of 1897-98. Two alternative routes were suggested, and that *viâ* the Kohat Kotal was adopted as being the shorter and cheaper. The existing track from Peshawar to Aimal Chabutra, midway between the former place and Kohat, required little more than metalling to render it a good cart road, and for this purpose Rs. 50,000 were allotted from Provincial funds in February 1900. Lord Curzon considered the original estimate of Rs. 4,85,000 for the rest of the project to be excessive, and after a reference to the military authorities, it was decided to adopt a more economical type of road permitting of the passage of military vehicles but suited to the actual requirements of the case, and metalled only where absolutely necessary. A revised estimate of Rs. 2,46,506 was accepted by Government in October 1900, and the work was entrusted to the Punjab Public Works Department, who carried it out most satisfactorily and with such expedition that the road was opened for traffic in August 1901. It has since been a well-used means of communication between the cities of Peshawar and Kohat.

#### MIRANZAI KURRAM VALLEY.

*Kushalgarh-Kohat-Thal railway.*—After the tour made by Lord Curzon on the frontier in the spring of 1900 measures were taken to proceed with the light military railway, 2' 6" gauge, which was intended to take the place of the large cantonment in the Miranzai valley as a means of support to the outposts in the Kurram Valley and on the Samana range. Some discussion occurred regarding the method of construction of the line, and eventually it was settled that the whole length—Kushalgarh to Thal—should be taken in hand simultaneously under the direction of the Public Works Department, military labour being employed as far as possible. The project was approved by the Secretary of State in March 1901, and referring to the decision of the Government of India to construct the section between Kushalgarh and Kohat on a road bed, which would permit of the eventual laying of a standard gauge track, he emphasised the great military advantages which would result from a permanent bridge at Kushalgarh and the conversion for the whole line into broad gauge railway.

Two Pioneer regiments and four companies of Sappers and Miners were brought to the site in January 1901; and a company of Imperial Service Sappers and Miners (Sirmur) was added later to the force. The objections raised by the

*Vide Chapter II,*  
page 60.

Despatch No. 25  
Railway, dated 22nd  
March 1901.

military medical authorities to the retention of the men below Kohat during the hot months led to some dislocation of work; and there was a considerable amount of friction between the Civil Railway Engineer and the troops in regard to the rates paid for labour. The work was, however, satisfactorily accomplished, and the troops gained experience not only in earth-work and blasting but also in plate-laying. The Kushalgarh-Kohat section was opened for traffic in May 1902, and the troops were all withdrawn by this date.

The extension to Thal was completed 10 months later, and this was no sooner accomplished than the necessity for a permanent bridge over the Indus, and the conversion of the Kushalgarh-Kohat section to standard gauge, came again before the notice of Government. Funds being available, these measures were sanctioned by the Secretary of State. The construction of the Kushalgarh bridge is now in progress: the conversion of the permanent way will be undertaken when the bridge is approaching completion.

Despatch No. 48  
(Railway), dated 9th  
July 1903.

*Extension of the railway to Kurram.*—In February 1904, His Excellency Lord Kitchener submitted his scheme for the reorganisation of the army. Among the works which he considered essential for the effective concentration of the army on the frontier of Afghanistan were the conversion of the Kohat-Thal railway to standard gauge, and the extension of this line through Parachinar in the Kurram Valley to the foot of the Peiwar Kotal. In making this recommendation regard was paid more to the rapid movement of troops on Kabul than to the reasons which originally led to the construction of a railway to Thal, namely, the support of the outposts in the Kurram and on the Samana. It was evident that the increase in the number of divisions of the field army necessitated the preparation of a greater number of lines of advance. With the sanction of the Secretary of State orders were given for a detailed survey for the conversion of the railway as far as Thal; an extension to Parachinar; and for a reconnaissance to the Peiwar Kotal and Karlachi on the Kurram river. The estimates are now under consideration by the Government of India.

Adjutant-General's  
letter No. 473-  
M-C, dated 17th  
February 1904.

*Defences in the Kurram.*—The defences of Thal fort, which is still in military occupation, have been improved, and the defensive works garrisoned by the Militia at Parachinar and Sadda have been, respectively, strengthened and rebuilt. Other minor posts have been constructed and rendered secure against tribal attack.

#### BANNU-THAL ROAD—IDAK-THAL ROAD.

Much discussion has taken place regarding the construction of a road to link the garrisons of Bannu and Thal. In 1900, the construction of this route formed part of the recommendations of the Mobilisation Committee. Again, in February 1901, the Defence Committee suggested the opening of direct communication with a view to removing the anomaly by which troops moving from Bannu to Thal marched 145 instead of 40 miles; but not as an urgent measure in the general scheme of defence against invasion.

In July of the same year Mr. Merk, Commissioner, Derajat District, recommended the ultimate continuation of the railway from Thal to Idak, a distance of 50 miles at the outside, and the immediate commencement of a camel or cart road connecting those two places. It was generally accepted that the suggestion for a railway was premature, on account of the difficulty in arranging for its protection; moreover, Lord Curzon was not prepared to consider the question of the Thal-Idak road until the railway was open to Thal.

The Military Department also preferred to await the establishment of the Tochi militia on a satisfactory basis, before proceeding with the work, and as Colonel Deane, Agent to the Governor-General, North-Western Frontier Province, concurred, it was decided in 1902 that the matter of the road should stand over. The question remained in abeyance until March 1903, when it was revived in connection with certain proposals for minor posts and communications. Neither the military nor the political advisers of Government were willing to take the responsibility of declaring the road to be essential for military or political reasons, though all parties concerned desired that the road should be made, and the Government of India accepted the necessity for it.

Lord Curzon was prepared to agree to the commencement of work if Colonel Deane were willing to increase the Northern Waziristan Militia, and if the increase would enable us to take over the Idak-Thal road without undue risk. If, however, Colonel Deane did not think that the situation admitted of an increase, then Lord Curzon would be in favour of postponing the making of the road. Meanwhile, His Excellency sanctioned the construction of a Border Military Police post at Gumatti and the opening up of a good track through the Gumatti pass.

The problem, however, was solved in a different way. Tribal *jirgas* connected with the Idak-Thal tract approached Colonel Deane on the subject of opening up the road, and proposed that it should be effected by instituting a system of tribal allowances. They had proved that they were capable of assuring a safe passage to travellers, among whose number was His Excellency Lord Kitchener. Under Colonel Deane's revised scheme the responsibility for the safety, improvement, and upkeep of the road was entrusted to the tribes who in return would receive an annual allowance of Rs. 6,000. Thus neither temporary military occupation, nor an increase to the militia, nor the building of posts would be necessary. The adoption of the same policy was recommended in reference to the Bannu-Thal route, involving the grant of tribal allowances up to a limit of Rs. 4,000. Government assented to these proposals in August on conditions that left them at liberty to construct any posts required; to hold the roads by any force; to choose the alignment; to move troops along the roads; and even to make a rail-road, if necessary. The inclusion or otherwise of the last condition was left to the discretion of Colonel Deane.

Negotiations with the tribes were eminently successful, and in January 1904, the terms of Government were accepted in their entirety. With regard to the Idak-Spinwam-Thal route *via* Shiwa, Colonel Deane recommended a small outlay with a view to putting the track in good order for mule or pony transport. The tract of country intervening between Bannu and Thal was of so difficult a nature that Colonel Deane thought it best to keep as free a hand as possible in respect to the opening of communications on that side. He, therefore, negotiated for a general power to open up routes both between Bannu and Spinwam, and between Bannu and Thal along the left bank of the Kurrum. Between Bannu and Spinwam, the route over the Ghasiari Pass, though difficult, was considered to be the best. Between Bannu and Thal there was no question regarding the superiority of the Gumatti-Zerwam-Drazanda line, and Colonel Deane recommended that it should be accepted. These recommendations were approved by the Government of India in February 1904, conditionally on the tribes binding themselves to safeguard the routes.



## TOCHI.

*Defences.*—The safety of communication in the Tochi to our frontier has been thoroughly secured by the construction of defensive posts at Idak, Datta Khel, Tutnarai, Miranshah, Kajuri and other less important places, for the accommodation of the Militia. These posts are considered to be impregnable against tribal attack.

## WANA.

*Communications with Wana.* —Prior to the formation of Militia Corps in Waziristan, there were three lines of communication between Tank and Wana, *viz.* :—(a) through Murtaza *viâ* Kajuri Kach and Ngandi Oba to Wana; (b) through Murtaza *viâ* Sarwekai and Ngandi Oba to Wana; (c) Tank *viâ* the Shahur Tangi, Jandola and Sarwekai to Wana. In connection with the proposals for the formation of Militia Corps in Waziristan and the progressive reduction of troops in that locality, the question of the future line or lines of communication with Wana was considered in 1899, by the local civil and military authorities in the Punjab. In submitting the report of the Militia Committee in March 1900, His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor recommended the abandonment of the road through the Shahur Tangi and the adoption, as the main line of communication, of the route from Murtaza *viâ* the Khushma Sar to Sarwekai and Wana, so as to obviate the necessity for the Jandola and Haidari Kach posts in the Shahur Tangi section of the Shahur Valley, and the occupation of the lower portion of that valley.

These recommendations were accepted by the Government of India in May 1900, on the condition that a road from Murtaza to Sarwekai and Wana could be made at a reasonable cost; that a sufficient supply of water could be made available; and that a good site existed for an intervening Militia post. The Government of India were not, however, willing to abandon and leave unprotected the existing Gomai line, which was a regular caravan route and possessed an excellent water-supply. It was accordingly decided that the two lines of communication with Wana should be maintained.

In December 1900, the Punjab Government reported that the water-supply on the Sarwekai route was defective; that the road would be liable to be raided by Mahsuds; that it would take the Powindah caravans a great deal out of their way; and that quarrels would ensue between the Powindahs and the tribes along the route in connection with the grazing of the caravan cattle. On the other hand, it was estimated that the route *viâ* Kajuri Kach, would not be more expensive, nor would it be longer than that *viâ* Sarwekai. It would be easier to defend, by continuing the excellent road, which at present ended in the air at Kajuri Kach. Fort Sandeman would be connected with India. For these reasons the Government of the Punjab strongly recommended the construction of an ekka road from Murtaza to Kajuri Kach, in preference to the original proposal which had been accepted by the Government of India; and the opinion was expressed that it would suffice to maintain a riding path from Murtaza to Sarwekai and Ngandi Oba, solely for military purposes. The Government of India decided, in February 1901, that the ekka road should be continued from Kajuri Kach to Wana, but otherwise concurred in the revised proposals of the Punjab Government. An estimate for the road placed the probable cost at Rs. 3,29,000, but it was expected that the actual cost would



not reach so high a figure. Before the project had been drawn up, the Government of the Punjab represented that unless the men were employed on the ekka road, there would be no work left for the Pioneer Regiment which had been brought to Waziristan for work on the Wana fort and outlying posts. As there was a scarcity of other labour, their employment was sanctioned in April in anticipation of the submission of the complete project. The detailed estimate when submitted in the following October amounted to Rs. 3,79,011, inclusive of departmental charges, but as this was considered an extravagant outlay by the Government of India, it was ordered that the best possible road should be constructed for an expenditure of Rs. 3,00,000, and that this allotment was not to be exceeded. Work on the road was commenced and was, in spite of many difficulties, carried on intermittently throughout the Mahsud-Waziri blockade, and more rapidly afterwards.

It was not, however, until May 1903 that the unsatisfactory condition of the project came to the notice of Government, the net expenditure on the road had then reached Rs. 6,63,636, and the work was still far from complete. Government were informed that the total cost of completing the ekka road from Murtaza to Wana would be 10½ lakhs as compared with 3 lakhs originally sanctioned. The matter was duly investigated and it was decided in January 1904, that for military and political reasons the completion of the road to Wana was essential and, therefore, orders were issued that work should continue: but the administrative and executive officers responsible for the unsatisfactory execution of the project were formally censured by the Government of India, as it was proved that supervision of the work and check on the expenditure of funds had not been efficiently exercised.

*Defensive posts, etc.*—The defences of Wana and of the other posts in the vicinity have been remodelled and rendered suitable for occupation by the local militia. Elaboration of defensive accessories have been avoided, but the posts have been made thoroughly secure against tribal attack.

#### BALUCHISTAN.

Minute of 4th September 1899.

*Quetta-Nushki railway.*—In connection with the promotion of our political and commercial interests in Russia in 1899, and more especially in Seistan, Lord Curzon raised the question of the construction of a railway from Quetta *via* Nushki to Seistan, and in the meantime took vigorous measures for the development of the Nushki-Seistan trade route. The Secretary of State, in his reply to the despatch which followed Lord Curzon's minute, commended the scheme to the consideration of the Government of India. The trade had increased so largely by the summer of 1901, that after the receipt of a recommendation from the Defence Committee in favour of the construction of the railway so as to provide for the better defence of the Quetta position, orders were issued for a survey of the line in the following September. Alternative schemes for 5' 6" and 2' 6" gauge lines were prepared, and subsequently it was decided to choose the former. Some doubt existed regarding the best off-take from the main line of railway: eventually a place Sir-i-ab in rear of the defences was chosen, and the alignment passed through Kanak, the South Barak Pass, and Chaman to Nushki. The railway was opened to traffic in 1904. Pending a decision regarding the extension of the railway to Seistan or northward to the Helmand, which is opposed by Lord Kitchener on strategic grounds, a temporary terminus has been established within a few miles of Nushki.

*Quetta Defences.*—The defensive requirements of the Quetta position received full investigation in 1901 and 1902, both by Sir R. Hart, in command of the garrison, and by a Committee under the presidency of Sir R. Low, Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Bombay Command. The Defence Committee eventually recommended the improvement of certain secondary internal communications with the Chiltan spurs to the east of the defence lines; the establishment of a system of telephonic communication; the provision of 15 miles of light military railway; and the preparation of certain gun emplacements; besides other measures of less importance. These works were duly executed by the end of 1904.

*Communications with Quetta and Chaman.*—Proposals to metal the roads from Sibi to Rindli, Sibi to Harnai and Kach, and from Quetta to Chaman were negatived, as the estimated expenditure was very considerable.

#### COMMUNICATIONS, ETC., ALONG THE NORTH-EAST AND EAST FRONTIERS.

*Roads to the Chumbi Valley.*—From Chitral along the north-east frontier there are no important new roads or forts to notice until Sikkim is reached. When it was decided that the Tibet Mission should proceed to Gyantsé before opening further negotiations it became a necessity to improve the communications between the Teesta and Chumbi Valleys. A recommendation was made to Government that the Jelap La route should be abandoned, and that for it should be substituted a mule path between Gantok and Chumbi passing over the Nathu La, which would be shorter and better graded. To this the Government of India agreed. Until it was decided that the Mission should advance to Lhasa, and in consequence that additional troops should be attached to the escort, any increased expenditure on the road beyond that which was absolutely necessary, was negatived. Sanction was subsequently given for the construction of an ekka road at an estimated cost of Rs. 2,60,000. This amount was exceeded by nearly 50 per cent. when the termination of the expedition put a stop to the work. It was subsequently decided that no further expenditure should be incurred on the road, and that the Jelap La route should be maintained as the main line of communication with Tibet.

Order in Council,  
dated 8th August  
1905.

A reconnaissance was made for another route into the Chumbi Valley through Bhutan country from Chalsa railway station in the Dooars, by which the excessive altitude of the Nathu and Jelap passes would be avoided. An alignment was found passing through the Amu Chu and Di Chu valleys, which entailed a crossing not more than 9,500' in height. But the enormous cost of this road, estimated eventually to be not less than 77 lakhs, precluded its construction.

*Fortified post at Manipur.*—After the quelling of the rebellion in 1891, troops were kept at Manipur in temporary quarters. Two years later the garrison was reduced to one battalion and estimates were prepared for the permanent accommodation of this number of men. This scheme proved unsatisfactory, and a Committee, presided over by General Penington, prepared another project in 1896, which included provision for a small defensive post costing about Rs. 23,000. The establishment of a permanent cantonment was estimated to involve an outlay of 4½ lakhs. In 1898, the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Bengal, pressed for various additions to the defensive post, which would have raised its cost to over a lakh, and ordered the clearance of the Royal

enclosure in the vicinity. On scrutiny the designs for the post were reduced to Rs. 60,000; but unfortunately many of the palace buildings of historical interest were destroyed before the visit of Lord Curzon to Manipur in the autumn of 1901. His Excellency questioned the need for any fortification at all at Manipur, and it was finally decided to dispense with a defensive post. In respect to the barracks and other cantonment works, large excesses had been incurred by the Assam Government without the authority of the Government of India. In all about 6 lakhs was spent on the uncompleted project. Since much extravagance had been displayed in the execution of the work, the Assam administration and the officials concerned were censured for their lax supervision.

Secretary of State's  
Despatch No. 3-Rail-  
way, dated 6th Jan-  
uary 1905.

Despatch No. 46-  
Railway, dated 7th  
September 1905, to  
Secretary of State.

*Railway between Bhamo and Momein.*—The extension of the Mandalay-Kunlon railway through Tali to Yunnan-Fu was abandoned in consequence of the difficulties of construction. In this connection His Majesty's Government has enquired whether the construction of any railway in Western Yunnan by the French would be strategically dangerous. To this question a negative reply was given. But in accordance with the Secretary of State's wishes a reconnaissance has been made of a route between Bhamo and Momein (Tenguch), and a detailed survey will be carried out in the cold weather.

#### INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS.

*Bombay-Sind railway.*—For many years the military authorities have laid stress on the strategic importance of a broad gauge railway alignment, as a means of concentrating rapidly on the North-West Frontier those troops from South India who are included in the field army; and for supplying the force in the Southern theatre of war. The extent of the military advantages to be gained by the construction of the line has not hitherto been clearly demonstrated, and as the commercial results would be unfavourable, the progress with the line has been slow. Only two sections, Hyderabad-Badin, (61 miles) and Viramgam-Malia, (90 miles) have hitherto been taken in hand. The former was opened to traffic in 1904. It is estimated that the central portion, which is 210 miles long, will cost 2·3 crores of rupees, and will entail a loss on working of 4 lakhs per annum.

*Khandwa-Purna line.*—His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has represented the military importance of a metre gauge connection between Khandwa on the Rajputana-Malwa railway and some station on the Godavery valley line, so as to link the metre gauge system of Upper and Lower India, and thus avoid a change of gauges in the transit of troops and stores. The matter is now under consideration.

#### INLAND DEFENCES.

Military Depart-  
ment letter No. 2180-  
M.-W., dated 25th  
July 1902.

*Attock and Rawal Pindi defences.*—The need for the maintenance in efficient defensive condition of forts, *points d'appui*, defensive positions, etc., on the main lines of communication, has not been overlooked during the past six years. The defensible bridge-head at Attock has been gradually completed, except in regard to the matter of water-supply. On the other hand it was decided in 1902, that there shall be no further progress with the Rawal Pindi defences, which are left in an unfinished condition on one face, and for which no adequate system of water-supply has been provided. There seems little doubt but that there would be ample time to complete the defences after mobilisation.

*Inland forts.*—The defensive qualities of inland forts have been carefully reviewed, some have been removed from the list of fortified places, for instance Saugor, Ludhiana, Multan old fort, Tank, Aligarh, Cuttack. On the other hand the defensive works of the Lahore Fort have been slightly strengthened without mutilating the existing structures which are of immense archaeological interest. Lord Curzon took strong exception to the original proposals, framed in 1899, which provided for the extensive demolition of buildings adjoining the walls; and for the construction of steel machicolis, etc., for the purpose of flank defence.

*Delhi Fort.*—The problem of Delhi fort was more difficult of solution because of the proximity of the neighbouring buildings and the vast perimeter of the Fort. A local Committee, which was assembled to devise the best method of improving the defences, made numerous proposals which were regarded as wholly impracticable by the Government of India and the Defence Committee. It was eventually decided to substitute for the smooth-bore artillery then in the fort a stronger armament of 2-40-pr. R. B. L. guns and 2-6-3-inch R. M. L. howitzers; but no additional works were undertaken.

Military Department letter No. 1892-M.-W., dated 14th May 1908.

*Lucknow defences.*—At the instance of the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh a scheme was prepared for the completion of the defensive position in the cantonment at Lucknow, which had been left in an unfinished state, and in an unsatisfactory condition owing to the obstruction of the zones of fire of the redoubts. A defensible central post was constructed, which included all the railway buildings, as a shelter for refugees in the event of a rising in the city. The works were completed in 1903 at a cost of about 2½ lakhs.

Military Department letter No. 2835-M.-W., dated 31st August 1900.

*Defensive posts and places of refuge.*—The Mobilisation Committee in 1900, in reviewing the military position in India, drew attention to the want of efficiency of many of the inland defences, and to the necessity for the better preparation of defensive posts in stations where no forts existed. Hitherto it had been ruled that although schemes should be held in readiness no expenditure should be incurred on these posts. The Government of India accepted the desirability of providing permanent defences of an unambitious type at important places where sufficient British force might exist, to serve as pivots for flying columns, and to render more men available for service in these units. No elaborate defences were contemplated; it was desired only to provide the posts with an efficient obstacle against organised assault, and, ordinarily, with protection only against musketry fire. The requirements of the country were carefully investigated in the next two years, and the majority of the works were carried out at very small cost.

*Defence of Railway bridges.*—Mr. Upscott's Committee of 1898, reported upon the measures necessary to secure the protection of the main railway lines of communication, and advocated the provision of permanent defences for the more important bridges and tunnels. In all they proposed to defend 78 of the former and 15 of the latter, at an estimated cost of about Rs. 23 lakhs. The proposals were subjected to scrutiny, and eventually defences were constructed for the bridge over the Chenab bridge at Wazirabad; the Bhagiara and Lekhora bridges on the line between Nowshera and Dargai; the North-Western railway bridges over the Beas and Haro rivers; the Ling tunnel near Attock,

Military Department letter No. 1746-M.-W., dated 28th May 1901.

and some other less important bridges. Existing defences at Phillour (Sutlej bridge); at the Ravi bridge near Lahore were strengthened. About two lakhs of rupees were spent on these works in the years 1901-1903.

*Defence of Railway workshops.*—The Defence Committee raised this question in 1900, when dealing with the internal control of India and the safety of internal communication. Measures have been taken for the protection of railway workshops at Sukkur, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Bombay and Kharagpur against attack by an armed mob. The railways have borne the charges incurred by the construction of defences of a simple character, which have been gradually brought into existence.

*Roadways for ordinary (not railway), vehicular traffic over railway bridges.*—Mr. Upcott's Committee also dealt with the subject of providing means to admit of the passage of troops, accompanied by military transports, vehicles and animals over railway bridges. For the sake of economy these bridges are rarely provided with continuous flooring, and in consequence troops can be passed over only in railway carriages. The necessity for roadways has been urged repeatedly by military authorities since the time of Lord Roberts, and in the years 1902 and 1903 about 2½ lakhs were spent in the fitting of the Empress bridge over the Sutlej at Adamwahan, the Ravi bridge on the Wazirabad-Khanewal section of the North-Western railway; the Alexandra bridge over the Chenab at Wazirabad; and the Victoria bridge over the Jhelum at Chak Nizam. A few less important bridges have also been provided with flooring. The necessity for it is investigated as each new bridge is added to the railway system.

P. W. D. letter  
No. 1151-R. C., dated  
20th September 1902.

An important discussion took place in connection with the Ganges bridge at Allahabad, regarding the incidence of the expenditure as providing roadways over new railway bridges. It was decided that, according to the nature of the requirements, Provincial or Military estimates should, in future, be debited with the extra cost incurred by the construction of roadways; and that the railway administrations should be freed from all charges in this connection. The maintenance of such roadways will, however, devolve upon the railways who will recoup themselves by the levy of tolls.

## CHAPTER X.

## Details of arrangements relating to mobility in time of war.

## Supply and auxiliary services in time of peace.

## SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT.

The Chitral Expedition of 1895 and the North-West Frontier campaigns of 1897-98, clearly revealed the inadequacy of the establishment of Government transport, as it stood at that date, to meet the requirements of a small army in the field; and at the same time disclosed the numerous evils which result from the hasty collection of large numbers of animals without proper supervision or adequate control. There was no possible doubt that a radical change in the system of transport was necessary, and a Committee was accordingly appointed in 1898, under the presidency of Major General Sanford, to frame a scheme for the improvement of the transport service.

The proposals of General Sanford's Committee were based on the probable transport requirements of the field army. They advocated the adoption of three principal measures—the use of light field railways; a system of registration of the transport resources of the country; and the maintenance of a sufficient number of transport corps and cadres to meet the requirements of the field force. Their proposals involved an extra annual expenditure of over 71½ lakhs. It was recognised, however, by the Military advisers of Government that, although the large expenditure recommended by the Committee was reasonable and justifiable from the point of view of efficiency for war, the financial resources of India could not meet the expenditure involved by the constant maintenance of so much standing transport. At a Conference between the military advisers of Government held in February 1899, to consider the proposals of General Sanford's Committee, it was decided that only the 1st and 2nd Divisions and lines of communication troops should be equipped with full transport on the normal scale; that for the 3rd and 4th Divisions and extra units the transport should be kept up on the cadre system; that only two pony cart trains and two cadres should be raised at once; and that the number of transport carts should be increased from 6,700 to 8,336.

The total cost of these proposals was estimated at about 40 lakhs. A still further reduction was made in Council, and not more than 20 lakhs of annual expenditure was eventually sanctioned by the Secretary of State in the following year.

Despatch to Secretary of State No. 134, dated 13th September 1900, (Appendix No. 54).

The extent of the reduction on the original proposals, and the actual increase to the transport is shown in the following table:—

	RECOMMENDED BY THE SIMLA TRANSPORT COMMITTEE		RECOMMENDED BY THE CONFERENCE.		SANCTIONED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.	
	Number.	Strength.	Number.	Strength.	Number.	Strength.
<i>Mules.</i>						
Corps—						
For use with cavalry brigades	...	2	1,872	2	1,872	1,872
Pack	...	21	17,840	9	7,560	7,560
Cadres—						
For use with cavalry brigades	...	3	516	3	516	516
Pack	...	9	1,728	9	1,728	1,728
With non-mobilisation services	...	...	5,040	...	5,040	5,040
Additional mules*	...	...	...	...	...	4,436
<i>Camels.</i>						
Corps	...	4	4,272	13	13,884	3,604
Cadres	...	18	6,408	9	3,204	9,612
With non-mobilisation services	...	...	2,400	...	2,400	898
<i>Pony cart trains.</i>						
Full trains	...	4	4,656	2	2,328	...
Cadres	...	2	208	2	208	208
Riding ponies	...	...	995	...	751	495
Carts	...	...	9,500	...	8,336	7,435
<i>Reserves.</i>						
Personnel	...	...	14,616	...	11,424	4,065



Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 61, dated 26th March 1903, (Appendix No. 55.)

Since 1900, the mules in Burma have been organised into two complete pack corps; the strength of the grantée camels at Lyallpore has been increased from  $3\frac{1}{2}$  to 4 corps; the organisation of the 2 mule corps with cavalry brigades, and 10 pack mule corps for the 1st and 2nd divisions were completed: and sanction has been given to the raising at Quetta; as an experimental measure, of a sub-division of a camel corps to be manned by Ghilzai camelmen under a British officer. Further, 5 Pack mule corps, 2 Mule corps (for cavalry brigades), and 6 Pack mule cadres have been formed to meet in part the requirements of the augmented field army.

*Legislation for the impressment of transport.*—This measure was first advocated in 1880 by Sir E. Collen. It was discussed in 1882, in 1884 and again in 1885, but both Lord Ripon and Lord Dufferin were unwilling to move in the matter. In 1893, it reached the stage of a draft Bill. Three years later a draft Bill was laid before Council, who ordered that the subject should stand over until Mr. Thorburn's Committee on transport had made its report.

This Committee advocated compulsory registration of animals and impressment of transport, this term including carriers and attendants. Since, in their opinion, the greater difficulty lay in provision of attendants, they recommended that legal power should be given to impress men as well as animals. Exception was taken by Lord Elgin to any legislation involving the impressment of men and, at the suggestion of the Commander-in-Chief, the question was referred to the Committee of 1893, presided over by General Sanford. They suggested an official registration of all animals fit for transport with a view to their purchase or hire by Government when required; the purchase of all animals required for service with troops in the field; and either purchase or hire of animals working on lines of communication; and also the acquisition of the legal right to compel an owner to sell his animal for transport purposes in time of war or emergency at a fair price.

The outcome of this recommendation is the Punjab Military Transport Animals Act of 1903, which provides for the periodical enumeration and registration of animals in the Punjab; for the compulsory purchase of animals in time of war; and for impressment for hire at any time. Rules have been made under this Act to regulate its working in the Punjab; similar rules are being prepared to operate for this purpose in the North-West Frontier Province.

In the Act no provision is made for the impressment of attendants. It was suggested that special precautions should be taken to prevent the Bill being misapplied to the impressment of persons as well as animals. Council, however, decided that legislation was not desirable; and that it would be sufficient to issue executive orders, as occasion might arise, in regard to the employment of men with purchased animals beyond the frontier of India. It is hoped that the owners or their representatives will voluntarily accompany impressed or purchased animals.

*Transport enumeration officers.*—General Sanford's Committee considered it of fundamental importance to introduce a system of registration of animals suitable for hire or purchase on mobilisation, so that, on occasion arising, peace transport establishments might be expanded as rapidly as possible. The Committee recommended that 17 officers should be appointed as registration officers. This proposal was accepted, and in March 1900 carried into effect. Since then 4 more officers have been appointed to this work.

*Officers employed with transport.*—In consequence of these measures the total number of officers employed on transport work has been increased from 16 in 1889 to 90 in 1905.

*Traction engines.*—In connection with the supply of light military railway plant for use on the frontier, four "Uganda" heavy type engines were obtained

from England, but after trial they were found wholly unsuitable, not only for the assistance of railway construction, for which they were originally designed, but also for the transport of military stores. The weight of the engines was excessive. Traction engines of the lighter types and steam automobile lorries were then imported, but so far the results of their trials have not been satisfactory. Further experiments are being made.

*Economic employment of transport.*—Efforts have been made to minimise the cost of military transport in peace time by prescribing employment by civil departments and by civil and military officers. A code of rules was published under which the Supply and Transport corps notified, from time to time, the localities in which it was prepared to take up contracts for carrying work, for which charges were fixed at the rates obtaining in the open market. The results obtained have been far from satisfactory.

*Supply Branch.*—The number of officers in the Supply Branch of the Supply and Transport Corps has been increased from 116 to 161—40 officers for executive work and 5 for appointment as Inspectors of Supply and Transport.

*Abolition of dual control and grant of charge allowance.*—A special commission, which was appointed in 1899-1900, to enquire into various matters connected with the accounts of the Supply and Transport Corps brought to notice the corruption rife amongst the subordinates of the Corps, both British and Native, and observed that special facilities for venality were afforded by the system of associating together British and Native subordinates in the joint charge of stores. Under this system it was impossible to fix responsibility for losses or discrepancies in stock, or for any other abuses. This objectionable system has been abolished, and the subordinate charges have been so re-arranged that each shall be held either by a British or a native subordinate with undivided responsibility. Further to induce honesty among these subordinates, whose pay was relatively low, their legitimate emoluments have been increased by a charge allowance varying from Rs. 20 to Rs. 100 a month.

Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 51, dated 18th March 1903.

*Re-organisation of the Supply and Transport Corps.*—In consequence of a representation by Lord Kitchener, a very important change was made in the organisation of the Supply and Transport Corps in 1904. The executive control of the Corps has been transferred to the Commander-in-Chief; while financial control and the arrangements necessary for the supply in bulk of all stores and animals,—such as contracts for supplies and the registration of animals—remain in the hands of the Military Department of the Government of India. In order to give effect to these changes it has been found necessary to increase the complement of officers and British subordinates by 24 and 20 respectively. The strength of clerks and other native establishments have also been augmented. The total number of officers in the Supply and Transport Corps has been raised to 271, of whom 86 are under the Government of India, and the remaining 185 under the Commander-in-Chief. The department under the Government of India is administered by Director-General of Contracts and Registration, (with the rank of Major-General) assisted by two deputies, one for contracts and the other for registration. To each Command there has been appointed a Director of Contracts and Registration, to whom are subordinated officers serving in each District. Under the Commander-in-Chief there is an Inspector-General of Supply and Transport (also with the rank of Major-General) with a staff of four officers, two for Supply and two for Transport work. To control the executive work in each command there is an Inspector and a Deputy Inspector-General of Supply and Transport; and Executive Officers are appointed to each division and brigade.

Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 146, dated 18th October 1904, (Appendix No. 56).

## MEDICAL SERVICES.

*Officers.*—Twenty-six officers were added to the Indian Medical Service in 1902 to provide a war reserve. The establishment of lady nurses was increased from 52 to 91 in 1902-04.

*Army Bearer Corps.*—The conditions of warfare on the North-West Frontier preclude the use of wheeled ambulance vehicles, such as are common in European armies. It is imperative to provide for the transport of sick and wounded men in doolies borne by trained native bearers. Since the Afghan war of 1878-80, frequent representations have been made regarding the deterioration of the class of *kahars*, or doolie bearers, enlisted for ambulance service. The frontier operations of 1897-98, revealed that a large proportion of the bearers were totally unfit for the hard work of a campaign, and of such inferior physique that they became an encumbrance to the columns. A Committee appointed in 1898 to report on the question, recorded their opinion that not only was an increase of pay necessary in order to obtain bearers of the proper stamp, but that their formation into a military body with a definite organisation was equally important. This view was accepted by Government, and, with the approval of the Secretary of State, the formation of the Army Bearer Corps was sanctioned in 1902. It is now organised in four divisions—one in each Command—and administered by the Principal Medical Officer of the Command with the assistance of a special staff officer selected from the Medical Services. The Corps is composed of 28 companies, each of 200 men and 4 companies of 100 men. An Assistant Surgeon is attached to each company for discipline, training and general interior economy; the pay of the men and their conditions of service have been improved. When they are not employed in transporting doolies, the *kahars* are utilised as hospital guards, orderlies, water-carriers, etc., and on other miscellaneous duties.

Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 68, dated 16th May 1901.

*Hospital Equipment.*—The maintenance of a reserve of six and three months' local supplies for general hospitals of the 1st and 2nd Divisions and 3rd and 4th Divisions, respectively, was authorised in 1901, and in the following year arrangements were made for the maintenance of a reserve of furniture for the four general hospitals for the 1st and 2nd Divisions of the field army. In accordance with the recommendation of a Committee on equipment, all field hospitals were supplied with surgical instruments of a more modern type; and medical stores on a revised scale.

*X-ray Apparatus.*—Several sets of X-ray apparatus had been obtained prior to 1899, but, owing to adverse climatic conditions, the absence of proper storage accommodation, etc., none of these were found suitable for despatch to South Africa and China with the expeditionary forces. An Indian Medical Service officer was, accordingly, sent to England to consult the leading manufacturers, and he procured an apparatus specially constructed for field service which has proved a success. A special X-ray institute will now be established at Dehra Dun for the storage of the apparatus and for the instruction of medical officers. The cost of the measure is debitable to civil funds.

*Additional field hospitals.*—Fifty-six additional field hospitals (16 British and 40 Native) will be required for the augmented field army provided under the Reorganisation Scheme. Imported stores for these hospitals, and local stores (except medicines) for 10 British and 34 Native hospitals, were provided in 1904-05. Local stores for the remaining hospitals will be supplied later.

## FIELD PARKS.

*Ordnance field parks.*—Of the nine ordnance field parks required for the enlarged field army, four were already in existence, and these have been nearly completed to the revised scale of equipment. Imported stores have also been obtained for the five additional field parks, and local stores for these have been partly supplied. The balance will be provided gradually as funds become available. Certain additional stores, both imported and local, are also required for the nine ordnance field parks in consequence of the recent decision that silladar cavalry in the field are to be supplied by Government with renewals of articles of equipment. These will be supplied in 1906-07 and subsequent years.

*Engineer field parks.*—It has been decided to maintain in peace time the equipment required for one engineer field park in addition to five existing units. Imported stores were obtained in 1904-05 and local stores will be supplied as soon as possible.

## VETERINARY DEPARTMENT.

*Officers.*—The establishment of officers of the Army Veterinary Department in military employ was raised in 1903 from 52 to 59, and their Indian pay and allowances were increased.

*Veterinary field hospitals.*—The number of veterinary field hospitals has been increased from six to twelve in consequence of the augmentation of the field army. Imported regimental stores required for these additional hospitals, as well as for the equipment of units and of transport, have been obtained. The supply of local stores for these ; and of both local and imported stores for a third base veterinary store depôt awaits the provision of funds.

India Army Order  
401, dated 26th June  
1905.



## CHAPTER XI.

## Details of measures connected with the supply of warlike stores and equipment.

## CENTRAL GUN-CARRIAGE FACTORY AT JUBBULPORE.

The proposal to establish a single Central Gun-Carriage Factory for India originated in 1895, when Major-General A. Walker, Director-General of Ordnance in India, reported that the introduction of steel into the construction of gun-carriages and mountings had so revolutionised the system of manufacture, that the three gun-carriage factories at Fatehgarh, Madras and Bombay, would be no longer able either to build a carriage or carry out extensive repairs, unless they were supplied with ready-made components from home. To refit the factories on modern lines would have entailed very heavy expenditure. Moreover it was not expected that sufficient work would be forthcoming to keep three factories employed. In these circumstances General Walker recommended the establishment of a single central factory completely equipped for the manufacture of field and siege artillery carriages, and capable also of dealing expeditiously with the manufacture of transport carts. Jubbulpore was suggested as a suitable location for the factory, being both central and in the vicinity of cheap and abundant labour markets.

After weighing the advantages and disadvantages of Allahabad and Kirkee, General Walker's preference for Jubbulpore as a site was endorsed by a Committee which was appointed in 1896 to make detailed investigations regarding the buildings, plant and staff which would be required. Their recommendation was accepted by the Commander-in-Chief. The want of space at Allahabad precluded the erection of a large factory at that station; while Kirkee possessed the material disadvantage of being remote from Cossipore, whence the factory would be supplied with steel. The Committee estimated the initial outlay on the factory at 26 lakhs, but considered that a saving in the cost of establishment and labour would result from a concentration of the work; and also that a large sum would be saved to the country by the local manufacture of carriages in lieu of importing them.

The Secretary of State, to whom the proposal was referred, accepted the contention of the Government of India that, in view of the large stock of artillery material and carriages in reserve, the financial advantages gained by the establishment of a central factory outweighed the chance of risk which might result from the destruction, or from the isolation of a single factory, and asked for further financial details, which were subsequently furnished.

Military despatches Nos. 152, dated 22nd September 1898, and 15, dated 1st February 1900, to the Secretary of State. (Appendix Nos. 57 and 58).

The initial cost of the machinery has exceeded very largely the original estimate (£19,152), partly because of the adoption of electricity as the motive power, but also because of the rise in the cost of metals which took place after the project had been commenced. It was also found desirable to instal machinery of a newer and more expensive type than had originally been contemplated. Further the cash set off against the original outlay, which it was anticipated would result from the sale of the factory buildings and sites in Madras, Fatehgarh



and Bombay, was found on examination to be non-existent. These properties will, however, be utilised for other Government purposes. The savings anticipated from the concentration of staff and establishment will probably not be realised. The supply of labour has offered much difficulty. The site finally selected for the factory is distant some 4 miles from the city and 3 from the cantonment of Jubbulpore, and it has been found necessary to build two villages for the accommodation of the work people, as otherwise a sufficiency of labour would not have been obtainable.

The construction of buildings and workshops has been in hand since 1901. Progress was retarded by the prevalence of plague in the working seasons of 1902 and 1903, and by delay in deciding on the arrangement of buildings for the accommodation of certain important items of plant and machinery. Eventually a very fine system of workshops and stores has been created, while the establishment consisting of officers and subordinates have been accommodated in Government quarters at a very reasonable outlay. Power is supplied by the electricity generated at the Narbudda falls which are situated near the factory; and the success of this system of working is assured. An ample supply of water has been obtained from the municipal mains. The defence of the factory against a local rising has received careful consideration: a clear field of fire has been secured by the acquisition of the land within half a mile of the walled enclosure; the occupation of commanding ground in the neighbourhood has also been denied to a possible enemy by the erection of small block-houses.

It will be seen from the statement of expenditure at the end of this chapter that the scheme now completed has outgrown the original project in every particular. An efficient and thoroughly well-equipped factory has however been evolved, which it may be hoped will prove economical in working. It has been possible to commence manufacture; and with the assistance of the gun-carriage factories at Madras and Bombay the carriages of 8 batteries will be constructed during the current year, in addition to 4,000 transport carts and 100 general service wagons. Next year the outturn will be increased to the extent of the vehicles of 11 batteries, and the brunt of the work will henceforward fall on the Jubbulpore establishment, for the Bombay factory will then be closed; and that at Madras will cease work in 1900.

#### CORDITE FACTORY, WELLINGTON.

So long as black powder was used for rifle and field gun ammunition, India remained self-contained in the matter of supply, since Government powder factories had been established at Ishapore and Kirkee. The introduction of cordite as a propellant made this country dependent upon England for the most important component of ammunition, and the failure to obtain an assurance from the War Office of an uninterrupted supply, together with the wide fluctuations in the cost of the imported article, led to the successful experimental manufacture of a small quantity of cordite at Kirkee in the year 1896. The desirability of rendering India entirely independent of the Home market then became obvious. Kirkee both on account of the climate and the configuration of the ground was found to be unsuitable for the site of a large manufactory, and eventually some months of investigation resulted in the selection of the Arvenghat valley in the Nilgiri hills, about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles distant from Wellington Cantonment. Here was

found an extensive site which allowed of the economical erection of houses at the comparative levels required for the manufacture of nitro-glycerine, while it possessed also the advantages of propinquity to a railway, an abundant water-supply, and a very temperate climate.

The original proposals for the establishment of a factory contemplated the manufacture, annually, of 358 tons of cordite, involving an initial outlay of Rs. 14,86,925, namely Rs. 7,56,425 on buildings and Rs. 7,30,500 on machinery. It was the intention that acids should be supplied by the firm of Messrs. Nobel and Co. from a local manufactory. The cost of the local cordite was then estimated at Re. 1-6-4 per lb. Progress with the work was however postponed by direction of the Secretary of State, pending the result of certain War Office experiments which might affect the composition of the propellant in service ammunition. Meanwhile investigations were continued to determine the exact location of the factory, which was doubtful in face of the objections, subsequently withdrawn, which were raised to the Arvenghat Valley site, by the Madras Government.

Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 21, dated 2nd February 1899. (Appendix No. 59.)

In June 1900 the Government of India, learning that it was improbable that the composition of the service propellant would be greatly altered, decided to proceed with the project. The site had by that time been finally selected, and proposals had been framed for the working of the factory by electrical energy generated at the Kateri water falls three miles distant. Arrangements were made at once for the supply of machinery and for the preparation of estimates for buildings, which were commenced in the following year. It was decided to include in the project a manufactory for the supply of sulphuric and nitric acids, which could not otherwise have been satisfactorily procured in this country. Later the need was recognised for a cannon cartridge branch of the factory, in which cartridges for artillery could be made up more accurately and under better supervision than if the cordite were distributed to arsenals in bulk and then packed into cartridges. These additions to the scheme, and the purchase of hydro-electric machinery caused the original estimates for machinery and plant and buildings to be very largely exceeded.

The numerous buildings of the factory, and the quarters for the large European staff of officers and subordinates, have been completed at a cost of Rs. 17,19,000, a comparatively small advance on the original estimate, in spite of the numerous demands, unforeseen at first, which arose during the progress of the work. The hydro-electric system of working the machinery, which was entrusted to an English firm, has proved an unqualified success both from the point of view of efficiency and economy. An ample and constant supply of power (200 H. P. at the factory) has been secured at small cost by utilising the water of the Kateri falls four miles distant, which are over 300 feet in height. Not only are all the machines worked, but the shops are lit by electricity.

The manufacture of acids was commenced in January 1904, and cordite was produced a few months later, which has been found to be fully up to the standard of the imported article. The factory is practically complete, except that a modified form of explosive (M. D. cordite) is being introduced necessitating some alterations in the buildings which are now being arranged for. When these have been completed the factory will be fully equal to all demands, even in time of war. A scheme for the manufacture of acetone, an ingredient of cordite, is

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now under consideration, and funds have been allocated in next year's Budget for the commencement of the project. The initial cost of the factory is shown in the statement following this chapter.

The cost of cordite as manufactured in India is somewhat higher than was anticipated, and if allowance is made for the interest on outlay, freight to military stations and other incidental charges, the saving on the price of imported cordite is probably not considerable. It is however a matter of the highest importance that India has been rendered self-supporting in respect to the supply of this article. Great credit is due to the local executive officers of the Ordnance Department and Military Works Services (Major Babington, R. A., and Major Stokes-Roberts, R. E.,) who brought the undertaking to a successful completion.

#### LYDDITE-FILLING FACTORY AT KIRKEE.

In October 1899 it was decided to equip the two Indian 5·1-inch howitzer batteries, 6-inch howitzer siege train, and the 6-inch howitzers of the North-West Frontier defences with lyddite shell, while it seemed probable that similar projectiles would also be required for the Indian coast defences.

Military despatch  
No. 47, dated 29th  
March 1900, to Sec-  
retary of State.

The desirability of a local shell-filling factory was represented by General Wace, the Director-General of Ordnance in India, in view of the delay which would occur in the supply of filled shells from England, since the factories at home were fully employed. It was proposed that the filling of the shell should be performed at Kirkee, and also that the exploders of the 5·4" shell should be manufactured in this country. A considerable saving was anticipated, but the independence of India in the matter of the supply of high explosive shell was the chief reason for the adoption of the measure. The initial outlay on the factory at Kirkee is shown in the statement at the close of this chapter. The factory was constituted a branch of the small ammunition factory at Kirkee and commenced work in October 1901.

#### PROOF ESTABLISHMENT, BALASORE.

Previous to 1901 the proof of shells, fuses, and gun fittings was carried out by the Proof Department at Balasore, a place between Calcutta and Cuttack; while that of the small arms ammunition manufactured at Kirkee and Dum Dum, was performed by the Superintendents of those factories. For many reasons it was considered desirable to test small arm ammunition by an independent department before issue to the service. Accordingly this additional proof was entrusted to the Balasore establishment with effect from April 1902.

#### ROLLING MILLS AT ISHAPORE.

In 1901 the Director-General of Ordnance in India represented the urgent necessity for increasing the capacity of the Foundry and Shell Factory at Cossipore in the matter of the manufacture of the heavier classes of forged steel shell; of cartridge metal and cupro-nickel; and of steel bar and gun components. Additional facilities for carrying out repairs to guns were also required. General Wace stated that owing to the value of land in the vicinity the cost of an extension of the existing Cossipore factory would be prohibitive, and that an enlarged factory could not well be supervised by the existing staff. The removal of the entire factory to the site of the abandoned Gun

Powder Factory at Ishapore was precluded by the insufficiency of the Government land there to accommodate more than a portion of the workshops in addition to the Rifle factory, which it had already been decided to erect at this place. It was accordingly proposed to establish at Ishapore rolling mills and furnaces for brass cartridge metal and cupro-nickel; and, similarly in regard to steel work, to provide steel making plant and rolling mills. The work of the Cossipore factory would thus be limited to the production of shells, metal fuses and tubes; the manufacture of gun components, and miscellaneous work.

The Government of India accepted the necessity for enlarging the output of the Cossipore factory, having regard to the difficulty of obtaining material for ammunition, etc., in the event of England being at war, and to the importance of rendering India independent in the matter of warlike stores. They recommended to the Secretary of State an outlay of Rs. 25 lakhs, of which 15 lakhs (£100,000) would represent the cost of works debitable to the Military Works grant, and the balance of 10 lakhs (£66,666) the debit to the Military estimates. It was anticipated that a slight saving might result from the working of the new factory, the annual expenditure in which was estimated to be Rs. 32,57,976.

Despatch to Secretary of State, No 56, dated 26th March 1903 (Appendix No. 60)

In anticipation of the Secretary of State's sanction to these proposals, which was received in May 1903, work had been energetically begun on the buildings, and these were practically completed in the short space of two years from the date of commencement. As is usual in the case of factory schemes, the cost of machinery proved to be very largely in excess of the original estimate. This is owing in part to the rejection of the original proposals for steam-driven plant in favour of machinery worked by the electricity generated in a central power house, and distributed both to the Rifle Factory and to the Rolling Mills. Some saving in establishment was, however, anticipated to result from the adoption of a single power house. The military expenditure was finally estimated at 13½ lakhs (£90,313) but has been augmented to the extent of Rs. 5,00,000 by the acceptance of a later proposal to transfer to Ishapore in addition to the rolling mills, the foundry and the steel making and forging plant which it was originally intended to retain at Cossipore. This step was rendered necessary by the institution at the latter place of gun manufacture plant; and also the increased outturn of fuses, which is demanded in connection with the augmentation of artillery reserves of ammunition.

Despatch No. 77-Military, dated 22nd May 1905.

Owing to the alteration of the buildings to accommodate the steel plant, a work which is still in progress, it has not been possible yet to utilise the rolling mills at Ishapore to their full capacity. It is however hoped that manufacture will be in full swing at the commencement of 1906. When the forge and steel working buildings are completed all shells will be forged in the new factory. The workshops have been fully equipped with machinery of the latest type worked, (except in the case of the heavy steel rolling mills which are steam driven) by electricity supplied from the central power station. The shops and stores are accommodated in a very fine range of buildings. The entire staff, with the exception of daily labourers, has been housed in Government quarters on the site of the factory.

#### GUN FACTORY AT COSSIPORE.

The question of manufacturing field guns in India was raised by Sir E. Elles in October 1902 in connection with the contemplated re-armament of the Horse and

Despatch to the  
Secretary of State,  
No. 55, dated 26th  
March 1900.  
(Appendix No. 61.)

Field Artillery with quick-firing guns. A scheme for a gun factory was prepared by the Director General of Ordnance, who proposed that it should be located at Cossipore, where accommodation would become available owing to the transfer of the rolling mills branch of the Foundry and Shell Factory to Ishapore. It was estimated that an outlay of Rs. 1,05,000 on machinery would permit of local gun manufacture, and result in financial advantage to the State. It was recognised however that the lack of appliances in India would necessitate the importation of large cast ingots, and of steel wire for wire-wound guns.

Investigation in England proved the inadequacy of these estimates, and it was also found that some expenditure would be necessary in adjusting the buildings at Cossipore to the requirements of the new manufacture and providing quarters for the additional establishment. Funds to the extent of Rs. 2,22,940 were eventually provided for the purchase and erection of machinery. The factory is now in full working order, and is capable of making all classes of guns from the 5" B. L. to the 3-pr. Q. F. Forty-eight 18-pr. and 13-pr. field guns will be constructed at the factory in the current year. By working up to the full estimated outturn of the factory, 90 guns of these types will be produced in 1906-07.

#### RIFLE FACTORY AT ISHAPORE.

Note of  
August 1900.

25th

Heavy indents for rifles were preferred on the India Office as the result of the decision in 1900 to rearm the Native troops with a weapon of '303" calibre. It was however found that the Government factories and the private manufacturers were wholly unable to comply with these demands in addition to those of the Imperial services and of the Colonies. The maximum supply which could be obtained from England did not exceed 50,000 rifles in a year, and it was impossible to secure any rifles at all of the latest approved pattern. In these circumstances it became imperative to make more satisfactory arrangements for the supply of small arms, and Sir E. Collen instituted the first serious proposal for the establishment of a rifle factory in this country. The success of the Cossipore factory in dealing with the intricate components of field guns, and with the manufacture of delicate fuses, justified the belief that an efficient rifle factory might be established in India. Accordingly a scheme was preferred for a manufacturing establishment capable of turning out 25,000 new rifles a year, in addition to the ordinary repairs. Although this number exceeds the normal annual requirements of the Indian army when equipped, the capacity of the factory could not be diminished if it were to be of material assistance during future rearmaments of troops with new pattern weapons.

Paragraph 20 of  
Military Despatch  
No. 25, dated 15th  
March 1901, from  
Secretary of State.

The scheme was warmly supported by the Viceroy and his Council, and while detailed proposals were being prepared a despatch was received from the Secretary of State communicating a suggestion from the War Office, that India should be rendered independent of England in the matter of rifle manufacture, owing to the impossibility of obtaining from Home any of the rifles of the newest type, which India had demanded. The details of the scheme were worked out in conjunction with the officials of the War Office Ordnance factories by an officer specially deputed to England. Work was started on the buildings as soon as the designs were received from Home. The site chosen for the factory was that formerly occupied by the gunpowder mills at



Ishapore. The supply of metal thus offers no difficulties, for the steel plant and forge of the Gun and Shell factory are located in adjoining buildings.

The design of the machinery was completed in April 1903, and by the close of the following year the buildings were practically completed, and a large portion of the machinery had been received in the country. Proximity to Calcutta allowed of the employment of large contractors on building works, and in consequence construction was unusually rapid. Arrangements have been made for the distribution to the machines of both the Rifle Factory and the rolling mills of electrical energy from a central generating station. A very fine system of workshops has been erected, which are connected with the main line of the Eastern Bengal State Railway by a siding. Quarters for the whole European establishment have been provided. The supply of 6,000 short Lee-Enfield rifles will be entrusted to the factory this year, in addition to the conversion of a large number of long rifles to the newer pattern. It is hoped that in 1906-07 the factory will attain its full estimated outturn of 25,000 rifles, in addition to 50,000 conversions of existing rifles to charger-loading pattern, and other repairs.

The initial outlay and recurring charges are shown in the statement at the end of this chapter. Savings resulting from local manufacture, conversion, and repair of rifles, have been estimated to amount to over 6 lakhs *per annum*, when the factory is working at full power. The purchase of 72,000 short rifles in England in 1904-05, will, however, reduce the profit which was anticipated, and it is improbable that savings will accrue after the reserve for the Indian army has been completed by the local manufacture of 47,000 rifles, because there may be insufficient work to keep the Ishapore factory fully employed. The military advantage resulting from the presence of a rifle factory in India, can hardly be over-estimated, however, and probably it will in the end be a success from a financial point of view.

#### APPOINTMENT OF AN INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF ORDNANCE FACTORIES.

The direct control of ordnance factories in India was transferred to the Director-General of Ordnance in 1893, and the centralisation of the administration proved successful. But the large addition to the number of factories, and the increase of manufacturing capacity, which has occurred during Lord Curzon's term of office, has led to the submission of a proposal for the appointment of an Inspector-General of Ordnance Factories, whose duty it would be, under the control of the Director-General of Ordnance in India, to supervise the working of the factories, to scrutinise expenditure, and to deal with the details of factory administration. The proposal included the appointment of an assistant to this officer, and the provision of a staff of 21 clerks, some saving being effected by the removal of an officer from the office of the Director-General of Ordnance in India, and the reduction of the pay of his Assistant. These recommendations have been accepted by the Secretary of State; but the appointment of an officer to the post has been deferred until the beginning of 1906.

Secretary of State's  
despatch No. 6, dated  
13th January 1898.

Despatch No. 144,  
dated 17th January  
1905, to Secretary of  
State.

#### MAINTENANCE OF ORDNANCE FACTORIES.

The efficiency of the existing factories has been well maintained during Lord Curzon's term of office. Considerable addition has been made to the Harness and Saddlery Factory at Cawnpore, which will permit of a larger storage of material; additional accommodation has been provided for tanning operations. Improvements have also been made in the ammunition factory at Dum Dum; and in this place the quarters of the subordinates are in process of renewal.



## Expenditure on Ordnance factories in India, 1900-01 to 1905-06.

Works.	Budget Heads.	Original estimate.	Final estimate.	AMOUNTS ACTUALLY PROVIDED.						TOTAL.	—
				1900-01.	1901-02.	1902-03.	1903-04.	1904-05.	1905-06.		
Cordite factory. Machinery from England Charges for erection of ditto.	Military estimates.	Rs. 6,75,755	Rs. 11,22,525 <sup>(a)</sup>	Rs. 1,05,000	Rs. 12,00,000	...	...	...	...	Rs.	13,05,000
	Military Works estimates.	Nil	Nil	...	...	...	...	...	Rs. 4,000	4,000	...
		Rs. 16,99,000	Rs. 17,90,000	Rs. 1,51,000	Rs. 6,99,000	Rs. 5,56,000	Rs. 2,42,000	Rs. 78,000	Rs. 64,000	17,90,000	30,99,000
Gun carriage factory, Jubbulpore. Machinery from England Charges for erection of ditto.	Military estimates.	Rs. 3,28,000	Rs. 6,08,750 <sup>(b)</sup>	...	...	Rs. 3,15,000	Rs. 2,13,750	Rs. 75,000	...	6,08,750	...
	Military Works estimates.	Nil	Nil	...	...	...	...	Rs. 25,000	Rs. 68,000	98,000	...
		Rs. 21,40,000	Rs. 23,05,000	Rs. 69,000	Rs. 2,86,000	Rs. 4,35,000	Rs. 3,48,000	Rs. 5,31,000	Rs. 5,00,000	21,69,000	28,65,750
Rifle factory, Ishapore. Machinery from England Charges for erection of ditto.	Military estimates.	Rs. 19,88,900	Rs. 19,80,000 <sup>(c)</sup>	...	...	Rs. 4,50,000	Rs. 15,30,000	...	...	19,80,000	...
	Military Works estimates.	Nil	Nil	...	...	...	...	Rs. 20,000	Rs. 53,500	73,500	...
		Rs. 15,50,000	Rs. 15,95,000	Nil	Nil	Rs. 1,55,000	Rs. 6,87,000	Rs. 5,68,000	Rs. 1,95,000	16,05,000	36,58,500
Rolling Mills, Ishapore. Machinery from England Local machinery Charges for erection of machinery. Additional charges for ditto.	Military estimates.	Rs. 5,60,538	Rs. 8,75,550 <sup>(d)</sup>	...	...	...	Rs. 5,60,538	Rs. 3,15,015	...	8,75,550	...
	Military Works estimates.	Rs. 2,72,205	Rs. 4,79,145	...	...	...	Rs. 4,51,823	Rs. 27,323	Rs. 4,20,000	4,79,145	...
		Rs. 1,04,618	Rs. 16,28,000	Nil	Nil	Rs. 26,000	Rs. 5,51,000	Rs. 6,90,000	Rs. 1,25,000	18,92,000	31,66,695
Field gun factory at Coosapore. Machinery from England Local machinery Charges for erection of machinery.	Military estimates.	Rs. 1,28,700	Rs. 2,11,440 <sup>(e)</sup>	...	...	...	Rs. 1,05,000	Rs. 1,06,440	...	2,11,440	...
	Military Works estimates.	Rs. 11,500	...	...	...	...	...	Rs. 11,500	...	11,500	...
		Nil	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
		Rs. 5,000	Rs. 5,000	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	2,22,940
											1,30,12,885
											3867,526

(a) Increase due to it having been decided subsequently to work the factory by hydro-electric power and to manufacture acids departmentally.  
 (b) Increase due to machinery for hydro-electric power and to general rise in value of metals and machinery since preparation of original estimate.  
 (c) Revised estimate furnished by India Office.  
 (d) Increase due to machinery for electric power.  
 (e) Revised estimate prepared by Major Banny in consultation with India Office authorities.

## CLOTHING FACTORIES.

*Supply of regimental necessities.*—It has been decided to stock regimental necessities in the clothing factories. A scheme has also been sanctioned by which a quarter of a million more garments will be made up in the factories than has hitherto been the case, and reserves will be maintained to enable issue to be made from stock. Extra accommodation for this purpose has been constructed at both factories.

*Establishment of a third clothing factory.*—As an experiment a third clothing factory has recently been started on a small scale at Fatehgarh to test the suitability of the place for the manufacture of clothing.



## CHAPTER XII.

## DETAILS CONNECTED WITH THE SUPPLY OF ANIMALS.

*Organisation of the Remount Department.*—In 1899 Sir E. Collen drew attention to the unsatisfactory condition of affairs in respect to the breeding of horses and mules, and the supply of horses to the army. In an exhaustive minute he traced the history of breeding and remount operations for more than a century, and from this record he deduced the necessity for defining a fixed policy in regard to this question, which is of vital military importance. Note of 7th November 1899.

Until recently the State has not interested itself in the supply of horses to native silladar cavalry, and consequently the operations of the Government remount and stud departments have throughout their existence been confined to the provision of remounts to British mounted troops, to the few non-silladar regiments of native cavalry, and latterly to the supply of the larger classes of mules which are required for mountain artillery. The desirability of utilising the country-bred horse for military purposes has been realised from the outset, and it has equally been recognised for many decades that the local breeds require improvement. Provision for these measures is consequently found in all the systems of organisation which have been adopted at different periods.

The Stud Department in 1858 was composed of three branches. The first (Home) branch was devoted to the breeding and maintenance of young stock, the produce of Government stallions and mares in stud farms; the second (*nisfi* or *assami* signifying partnership) provided for the purchase of the stock resulting from Government stallions and Government mares issued on loan to private dealers; the third (*zamindari*) controlled the working of Government stallions amongst mares which were the property of zamindars. Under the second system provision was made for the compulsory purchase by Government at fixed prices of any young stock; while under the Zamindari system Government retained a lien only on the produce.

Government studs have never proved satisfactory. The supply of horses has always been unequal to the demand both in number and quality; and the record of the studs is one of repeated and gross mismanagement. The Committee of 1869, appointed by Lord Mayo, reported that the cost of horses supplied by the studs was not less than £148 each; that the studs had failed to produce any amelioration in the indigenous breed of horses; and that Government interference had completely paralysed private enterprise. The pruning knife was consequently applied. Two of the stud depôts were closed in 1873, and the *assami* and *zamindari* systems were abolished. Although Government stallions were still maintained for the service of private mares, no lien was retained on the resulting produce. The final dissolution of the Home Stud, and the consequent cessation of all State breeding, occurred three years later, in spite of the report of another Stud Commission, of which Major-General Chamberlain was president, whose recommendations were strongly in favour of its retention. The other main proposals of this Commission, in addition to those relating to the future administration of the Stud Department, comprised the supply of

stallions under proper supervision for the service of approved and branded mares belonging to private persons ; the award of Government prizes at horse fairs ; and the purchase of young stock by the Remount Department.

G. G. O. No. 155  
of 1876.

Two new organisations, subordinate to the Military Department, were then created, namely, the Army Remount Department charged with the sole duty of purchasing horses, Australians, Arabs and country-breds ; and the Horse-breeding Department, entrusted with the supervision of Government stallions and all measures tending towards the improvement of the Indian breed of horses. The latter organisation, renamed the Civil Veterinary Department, was transferred in 1889 to the control of the Revenue and Agricultural Department of the Government of India, with the prescription that the Military Department should exercise authority in all matters relating to the breeding of horses and mules for military purposes. Except that the Civil Veterinary Department became gradually more interested in the breeding of cattle and sheep, the functions of the two administrations remained on the whole unchanged until the recent reorganisation.

By the agency of the last named establishment, the Military Department controlled the selection, purchase, distribution and disposal of all stallions purchased from Imperial funds. These animals were scattered in breeding districts throughout India during the cold weather, singly or in pairs, at "stallion stands," and were permitted to cover, without fee, any selected and branded mare. The civil duties of the officers of the Department related to the breeding of cattle ; the prevention and suppression of equine and bovine disease ; and the diffusion of veterinary education.

The Army Remount Department from 1876 until 1881 consisted of three independent purchasing agencies in Bengal, Madras and Bombay, each provided with Remount and purchasing depôts. Young country-bred stock was sent to the Hapur Depôt after purchase and pending issue. In the latter year a Director was appointed to supervise and control all remount operations.

In spite of the frequent investigations and reorganisations which had taken place, the state of affairs in 1899 was clearly most unsatisfactory. Although it had been for years the declared aim of the Government of India to make India, eventually, independent of Australia in the matter of remounts, and to horse all mounted troops with country-breds and Arabs, nevertheless, in the previous year only 94 country-breds had been passed into the ranks of British troops, and the number of horses of this class in the country suitable for remounts was evidently very small. The cost of feed and keep of the remounts had largely increased, and in consequence the value of horses issued from the depôts was very high. It was doubtful whether the horses should not be sent direct from the purchasing yard to the ranks. Some improvement of the indigenous breeds had undoubtedly been effected, but, in consequence of the lack of supervision which resulted from an insufficient staff, it had been found impossible to attain any wide-spread standard of type. No benefit had accrued to Government from the expenditure which had been incurred, and there was an extraordinary divergence of opinion regarding the policy which had been followed in the matter of the choice of stallions. The supply of mules was on an equally unsatisfactory footing.



*Remount Commission.*—Sir E. Collen's proposal for the appointment of an expert Commission to advise Government on the subject was warmly supported by His Excellency Lord Curzon. The Secretary of State agreed that there was urgent need for a searching investigation to be made. In the autumn of 1900 the arrangements for a Commission were completed, after the settlement by a preliminary committee of the procedure and mode of carrying out the enquiry. The Commission, which was composed of Major-General Tyler, Inspector-General of Artillery (President), Lord Arthur Cecil, a breeding expert from England, Major-General Elliott, and Major J.-R. Dunlop-Smith, Director of Land Records and Agriculture, Punjab, made an extended tour between October 1900 and March 1901, and later reassembled in England for the preparation of their final report. The Commission stated their opinion that the system of horse-breeding practised for the previous 24 years had completely failed to answer the expectations it was intended to fulfil; that little private enterprise existed, and that the supply of horses fit for army remounts was continually decreasing, and that the native cavalry were being rendered yearly more and more dependent on the Australian market. They recommended the abolition of the dual control under which the remounting and horse-breeding operations were carried on; and the formation of an Imperial Stud Department to carry on the combined duties connected with remounting the army and horse and mule breeding. The Commission considered that the new organisation should be directly and completely under the Department of Revenue and Agriculture in view of the close collaboration with the civil executive officers which would be necessary for the successful working of any horse-breeding scheme. At the same time they proposed that the department should be officered by officers of the army, and not by veterinary surgeons or civilians. They recommended the formation of small studs for breeding horses, and of two small studs for donkey-breeding. They also proposed that remount Australian and Arab horses should be issued direct to regiments and batteries from the ports of disembarkation, and thus make room for studs.

In respect to general horse-breeding they suggested the remodelling of the "diffused" system of breeding, and the restriction of operations to favourable districts. They proposed also the grant of land on the Chaj Doab and other canal lands, on service conditions: namely, the provision by the tenant of brood mares for breeding either horses or mules; a Government lien being retained on the young stock up to 12 months of age. In the matter of the purchase of stock their scheme included the acquisition of tracts of land for young stock runs; the purchase of young stock at an early age; and the provision of land for native cavalry runs.

With the principle of undivided control the Government of India were in concord, but they were unable to agree that the work and responsibility of providing horses for the army should be thrown upon a civil department. It was accordingly decided that the control should be vested in the Military Department, which would in any case be charged with the arrangements for the purchase of horses, and with the preparation of schemes for the supply of animals, during the progress of a campaign. Little difficulty was anticipated in securing between the officers controlling breeding and the civil officers of districts, that co-operation which would be so important.

Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 210, dated 30th October 1902.  
(Appendix No. 62.)



Despatch No. 210, dated the 30th October 1902, to Secretary of State.

\* DISTRICTS.

*Rawal Pindi Circle.*—Gujrat, Rawal Pindi, Hazara, Jhelum, Attock.

*Jhelum Canal Colony Circle.*—Jhelum Canal Colony, Shahpur, Jhang, Chenab Colony, Gujranwala, Sharakpur Tahsil of the Lahore District.

*Lahore Circle.*—Lahore, Multan, Dera Ghazi Khan, Amritsar, Ferozepore.

*Baluchistan Circle.*—Baluchistan and Sind.

*United Provinces Circle.*—Bulandshahr, Meerut, Aligarh, Muzaffarnagar.

*Deccan Subsidiary Circle.*—Poona and Ahmednagar, under the Superintendent of the Ahmednagar depôt.

*Measures of reform.*—The scheme resulting from the Commission's report, and eventually sanctioned with effect from 1st April 1903, provided for the organisation of the Horse and Mule-breeding branch of the Army Remount Department in 5 circles,\* to which an equal number of officers were allotted. Within their administrative areas these officers, which possess the status of special Assistant Commissioner, were entrusted with the control of all State-aided breeding of horses and mules, whether with Government or district board stallions, and were subordinated to the civil authorities. The full complement of stallions in the selected circles has been completed.

The duties of the remount branch of the Department have been enlarged by the reorganisation, and effect has been given to the recommendations of the Commission in the following way. A small stud for breeding horse stallions of pure type has been established at Ahmednagar by the purchase of 85 mares of Arab, Katiawari, Marwari, Deccani and Australian breeds; Punjabi mares have been bought for a similar stud at Mona. Two studs of 20 jennies each have been established at Mona and Mirpur for breeding donkey stallions; an increase in the number of donkey mares is under consideration. The Committee's proposal to issue remounts direct to the ranks has been negatived because it is necessary to keep turning over the horses in the reserve. Arabs and Persians are, however, retained only two or three months at the Ahmednagar depôt. Grants of land in the Jhelum Canal Colony, which was first started in 1902, have been made to persons who undertake to keep a brood mare, and to give Government a lien on the young stock up to the age of 18 months. Nearly 4,000 mares, branded as a sign of their suitability for the rearing of remounts, are now in the Colony. As the country is well stocked with stallions it may reasonably be expected that there will be 2,500 foals annually available to select young stock from. Progress is also being made with a similar colony under mule-breeding conditions of tenure on the Chenab Canal, which will accommodate 2,700 mares.

The young country-bred stock, both horses and mules which will be purchased to the number of 6,000, will be placed in two runs of 10,000 acres each, one at Mona, adjoining the site of a remount depôt, which has already been established; and one at Sargodha which will be started next financial year. Up to the present it has been possible to collect about 1,200 young stock in the Mona run partly horses and partly mules; from these between 60 and 70 horse remounts will be issued to British cavalry regiments in the current year. A good commencement has therefore been made with the scheme, and eventually it may be possible to supply annually 500 to 600 country-bred remounts from the canal colony. It is, however, improbable that artillery draught horses will ever be bred in this country in any number.

The above mentioned measures which were estimated to cost in all 9½ lakhs initially, and to involve a recurring expenditure of Rs. 3,64,000, have been carried out during the past two years, and thus many of the proposals of the Commission have been given effect to. By the transfer of the remount depôt from Kurnal to Mona, a great improvement has been effected, for the sickness both of men and horses at the former place had seriously impaired the work of the depôt. The move was carried out in 1902 at a cost of about 3½ lakhs. The location of the new depôt in the vicinity of the young stock run has resulted in economy of staff and establishment.

*Assistance to Native Cavalry.*—The native cavalry has received both direct and indirect assistance in the matter of remounts. Five regiments of Bengal cavalry were allotted 7,500 acres on the Chenab Canal in 1899 to serve as horse runs and for the rearing of country-bred remounts. Ten runs of 750 acres each, all irrigable land, were reserved for regiments of Bengal and Punjab cavalry on the Jhelum canal; who were also offered an advance of Rs. 20,000 each towards the initial expenditure. It was, however, stipulated that, to avoid interference with the Government runs, the runs should be kept for the maturing of three years old stock, and that no stock of lesser age should be purchased by the regiments. Six of the regiments accepted these terms. It has also been arranged that the country bred stock, purchased by the Army Remount Department, which does not attain the standard of the British cavalry, shall be offered to native cavalry regiments at the price of Rs. 300 a head.

Military Department letter No. 758-D., dated the 3rd February 1904.

*Horse-breeding* in the other circles is not yet in a very flourishing condition as the following statement shews:—

Circles.	1904-05.				1903-04.						Number of young-stock purchased for the British service during 1904-05.
	Number of stallions.	Number of branded mares.	Number of mares covered.	Percentage of mares covered.	RESULT OF COVERINGS						
					Number of mares covered.	Number of foals born.	Result not known.	Number not held.	Number aborted.	Percentage foals born.	
Jhelum Canal Colony ...	99	5,657	4,033	71	3,005	941	602	1,462	...	31·31	151
Lahore ...	46	4,427	2,077	47	2,694	803	536	1,289	56	29·92	44
United Provinces ...	38	2,388	1,061	44·5	1,156	228	147	657	24	28·37	38
Deccan ...	34	1,174	1,047	89	1,030	329	47	654	...	31·94	11
Baluchistan ...	50	3,199	1,853	58	1,839	551	290	998	...	29·96	18
Rawalpindi...	26	1,998	1,079	54	1,450	347	292	811	...	23·93	8
Total ...	293										270

It should, however, be added that horse-breeding operations were only transferred from the Civil Veterinary Department to the Army Remount Department in May 1903. Considerable improvement in the horse-breeding conditions of the country cannot reasonably be expected at once. Progress with remedial measures must necessarily be gradual and slow.

*Remounting Native Cavalry on field service.*—A decision of great importance has been made in the matter of remounting native silladar cavalry on service. In future the responsibility for all replacements will be borne by the State, in return a deduction will be made from the sowar's pay of Rs. 2-8 *per mensem* for each horse, and 12 annas for each mule taken on service.

Military Department letter No. 2470-D., dated the 5th June 1905.

*Madras cavalry horses.*—The Madras (non-silladar) cavalry regiments were until 1900 mounted on Arabs and Persians costing on an average Rs. 760 each. It was then decided to mount them on small Australians costing a little more than half the former price.

Military Department letter No. 3428-D., dated the 31st May 1900.

*Purchase of stallions.*—In accordance with the recommendation of the horse and mule breeding Commission, it was decided in 1902 that all purchases of Imperial stallions in this country should be made by a committee of experts and not by individual officers.

Military Department letter No. 3644-D., dated 8th July 1902.

Military Department  
endorsement No.  
3084-D., dated the  
17th June 1903.

*Purchase of mules for Imperial Service troops.*—It was found necessary to arrange for the purchase of remount mules for these units through Government agents so as to avoid undue competition.

*Increase of reserve of horses.*—It was decided in August 1903 to increase the reserve for the British mounted services, then 1,000 in strength, by 2,000 remount horse. The animals were all purchased before the close of the financial year. The reserve will however be depleted, shortly, by the issue of 2,500 remounts to Royal Horse Artillery and Royal Field Artillery batteries on the receipt of the new quick-firing armament.

*Purchase of mules in the Argentine and in Persia.*—The increase of the transport establishment rendered it necessary to import a large number of mules. More than 6,000 were purchased in the Argentine and were landed in this country at an average cost of Rs. 323 each. From Persia 551 mules were obtained, each costing Rs. 225 on the average. Some of the Argentine mules were employed in the Tibet expedition, and were very well reported on. Similar purchases, but on a much smaller scale, are being made in the current year.

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## CHAPTER XIII.

## DETAILS OF MILITARY LEGISLATION.

*Indian Works of Defence Act.*—In 1897 the Commander-in-Chief submitted to the Government of India correspondence relating to the difficulties which had arisen in consequence of indiscriminate building in the vicinity of fortified places in India to the detriment of the defences, and more especially in connection with the Rawal Pindi redoubts. Attempts had been made to acquire clearance rights on certain areas of privately owned land, but many of the owners had refused to come to terms; and, as the law then stood, it was impossible to prevent them from building on their lands, although the defensive qualities of the forts would thereby be adversely affected. The necessity for imposing restrictions upon the use and enjoyment of land in the vicinity of defences has long been recognised by the majority of the European States. By an enactment of 1791 in the French legislature degrees of stringency, varying according to the position occupied by the site in three concentric zones of different radii, are imposed upon buildings and other obstructions, and are enforced by extensive powers of demolition. By English law the Secretary of State is invested with very drastic powers for the destruction and removal of any obstacles, subsequent to a declaration that such measures are necessary in the vicinity of any fortification. It was decided in India also to have recourse to legislation, which was effected on the 20th March 1903.

Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 79, dated 24th April 1902.

The Indian Act is framed on the French model in regard to the specification of three concentric defensive zones (the radii of which have been adjusted to accord with modern military requirements) in which restrictions of different degrees of stringency are enforced. The drastic measures permitted by the English statute have been avoided by defining the act of demolition and restriction which may take place, and by prescribing that these acts shall ordinarily follow and not precede the award of compensation. The procedure relating to the assessment and grant of compensation is similar to that prescribed in the Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894). In the event of an emergency notified as such by the Governor General in Council, full powers of action are reserved to the responsible officers of the State.

*Punjab Military Transport Animals Act.*—The experience of the Afghan war disclosed the necessity for legalising the impressment of transport in the Punjab for service beyond the frontier. The question was not then pursued; but came again under the consideration of the Government of India in 1884, when it was decided to wait until the right of Government to impress carriage had been questioned in a Court of Law. During the expeditions on the North-West Frontier, which took place in 1891-1892, the attention of the Supreme Government was again and more forcibly drawn to this question by the Government of the Punjab, who represented that owing to the absence of any legal sanction empowering district officers to impress transport, the former were frequently placed in a position of great embarrassment when they made efforts to assist the army in this respect.



Letter No. 5379-D.,  
dated 6th November  
1893.

In some of the other provinces the State already possessed legal power to impress transport in aid of military movements, but it was doubtful whether the local regulations were suited to modern requirements. A draft Bill was accordingly prepared in 1893 and referred to Local Governments ; but it was shelved until the receipt of a report by a Committee on the supply of military transport, which was convened at the close of the Chitral Campaign to consider and report on the best mode of collecting transport required for expeditions and for ordinary peace marches. The Committee recommended the compulsory registration of animals, and the impressment not only of animals but of attendants. This principle of impressing men was not acceptable to Lord Elgin, and, at the instance of the Commander-in-Chief, the matter was again referred to the Transport Committee of 1898, which, with General Sanford as president, was assembled to advise Government on the whole question of the provision and organisation of transport in time of peace and war. This second Committee recommended that all animals in the Punjab, which might be fit for transport purposes, should be registered with a view to purchase or hire on emergency. Purchase was contemplated in all cases of service with the field army beyond the frontier ; purchase or hiring would be permissive alternatives for service on the lines of communication within the borders of India. It was also proposed that Government should acquire the legal right to compel the sale at a fair price of any animal fit for transport purposes in time of emergency. A draft Bill, prepared in communication with the Punjab Government, was ultimately passed in the Punjab Legislative Council. This enactment, (the Punjab Military Transport Animals Act of 1903) provides for the periodical enumeration and registration of animals in the Punjab ; for the compulsory purchase of animals in time of war ; and for impressment for hire at any time. Rules have been drawn up under the Act to regulate its operation in the Punjab and in the North-West Frontier Province. No provision is made for the impressment of attendants because it is probable that the owners or their representatives will accompany impressed or purchased animals without compulsion. On the other hand it was decided that it was not desirable to legislate with a view to prevent the Bill being misapplied to the impressment of persons as well as animals. Executive orders will be issued, when necessary, in regard to the employment of men with purchased animals beyond the frontier of India.

*Emergency bills* —In 1901 the Government of India forwarded for the approval of the Secretary of State the drafts of four bills which it was intended to hold in reserve with a view to their being passed into law in case of serious emergency. These bills related severally to—

Despatch No. 28,  
dated 7th March 1901.  
(Appendix No. 63.)

- (a) the control of railways in war ;
- (b) the better protection of railway property ;
- (c) the compulsory enrolment of able-bodied men not being soldiers or volunteers ;
- (d) the compulsory purchase of horses.

The last named bill was intended to supplement the operation of the Punjab Act relating to enumeration and registration of transport animals,

and the working of similar legislation in other provinces. The Secretary of State accepted the principle of the bills, but reserved final sanction pending detailed examination of the drafts.

In respect to the *protection of railway property*, the necessity for legislation of this character was brought to light originally by Sir A. Macdonnell, Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, who urged the need for a definite scheme for patrolling railway lines and for guarding railway bridges; and later by a Committee which was appointed, with Mr. Upcott as president, to work out the details of such a measure. By the Act, after declaration of an emergency in which the ordinary processes of law are declared to be inadequate for the protection of railway property in any area, communal liability for damage or attempted damage to a railway is imposed on the inhabitants of the district.

Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 16, dated 31st January 1902.

The question of the *control of Indian railways* other than State worked lines, was raised by Sir E. Collen in 1899 in view of the fact that the *personnel* and *material* in the service of the North-Western Railway would be insufficient to meet the demands of railway traffic during mobilisation, and also having regard to the necessity for rapid movement against insurgent bodies in the interior of the country, should disturbances occur. As matters then stood the State would have been powerless to reinforce or supplement the staff and stock of any railway affected, by transfers from company-owned lines. The necessity for legislation was also urged by the Upcott Committee who proposed that, in case of emergency, the railways should be taken over and worked under military supervision. Full control will be attained, when required, by the passing of the bill which has been drafted.

*Compulsory purchase of horses.*—The State cannot maintain in time of peace a reserve of horses which shall be equal to all the demands for remounts in time of war; it may not always be possible to import a sufficient number of animals. The power to impress horses in emergency has been given to the State in England, and it was necessary that the Government of India should possess at least equal powers. The draft bill has been framed on the English model, as far as possible.

The intention of the bill dealing with the *compulsory enrolment of men* was to empower the General Officer in command of troops to enrol after the declaration of an emergency such persons as he might select for military service from the able-bodied population of a district. The Secretary of State pointed out that the exercise of this power would have a bad effect upon the native population, and in respect to Europeans and Eurasians preferred to rely upon the volunteer organisation. In answer to a further representation by the Government of India, he referred them to the provision of the Indian Council Act, 1861, by which the Governor-General has power in emergency to make without reference to his Council, temporary ordinances which shall have the force of law. Any measures prescribed by ordinance for the compulsory arming and organisation of the European and Eurasian population would therefore be legal.

Secretary of State's despatch No. 142-Mil., dated 27th November 1903. (Appendix No. 64.)

*Military control over Indian ports.*—It was found after a discussion in 1901 that the application of the same power would render unnecessary the legislation it was proposed to undertake through the medium of a secret



order in Council for the establishment of legal military control over the inhabitants of certain of the defended ports.

*Cantonment Code, 1899.*—Previous to 1899 there were different Cantonment Acts and varying cantonment rules in force in each of the three Presidencies. These, being found to be defective in many respects, were replaced in 1889 by the Cantonments Act (Act XIII of 1889). Sections 25 and 26 of this Act empower the Governor-General in Council to extend the provisions of Municipal Acts to cantonments; and also to make rules providing for the constitution and functions of the cantonment committees and magistrates; for the management of cantonment funds; and for sanitary measures in cantonments. A complete code of cantonment regulations, made under the Act, was prepared and published in June 1899 under the title of the “Cantonment Code.”

*Cantonments (House Accommodation) Act, 1902.*—The great and increasing difficulty of securing suitable houses in cantonments at reasonable rents for military officers led to the proposal that the rules contained in Indian Army Regulations regarding the occupation of lands in cantonments should be given the force of law. The provisions of these rules were accordingly embodied in the draft of the Cantonments Bill, but they were subsequently excised in view of the strong opposition of house-owners, who were especially antagonistic to the declaration made in the bill, that all land in Cantonments was the property of the State, and that the tenure of the private houses in cantonments had hitherto been subject to these regulations. A revised bill, approved by the Secretary of State, was introduced into the Legislative Council in November 1898, and after further revision passed into law as Act No. II of 1902. The matter of land and house tenure has now been placed on a legal footing, and it has been determined that houses in cantonments built after certain dates, should, unless proved otherwise, be assumed to be subject to the regulations in force at those dates. This enactment will therefore bring the house-owners under the cantonment authority and the rules (modified) of the India Army Regulations, the legality of which they formerly disputed. In consequence the conditions of the tenants have been ameliorated. On the other hand the house-owners now know the exact legal conditions of their tenure, and are not affected by changes in military regulations.

Despatch from Secretary of State No. 58, dated 29th July 1897.

*Bill for facilitating and regulating artillery and rifle practice.*—With the object of providing means of facilitating and regulating artillery and rifle practice, and for preventing danger to the public therefrom, a bill entitled “the Artillery and Rifle Ranges Act,” was introduced in the Council of the Governor-General on the 23rd March 1904. It was, however, found in the following year that the bill as drafted would be of no value in respect to areas over which Government had not already obtained the right of user; and consequently would possess a very limited scope. The bill was therefore not proceeded with.

*Indian Officials Secret Acts of 1889.*—It was found on attempting to apply this Act to specific offences that the onus of proving criminal intent was imposed upon Government, and that the difficulty of obtaining such proof

Despatch No. 107, dated 10th October 1902. (Appendix No. 65.)

rendered the law practically inoperative. With the sanction of the Secretary of State, the Act was therefore amended so as to throw the onus of proof, that

lawful authority had been obtained upon the person accused of wrongfully obtaining information in connection with defences. Further the original Act was defective in that, owing to the lightness of the maximum punishment accorded to the offences detailed in the Act relating to spying, communicating information, etc., those offences wereailable and non-cognizable. In consequence, without a warrant, arrest could not be made either by police or private persons. Under the amended Act this defect was removed, and authority was given to any public servant to arrest a person, who, in his view, might commit any offence of this character. The procedure after arrest was also defined. The provisions of the Act were also made applicable to civil affairs.

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## CHAPTER XIV.

## MISCELLANEOUS.

*Abolition of Military Savings Banks.*—In view of the facilities afforded by the Post Office the system of Military Savings Banks was discontinued in 1899. From that date the savings of British soldiers have been invested in the Post Office Savings Banks.

*Construction of Central Library at Simla.*—A building was constructed at a cost of Rs. 30,000 at Simla in 1892 for the accommodation of the United Service Institution of India, and the libraries of the Military Department and Army Head Quarters in India. The Government grant to the Institution was reduced by Rs. 800 per annum in lieu of rental.

*Refuge for destitute widows and children of British soldiers.*—Measures were taken in 1904 to relieve the widows and children of British soldiers, living in a state of destitution in the bazaars in various stations, by payment of a capitation allowance to such charitable institutions as were willing to receive them.

*Pasteur Institute.*—In the year 1897 the Secretary of State for India granted permission for the establishment of a Pasteur Institute for India. At the instance of Sir William Lockhart, Commander-in-Chief in India, proposals were put forward in 1899 for a small experimental laboratory at Kasauli, where anti-typhoid vaccine, anti-rabic serum, etc., could be prepared, and where soldiers could be inoculated. The initial expenditure on such an institute was estimated at Rs. 3,000, and the recurring cost at Rs. 9,521 yearly. As a set-off against this outlay it was represented that during 1898-99 the cost of sending soldiers to Paris for treatment had, in passages alone, amounted to Rs. 10,595. The scheme was approved of by the Government of India, but in view of the proposals which had already received the Secretary of State's sanction, it was decided that the Kasauli Institute should be on an experimental footing for three years, and that it should be worked by the Committee of the Anti-rabic Institute of India, the Government of India placing at the disposal of that body the services of a Medical Officer and an Assistant. It was contemplated that the institute should undertake the treatment of officers and soldiers, British and Native, and of Civilians; the preparation of the various vaccines; and general bacteriological work connected with the Army, in return for an annual grant-in-aid of Rs. 9,500 by the Government of India in the Military Department. The institute, which has now been working since August 1900, has proved eminently successful. The yearly grant-in-aid has been increased to Rs. 12,000, with effect from April 1st, 1903.

*Abolition of India Army Circulars.*—It was decided in 1903 to abolish the system of publishing orders to the Army in G. G. O.'s, G. O. C. C., or India Army Circulars, and to introduce a system under which such orders are promulgated by the Commander-in-Chief in India Army Orders.

*Honorary Colonels of Native regiments.*—His Majesty the King was graciously pleased to approve in 1903 of the appointment of distinguished officers of the Indian Army as Honorary Colonels of Native regiments. G. G. O. No. 1023,  
dated the 16th October 1903.

*Despatch to England of a Coronation Contingent.*—A representative contingent of Indian troops, 1,000 strong, of all arms, including 100 Imperial Service Troops and a detachment of 100 Indian Volunteers, was sent to England to take part in the ceremonies of the Coronation of King Edward VII. The contingent sailed in the R. I.M.S. *Hardinge* on the 24th May and returned to India on the 10th September 1902.

*Coronation Darbar, Delhi.*—Thirty-four thousand British and Native troops were assembled at Delhi in January 1903 for the Darbar held to celebrate the Coronation of the King-Emperor, and were reviewed on the 8th January 1903. The British and Native Veterans of the mutiny who took part in the Siege of Delhi, or in the Defence and Relief of Lucknow, were present as the guests of the Government of India. In the month previous to the concentration of the troops, extensive manœuvres were carried out between Umballa and Delhi, and in the neighbourhood of the latter place. The following favours and concessions to the different branches of the Army in India were announced at the time of the Darbar :—

- (a) A temporary increase of 50 appointments to the Order of British India ;
- (b) the establishment of 10 first class and 20 second class appointments in the Order of British India for Imperial Service Troops ;
- (c) the release of certain classes of military offenders of both the British and Native armies on the 1st January 1903 ; or the mitigation of punishment in particular cases ;
- (d) the grant of additional meritorious service medals to dafadars and havildars ; and of long service and good-conduct medals to the rank and file ;
- (e) a money grant to all British and Native Corps.

*Detention of Boer prisoners of War in India.*—At the request of the Home Government arrangements were made for the detention and custody in India of over nine thousand Boer prisoners of war. The first contingent arrived in India in April 1901 ; the last in May 1902. They were located in sixteen camps and detained in India for about three years. On the conclusion of peace, the prisoners were repatriated at the public expense, with the exception of a small number who either returned to their country at their own expense, or, who being of foreign nationality, were made over to their Consuls. The repatriation of the prisoners commenced in July 1902, and was not concluded until January 1904. The necessity for the prolonged detention of many of the prisoners was due to their refusal to take the oath of allegiance. The last camp was closed in the beginning of 1904. All charges in connection with the prisoners of war were borne by the Imperial Government.

*Persian Consulate Guards.*—In 1903 the Secretary of State decided that the British Consuls in Persia should be provided with 131 sowars from Native Cavalry regiments ; 70 men had been already employed on this duty. The remaining 60 were sent into the country in 1904.



## CHAPTER XV.

## FIELD OPERATIONS.

## EXPEDITION AGAINST THE BEBEJIYA MISHMIS.

A petty punitive expedition was undertaken in November 1899 against the Bebejiya Mishmis, a clan of the Mishmis tribe in the North-East corner of Assam in return for a treacherous raid on British subjects near Sadiya. Lieutenant-Colonel E. H. Molesworth, 44th Gurkha Rifles, commanded the force of six companies of Infantry (taken from the 10th Bengal Infantry and the 42nd, 43rd and 44th Gurkha Rifles), a half company of sappers and miners, and two mountain guns.

Owing to the great difficulty of transporting supplies over the Mabu pass—nearly 9,000 feet high—under the most adverse conditions of weather, the actual strength of the column which visited the Bebejiya country was reduced to the equivalent of one company of infantry and a few sappers and miners. No opposition was encountered; but a number of the coolies enlisted for transport purposes succumbed to exposure. Four of the Bebejiya villages were burned, and the expedition returned to Sadiya through the friendly Chulikatta Mishmi country.

## PUNISHMENT OF THE PARA CHAMKANNIS.

It was found necessary to punish the Chamkannis, a predatory tribe living near the Kurram for non-payment of a fine imposed in 1897, and for many subsequent raids. With a force consisting of 200 rifles of the 22nd Punjab Infantry, 300 rifles of the Kurram Militia, and some levies, amounting in all to about 700 men, Captain Roos-Keppel then on special duty in the Kurram, completely surprised the village of Hajji Khel and Mirza Khel Chamkannis on the night of the 1st March 1899, destroying 9 large villages and capturing 113 prisoners, 3,000 head of cattle and about 200 firearms. The Chamkannis lost 6 or 8 killed, our casualties being only one man wounded. The tribe shortly afterwards made complete submission.

## DESPATCH OF TROOPS TO SOUTH AFRICA.

In the summer of 1899, the attitude of the Transvaal Government in their negotiations with the Imperial Government rendered it necessary to consider the possibility of military operations in South Africa. Early in July the assistance which India could render in such an eventuality was considered, and it was decided that three batteries of Field Artillery, three regiments of British Cavalry, and 4 battalions of British Infantry could be spared. All preparations were made for immediate despatch of this force, together with the necessary Field Hospitals and an Ordnance Field Park. It was finally mobilised and ordered to Bombay on the 9th September 1899. Embarkation began on the 17th September and was completed in ten days, except that of a batch of reserve horses, which followed on the 5th October. Cavalry, infantry, 3 field batteries with an ammunition column,  $3\frac{1}{2}$  British Hospitals, 2 Sections of Native Field hospital, an Ordnance Field Park, a veterinary Field Hospital, and 503 reserve mules, and 250 reserve horses were embarked during this short period.



The celerity of this operation practically saved Natal from being overrun by the Boers, and the appreciation of His Majesty's Government was expressed in the following terms : " Promptitude with which Indian reinforcements are being delivered in South Africa is much appreciated by War Office, and Her Majesty's Government hope you will express our admiration to those responsible for arrangements."

The news of reverses to the British arms, which reached this country two months later, evoked patriotic offers of assistance, not only from the Government of India and the British community, but also from some of the native rulers. A small but fine Contingent of mounted volunteers was raised by Lieutenant-Colonel D. M. Lumsden, late commandant of the Assam Valley Light Horse. In January 1900 a fourth regiment of British Cavalry, 2 batteries of Royal Horse Artillery and 3 companies of Mounted Infantry were despatched; as well as 300 artillery horses, which formed a part of the contingent offered by the Maharaja Scindia. Lumsden's Horse organised in two companies numbered 304 officers and men all told, and sailed from Calcutta in March 1900, returning after a year's campaigning.

The number of British troops taken from the Indian Garrison in September and October 1899 for service in South Africa was (officers and men) 8,215.

These troops were composed of 2 batteries of Horse Artillery, 3 batteries of Field Artillery, 4 regiments of British Cavalry and 4 battalions of British Infantry.

There were several moves of British troops between South Africa and India subsequently, and on 1st June 1902, at the close of the war, there were 7,123 British Troops absent from India in South Africa, composed of 2 batteries of Royal Horse Artillery, 4 regiments of British Cavalry and 4 battalions of British Infantry.

The whole expenditure connected with the employment in South Africa of troops from India was borne by the Home Government. Considerable savings accrued by reason of the absence of these men from India, and the consequent relief to the Indian revenues. The method of utilising these savings has been indicated in Chapter IV.

#### MEASURES FOR THE COERCION OF THE MADDA KHEL WAZIRS.

In September 1900 the withdrawal of regular troops from Datta Khel in the Tochi was contemplated, but before carrying out the measures it was determined to take such steps as would bring about the surrender of eight outlaws who, more than three years before, had participated in the treacherous and unprovoked attack by the Madda Khel Wazirs of Maizar and the neighbouring villages on the escort of the Political Officer of the Tochi Valley. Failing this, it was the intention to inflict exemplary punishment on the Madda Khel villages which had harboured them. The surrender of the outlaws was accordingly demanded from a jirga on pain of seizure or destruction of the tribal crops, and the destruction of their towers. In the event of surrender being delayed a fine of Rs. 3,000 was to be imposed. No outlaws were handed in by the tribe, and accordingly a punitive expedition was ordered.

No opposition was encountered by the force commanded by Brigadier-General W. Hill, C.B., Commanding Derajat District, which consisted of the 2nd Sikhs, 5th Punjab Infantry, 6 guns of No. 7 (Bengal) and No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery; together with  $\frac{1}{2}$  Squadron 2nd Punjab Cavalry and  $\frac{1}{2}$  of No. 1 Company Sappers and Miners. All the towers and crops in the Maizar Valley and Sheranni were destroyed, but of the eight outlaws it was possible to secure only one.

\* THE MAHSUD-WAZIRS BLOCKADE.

The blockade against the Mahsud-Wazirs was established in order to enforce the payment of a fine of a lakh of rupees, which had accumulated on account of numerous offences committed against the Government and British subject.

For some two years after the expedition of 1894-95, the Mahsuds had remained quiet; the *maliks* had kept their obligations; and the Mulla Powinda's influence seemed to have waned. In 1897, at the time of the Maizar affair in the Tochi Valley and the subsequent punitive expedition, the Mahsuds held aloof, in spite of attempts on the part of the Mulla Powinda to induce them to revolt; but in the following summer a recrudescence of outrages in British territory took place. During 1899 the outrages continued in a more pronounced form. In spite of an alleged settlement of the differences with the Mahsuds which was reported in March 1900, the fine was not paid and crime continued unabated throughout the year. A most serious outrage occurred on the night of the 22nd October 1900, when the Border Military Police post at Nasran, in British territory, 11 miles north of Tank, was surprised by Mahsuds. Lieutenant Hennessy, 45th Sikhs, Commanding at Jandola, started at daybreak next day to intercept the raiders and succeeded in his object, but at the cost of his life. It became obvious that effective steps should at once be taken to coerce the tribe, and, after consulting the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, the Officer Commanding the Punjab Frontier Force and the Commissioner of the Derajat, it was decided by the Government of India that the measures of coercion should take the form of a blockade in preference to that of a costly and unremunerative expedition.

In outline the scheme for the blockade was as follows:—The existing garrison in the Tochi Valley would close the Mahsud country on the north; Wana and the Gomal posts would effect the same on the south; a considerable addition would be made to the garrison of Sarwekai which would become the pivot of the position, and would prevent the Mahsuds raiding into the Gomal and elsewhere; flying columns would be stationed at Tank and Tajori.

Mr. Merk, Commissioner of the Derajat, received a representative tribal jirga at Tank on the 8th November 1900, explained to them the intention of Government to demand a lakh of rupees in complete settlement of their fines, and told them that, if within fifteen days they had not paid half of this sum, a blockade would be established, which would not be removed until the final instalment had been brought in. The jirga withdrew to discuss the proposals made to them, but at the end of fortnight they asked for two months' grace, and as there was no prospect of the early payment of the moiety of the fine, the blockade was proclaimed from the 1st December, and was enforced on that date.

\* A map is attached to illustrate the account of the operations.

The troops engaged were the 1st and 5th Punjab Cavalry, 2 guns of the Derajat; 4 guns of the Jullundur and 2 guns of the Gujrat Mountain Batteries; the 17th Bengal Infantry, 23rd Pioneers, 27th and 28th Punjab Infantry, 35th and 45th Sikhs, 2 Companies of the 9th, the 23rd and a Wing of the 24th Bombay Infantry. The whole, except the garrison of some petty outposts, came under the orders of the General Officer Commanding, Derajat District, General W. Hill, C.B., who was succeeded in August 1901 by Brigadier-General Denning, D.S.O.

A cordon was formed on the eastern side of the blockaded area, by a moveable column of 100 sabres and 300 rifles at Janikhel, and a similar column of 200 sabres and 600 rifles at Zam, acting in conjunction with certain Border Military Police. The Police posts of Khaira Khel and Mullazai were garrisoned by regular troops.

On the south, military garrisons occupied Murtaza and Manjhi at the mouth of the Gomai; two temporary posts were formed at Toi Manda and on the Khwuzhma Narai. Kajuri Kach was strengthened by an additional half company; Haidari Kach retained its usual garrison of half a company, while Jandola was increased by 50 rifles. Four hundred rifles were added to Sarwekai, and a new temporary post was established on the Spin plain. Ngandi Oba received a garrison of 20 sabres and 27 rifles, and the 23rd Pioneers were located at Murtaza. South of the Gomai and to the south-west of the Wazirs, the Zhob district garrisons were increased by the addition of a new levy post at Shinbaz Kotal, while Mir Ali Khel and the outposts of Moghal Kot and Kuch Bina were occupied by the 23rd Bombay Infantry from Fort Sandeman and a Wing of the 24th Bombay Infantry from Loralai. Rapid inter-communication between the blockading posts was ensured by a branch telegraph line linking up Sarwekai with Ngandi Oba; and further telegraphic communication was added by lines between Bannu and Jani Khel, Gazni Khel and Khairu Khel, Tank and Mullazai. In the Zhob district a branch field telegraph line was extended from Girdao to Hussain Nika.

At first it appeared that the Mahsuds were in earnest in their intention to pay the exceedingly lenient fine which had been imposed upon them. For a time raiding on British territory stopped, small sums in cash were handed in, and larger payments were made in rifles and cattle. Contributions, however, ceased in about the middle of January 1901, and during the fortnight ending on the 15th of that month, some half dozen offences against Government servants and property were reported. These crimes were considered by Mr. Merk to have been deliberately instigated by the Maliks in the hope of forcing Government into an expedition, in which case they looked to being protected as friendlies, while the trouble would fall on the tribesmen and the Maliks' political adversary, the Mulla Powinda. During February and March the situation improved; but in April tension between the different political factions within the tribe increased. Mahsud raids, chiefly on Powindas and Darwesh Khels, recommenced, and on the 10th of that month, in one bold raid into Zhob, a gang looted the baggage of Captain Jacob, Commandant of the Zhob Levy Corps, and killed two men.

Government had contemplated for some time the question of abandoning the Shahur Valley line of communications with Sarwekai through the Shahur



Tangi—a very difficult defile and one which afforded great opportunities to raiders. At the end of March it was decided that, owing to the physical impossibility of adequately guarding the passage of small parties along this route, Haidari Kach post should be dismantled and the route abandoned. This led to the breaking up of the Zam Moveable Column which was now divided between the posts of Tank, Girni, Jatta and Zam.

The wing of the 24th Bombay Infantry left their blockading stations on the 6th April 1901 for Loralai, being replaced at the outposts of Kuchbina and Moghal Kot by the Zhob Levy Corps. The latter post was also occupied by a detachment of the 23rd Bombay Rifles and a party of the 6th Bombay Cavalry.

Contributions in cash, breech-loading rifles and in cattle were made by the tribe in May 1901, to the value of Rs. 67,500, after conference with the Commissioner, Mr. Merk. During June and July small contributions towards the fine continued to be paid: nevertheless numerous fresh outrages by the Mahsud tribesmen were reported. On the 12th May a ration party of the Southern Waziristan Militia was taken at a disadvantage by Mahsud raiders between Kajuri Kach and Kashmir Kar; one sepoy was killed, four were wounded, and seven rifles were carried off. The other outrages included attacks on the village of Hassu Khel in lower Daur, when three villagers were killed and three wounded; on the regimental grazing guard of the 45th Sikhs at Jandola; on the Border Military Police Post at Baran in the Bannu district; on the Charweshkai post in the Sheranni country, when three Levy sepoy were killed and the Post Officer wounded; and on some militia sepoy near Tiarza, when one non-commissioned officer was killed and two men were wounded. These were followed by a still more serious offence. On the 6th August, in broad daylight, the militia post at Kashmir Kar was attacked by a band of Mahsuds estimated to be 200 strong. The thirty men of the garrison were surprised. A Havildar, three sepoy and three labourers were killed, the Native Officer Commanding the post and three men were wounded; and thirty rifles, with a large quantity of ammunition and property were carried off.

By this time the fines due from the tribe for offences committed since the commencement of the blockade alone, aggregated nearly half a lakh, while about half this amount was still due on account of the original fine. Till now, the troops employed in the blockade had acted on the defensive. Ordinarily, retaliation had not been undertaken; although on occasion prompt pursuit had forced the raiders to abandon their loot. In one instance over 1,000 sheep, which had been lifted near Chichobe, were saved by the prompt action of the Risaldar commanding the detachment of the Zhob Levy Cavalry at Moghalkot. The position was, however, rapidly becoming intolerable, and the Government of India decided that active retaliation should succeed the passive phase of the blockade, but that no active operations should be undertaken until the cold weather.

During September and October the Mahsuds were comparatively quiet, being occupied in fighting out a dispute of long standing with the Darwesh Khel, nevertheless they committed several minor offences and one of a more serious character. On the 23rd September, a band of about 50 Mahsuds, armed with rifles, marched 25 miles into the Bannu district and attacked a

village, killing seven persons. All payments towards the fine had now ceased. After ten months' rigorous enforcement of the blockade, only some three-fourths of the original demand had been collected; and the fines recorded for fresh offences had reached a figure which there was little prospect of realizing from the tribe by passive measures alone.

Two alternatives presented themselves to Government—the continuance of the blockade throughout the winter, followed by the despatch of an expedition through the country in the spring; or the maintenance of the blockade, emphasised by a succession of sharp sallies or raids of three or four days' duration, from different quarters of the blockade cordon, with a view to the destruction of crops and the capture of cattle and men. The decision given was in favour of the latter course of action in the belief that thereby would be found the only means of bringing the Mahsuds to subjection without the costly and indecisive expedition which it had been, from the first, the aim of Government to avoid.

While preparations were being made for retaliatory measures, a picket of the 9th Bombay Infantry was ambuscaded by Mahsuds on the 2nd November at Nili Kach and three men were killed. On the following afternoon a party of 32 rifles of the 17th Bengal Infantry, under the command of a Subadar, forming part of the escort furnished for the survey of the Murtaza-Sarwekai road, was ambushed by Mahsuds about two miles from the Khuzma Khulla post. The Subadar, 23 rank and file and six other persons were killed, and two sepoy and four other persons were wounded.

The Suliman Khel Moveable Column had meanwhile been moved to Dabra (on the Tank-Jatta road, 10 miles south of Zam) at the end of September, without arousing the suspicion of the Mahsuds, who supposed that the old Zam Moveable Column had been reformed. Field telegraph offices opened at Dabra and Spin in October, and it was also arranged that the reliefs for the Dera Ismail Khan garrison and the blockading force should be simultaneously brought to the Dera Ismail Khan border.

The *first series of active operations* was directed against the Mahsuds of the Khaisara and Shahur Valleys, combined with demonstrations from Jandola into the Takhi Zam, and against the North-Western portion of Mahsud territory from Datta Khel in the Tochi Valley. Instructions were given for the destruction of all Mahsud towers and defences, the capture of as many prisoners and cattle as possible; the removal of all grain and fodder; and the return of the columns to their several bases on the fourth day.

The force which was under the direction of Brigadier-General Denning, Commanding the Derajat District, was thus constituted:—

*No. 1 column* at Datta Khel under Lieutenant-Colonel Tonnochy, 3rd Sikhs; strength 900 rifles, 3rd Sikhs, and 2nd Punjab Infantry.

*No. 2 column* at Jandola under Colonel McRae, C.B., A.-D.-C., 45th Sikhs; strength 1,100 rifles, 1st Punjab Infantry, 27th Punjab Infantry, 45th Sikhs, and 9th Bombay Infantry.

*No. 3 column* at Sarwekai under Lieutenant-Colonel McLeod, 29th Punjab Infantry; strength 1,100 rifles, 1st Punjab Infantry, 29th Punjab Infantry, and 35th Sikhs.

*No. 4 column* at Wana under Lieutenant-Colonel W. Bunbury, 28th Punjab Infantry; strength 1,500 rifles, 17th Bengal Infantry, 23rd Pioneers and 28th Punjab Infantry.

To each column a Royal Engineer officer and an explosive party were attached.

No. 1 Column left Datta Khel on the 23rd November 1901, destroyed Dodgul on the 25th and the tower of one Khandar, a notorious outlaw, on the same date. Here Captain Forster, of the 2nd Punjab Infantry and one sepoy were wounded. The towers and defences of thirteen other villages were levelled. On the 26th, a reconnaissance was made towards Shaktu, and on the 27th, after leaving a small garrison at Bitt Malik Shahi, Colonel Tonnochy, with the remainder of the force, made a dash for Makin, about three-quarters of which was destroyed. During the retirement from this village the Mahsuds followed up the rear-guard, which lost two sepoy killed and five wounded. Bitt Malik Shahi was destroyed on the 28th, and the column returned to Datta Khel the same day.

No. 2 Column left Jandola on the night of the 24th November and proceeded *viâ* the Takhi Zam to Kot Shingi, which was partially destroyed, as well as some smaller villages *en route*. At Kot Shingi heavy opposition was encountered; and as the coolies who were employed for transport purposes had stampeded, and there were wounded to be carried, Colonel McRae abandoned his intention of joining the Sarwekai Column, and with the enemy following up his rear guard, returned to Jandola, which he reached on the afternoon of the 25th. About 20 casualties occurred during the operation. On the following day Colonel McRae made a reconnaissance as far as the Shahur Tangi and returned without encountering opposition.

No. 3 Column left Sarwekai early on the morning of the 25th November and penetrated to Badshah Khan's village, destroying the defences of several others *en route*. The column took several prisoners, captured 500 live stock, and returned to Sarwekai on the 27th without any casualties.

Leaving Wana on the night of the 24th November, No. 4 column surprised Torwam at daybreak on the 25th. In two days the Khaisara villages were completely cleared by the column, aided by a small mixed force detached from the Wana garrison under Captain McBarnet, 5th Punjab Cavalry. It returned to Wana on the 28th, having captured 124 prisoners and seized a large quantity of cattle, grain and fodder. The casualties were about twenty in number.

Simultaneously with these operations the Southern Waziristan Militia under Major Harman, D.S.O., operated in the Shaman Khel country, and, by a succession of well directed movements, effected a very large capture of cattle and flocks. The Northern Waziristan Militia under Captain Ferguson-Davie, D.S.O., operated on the Shaktu from Miranshab, and captured some of the Khaisara Maliks.

The success of the first series of operations was largely due to the fact that the Mahsuds were taken completely by surprise and had no time to remove their stores of grain, fodder and live stock. During the course of the combined



operations, 201 prisoners were taken and 4,000 animals were captured. The casualties amounted, on the Mahsud side, to approximately 60 killed, and on our side to 5 killed and 44 wounded.

Seeing that a sharp and swift repetition of these blows was the most effective method of reducing the tribe, the local civil officers proposed an early renewal of the attack. General Dening, in consultation with Mr. Merk, submitted proposals for further operations and at the same time asked for two additional battalions to enable him to carry them out. Consequently the 38th Dogras and the 32nd Pioneers, together with two sections of a field hospital, were despatched to Tank. The idea was entertained at first of forming an entrenched camp at Ahmedwam, to act as a base for a series of raids into the neighbouring valleys, but lack of water caused the abandonment of the scheme. In the meanwhile General C. O. Egerton, D.S.O., A.-D.-C., had been directed to proceed to Tank to assume control of the blockade operations, and four additional regiments were sent up.

*Second series of operations.*—The second series of operations commenced on the 4th December 1901, when Brigadier-General Dening advanced from Jandola against Kot Shingi and destroyed it. His force\* was divided into two columns under Colonel McRae, C.B., 45th Sikhs, and Lieutenant-Colonel Gray, 1st Punjab Infantry.

\* 50 Sabres, 1st Punjab Cavalry.  
4 Guns, Gujrat Mountain Battery.  
1st Punjab Infantry.  
23rd Pioneers.  
27th Punjab Infantry.  
28th " "  
29th " "  
35th Sikhs.  
45th " "  
Explosive party.

Punjab Infantry.

The next day the defences of several other villages were destroyed. During retirement on Guri Khel, the rear column under Colonel McRae became heavily engaged, and, owing to the premature withdrawal of a picquet, his left flank was so seriously threatened that he deemed it necessary to retake the position. As darkness was coming on, the column bivouacked on the ground it occupied, and continued its march on Guri Khel the following day. The casualties during the retirement were Captain McVean, 45th Sikhs, severely wounded, nine men killed, and eleven wounded. The entire force remained in bivouac at Guri Khel during the 6th December, the enemy making frequent attacks on the picquets, but being invariably repulsed. The Mahsuds were now seen in large numbers working round both flanks, and General Dening, fearing for the safety of a convoy which was expected from Jandola, resolved to retire on that place. On the 7th the force withdrew to Murga Bund, the enemy suffering severe loss in their attempts to rush the picquets and rear-guard. Jandola was reached, without further molestation on the evening of the 8th December, the defences of several villages being destroyed *en route*.

On the 10th December a column, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hogge, consisting of the 23rd and 22nd Pioneers and a detachment of the 29th Punjab Infantry, with 2 guns, of the Gujarat Mountain Battery marched from Jandola for Sarwekai, which it reached next day, having destroyed considerable quantities of grain and fodder and captured three prisoners. On the 15th a reconnaissance was made by this column from Sarwekai to Turan China, when further stores of grain were destroyed without opposition.

On the 17th December Major Lucas, D.S.O., 5th Gurkha Rifles, Commanding at Wana, made a demonstration against the Khaisara.

On the 19th December a force\* of 2,800 regular infantry with 4 guns and other units, and a detachment of the Southern Waziristan Militia, left Jandola in three columns under the command of Brigadier-General Dening, and marched to Umar Raghza.

\*4 Guns, Gujrat Mountain Battery.  
13 Sabres, 1st Punjab Cavalry.  
1st Punjab Infantry.  
27th " "  
28th " "  
35th Sikhs.  
38th Dogras.  
45th Sikhs.  
Southern Waziristan Militia.  
Explosive party.  
† 2 Guns, Gujrat Mountain Battery.  
23rd Pioneers.  
29th Punjab Infantry.  
32nd Pioneers.  
Explosive party.

It was joined at Darekai, in the Tré Shinkai, on the 21st by a column† of 1,300 infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Hogge, which had started from Sarwekai on the same date, and had moved up the Shahur Nala, encountering slight opposition.

Meanwhile on the 20th December General Dening moved his force to Ahmadwam and thence up the Tré Nala to Paridal, where it bivouacked. Next day he marched down the Tré Nala to meet the Sarwekai column, and, after effecting a junction, the united force bivouacked at Dwé Shinkai. Leaving the two Pioneer Regiments to guard the camp, the remainder of the force moved up the Dwé Shinkai in three columns, No. 1 under Colonel McRae, No. 2 under Colonel Gray, and No. 3 under Colonel Vivian. On the 23rd December General Dening detached a column under Colonel Gray against Talab Khel and Sangar, and another, under Major Drew, against the Guri Khel villages north of Ahmadwam. General Dening himself, with the remainder of the force, returned to Guri Khel, where the whole force re-united. Some opposition was encountered, Captain Cassels, 35th Sikhs, and seven men, 38th Dogras, being wounded. From thence the whole force returned to Jandola on the 24th December.

*Third series of operations.*—In pursuance of the same policy and with the object of avoiding any measures which might involve a more than transient occupation of the Mahsud country, and thus insensibly develop into an expedition, the Government of India next, in communication with General Egerton and Colonel Deane, arranged for a third series of operations which would have the effect of tightening the cordon of the blockade, and of dealing further blows at the Mahsuds from an unexpected direction in the large grazing grounds lying between the Khaisara Valley and Tank.

† Murree Mountain Battery.  
1—2nd Gurkha Rifles.  
1—3rd " "  
11th Rajputs.  
13th " "

Extra troops which were originally intended to form a reserve brigade, had by this time arrived on the scene.

Three columns advanced simultaneously on the 1st January 1902. *No. 1 Column.*—From Jandola, under Brigadier-General Dening. Strength 30 sabres, 4 mountain guns and 2,450 rifles. *No. 2 Column.*—From Jani Khel, under Colonel McRae. Strength 4 Mountain Battery guns and 1,400 rifles. *No. 3 Column.*—From Datta Khel under Lieutenant-Colonel Tonnochy, 3rd Sikhs, strength 2 Mountain Battery guns and 1,400 rifles. In addition some 300 of the Northern Waziristan Militia under Captain A. F. Ferguson-Davie, and 300 Southern Waziristan Militia under Major Harman, were employed under the orders of the Commissioner to crown the

Babargarh range and prevent the Mahsuds from escaping into the Bhattanni country.

The Jani Khel and Datta Khel Columns effected a junction at Kikarai on the 5th January, with but slight opposition, and the following day moved up the Shaktu, destroying the 13 towers of the Tutia Khel defence. Unfortunately, during the operations, Captain C. P. Down, Political Officer in the Tochi, was mortally wounded. On the 8th January they reached Datta Khel. No. 1 column returned to Jandola on the 7th January, having captured a quantity of live stock and some prisoners, without a serious engagement.

As the troops needed rest, General Egerton now withdrew the bulk of the Jandola column into standing camp at Zam; the 38th Dogras and 2nd Gurkha Rifles to Miranshah; and the Murree Mountain Battery, 3rd Gurkha Rifles and 27th Punjab Infantry to Baran on the Bannu border. The Militia returned to their usual stations.

The total casualties during whole series of operations amounted on the British side to—

*British Officers.*

Died of wounds	...	...	...	...	...	1
Wounded	...	...	...	...	...	4

*Native Officers.*

Killed or died of wounds	...	...	...	...	3
Wounded	...	...	...	...	3

*Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.*

Killed or died of wounds	...	...	...	...	26
Wounded	...	...	...	...	99

*Followers.*

Killed	...	...	...	...	1
Wounded	...	...	...	...	5

*Southern Waziristan Militia.*

Wounded	...	...	...	...	2
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The casualties on the Mahsud side were about equal. Great damage had been inflicted on their settlements and more than 4,000 head of sheep and cattle were captured from them.

On the 16th January 1902 the Mahsuds sent in a deputation asking for terms, and were informed that a preliminary to any discussion was the payment in cash of the balance of the one lakh fine, and the surrender of all rifles taken during the blockade. They were given until the 9th February to comply with these conditions, and on that date the *jirga* met Mr. Merk at Jandola, bringing a considerable portion of the fine and rifles. The remaining rifles were surrendered by the 26th February. Government further decided that before the blockade could be raised certain outlaws must be surrendered, and that all animals looted during the blockade up to the end of November 1901 should be restored. By the 23rd February the balance of the fine was paid up.

Immediate steps were taken by the Mahsud Waziris for the arrest of such outlaws as remained within the tribal borders, and a promise was given to exclude permanently all those who had fled into Afghanistan.

On the 10th March, 93 *jirga* prisoners were given in as security for the restoration of cattle within one month, and the blockade was raised the same day. In communicating their remarks upon the final report of the Commissioner of the Derajat upon the Mahsud blockade, the Government of India expressed concurrence in his opinion that the operations against the Mahsuds, and more especially the offensive operations, had been successful. Satisfaction had been obtained for previous offences and compensation had been exacted for offences committed during the blockade. It was considered that the tribe had suffered, in addition, severer punishment than had previously been inflicted, and that there was every reason to believe that their submission was genuine and complete. It was acknowledged that a passive blockade is not of itself, unless unduly protracted, sufficient to compel the submission of the tribesmen, and is not therefore worth the expense and exposure to the troops that is entailed. The active blockade, with recourse to sudden retaliatory raids, which was a new departure in frontier warfare, promised as good results in the future as at the time of its initiation.

The greatest number of troops employed at any one time on these operations was 12,777, exclusive of frontier militia. Of these 8,232 belonged to the frontier garrisons of Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, the Tochi and Wana; and the remainder, *viz.*, 4,545 were specially mobilised. With the approval of His Majesty, the India General Service Medal with clasp "Waziristan 1901-02" was awarded to the troops and followers who took part in the active operations.

Foreign Department  
letter to the Agent  
to the Governor Gen-  
eral, North-West  
Frontier Province,  
No. 1391-F., dated  
23rd May 1902.

#### THE CHINA EXPEDITION.

The "Boxer" outbreak which, in the summer of 1900, drew to North China military contingents from nearly every European nation, originated in the Shantung Province. In China, as elsewhere, an air of mystery as to its proceedings is recognised as a valuable asset to a secret society, and the teachers of the "Boxer" cult were not behindhand in laying claim to supernatural powers. Knowing the aversion of the Government to all secret societies, the leaders of the movement were careful to profess great loyalty towards the Throne, and adopted as their motto the words "Exalt the dynasty and destroy the foreigners." The numbers of the society swelled with startling rapidity, and, with an eye to pleasing the people, it was proclaimed that the object of the movement was the destruction of the Roman Catholic priests and converts. That such an object would appeal to the popular mind was natural, for a law of recent introduction had given to the French Roman Catholic priests powers which were reported to be not infrequently unjustly applied for the protection of wrong-doers among the converts.

At first the "Boxers" confined their operations to Shantung, but towards the end of 1899 they overflowed to the southern part of Chi-Li. Although punishment was meted out to actual offenders, the Chinese Government, in the edicts issued, undoubtedly favoured the "Boxer" cause, and the Chinese officials, compelled in the first instance to tolerate the movement, soon found



themselves powerless to restrain it, and a reign of terror began. Gaining courage as their numbers increased, the "Boxers" openly defied the provincial officials and spread devastation through the land. The immunity which had hitherto been enjoyed by Protestant converts was of short duration, and in June 1900 a wholesale massacre of Chinese Christians commenced.

In the meantime the Foreign Ministers were vainly demanding the suppression of the rising, but were put off by promises which the Chinese Government had no intention of fulfilling. As the Legations were considered to be threatened, they were reinforced by detachments from the allied fleets lying off Taku bar. On the 13th June the legations were first attacked and all communications with the outer world were severed. Admiral Seymour having been warned of the critical situation of the small European community in Peking, had rapidly assembled an international force of some 2,000 seamen and marines for its relief. As no transport of any kind was procurable; the railway was the only possible line of advance but as it had been torn up by the "Boxers" progress was slow. Moreover the line behind the relieving force was destroyed by the Chinese, who thus interrupted communication with Tientsin.

At Lang-Fang, on the 11th June, Admiral Seymour encountered the first active opposition. North of this place the line was found to be wrecked to such an extent that further advance by railway was hopeless. Besides the opposition had now assumed such proportions that Admiral Seymour found his small column unequal to the repair of the line, as well as the holding in check of the swarming hordes of Chinese which now encompassed him on every side. He, therefore, decided to make use of the river route and withdrew his force to Yangtsun, where he had ordered boat transport to await him. These orders had never reached Tientsin, and in default of transport of any sort, with ammunition exhausted and a shortage of supplies, nothing remained for him but to retire on Tientsin. The Hsi-Ku Imperial Armoury, within a few miles of the Native City of Tientsin, was reached in face of strenuous opposition, every village, and every favourable position being successively contested by bands of the enemy. Beyond Hsi-Ku Admiral Seymour was unable to move. Between him and the Concessions lay the native city swarming with well-armed Chinese; and through the tortuous by-ways of the town he could not hope to transport his wounded, which now numbered over two hundred. The discovery of quantities of modern arms and ammunition in the armoury, however, enabled the force to hold out against frequent and determined attacks until it was relieved on the 25th June.

Meanwhile Tientsin itself had been in a state of siege. The garrison had, been strongly reinforced from the international fleets, and, as communications with the sea were threatened, it had been necessary to bombard and assault the Taku forts commanding the entrance to the river Pei-Ho.

On the 16th June the Chinese delivered a determined attack on the Concessions, and were driven out only with the greatest difficulty. On the same date they commenced a bombardment of the town which continued without intermission, until the 22nd, when the first detachments of the relieving force from Hong-kong appeared in the vicinity of the settlement. Contingents from Weihai-wei and Singapore later swelled the garrison to numbers warranting an

assumption of the offensive. General Dorrard arrived and took over command of the British contingent. On the 27th an international force assaulted the eastern arsenal about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles north-east of the Concessions; on the 5th July the Chinese were driven from the west arsenal. But the native city still harboured vast numbers of the enemy, and from it desperate attacks were delivered on the Railway station, while an almost continuous rain of shell was poured into the Concessions. Meanwhile a steady stream of reinforcements was reaching the settlement, until the garrison was augmented to over 12,000 men. The time had now arrived to carry out the assault on the native city, and after, twenty-four hours of heavy fighting on the 13th and 14th July, the Japanese succeeded in blowing in the southern City gate. The fall of the walled native city caused a general withdrawal of the Chinese from the neighbourhood of the Concessions.

Early in June 1900 the Home Government contemplated the despatch of the Hongkong and Singapore garrisons to the north, and Indian troops were demanded in replacement. The 1st Sikhs and 7th Bengal Infantry were accordingly held in readiness to proceed to China. On the 18th June, the situation in Peking and Tientsin being very grave, the Government of India was asked to take steps for the immediate despatch of three infantry regiments, a native cavalry regiment, a company of sappers and miners and a battery of horse or field artillery; in addition to the two battalions already warned for service. Brigadier-General Sir Alfred Gaselee, K.C.B., A.D.C., was selected to command the expeditionary force,\* and Brigadier-General E. G. Barrow, C.B., Deputy Adjutant General, Bengal Command, was appointed infantry brigadier. A thousand mules—all that could be spared from India at the time—were detailed for the obligatory mule transport establishment of the force, and orders were issued for the enrolment in the Punjab of two transport coolie corps, each 1,000 strong, to provide additional carrying power; eventually two more of similar strength were sent. None of these coolies were used in China for carrying loads, but a number of them were employed in various ways. They did not prove a very useful addition to the force, and most of them were soon sent back to India.

\*12th Field Battery.  
1st Bengal Lancers.  
24th Punjab Infantry.  
22nd Bombay Infantry.  
1st Madras Pioneers.  
1 Company Madras Sappers and Miners.  
R-7 Ammunition Column.  
1 Photo-litho section.  
1 Printing section.

On the 22nd June Her Majesty's Government expressed satisfaction with the prompt action of the Government of India, and at the same time, in reply to Lord Curzon's offer, asked if India could augment the force hitherto detailed to a strength of 10,000 native soldiers, including another cavalry regiment, more sappers and miners and, if possible, another battery. In return the Home Government undertook to deliver in India, by the 1st October, four battalions of British infantry. As accounts from Tientsin seemed to show that mounted troops would be of the greatest service there, the Secretary of State agreed, on the 19th July, to the despatch of the additional mounted troops† to China.

3rd Bombay Cavalry.  
16th Bengal Lancers.  
B. Battery Royal Horse Artillery.  
R-2 Ammunition Column.

In view of the increased strength of the force, the temporary rank of Major-General, with the local rank of Lieutenant-General, was conferred on Sir Alfred Gaselee, and Brigadier-General E. G. Barrow was appointed Chief of the Staff, with the local rank of Major-General. Sir Alfred Gaselee was also

Despatch of Indian Troops to China.



appointed to the Chief Command of all Imperial British troops in North China, and orders were received from England, that, since the cost of the expedition would be debited to the Imperial Treasury, the direction of operations would be undertaken by the Home Government, which would issue its instructions through the Secretary of State for India.

Wei-hai-wei was selected by the War Office as the base for the troops in North China, Colonel Lorne Campbell being appointed Commandant with the local rank of Brigadier-General.

The despatch of the expedition was pressed forward with all haste, and the first detachment to leave India for North China was the left wing of the 7th Bengal Infantry, which sailed from Calcutta on the 25th June and arrived at Taku on the 17th July. From that date until the middle of September, an almost continual stream of transports carried away troops and stores from Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Karachi and Rangoon. In a few cases the troops were embarked at Bombay, their obligatory transport being despatched from Calcutta; but as this arrangement resulted in units reaching their destination without transport, it was afterwards arranged that the obligatory transport should be despatched in the same steamer as the troops to which it belonged. By the 13th of August the whole of the original force of two infantry brigades, the divisional troops and the cavalry brigade, had sailed.

As General Gaselee decided to employ the Hongkong regiment actively in the north, it was replaced at that port by the 34th Pioneers. On his voyage up the China Coast General Gaselee stopped at Shanghai to confer with the local authorities on defence measures. As a result of this conference, the 2nd Brigade of the China Expeditionary Force was diverted to Shanghai, where it remained throughout the subsequent operations in the north.

The despatch of an Indian force occasioned a striking display of loyalty on the part of many of the native Chiefs in India, who came forward with offers of troops for service in China; notwithstanding that the Imperial Service contingents which they maintain are organised solely with a view to co-operation in the local defence of India. The Maharaja of Gwalior's princely offer to provide and maintain a hospital ship for the service of British and Native soldiers in China was gratefully accepted by the Imperial Government. His Highness also volunteered to serve in person and to devote the strength of his State to the support of Great Britain. The Maharaja of Káshmir and the Raja of Nabha tendered the services of their troops. The Jodhpur Imperial Service Troops, with Colonel Sir Partab Singh in command, were placed at the disposal of the Government of India; as were also those for Patiala, Kapurthala, Bikanir, Bhopal, Maler Kotla, Jind, Alwar, Rampur and Bahawalpur. The Maharaja of Patiala and Bikanir, the Raja of Jind and the Maharaj Rana of Dholpur offered personal services, while the Gaekwar of Baroda expressed a wish to provide a cavalry regiment.

It was clear that the patriotic and loyal sentiments of Native Princes would be inadequately recognised by a mere public acknowledgment of gratitude. The Government of India therefore decided to make a selection from the troops thus placed at their disposal, and to send to China a small force which should be representative of the support, both moral and material, which had been so abundantly preferred. Her Majesty's Government agreed to the proposal,

and accordingly certain Imperial Service units were detailed to join the 4th Infantry Brigade and the Divisional troops.

On the 2nd and 6th August, respectively, the 3rd and 4th Infantry Brigades, commanded by Brigadier-Generals Reid and Cummins were warned for service in China. Certain details were also added to the line of communication troops.

The troops sent from India to China were: 1 battery Royal Horse Artillery, 1 battery Royal Field Artillery (335 British Troops of all ranks); 3 companies Sappers and Miners (25 British Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers and 551 Native Ranks); 3 regiments Native Cavalry (39 British Officers and 1,492 Native Ranks); 17 regiments Native Infantry (252 British Officers and 12,328 Native Ranks); giving a total of 648 British and 14,371 Native troops, excluding the Hong Kong Garrison.

To anticipate the heavy calls for drafts which might be necessary to replace casualties in action or by disease, it was decided, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, that in the case of corps proceeding to China, extra recruitment should be permitted to the extent of 100 men for each battalion; and 10 per cent. on peace establishment of each unit of Cavalry and Sappers and Miners. The Home Government agreed to bear the extra cost involved by this measure, as well as all charges connected with the expedition. The savings resulting from the absence of the troops from India, were utilised as described in Chapter IV.

General Gaselee reached Tientsin on the 27th July. Since the capture of the native city on the 14th July, everything in and around Tientsin had been perfectly quiet. The all-important business was now the immediate relief of the Legations in Peking. Owing to the deflection of the 2nd Brigade to Shanghai, General Gaselee had less than 4,000 troops available for the advance, and could expect no increase to his strength for some weeks. Nevertheless he was foremost in urging that the advance on Peking should no longer be delayed. At the beginning of August the northernmost outpost of the Allies was in the Hsi-ku Armoury, about three miles north of Tientsin City. The principal Chinese camp was at Pei-ts'ang, about five miles from Hsi-ku. It was resolved to drive them out of this position and to advance as far as Yang-tsun.

The united forces\* advanced at daylight on the 5th August. By 10-30

\* British Contingent.

12th Battery, Royal Field Artillery.

1st Bengal Lancers ... 400 men.

7th Bengal Infantry ... 500 "

24th Punjab Infantry ... 300 "

1st Sikhs ... 500 "

A.M. the boat brigade at Pei-ts'ang was captured. An attempt to continue the advance up the right bank of the Pei-ho failed owing to deep water channels and the marshy nature of the ground. It was therefore decided to halt at Pei-

ts'ang for the night. On the left bank of the Pei-ho the Russians and French had been stopped by the inundations and had taken no part in the fighting. The British losses during the day were 26 killed and wounded, while the Japanese, who had borne the brunt of the battle, suffered over 300 casualties. The other allies sustained no losses.

On the 6th August the march on Yan-tsun was resumed. The enemy was soon discovered in a position south of Yang-tsun, and was routed by the

British, American, and Japanese troops. The British casualties during the action amounted to 6 men killed, and one officer and 37 men wounded. Next day the whole force halted at Yang-tsun, and a conference of the allied generals was held, at which it was decided that the advance on Peking should be pushed on without giving the enemy time to recover. The French, having no transport, were obliged to remain at Yang-tsun supported by small detachments of British, Japanese and Americans.

On the 8th the advance was resumed, the British, Russian and Japanese cavalry covering the front of the whole force. Tung-chou was occupied on the 12th, very little resistance having been encountered *en route*. The Japanese, American, and British Generals were anxious to attack Peking on the 14th, but in deference to the wishes of the Russian Commander, who expressed his inability to move earlier, further advance was postponed to the 15th. An attempt on the part of the Russians to forestal their allies by a premature attack on Peking was frustrated by Chinese opposition in the suburbs of the town. The Japanese also were stoutly opposed at the City gate assigned to them as their objective. The British found an undefended entrance, and were able to claim the credit of reaching the Legation defences foremost of the allies, and of being the first to relieve the beleaguered garrison.

In April 1901 General Gaselee proposed a progressive withdrawal of troops from China, and the breaking up of the 4th Brigade was sanctioned. He, later, proposed further considerable reductions. It was the unanimous opinion of the generals that delay in the evacuation of Chih-li would, owing to the unhealthiness of the hot season, cause much loss of life. They came to an agreement as to the total numbers of troops which would be sufficient to guarantee the acceptance of the terms imposed upon China, and it was settled that the reduction of the British Contingent should be effected *pari passu* with that of the Allies. The withdrawal commenced on the 3rd July, and Peking, except for the Legation guards, was evacuated on the 19th August. By that time the defences of the Legation had been greatly strengthened. The command of the British Contingent devolved on Major-General O'M. Creagh, V.C., who, in January 1902, proposed to reduce the number of British troops in North China (excluding Shanghai) to 2,000 men, inclusive of the Legation guards. It was not, however, until the reduction of the French and German Contingents, had been effected that it became possible to reduce the British Contingent from eight battalions to six, which were divided equally between North China and Hong Kong. Subsequently the garrison of each place has been reduced by 1 Battalion of Native Infantry.

#### DESPATCH OF TROOPS TO JUBALAND.

In response to a demand by the Secretary of State a small force\* was despatched from Bombay in January 1901 to assist in quelling disturbances in Jubaland, under the British East African Protectorate. The troops returned to India in the following May.

\* One Section, No. 9 Native Mountain Battery.

Head-quarters Wing, 16th Bombay Infantry.

50 Camel Sowars, Aden troop.

\* Maxims with detachment 16th Bombay Infantry.

\* A detachment from the Aden troop proceeded direct from Aden.



## OPERATIONS IN THE ADEN HINTERLAND.

The despatch of troops to the Aden Hinterland was the result of unfounded claims made by certain tribes on the borders of the Turkish province of Yemen to territory which was undoubtedly subject to British jurisdiction. Disputes arose in 1901, and in that year certain subjects of the Turks constructed a defensible tower at Ad Dareja within the limits of the Haushabi tribe, which was under British protection. The tower commanded a main trade route and was used as a customs post. After a long diplomatic correspondence it was destroyed by a force sent out from Aden in July 1901 under Major Rowe of the 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment. The column was composed of 200 men of the 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment, 200 men of the 5th Bombay Light Infantry, one half of No. 4 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners and 6 mountain guns manned by No. 16 Company, Western Division, Royal Garrison Artillery.

In October 1901 the British and Turkish Governments agreed to the demarcation of the frontier between the Turkish province of Yemen and the Aden Protectorate. Colonel Wahab, C.I.E., R.E., was appointed British Commissioner, while Colonel Mustafa Rienzi, assisted by several colleagues, represented the Turkish interests. It was arranged that the escort of each Commission should not exceed 200 men ; but the Turks had troops within 12 miles of Dthala, where the first meeting took place on the 11th February 1902, while the British Commission had no supports nearer than Aden, 88 miles distant by road. The Turkish Commissioners, however, adopted an attitude so uncompromising as to verge on open hostility and, in addition to putting forward preposterous claims, they seized and occupied all territory in dispute. The British Commission was thus placed in an undignified, and by no means secure position, and could effect no progress in the work of delimitation beyond a partial survey of the immediate neighbourhood.

In August the British Government formally protested to the Porte against these acts of occupation, but with little practical effect, and it was therefore determined to resort to force if necessary. The Aden Garrison was reinforced by the 102nd Grenadiers, a wing of the 123rd Rifles and the Abbottabad Mountain Battery from India ; and in January 1903, a column under the command of Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel English, Dublin Fusiliers,

marched from Aden for Dthala. In strength the column\* was little over 500 men, but such was the lack of water along the route that even this small force

\* Second Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers,  
102nd Grenadiers.  
Aden Troop-  
No. 45 Company, Royal Garrison Artillery, with  
two 7-pr. guns.

was compelled to move in two detachments, and took nine days to reach its objective. The Turks had meanwhile increased the garrison of Kataba, 12 miles from Dthala, and had strengthened their post at Jalela where they had erected a defensible serai within 2 miles of the camp of the British Commission. They had about 850 men between these two places with seven mountain guns and one field piece of modern type. The situation was now becoming serious, and although the Turkish Government might have no intention of embarking on open war, it was evident that the official representatives of the Porte on the Aden frontier would yield only to a display of force.

Early in February, His Majesty's Government agreed to the despatch of additional troops to Aden. By the middle of March over 2,000 British and

Native troops, fully equipped with camel transport and supplies for a month were concentrated at Dthala and Nobat Dakim. The line of communications was organised, the road improved, and Dthala and Aden were connected by field telegraph. To add to the effect of the movement of troops, and to convince the Porte that His Majesty's Government was thoroughly in earnest, two cruisers from the Mediterranean fleet were ordered to Aden, whence they could reach Hodeida, the port of Yemen, in little more than a day's steaming.

On the 13th March an ultimatum was presented to the Porte which resulted in all Turkish troops and levies being withdrawn behind the line indicated by the British Commissioner as the approximate frontier of the Aden Protectorate. Although there was no longer much fear of a collision with the Turks, the local officials were not inclined to be friendly, and demarcation was still delayed. Various attempts, too, were made to tamper with the tribes within the British sphere of influence, and for these reasons it was impossible to reduce the number of troops at Dthala to any material extent. As, however, there was a scarcity of forage, the Abbottabad Mountain Battery was ordered back to India, and some other units were moved to Aden. Hitherto the tribes on the line of communications had given but little trouble. A few shots had been fired when the troops first marched up, but on the whole they were fairly well disposed. In May, however, it was found necessary to send a column from Dthala against a small group of tribes in the hilly and rather difficult Al Ajud country, east of the main route to Dthala where it passes through the Hardaba defiles. This column consisted in the first instance two companies of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and 123rd Rifles and four guns, 6th Mountain Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery; the whole being under the command of Major G. C. Dowell, Royal Garrison Artillery. Slight opposition was encountered, and our losses during the eight days the column was in the field, were two men wounded. Some towers were blown up or destroyed by shell fire, but the enemy's losses were not ascertained.

In August there were at Dthala, Jalela and in a post at the foot of the pass, leading to Dthala, 1,470 Infantry of the Dublin Fusiliers, Hampshires and 123rd Rifles, six mountain guns and two guns of No. 45 Company, Royal Garrison Artillery. The Boundary Commission escort consisted of about 200 men, while on the line of communications there were about 210 Native infantry and some camel sowars of the Aden Troop.

On the 31st August a survey party with an escort of 100 British and 100 Native infantry with two guns of No. 6 Mountain Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery, marched for the Shaibi territory. This tribe is an offshoot of the Yaffai-assufal (Upper Yaffai) and occupies a small, but extremely difficult piece of country between the Bana river and the Dthala plateau. On the 4th September the survey party was fired on and a Native surveyor was killed at a village called Hadara. As a reprisal the towers of this village were destroyed on the following day without opposition. Meanwhile, to maintain communications with Dthala, a post had been established at Awabil, garrisoned by 100 Hampshires, 100 of the 123rd Rifles and two 7-pr. guns. This post was attacked on the 13th September, but the garrison repulsed the enemy killing 20 of them and wounding many more, including several persons of consequence. Our losses were one mortally, and five slightly wounded.

The Turks now laid claim to Rubiaten in such terms that the survey party there had to be withdrawn, and the whole of the troops returned leisurely to Dthala. But in the Shaibi country the joint Commissioners came to an agreement on the boundary and erected the first pillar on the 11th October.

Meanwhile the Aden column had become appreciably reduced in strength. The climate had commenced to tell on the troops, and a number of men were unfit for duty in the field. The total strength of the column in October did not exceed 1,120 Infantry, 6 mountain guns and a few camel sowars. The tribes on the line of communications now began to give trouble. The Dthambaris, who had always been ill-disposed, interfered with the main road above Nobat; the Kotaibis, the strongest and most truculent of Al Ajud clans, imposed dues, to which they had no right, on the road near the Hardaba defiles. To keep communications open it was necessary to establish a strong post at Sulek; nevertheless two outrages were committed on the road by Dthambaris, inhabitants of a village called Nakhien. On the 5th October 200 rifles of the Dublin Fusiliers (who were returning to Aden), about a Company of the 102nd Grenadiers, two guns of No. 6 Mountain Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery, a section of the camel battery and some mounted infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel English, marched for Nakhien. The village was reached on the 7th and its towers and crops were destroyed. Our losses were six wounded, one of whom died. This affair at first seemed to produce a good effect, but the withdrawal of the Dublin Fusiliers to Aden was apparently taken as a sign of weakness on our part, and the tribes were encouraged to further efforts. On the 25th October a party of the Kotaibi ambuscaded the mails on their way down country from Dthala, killing both the sowars who were in charge of them, and carrying off all the bags. The same day the Kotaibis appeared in force before the Sulek post, and commenced a series of attacks which eventually necessitated relief from Dthala, where the Dublin Fusiliers were replaced by the 1st Battalion of the East Kent Regiment (the Buffs) and the head-quarters of the Hampshires, 255 strong.

A column of 540 infantry and four guns having been formed, a series of operations was now undertaken against the Kotaibis, which lasted until the 13th November, and resulted in the tribe being completely driven from their fastnesses with a loss of perhaps 250 men. Their towers were demolished, and their villages and crops almost entirely destroyed with heavy loss. The British casualties were 9 killed and 21 wounded, including two officers.

By the end of 1903 progress in demarcation work permitted of the Aden column being withdrawn to Al Mileh between Sulek and Nobat, and later to Musemir. The 123rd Rifles were at this stage sent back to Aden, being replaced by the head-quarters wing of the 102nd Grenadiers.

The Boundary Commission was now on the point of entering the country of the Subaihi, a predatory tribe broken up into many sections and recognising no central authority. Against this tribe retribution for a long list of misdeeds had been outstanding for years, and it was fully expected that they would actively oppose the progress of demarcation. In order to be prepared for eventualities, the Commission escort was reinforced by 2 guns, 40 rifles and a maxim. The difficult nature of the country about to be traversed did not admit of a larger increase.



For the support of the Commission a flying column was organised from the troops at Musemir, while a second force, known as the "Subaihi column" was mobilised at Aden. This force, consisting of 3 Companies of the Buffs, 2 Companies of the 123rd Rifles and one section of the camel battery, moved to Dar-al-kudaimi in the Subaihi country, there to await the arrival of the Boundary Commission. These measures effectually overawed the tribe, and except for an unimportant encounter, the progress of the Commission was opposed. The Aden column,—with the exception of the flying column and the headquarters of the 102nd which withdrew to Musemir,—was broken up on the 1st March 1904, but troops were temporarily retained at Dthala and on the line of communications thither. As the Commission was now approaching the coast, Ras Ara, 70 miles west of Aden, became its base, and here 350 rifles of the 94th Russel's Infantry were located until the delimitation work was brought to a conclusion in the following May.

#### PUNISHMENT OF THE GUMATTI OUTLAWS.

Since the beginning of 1899, a series of attacks had been made upon our Militia and Border Military Police posts in the country between the Tochi and Thal. In August 1902, a raid was made on the Gurguri Police station, in which the Deputy Inspector and a constable were killed. The offences were traced to Darwesh Khel outlaws, who had taken refuge in the tract of country between Thal, Bahadur Khel and Bannu. Major-General C. C. Egerton, C.B., D.S.O., A.-D.-C., Commanding the Punjab Frontier District, was selected to command the force detailed to carry out reprisals, which was organised in four columns:—

(1) Idak Column, commanded by Colonel Tonnochy, consisting of 150 sabres, 1st Punjab Cavalry, 2 guns and 600 rifles and 20 men Northern Waziristan Militia.

(2) Thal Column, commanded by Colonel Pollock, consisting of 150 sabres, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, 4 guns, Kohat Mountain Battery and the 22nd Punjab Infantry.

(3) Barganattu Column, commanded by Colonel Martin, consisting of 40 sabres, 5th Punjab Cavalry, 2 guns from Bannu and 600 rifles from the garrison of Kohat.

(4) Gumatti Column, commanded by Colonel Radford, consisting of 40 sabres, 1st Punjab Cavalry, 2 guns and 400 rifles from the garrison of Bannu.

The Idak Column started on 17th November 1902, and the other columns on the following day. The Idak Column had several casualties in effecting the destruction of a tower held by a small party of outlaws; namely, Colonel Tonnochy and Captain G. E. White killed and three officers wounded; also three native ranks killed and eleven wounded. During the next few days the four columns moved in various directions harassing the enemy and destroying his towers. In these operations 66 towers were destroyed, 5,288 cattle and a number of arms were captured, and many of the enemy killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. Sufficient punishment having been inflicted, the whole force was withdrawn by the 25th November.

## OPERATIONS IN SOMALILAND.

Native levies had for some time been engaged in Somaliland in operations conducted against the Mullah. In October 1902, the latter was strongly reinforced, severe fighting took place, and the levies were forced to retire. Colonel Swayne, who was conducting the operations asked that reliable troops should be sent, and on 19th October orders were issued to the Resident at Aden for the despatch of a Native Infantry Battalion. A wing of the 101st Grenadiers was accordingly sent from Aden on 21st October, and was followed, on the 9th November, by No. 65 Native Field Hospital. About the same time 900 East African troops arrived under Brigadier-General Manning, who assumed Command of the forces in the Protectorate; and 150 Native Mounted Infantry were despatched from India, followed in December and January by the 52nd Sikhs, 107th Pioneers, No. 1 Co., 3rd Sappers and Miners, a section of No. 15 British Field Hospital, No. 69 Native Field Hospital and 22 Native ranks of the Bikanir Camel Corps.

Operations in Somaliland.

A portion of General Manning's force met with a reverse in June 1903, and the fear of the interruption of his communications with Berbera, caused reinforcements to be hurried to the Protectorate. From Aden came 300 men of the Hampshire Regiment and half a battalion of the 101st Grenadiers, while from India were despatched 2 Companies of British and 2 of Native Mounted Infantry, the 27th Punjabis, No. 3 Co. of the 3rd Sappers and Miners, a printing section of the 2nd Sappers and Miners and No. 4 Engineer Field Park, together with another section of a British Field Hospital, a Remount Depôt, Brigade Supply Office, and Field Staff Offices. Major-General Sir C. C. Egerton was appointed to the Command of the force, and conducted the operations under the control of the War Office, to which all expenditure was debited.

With the exception of the 101st Grenadiers, 107th Pioneers and 2 Companies of Native Mounted Infantry, all the Indian troops returned from Somaliland to India between May and July 1904. The numbers of British and Indian Troops detached from the Indian Garrison for service in Somaliland were—

British Troops . . . . .	300
Native Troops (excluding 79 British Officers) . . . . .	3,376

being  $\frac{1}{3}$ rd Battery Native Artillery, 2 Companies Sappers and Miners,  $\frac{2}{8}$  Battalion British Infantry, and 4 Regiments Native Infantry. The saving which resulted from the debit of the pay of these troops to the Imperial Exchequer were utilised on measures for the improvement of the army (*vide* Chapter IV).

## THE TIBET MISSION.

In June 1903 His Majesty's Government directed the despatch of a Mission to the Tibet Frontier for the discussion of frontier and grazing questions and of trade relations generally. Khamba Jong, on the Tibet border north of Sikkim, was fixed on as the meeting place of the delegates, and Major F. E. Younghusband, who was later granted the temporary rank of Lieutenant-Colonel was appointed to act in the British interest, an escort of 200 men of

the 32nd Pioneers being detailed as escort to the Mission. In order to be prepared for emergencies a further detachment of 300 men of the same regiment was held in reserve at Tangu in northern Sikkim, three marches south of Khamba Jong. By the 1st July the Mission and escort were assembled at Tangu. Thence Mr. Claude White, Political Officer in Sikkim, proceeded in advance to Khamba Jong, being eventually joined there by the British Commissioner.

The Tibetan officials, however, refused to negotiate at Khamba Jong, and notified the intention of their Government to resist forcibly any further advance into the country. Matters were thus at a deadlock, and by the middle of September negotiations had not advanced in any particular. The Imperial Government now appealed to the Court at Peking, as China had from time immemorial, claimed suzerainty over Tibet, and urged that pressure should be brought to bear on the ruling powers of the latter country. It was granted that failing a satisfactory issue to these representations, it would become necessary to consider the position from a military point of view; but any proposal to advance far into Tibet was regarded with grave misgivings by the Imperial Government, who were disposed to think that the occupation of the Chumbi Valley would sufficiently convince the Tibetans of the earnestness of our intentions.

The reply of the Tsungli Yamen to the communication from the British Government being of the usual evasive nature, authority was given for the advance of the Mission to Gyantse, as well as occupation of the Chumbi Valley, should a complete rupture of negotiations prove inevitable. On the 23rd September the move of the 23rd Pioneers to Sikkim was sanctioned; and a few days later Colonel J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., R.E., on whom the temporary rank of Brigadier-General was conferred shortly afterwards, was appointed to the charge of the whole line of communication, with command of all troops from Silliguri onwards, except the actual escort to the Mission. In view of a possible advance into Tibet proper, the Government of India drew up in October a scheme prescribing the force\* to be employed. On the 6th November the Imperial Government sanctioned an advance on Gyantse for the enforcement of trading facilities, and directed that the Mission should return from thence when satisfaction had been obtained in this respect.

\* 2 guns, No. 7 Mountain Battery, Maxim gun detachment, 1st Battalion, Norfolk Regiment.  
2—7-pr. R. M. L. guns from Shillong.  
No. 12 Company, 2nd Sappers and Miners.  
No. 3 Company, 1st Sappers and Miners.  
23rd Sikh Pioneers.  
32nd Sikh Pioneers.  
8th Gurkha Rifles  
1 Section, No. 21 British Field Hospital.  
No. 71 Native Field Hospital.  
1 Section, No. 56 Native Field Hospital.  
3 Sections, No. 76 Native Field Hospital.  
From these troops, one Company of Mounted Infantry was formed; a second was added later.

As the Chumbi Valley route had been selected for the general advance, the original Mission escort was withdrawn from Khamba Jong. Precautionary measures were, however, taken to guard against a Tibetan incursion into northern Sikkim, by the location of two Companies at the junction of the Lachung and Lachen branches of the Teesta river.

(a) The first phase of the operations included the occupation of the Chumbi Valley and the period of preparation for the advance to Gyantse; or from 15th October 1903 to 24th March 1904. In December 1903 the enemy had collected a considerable body of troops to watch the Mission at Khamba Jong, and every effort was made to encourage them in the idea that our main advance was to be made from thence. Thus when the Mission withdrew into Sikkim on the 13th December, simultaneously with the main advance into the Chumbi Valley, it appears that a number of the enemy's levies seeing the former movement, and

(a) The following description is extracted almost *verbatim* from General Macdonald's despatch of October 1904.



not having time to hear of the latter, disbanded, and could not be again collected in time to resist our advance up the Chumbi valley. Chumbi was occupied on the 15th December 1903, and a flying column pushed on and secured Phari Jong on 20th December, thus completing our hold on the valley. For urgent political reasons the Mission was installed at Tuna on the 8th January 1904, with sufficient escort to protect them against the 2,000 to 3,000 Tibetans who had by now assembled at Guru. Between the Chumbi Valley and Gyangtse stretched a barren tract of about 100 miles, where not even fuel or fodder could be depended on, and before an advance in force could be made, some 15,000 maunds of supplies had to be collected at Phari. The forwarding of this mass of stores in mid winter, over the lofty passes which separate Sikkim from Chumbi, was one of immense difficulty. The necessary arrangements were completed by the 24th March 1904.

The second phase included the advance to Gyangtse, and the period of preparation for the advance on Lhasa if necessary. For though the actual decision to advance to Lhasa was not arrived at till July, the military preparations for such an eventuality had to be made in advance. This period extended from 25th March to 12th June. On the 29th March the Gyangtse column was concentrated at Tuna. The Tibetans had now about 7,000 men in the field, distributed as follows : 3,000 at Guru guarding the Gyangtse road, 2,000 at Hram, east of the Bamtso lake guarding the Lhasa road, and 2,000 in reserve between Kala Tso and Gyangtse. The first mentioned body commenced active hostilities on the 31st March as we marched to Guru, and were completely defeated. This defeat led to the hasty retirement of the Hram force on Kala Tso. A Company was left at Tuna and the advance to Gyangtse was resumed on the 4th April, the enemy falling back and skirmishing at Samoda and Kangma.

On the 10th April, having received reinforcements from Gyangtse, they stood at the Zamdang gorge and were again decisively beaten. Our escort pushed on, and on the 11th April were before Gyangtse, the fort at which place was surrendered to us next day. The Mission were then located in the village of Chungloo, which was fortified and provisioned, and Lieutenant-Colonel H. R. Brander, 32nd Pioneers, was placed in command of their escort, consisting of 500 Rifles, 50 Mounted Infantry, two seven-pounders and two Maxims with details, and with sufficient transport for a moveable column of 400 men and two guns. The remainder of the force, consisting of 300 rifles, 100 Mounted Infantry and two guns, with all remaining transport, began its return march to Chumbi on 19th April, and dropped *en route* one company at Kangma and another at Kala Tso, where a company had been already left on the way up. Chumbi was reached on 27th April. The weather had been very inclement, with frequent snowstorms.

Meanwhile the Tibetans were again assembling, and Lieutenant-Colonel Brander went out with his moveable column on the 2nd May, and on the 6th completely defeated a gathering of 3,000 men at the Karo la. Another force of 1,600 men, who had assembled at Dongtse, took the opportunity to attack the Mission Post on the early morning of the 5th May, but were beaten off with heavy loss. They, however, occupied and strengthened Gyangtse Jong. Reinforcements of 200 men including half a company of Sappers and two ten-pounder guns were sent to Gyangtse, and Lieutenant-Colonel Brander was

directed not to assault the Jong but to be sufficiently active to keep the enemy's attention concentrated on Gyangtse and off our communications. He carried out his rôle admirably, and by the capture and occupation of a house, afterwards called the Gurkha Post, on the 19th May; the capture and destruction of Tagu on the 20th May; the capture and occupation of Palla on 26th May; and various minor operations, kept the enemy so busy that they only attacked Kangma unsuccessfully on the 7th June, and made one other threat on our communications which by that time had been strengthened.

The third phase of the operations was the advance in force to Gyangtse and thence to Lhasa, during the period from 13th June till 3rd August. As soon as the additional reinforcements\* asked for, arrived in Chumbi, the advance on Gyangtse began, the force moving in two columns. The first column comprised 125 Mounted Infantry, 8 guns, 1,450 infantry, 950 (200-lb) guns, 1 Company, Native Mounted Infantry. Head-Quarters Wing, 1st Royal Fusiliers. 40th Pathans. Section A, 22nd British Field Hospital. Section D, 57th Native Field Hospital. Reserve. 4 Guns, No. 27 Mountain Battery. No. 1 Company, 1st Sappers and Miners. 19th Punjabis. 33rd Punjabis. No. 42, Native Field Hospital. No. 47, Native Field Hospital. Of these reserve troops only the 19th Punjabis, one Section No. 27 Mountain Battery and one Section No. 42 Native Field Hospital were actually sent to the front.

The leading column reached Kangma on the 22nd of June and was there joined by the second column next day. The enemy had by this time collected against us a force of 16,000 men. They had several small cannon, some 30 jingals and wall pieces and 800 breechloaders, while the balance were armed with matchlocks. They were distributed as follows:—At Gyangtse 8,000, at Niani holding the Kangma-Gyangtse road 800; at Niru 15 miles east of Kangma and guarding the Kangma-Ralung road 800; at Gubshi 18 miles east of Gyangtse and guarding the Lhasa road 1,200; at Tsechen, guarding the Gyangtse Shigatse road 1,200; with a support of 2,500 men at Dongtse. All these bodies held strongly fortified positions, and a further force of 1,500 was at or *en route* to the Karo la, which was also fortified. Thus, though the enemy had a great numerical superiority, they were so distributed as to facilitate their being dealt with in detail.

On the 25th June the march on Gyangtse was resumed, and the enemy located in a strong position at Niani where they had been reinforced from Gyangtse. On the 26th June the enemy were driven from Niani after a sharp action in which a portion of Lieutenant-Colonel Brander's force participated, and Gyangtse was reached on the same day. General Macdonald was sent to drive the enemy from their Tsechen position, and so open the fertile Shigatse valley to our foraging parties, an operation which was successfully carried out on the 28th June, with surprisingly little loss, thanks to the thorough co-operation between the Artillery and Infantry.

Their defeat at Tsechen led the enemy's force at Dongtse to hastily retire on Shigatse, while some 2,000 of the enemy also deserted from Gyangtse Jong. General Macdonald had moved his camp to the south bank of the Nyang Chu on the 28th, and commenced a bridge west of the town near an advanced post, which Lieutenant-Colonel Brander had established the same day, with a view to inducing the enemy to believe our main attack on the Jong would come from the north-west. Meanwhile the enemy sent in flags of truce, and futile negotiations followed with the Mission until noon of the 5th July, when active operations were resumed. That afternoon a strong demonstration was made against the north-west face of the enemy's defences, to confirm them in the idea that this was the direction of our main attack. At midnight the troops intended for the

real attack on the south-east side of the Jong, moved silently off and were in their allotted position at 3-30 A.M. on the 6th July. The enemy had been misled by the demonstration the previous day, and when these three assaulting columns advanced against the town at 4 A.M., they effected an entrance with comparative ease, and had so strongly established themselves by the time the enemy could draw men from their north-west defences, that the enemy's persistent efforts to dislodge them were completely frustrated.

Late in the afternoon, the south-west curtain of the Jong was breached, and the Jong carried by assault by Gurkhas and Fusiliers, supported by a concentrated fire of every gun and maxim. Though the Monastery and greater part of the town were still in their hands, the enemy fled during the night mostly towards Shigatse, and their force at Gobshi retired hastily on the Karo la.

A flying column despatched down the Shigatse valley for supplies, found both Dongtse and Penam Jongs evacuated, and returned to Gyantse with large stores of grain and meal. An advance on Lhasa was now imperative, and on the 14th July the Lhasa column consisting of 200 Mounted Infantry, 1,900 Infantry and Sappers, 8 guns and 6 Maxims with 2,000 followers and 3,900 animals, carrying 23 days' rations, marched out. A Garrison of 8 companies Infantry, 50 Mounted Infantry and four guns was left to hold Gyantse. On the 16th after marching in daily rain, the Lhasa column reached Ralung and ascertained that the Karo la (16,600 feet) was strongly fortified and held.

On the 18th July the Karo la was forced after comparatively slight resistance, the bulk of the enemy having fled during the night. Next day Nangartse Jong was occupied without resistance, and some loss was inflicted on the retiring enemy. Pete Jong was occupied on the 21st without resistance. On the 24th July we crossed the Khamba la pass (16,400 feet), and reached the Sangpo (Brahmaputra), the mounted troops having that morning seized both ferries. On the 25th July we reached Chaksam ferry, and the same day passed over the river a company of Mounted Infantry and 7 companies of Infantry. As the guns could effectively command the north bank of the river, our position was quite secure. The passage was completed on the morning of the 31st July, and the same day the advance on Lhasa was resumed. The enemy had fortified several positions between Chaksam and Lhasa, but abandoned all of them as we approached, and the force encamped before Lhasa on the 3rd August, having encountered no resistance since the skirmish at Nangartse on the 19th July.

Posts had been established at Ralung, Negartse, Pete Jong, Chaksam ferry and Trilung bridge, and the garrisons of those, together with convoy escorts, absorbed 70 Mounted men and 400 Infantry. As about 50 sick had also been left at posts between Gyantse and Lhasa, the effective strength at Lhasa was reduced to 130 Mounted Infantry, 8 guns, 1,450 Infantry and Sappers and six maxims.

The fourth and last phase of the operations included the occupation of Lhasa and the withdrawal of the troops after the conclusion of the Treaty, and extended from the 4th August till the close of the operations.

The Lhasa valley is extensively cultivated, but does not produce sufficient for the requirements of Lhasa and its monasteries, and the crops were not yet ripe, so that the food question soon became critical. The Amban and the Tibetan authorities promised supplies, but all the effects of the Mission to persuade



them to act up to their promises proved of no avail, and on the 5th August the troops had only  $1\frac{1}{2}$  days' rations in hand. A convoy from Gyangtse could not be expected before the 29th at earliest, so strong measures were taken, and on the 8th August we moved out with 900 rifles and 6 guns against the Debung Monastery which was said to contain 9,000 monks and have ample granaries.

It was not until the guns were in position and infantry had been ordered to advance, that they agreed to General Macdonald's demands. Next day a requisition for a smaller amount was made on the Sera monastery. The demonstration against Debung also stimulated the Lhasa authorities, and induced them to bring in satisfactory supplies daily. On the 13th August one of our reconnoitring parties surprised a camp of Tibetans and made 64 prisoners; again on the 18th August a reconnaissance up the Kyichu valley effected the dislodgement of 600 soldiers from the arsenal. The activity of these reconnoitring parties induced the Tibetan troops to withdraw 20 to 30 miles from the capital and reduced the tension. By the 1st September the situation had so far improved that the troops were allowed to pay daily visits to Lhasa City and Bazar, and on the 7th September the Treaty was signed in the Pota La; small bodies of men selected from units composing the Lhasa Column were present at the interesting ceremony as a Guard of Honour.

In consultation with Colonel Younghusband it was decided that the force should withdraw on the 23rd September. By this time the posts between Lhasa and Gyangtse had been stocked with two or three days' supplies for the column, and on the 9th September the Sappers, with one company of infantry, the Brigade coolies and five days' supplies for the force to Chaksam, left Lhasa to arrange for the passage of the Sangpo. The upper crossing, Parti, was found the more suitable, and three ferries were extemporised.

On the 23rd the force marched from Lhasa in one column. On the 27th Parti ferry was reached, and so excellent were the arrangements of the engineers, that the whole force was passed over by 2 P.M. on the 29th. The force marched from Parti to Gyangtse in two columns, leaving the former place on the 29th and 30th September, and arriving at Gyangtse on the 5th and 6th October, respectively.

In all the escort had 16 engagements and skirmishes in which they sustained loss. The total war casualties amounted to 202, including 23 British officers of whom five were killed. The operations had to be carried out in the face of exceptional natural and climatic difficulties. The theatre of operations was on the whole singularly barren and sterile, the only comparatively fertile districts being the Chumbi Valley, the Gyangtse-Shigatse Valley, the Sangpo Valley near Chaksam and the Lhasa district. The operations had to be carried out at an average altitude of 14,000 feet, while the troops had more than once to fight at altitudes of 17,000 to 18,000 feet. Four lofty ranges had to be surmounted by passes of 14,200, 15,200, 16,600 and 16,400 feet, respectively, and the first two of these had to be regularly traversed during the winter, when gales, snow and 50 degrees of frost were not unusual.

Moreover the escort had to traverse two stretches of country, each nearly 100 miles, when not only food for the men, but grain, fodder and even fuel had to be transported in whole and part. To these difficulties must be added the passage of the Sangpo, a rapid and dangerous river.

## APPENDIX.

*List of illustrative documents collected in Part III.*

Appendix No.	Number and date of paper.	Subject.	Page of summary on which paper is quoted.
1	Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 1-Secret, dated 28th January 1898.	Disturbances on the North-West Frontier of India	9;62
2	Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 208, dated 26th October 1899 (Foreign Department).	Military position on the North-West Frontier. Substitution of Levies Rifles and Militia Corps for regular troops on the Samana in Kurram, the Tochi valley, Wana and adjacent parts of the frontier.	10;54;65;75
3	Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 3-Political, dated 4th January 1900.	Above arrangements sanctioned ... ..	10;59
4	Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 84, dated 4th May 1899.	Future strength and location of the garrison to be maintained in Chitral. Entertainment of Chitrali Levies for holding minor posts.	47
5	Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 106, dated 7th July 1898.	Details of the proposed military arrangements for the future holding of the Khyber.	49
6	Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 81, dated 4th May 1899.	Revised proposals in regard to the defensive works required for holding the Khyber Pass.	51
7	Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 141 (Foreign Department), dated 20th July 1899.	Proposed construction of railways to the Durand frontier by the Khyber Pass and by the Kabul river and the proposed extension of the standard gauge from Peshawar to Jamrud.	51
8	Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 122-Secret, dated 4th August 1898.	General proposals regarding the future military arrangements on the Kohat and Miranzai Border, in the Tochi valley, and at Wana and the adjacent portion of the frontier.	9;62;71
9	Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 37-Secret, dated 25th November 1898.	Request for a reconsideration of the above proposals.	62;71
10	Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 82, dated 7th June 1900.	Proposed construction of a light railway from Kohat to Thal in preference to the formation of a cantonment at Torawari.	56
11	Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 47, dated 31st March 1904.	Scheme for the redistribution of the Army in India.	80
12	Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 138, dated 29th September 1904.	Views of the Government of India in connection with the above scheme.	16;82
13	Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 148, dated 18th November 1904.	Views on the above scheme ... ..	18;81;84
14	.....	Progress report, dated 12th October 1905, showing the deficiencies in the Indian Field Army.	81
15	Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 58, dated 26th April 1900.	Views of the Government of India concerning the Military defence of India.	19;81;90
16	Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 140, dated 30th July 1903.	Proposed maintenance in South Africa of a force sufficient to furnish reinforcements to India on an emergency.	19;92
17	Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 12, dated 4th March 1904.	Necessity for reinforcements to India ... ..	92
18	Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 6, dated 29th January 1904.	Proportion of British to Native troops in India ...	93

Appendix No.	Number and date of paper.	Subject.	Page of summary on which paper is quoted.
19	Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 52, dated 28th April 1904.	Proportion of British to Native troops in India ...	93
20	Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 83, dated 13th June 1901.	Effect of the operations on the North-West Frontier during 1897-98 on the physique of the short service soldier in India, and question of the waste of war as affected by the age of the men engaged in the campaign.	94
21	Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 180, dated 15th September 1904.	Representation on the subject of the despatch to India during trooping season of 1904-05 of men serving on a three-year engagement who have not extended their service.	95
22	Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 55, dated 30th March 1899.	Proposal to form local regiments from the Eurasian community.	96
23	Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 6 Military, dated 18th January 1900.	The above proposal negatived ... ..	96
24	Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 211, dated 5th November 1903.	Proposed increase of the Native Army Reserve to 50,000 men.	97
25	Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 103, dated 19th July 1900.	Grant of Commissions in Her Majesty's Service to Natives of India.	99
26	Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 53-Military, dated 5th May 1905.	Admiralty proposals in connection with the subsidised vessels of the East Indies Squadron.	106
27	Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 5, dated 10th August 1905.	Opinion of the Government of India on the above proposal.	24;106
28	Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 218, dated 30th October 1902.	Proposals for the revision of armament and for the improvement of the coast and frontier defences of India.	108
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